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Chapter 1
Breaking through the crisis with decentralisation? 
Collective bargaining in the EU aft er the great recession
Roberto Pedersini and Salvo Leonardi
1. Setting the scene
The debate about industrial relations developments in Europe in recent years has 
focused on the multiple impact of the crisis (¿ nancial, economic and ¿ scal) and of 
policy and regulatory reforms promoted by European economic governance, the so-
called Troika, and national governments (Marginson 2014; Marginson and Welz 
2014; Papadakis and Ghellab 2014; Schulten and Müller 2015; Koukiadaki et al. 2016; 
Guardiancich and Molina 2017). Against this background, the diɣ erent developments 
that have characterised national industrial relations systems entail a number of tasks, 
not only at the academic level, but also at the operational or practical level. First of 
all, it is important to improve our knowledge of the diɣ erent national trajectories 
and analyse evidence in a comparative perspective. There is remarkable potential 
here for cross-national fertilisation and strategic learning; these are key components 
of both scholarship and social partner initiatives in labour relations. Secondly, such 
knowledge and analyses can contribute to strengthen forms and tools of cooperation 
and coordination at European level, which trade unions at both national and European 
level have been promoting for many years.
In order to pursue these objectives, a number of trade union–related research institutes 
and academic departments initiated the DECOBA project, funded by the European 
Commission. The DECOBA project, in particular, aims to:
– analyse the ongoing shift from centrally coordinated multi-employer collective 
bargaining to decentralised negotiations in a number of EU Member States where 
the former has traditionally been strong (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Spain); 
– tackle the issue of how company-level bargaining can, in a changing environment, 
play a new, useful role in establishing working conditions, without paving the way 
for social dumping and wider inequalities;
– promote greater expertise and awareness, especially among the social partners, 
about such crucial developments and issues.
In previous studies, some of the DECOBA partners have stigmatised the negative 
implications of mainstream economic theory that regards wages as merely a cost factor 
and its policy implications in terms of adjustment and internal devaluation, which are 
part of ‘the strange triumph of failed ideas’, as Paul Krugman puts it (2010; see also 
Lehndorɣ  2012, 2015). In a number of other European studies (CAWIE, GOCOBA), a 
diɣ erent view and narrative was put forward, arguing that the competitiveness crisis 
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in countries such as the southern European Member States was not due to high wage 
levels and labour market ‘rigidities’, but to elements of non-price competitiveness (¿ rm 
size, infrastructure, shadow economy, ¿ nancial speculation). Alternative strategies 
were identi¿ ed, aiming at inclusive and wage-driven growth, based on the assumption 
that ‘Europe needs an inclusive growth strategy that focuses on reducing inequality 
and enhancing real income growth … Restoring and supporting collective bargaining 
on wages is de¿ ned as a key factor in this strategy’ (Van Gyes and Schulten 2015: 409). 
Wage increases should be welcomed in order to support private demand and wage-led 
growth, which is still by far the most important macroeconomic factor in most euro-
zone countries (Onaran and Obst 2016).
The DECOBA project was launched to update these analyses with new facts and 
developments in the early post-crisis phase and it goes beyond a merely descriptive 
approach. From this point of view, our key issue is to verify the conditions under 
which European industrial relations are entering the post-austerity phase, now that 
European and international institutions have given signals of a new era by recognising 
the shortcomings and failures of the austerity approach. The OECD and the IMF have 
reconsidered the eɣ ectiveness of austerity policies and have rede¿ ned their analyses 
with much more attention to (in)equality, the growth potential of wages and the bene¿ ts 
of coordinated bargaining (OECD 2012; IMF 2016). In a similar vein, the Juncker 
Commission has proposed the ‘European Pillar of Social Rights’, while ECB President 
Draghi admitted the importance of countering underemployment and increasing wages 
for boosting consumption and GDP, echoing some of the main points of the ETUC 
campaign for a ‘pay rise’ all over Europe.
What is the current state of industrial relations in the European Union, after what has 
been described as a ‘frontal assault on multi-employer bargaining’ (Marginson 2014)? 
Were multi-employer collective bargaining institutions indeed compromised or are they 
still solid? Which processes were initiated during the crisis and the adjustment phase 
and which trajectories can we identify for the future? Can the new policy climate ¿ nd 
fertile ground for con¿ rming industrial relations as a key component of the European 
model?
In order to respond to these questions, we focus on the transformations of recent 
years, notably in 2012–2017. But we broaden our perspective to include, on one side, 
the trajectories that the countries under review were following before the crisis and to 
assess, on the other, the eɣ ects of institutional change on industrial relations processes 
and outcomes. In this sense, we consider not only the revision of rules, but also the 
impact of reforms on practice, which crucially depends on the responses and strategies 
developed by social partners, in a changing economic and institutional environment. 
Domestic elements and especially the agency of national actors have in fact remained 
relatively unexplored. Here, we want to analyse both the external and internal drivers of 
adjustments in industrial relations and highlight the role played by the diɣ erent actors, 
namely national governments, trade unions and employers’ associations.
By taking advantage of the longer span of time, we can obtain new insights about 
current developments in collective bargaining and industrial relations. Of course, 
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we are analysing an ongoing process and it is diɤ  cult to extrapolate future trends. 
However, we can better focus on the state of play and emerging patterns. Moreover, we 
believe that the inclusion of agency adds substantially to the explanatory power of the 
analytical framework and provides a better understanding of what might be inÀ uencing 
the prospects of national industrial relations systems, in a combination of continuity 
and change.
In this general picture, economic and institutional (regulatory) factors are strictly 
intertwined and it is often diɤ  cult to identify their respective roles. The ¿ nancial 
crisis led to pervasive liquidity problems, a credit crunch and increased bankruptcies; 
the economic crisis involved declining demand, widespread reorganisation and 
restructuring processes, as well as rising unemployment; and the ¿ scal crisis hardened 
public budget constraints and, besides inducing a retrenchment of public expenditure, 
often led to public sector job and wage cuts.
Policy and regulatory reforms were often intended to respond to the challenges posed 
by the manifold crisis, which clearly did not hit all EU countries in the same way. 
External pressures exerted by European Economic Governance and the Troika had 
quite diɣ erent degrees of force and involved distinct tools and implications for the target 
countries, basically depending on the presence and severity of imbalances and their 
contingent situations. Indeed, if the incisiveness of external intervention has sometimes 
been very important, this was basically in response to internal problems. Whereas the 
speci¿ c recipes and recommendations can be criticised for their social impacts and 
ineɣ ectiveness, and possibly better measures could be adopted, the relevance of the 
problems they wanted to address – public debt crisis or bailouts in the ¿ nancial sector 
– must be acknowledged.
In sum, the basic descriptive question we want to address is whether, during the period 
under analysis, there was a change in collective bargaining structures. More precisely, 
we want to assess whether the crisis can be regarded as a turning or a break point, 
whereby national industrial relations systems have been diverted from their previous 
trajectory to follow a new path, or at least existing trends have been accelerated to the 
extent that the fundamental features of collective bargaining structures have eɣ ectively 
changed. From the analytical point of view, we want to identify the main drivers that can 
explain the pattern we observe, be it continuity or change. In this respect, as mentioned 
above, the main variables we use are economic conditions, public ¿ nances, external 
policy pressures and domestic agency in the political, economic and industrial relations 
domains – that is, what governments, enterprises and social partners did to tackle the 
crisis itself or the growing external pressures.
Our analysis is based on ¿ ve in-depth cases presented in the following chapters. They 
cover a fairly diverse set of industrial relations systems, as well as diɣ erent situations, as 
far as the other variables under consideration are concerned. The case studies provide up-
to-date and extensive information on industrial relations developments in the economy 
as a whole and in two distinct sectors: metalworking and retail trade. Examining this 
large evidence base allows us to respond to the ¿ rst descriptive question, whereas 
for the explanation of the diɣ erences across countries, we propose an interpretative 
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framework. The use of a case-study analysis provides some important insights into 
the processes shaping change in collective bargaining and industrial relations, but 
the complex web of causation and correlation needs to be further explored. However, 
it would be diɤ  cult to study transformations of a mostly qualitative nature by using 
other methods, considering that proper quantitative data on these phenomena (that is 
consisting of ‘measures’ rather than ‘scores’) are often missing.
Despite important diɣ erences, all the national industrial systems covered by this study 
share two basic features, which make them particularly relevant for our investigation of 
the transformation of the collective bargaining structure:
(i)  the traditional pivotal role of sectoral bargaining;
(ii)  the multi-tier bargaining system, which includes second-level negotiations, mostly 
at company level (with the peculiarities of the German case concerning the role 
of works councils, see below), but to a certain extent at territorial level too. More 
variation exists in terms of the extent and relevance of inter-sectoral bargaining, 
but, with the exception of Germany, this level plays a signi¿ cant role everywhere.
By looking at changes in these characteristics, we can see whether the balance point 
of collective bargaining is moving downward and whether multi-employer bargaining 
remains the most important steering factor in the system overall.
2.  Deﬁ nition of variables
Analysing bargaining structures is a complex exercise, especially in multi-tier systems. 
While it can be relatively simple to identify the most important bargaining level, 
assessing the relative importance of other levels may not be so straightforward. This 
implies not only the consideration of rules on prerogatives, priorities and coordination 
across diɣ erent levels, but also of the eɣ ective relevance of the provisions de¿ ned at 
the various levels. This involves both a qualitative assessment of the importance of the 
diɣ erent levels (by looking, for instance, at the scope of the various agreements) and a 
quantitative analysis, which can focus on the relative coverage of the distinct levels. The 
latter consideration points to a more fundamental issue: if we concentrate on collective 
bargaining institutions, we may overlook the shrinking of collective bargaining coverage 
overall. If ‘disorganised decentralisation’ brings the collective bargaining system closer 
to market regulation, the reduction in the coverage of collective bargaining – which we 
may call ‘decollectivisation’ – goes even more clearly in the same direction.
Therefore, in order to analyse the state and transformations of collective bargaining, we 
will look at the following features:
– the coordination of collective bargaining by assessing the degree of vertical 
coordination (organised/disorganised bargaining) and horizontal coordination 
(unitary/segmented bargaining) and by establishing whether coordination is 
the result of internal processes governed by the bargaining parties or of external 
intervention by the state and government (autonomous/dependent coordination);
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– the coverage of collective bargaining (high/low) provides an indication of the 
eɣ ectiveness of collective regulation of employment relations at various levels;
– the quality of collective bargaining (core/framework/implementation provisions) is 
related to its incisiveness in determining actual employment and working conditions 
by both central/sectoral and decentralised agreements.
To some extent, these dimensions may be considered a selection of the classic variables 
proposed by Hugh Clegg in Trade Unionism under Collective Bargaining (1976). 
Clegg spoke of the extent of collective bargaining, as the proportion of employees 
covered by agreements, and of the degree of control and the scope of bargaining, as 
the capacity, respectively, to set and enforce obligatory standards and to regulate a 
broad range of aspects (Clegg 1976: 8–9). As we are focusing on multi-tier bargaining 
systems, some adaptations are needed, because the issues of vertical coordination and 
of the quantitative and qualitative relevance of the diɣ erent negotiation levels become 
particularly important.
2.1 Bargaining structure and coordination
Coordination is often regarded as the key feature of the collective bargaining 
structure. It has replaced the role that centralisation formerly played in the analysis 
of neocorporatism in the 1970s and 1980s, in order to take into consideration 
both the reality of multi-tier bargaining systems and the growing importance of 
decentralised bargaining (Traxler 1995; Traxler et al. 1997). For our purposes, it is 
important to distinguish between diɣ erent kinds of coordination mechanism, which 
impinge on diɣ erent characteristics of the bargaining system. First, we can identify 
vertical coordination between bargaining levels, so that the relative prerogatives and 
competencies of the various points of negotiation are clearly established in order to 
reduce the scope for overlap and replications. Second, horizontal coordination across 
bargaining units ensures an even development in the main elements of negotiation, such 
as wages or the bargaining structure itself, and can promote the diɣ usion of the results 
achieved in certain areas to other segments of the economy. Third, we can distinguish 
between internal and external coordination, since coordination can be the result of 
rules or practices autonomously produced by the social partners or it can derive from 
constraints imposed and provisions enacted by the political authorities. These diɣ erent 
forms of coordination can be linked to three important features of collective bargaining 
systems: whether it involves organised or disorganised decentralisation within a multi-
employer bargaining framework; whether the bargaining system is unitary (inclusive) 
or segmented; and whether it is autonomous or dependent on state intervention.
Due to the variety of market situations and organisational patterns across diɣ erent 
sectors, it is essential to limit the focus of horizontal coordination to wage developments, 
on one side, and the rules governing bargaining itself, on the other. Although 
traditionally only wage-setting is considered in this kind of analysis (Visser 2013), 
the inclusion of this second element allows us to check for the existence of multiple 
bargaining structures within a single economy, instead of assuming that each country 
embraces a unitary system. A further element of horizontal segmentation may be linked 
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to the proliferation of ¿ rst-level (typically sectoral) bargaining units, usually due to the 
establishment of new employer associations for existing or emerging sectors. If the 
new bargaining units adopt the prevalent bargaining structure and are covered by the 
existing peak-level organisations, the impact on horizontal coordination may be trivial. 
By contrast, if they create separate bargaining systems, then horizontal coordination 
may be jeopardised. Turning to vertical coordination, it is useful to broaden our attention 
to include at least the main conditions of employment, such as wages, working time and 
work organisation, in order to better grasp the relations between and relative scope 
of the various bargaining levels. In fact, in many cases, the scope of wage À exibility at 
lower bargaining levels can be limited, especially downwards, whereas other important 
elements of employment can be broadly determined through decentralised agreements.
There are a number of connections between types of coordination and the means and 
processes by which it can be achieved (Traxler et al. 2001; Traxler 2003; Traxler and 
Brandl 2012; Visser 2013: 54–61). For instance, the introduction of binding statutory 
wage ceilings and À oors promotes horizontal coordination and imply a lower level of 
autonomy on the part of the bargaining system; the presence of pattern bargaining 
essentially promotes horizontal coordination between bargaining units. However, the 
introduction of statutory or collectively agreed rules can ensure both horizontal and 
vertical coordination: a national wage norm steers pay rises across sectors, whereas 
the favourability principle aɣ ects relations between bargaining levels. Similarly, 
organisational action by the unions and/or the employers can contribute to coordination 
across bargaining units and between bargaining levels.
Table 1 presents the main coordination patterns, reÀ ecting horizontal and vertical 
coordination. Centralised bargaining systems, by de¿ nition, involve high scores on 
both dimensions, essentially because the exclusivity or even merely the prevalence of 
one encompassing central bargaining level resolves the issue of coordination. Where 
sectoral bargaining prevails and company or local agreements are possible, as in 
the national cases under investigation here, it is no longer possible to disregard the 
coordination problem.
Table 1 Main coordination patterns
Horizontal coordination
High Low
Vertical 
coordination
High
Organised 
bargaining
Segmented 
bargaining
Low
Decentralised 
bargaining
Disorganised 
bargaining
Source: Authors’ design.
In such a situation, the bargaining structure can replicate the ‘coherence’ automatically 
enforced by centralised systems only if it can ensure high horizontal and vertical 
coordination. This is the case of organised bargaining, with regard to which centralisation 
is only one possibility. The opposite condition of symmetrically low coordination on 
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both dimensions identi¿ es disorganised bargaining, thereby reproducing the basic 
distinction between organised and disorganised decentralisation introduced by Traxler 
(1995). However, our scheme takes into consideration two intermediate positions: 
segmented bargaining between vertically organised separate bargaining units and 
decentralised bargaining, which enhances the autonomy of second-level agreements, 
but maintains overall horizontal coordination across the whole economy. Although, at 
¿ rst sight, this may seem an implausible combination, it could depict a radical shift to 
company-level bargaining, coupled with the implementation of a legally enforced wage 
norm. Moreover, it is important to recall that we are now looking only at the institutional 
features of the bargaining system; we will discuss its eɣ ectiveness in the section on 
coverage. This means that decentralised bargaining without signi¿ cant coverage of 
decentralised agreements could well amount to the demise of the bargaining system 
altogether.
The factors that can inÀ uence horizontal coordination include the presence of an 
intersectoral bargaining level, the force and role of peak organisations on both sides 
of industry; the practice of pattern bargaining; and legal provisions that enforce 
wage À oors and wage ceilings or wage norms. Similarly, vertical coordination can 
be promoted by prerogatives and priorities established in both collective agreements 
(as in the opening-clause system in Germany) and legislation (for instance, by de¿ ning 
a favourability principle, which ensures that decentralised deals can only improve 
on conditions established in higher levels, as in the case of Belgium). Typically, legal 
provisions inÀ uencing the degree of horizontal coordination help to enhance it by 
implementing general standards in terms of wage developments or other working 
conditions. On the contrary, the eɣ ect on vertical coordination critically depends on the 
content of the norms, which may support both organised and disorganised bargaining 
systems.
We now turn to our national cases and identify their speci¿ c features as regards 
bargaining coordination. Despite their common features – that is, the pivotal role of 
sectoral bargaining and the presence of diɣ erent bargaining levels – their collective 
bargaining institutions diɣ er substantially and the changes introduced in recent years 
point to diɣ erent trajectories. Detailed descriptions of national bargaining systems and 
their recent reforms can be found in the individual chapters in this volume. Here, we 
provide a brief overview and interpretation, in accordance with the analytical framework 
presented in this chapter.
Belgium is usually described as a highly institutionalised and centralised system. Some 
of its basic features are con¿ rmed by the current analysis. However, the emerging picture 
is slightly more diversi¿ ed. Horizontal coordination is ensured by both legislative 
provisions, notably the introduction of a statutory ceiling for wage increases in order to 
maintain competitiveness (already in 1996), and by the indexation mechanisms, which 
are universally present in collective agreements, although they operate according to two 
distinct mechanisms in the diɣ erent sectors (see the chapter on Belgium for details). A 
further element of coordination derives from intersectoral bargaining, which determines 
the norm of wage increases across the economy, which is supposed to be added to the 
indexation factor. In terms of vertical coordination, a strict favourability principle 
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applies, so that decentralised bargaining can only enhance economic and normative 
provisions, as well as protections. Some limited variation in the structure of collective 
bargaining can be found across sectors, essentially concerning the relative importance 
of sectoral agreements as opposed to company bargaining. In certain industries, sectoral 
bargaining tends to determine only a general framework, whereas the most important 
provisions are set at company level. This happens for instance in the chemical and 
banking sectors, while in steel and paper company agreements are prevalent, due to the 
presence of a small number of very large enterprises. Such variance, however, remains 
in the collective bargaining system, legally regulated at central level since 1968.
A number of changes have aɣ ected the Belgian collective bargaining structure in 
recent years – including an increase in the importance of regional social dialogue – 
especially with regard to policymaking. However, focusing on the bargaining system 
in the private sector, the most important changes concern the government’s renewed 
activism, imposing wage moderation by enacting strict statutory wage norms. Such 
interventions in 2011–2016 did not aɣ ect the established bargaining structure, which 
remained organised, but have reduced bargaining autonomy. This state of aɣ airs 
was institutionalised with a reform of the wage-setting system in March 2017, which 
reduces social partners’ autonomy and increases government inÀ uence (see the chapter 
on Belgium). Interestingly, the autonomy that the social partners have lost at the 
intersectoral level has been reinstated at the decentralised level. In order to recover at 
least partly the leeway they lost at central level, the social partners have enhanced the 
role of decentralised negotiations, thereby stressing the potential of decentralisation 
in a system that remains protected by a fairly strict favourability principle. Referring 
to the distinction between opening clauses, which empower decentralised bargaining, 
and opt-out clauses, which enable derogations (Marginson and Welz 2014:, 8), we can 
say that the Belgian example seems to point to a proactive response by social partners. 
They were able to preserve their autonomy in ways that correspond to the government 
objective of promoting the diɣ usion of gain-sharing at company level. In sum, we can 
say that nowadays Belgium has a system of organised bargaining with less social partner 
autonomy in wage setting at central level, but potentially more scope for supplementary 
decentralised bargaining.
France has a similarly highly institutionalised system, whose main governing factor is 
national legislation. The presence of extensive regulations on mandatory negotiations 
at national and decentralised level since the 1982 Auroux laws; widespread use of the 
extension of multi-employer agreements; regulation of representativeness; provisions 
on workplace representation structures; and the presence of a legal minimum wage 
contribute to de¿ ne a framework strongly inÀ uenced by government action. Such 
characterisation is further strengthened by the provisions on mandatory social dialogue 
at national level, enacted in 2007 under Jacques Chirac and reinforced later under 
both Sarkozy and Hollande, as well as by the traditional role played by a statutory 
favourability principle. The lack of intersectoral wage bargaining and of an economy-
wide wage norm indicate that horizontal coordination may be less eɣ ectively ensured in 
France than in Belgium. However, the role played by the minimum legal wage (SMIC) 
can be regarded as similar. We therefore consider France to be a second example of 
organised bargaining.
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Recent reforms have not aɣ ected horizontal coordination nor the general 
institutionalisation of industrial relations. Rather, they have focused on vertical 
coordination and have tried to increase decentralised bargaining autonomy by loosening 
the favourability principle in certain areas. The most recent ordonnances signed by 
President Macron on 22 September 2017 continued along these lines by identifying a 
limited set of issues – for instance, minimum wage rates, job classi¿ cation systems, 
equality between women and men, training – which are reserved for sectoral agreements 
and to which the favourability principle will continue to apply, and a second group of 
topics which sectoral agreements may decide to exclude from possible derogations at 
decentralised level. On all other issues, decentralised agreements can now introduce 
provisions that are independent and potentially derogate from existing sectoral rules. 
Certainly, to achieve this result a majority company-level agreement is needed, because 
with no agreement the sectoral deal remains in force. However, especially if a company 
runs into economic diɤ  culties or is under threat of delocalisation, the new institutional 
setting seems to provide grounds for more concession bargaining. In SMEs, in 
particular, where no trade union is present, the agreement may now be concluded by 
elected employees who are not mandated/appointed by unions and in micro ¿ rms the 
employer initiatives may be sanctioned by an employer-initiated employee referendum. 
In larger enterprises, the employer continues to need the unions’ agreement and this 
may provide some leverage for their demands, too. The general trend in rules seems 
therefore to be moving France towards decentralised bargaining, in which horizontal 
coordination will remain mostly dependent on the SMIC. Beyond the new rules, vertical 
coordination will rest mainly upon trade union strength at decentralised level, based on 
the broad entitlements assigned by legislation, the mandatory nature of negotiations 
and the presence of a now unitary employee representation structure in which they are 
predominant. However, it is worth mentioning that such developments may weaken 
the overall relevance of multi-employer bargaining, which would critically depend on 
the continuity of the extension of sectoral bargaining. Otherwise, the risk of moving to 
single-employer bargaining may soon emerge.
Germany has long been regarded as the exemplary case of coordinated bargaining. 
In this traditional picture, on one hand, horizontal coordination is ensured by pattern 
bargaining, often led by the strong metalworking union IG Metall. On the other hand, 
vertical coordination is supported by granting exclusive bargaining rights to trade 
unions, which operate mainly at sectoral level. In workplaces, the codetermination 
rights entrusted to works councils represent an important balance for management 
prerogatives in employment-relevant issues. Works councils and management can 
conclude so-called works agreements, which de facto represent a second bargaining 
level, although they are not seen as collective agreements in the strict sense, as 
they can only supplement sectoral collective agreements and have to comply with 
the favourability principle. Trade unions are not formally involved, although they 
eɣ ectively play a substantial part in works councils, since many councillors are in fact 
trade unionists, especially in larger companies. Legislation on employee representation 
in the supervisory boards of large companies contributes to de¿ ne an overall picture 
of worker participation and provides further leverage for coordination in a broader 
sense. The inclusion of opening clauses in sectoral agreements, which started as early 
as the 1960s, con¿ rms the capacity of the industrial relations system to combine some 
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degree of decentralisation with continued control by industry-wide agreements. In fact, 
the opening-clause system gained momentum in the 1980s–1990s and soon became a 
reference for organised decentralisation.
The analysis presented in this volume points to a signi¿ cantly diɣ erent state of 
industrial relations in 2017. In terms of horizontal coordination, pattern bargaining 
probably plays a less prominent role than in the past. In fact, it may well have lost its 
pivotal position in the German industrial relations system. A possible new candidate 
for horizontal coordination might be the legal minimum wage introduced as recently 
as January 2015. However, it remains to be seen to what extent the development of the 
minimum wage will inÀ uence collective bargaining. So far, it only has inÀ uence on a 
few collective agreements in low pay sectors. By contrast, minimum wage adjustment 
largely follows the development of collectively agreed wages. In fact, the Minimum 
Wage Commission, which is made up of employers and trade union representatives, 
in preparing its biennial recommendations on adjustment to the minimum wage level, 
is also supposed to consider developments in collectively agreed wages (Amlinger et
al. 2016). But if coordination now rests at least partly on the legal minimum wage, the 
nature of coordination has somehow changed. While pattern bargaining could play 
a progressive role in speci¿ c bargaining rounds, the legal minimum wage essentially 
provides for rather modest protection and ensures – by de¿ nition – minimum pay 
development.
Turning to vertical coordination, the expansion and recon¿ guration of the opening-
clause system in recent years has, on one side, reduced its original exceptional nature 
and, on the other side, con¿ rmed a fairly developed management procedure that 
ensures trade union inÀ uence on the process overall. For instance, in the case of the 
metalworking sector, the Pforzheim Agreement of 2004 introduced a general opening 
clause, but, at the same time, it enabled the institutionalisation and regulation of 
the derogation procedure, thereby resolving the problem of earlier disorganised 
decentralisation. As a consequence of such a regulatory setting, with some sectoral 
speci¿ cities (see the German chapter for a comparison between the metalworking, 
chemicals and retail sectors), the once quite separate roles of trade unions and works 
councils have somehow become closer, since the implementation of opening clauses 
involves the two actors in the same processes with shared responsibilities. Overall, it is 
possible to con¿ rm the institutional framework as supporting bargaining coordination, 
at least in manufacturing. However, there is a growing role of legal intervention due 
to the decline of collective bargaining coverage, which was not the case in the past. 
Indeed, the reinforced possibility to extend sectoral collective agreements introduced 
by legislation (Schulten 2018), as well as the legal minimum wage signal somewhat 
less autonomy on the part of the industrial relations system, while promoting a re-
strengthening of the bargaining system and its coordination capacities, as traditional 
supportive measures used to do.
Until the 1990s, Italy was, alongside the United Kingdom and the Nordic countries, 
a typical case of voluntarism, with a minor role for statutory regulations, apart from 
a number of important provisions promoting trade union action established by the 
Workers’ Statute of May 1970. Similarly to the German case, horizontal coordination 
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was promoted by the leading role played by the metalworking sector through pattern 
bargaining and, at certain junctures, by public employers in the large segment of 
state-owned enterprises, which was also important in the French case. The relevance 
of the major trade union confederations (CGIL, CISL and UIL) and employers’ peak 
association (Con¿ ndustria) provided an encompassing framework for industrial 
relations, which helped diɣ use practices across sectors. Moreover, the presence 
of an indexation mechanism, designed in a way that had a strong equalising impact 
on wage diɣ erentials in the high-inÀ ation years of the early 1980s, represented an 
important factor in economy-wide wage coordination. There were no strong or legal 
rules for vertical coordination, but the clear predominant role played by the industry-
wide agreements, as well as the union capacity to extend their action to workplaces 
signi¿ cantly reduced the autonomy of decentralised bargaining, whereas it allowed 
forms of micro-concertation (Regini 1995). 
The institutional picture changed in the early 1990s as new rules for horizontal and 
vertical coordination were enacted. In the ¿ rst direction, the monetary policy tool of 
planned inÀ ation was the key income-policy indicator and provided the yardstick for 
wage increases in all sectors, with the objective of preserving the purchasing power of 
pay. In the other direction, the second level of negotiation specialised in gain sharing, 
so that duplication of norms was ruled out and a speci¿ c prerogative on performance-
related pay was recognised with regard to decentralised deals. Consequently, Italy 
entered the 1990s with an organised bargaining system, which put it alongside Germany 
and other continental European countries (Pedersini 2014).
A series of intersectoral agreements after 2009 introduced some adjustments, but 
did not modify the basic features of the system. Forecast inÀ ation has become the 
main reference for periodic wage increases at the sectoral level (in some cases, the 
reference is ex-post inÀ ation, see the chapter on Italy for details), thereby con¿ rming 
the specialisation of industry-wide agreements in preserving the purchasing power 
of pay. The scope for decentralised bargaining has increased somewhat, and the 
opening-clause system has been introduced, with the de¿ nition of speci¿ c rules on the 
eɣ ectiveness of agreements, in order to take into account the presence of a plurality of 
unions within workplaces, which may not sign all deals jointly. In particular, since 2011 
a number of intersectoral agreements signed by CGIL, CISL and UIL, together with 
Con¿ ndustria have introduced a minimum representativeness threshold of 5 per cent 
for participating in sectoral negotiations and have endorsed a majority principle for the 
validity of agreements at all levels. Through these provisions, coordinated bargaining 
has been preserved.
However, a new provision was introduced in the Italian legal system in the summer 
of 2011, which enables decentralised agreements to derogate extensively from sectoral 
collective agreements and, to a certain extent, even from legislation. According to 
Article 8 of Decree Law 138/2001, derogatory agreements can be linked to a large 
number of objectives: increasing employment, enhancing the quality of employment 
contracts, promoting employee participation, ¿ ghting undeclared work, improving 
competitiveness and wages, managing industrial reorganisation and restructuring, 
supporting investment and the start of new economic initiatives. Derogations can 
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similarly cover a wide range of topics, including working time, the introduction of new 
technologies, work organisation, job classi¿ cation and tasks, non-standard contracts, 
hiring procedures and the consequences of terminating the employment relationship. 
Moreover, horizontal coordination has been threatened by the emergence of new 
bargaining units, which may be either inside or outside the traditional perimeter of 
intersectoral relations between the major industrial relations actors. Notably, this 
happened with the exit of the Fiat Group from Federmeccanica, Con¿ ndustria’s 
aɤ  liated metalworking employer association, and the creation of a new, separate 
collective bargaining system. The increasing number of industry-wide agreements in 
recent years, with new signatory employer associations, and the splits opening up in 
some employer associations are going in the same direction. In general, the overall 
regulatory framework remains attached to the model of coordinated bargaining, 
but it now includes some elements of both decentralised bargaining and segmented 
bargaining, which may erode and disorganise the system.
Spain, like the other countries examined here, entered the ¿ nancial and economic crisis 
with a substantially coordinated bargaining system, anchored to centralised agreements 
setting guidelines and wage norms, widespread use of indexation mechanisms in 
collective agreements, as well as a predominant role for sectoral bargaining, usually 
at provincial level. Measures unilaterally enacted by the government during the crisis 
introduced some signi¿ cant changes, in three instances between 2010 and 2012. Major 
changes were enacted with the 2011 and 2012 reforms.
In June 2011 the socialist government introduced measures aimed at favouring 
decentralised bargaining. The new legislation suppressed the possibility to establish 
by agreement the complementarity of the various bargaining levels, whereby higher 
levels can restrict the scope of decentralised deals by stating that lower levels cannot 
regulate what is already regulated at higher levels. In addition, it provided for the 
priority of decentralised agreements on a number of key issues, such as basic wages and 
supplements, overtime and shift bonuses, working time and job classi¿ cation systems. 
However, this legal priority was balanced by the possibility of sectoral agreements to 
establish coordination rules and exclude certain topics from the negotiation entitlements 
of decentralised bargaining.
The conservative government’s reform of 2012 proceeded further along the path of 
strengthening decentralisation. First, temporary derogations from sectoral agreements 
became easier, as the reasons allowing them were broadened and the number of items 
that could be derogated expanded. Second, the eɣ ectiveness of collective agreements 
was limited to only one year after their deadlines. Previously, expired agreements 
continued to be valid inde¿ nitely, until they were renegotiated. With the 2012 reform, 
expired agreements remain eɣ ective for only one year after expiry, which puts pressure 
on unions. In fact, unions now have to negotiate under the threat of losing collective 
bargaining coverage if the negotiations for renewal last more than one year. Third and 
most importantly, the clause allowing sectoral agreements to regulate the bargaining 
structure and exclude some issues from decentralised agreements was suppressed, 
thereby making decentralised bargaining a general and non-suppressible regulatory 
tool with regard to the key topics of collective bargaining mentioned above. Finally, 
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employer prerogatives for unilateral internal À exibility were reinforced. Employers 
can now introduce substantial changes in working conditions if they are not regulated 
by mandatory collective bargaining agreements, concerning the following issues: (i) 
working day; (ii) working time and distribution of working time; (iii) shift work regimes; 
(iv) system of remuneration and wage levels; (v) work performance; and (vi) tasks.
In terms of the vertical relationship between the various negotiation levels, such changes 
have clearly shifted the institutional balance of the bargaining system to an overly 
decentralised bargaining setting, with fairly broad scope, which does not include for 
instance the reservation of some basic elements to sectoral agreements, as in the French 
case. Moreover, the new rules undermine the eɣ ectiveness of horizontal coordination in 
wage bargaining allowed by indexation mechanisms and guidelines set in higher-level 
agreements. Therefore, the Spanish bargaining system appears to represent a case of 
decentralised bargaining, potentially prone to a shift to disorganised bargaining.
2.2  Bargaining coverage
Having analysed the changes in bargaining institutions, we can now turn to consider 
the relative coverage rates of both sectoral/central agreements and decentralised 
ones. Because we are studying multi-tier bargaining systems, which were traditionally 
centred around industry-wide agreements, the impact of the possible shift to lower-
level agreements must be assessed against their eɣ ective diɣ usion.
As we have seen, in Belgium the bargaining structure has not undergone radical changes 
in recent years and is still characterised by high horizontal and vertical coordination. 
Unilateral intervention by the government in wage-setting, however, has decreased the 
autonomy of the bargaining system. The lower scope for wage bargaining at sectoral 
level has triggered some readjustment in the balance between bargaining levels, so that 
the relevance of decentralised agreements increased somewhat, but still in a closely 
coordinated setting. In terms of coverage, sectoral agreements continue to cover almost 
the whole workforce (90 per cent or more), thanks to the joint committee system and 
extensions, although no data are available on the coverage of decentralised agreements. 
However, there are indications of increased use of second-level deals. This rise is 
related mainly to the use of company settlements on variable pay as complementary 
or alternative to the (imposed) wage moderation or freezes at central level. Between 
2009 and 2015 the percentage of the total wages coming from this bonus system rose to 
almost 1 per cent (based, among other things, on 1,917 company agreements).
In contrast to Belgium, in France changes in bargaining structure have been important, 
amounting to an institutional drift to decentralised bargaining. Concerning coverage, 
sectoral agreements still inÀ uence the employment terms and conditions of almost 
the whole workforce (90 per cent or more), as in Belgium. Decentralised company 
agreements have become progressively more important since the early 1980s, not only 
because of their entitlements, as indicated above, but also in numerical terms. In fact, 
coordination ensured by the favourability principle was soon coupled with competition 
in rule setting between the sectoral and company levels (Morin 1996). This was also 
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because employers could exploit their increased bargaining power at company level (see 
the chapter on France). The number of company deals progressively increased from 
relatively low levels in the early 1980s (3,900 in 1984) until the end of the 1990s, when 
they peaked in connection with the implementation of the Aubry laws on the 35-hour 
week. After falling again until 2003, their number started to grow and reached almost 
40,000 in 2013, above the peak of the year 2000. In 2014 and 2015, the number of 
company deals was stable at around 37,000.
In France, company level collective bargaining follows a cycle inÀ uenced by mandatory 
negotiations on diɣ erent topics, which do not take place at the same time, but in periodic 
rounds. Nevertheless, they have involved a fairly stable share of the workforce in recent 
years. In 2015, for instance, agreements were reached in 15 per cent of workplaces with 
more than 10 employees and covered 61.5 per cent of the respective workforce. Existing 
data do not allow us to identify any impact of the measures which provided more scope 
for derogations at company level, also due to the short time passed since the introduction 
of the latest measures. However, previous interventions in the same direction did not 
show a very high take-up rate. An early reform in 2004 allowed company agreements 
to derogate sectoral standards on all matters except basic wage rates, job classi¿ cation, 
vocational training and supplementary social protection. At the same time, legislation 
allowed sectoral agreements to regulate or even rule out this option and indeed most 
industry-wide deals used this possibility and enforced a strict hierarchy between levels, 
with sectoral provisions prevailing. Similarly, a temporary derogation of sectoral 
standards agreed in the national inter-sectoral agreement (ANI) on competitiveness 
and job security signed in 2013 during the Hollande presidency was used in only ten 
agreements. Despite this current state of aɣ airs, it must be recognised that the formal 
and real importance of company bargaining certainly provides a solid basis for making 
the institutional shift to decentralisation without strong vertical coordination eɣ ective, 
as allowed by the latest Macron ordonnances.
Table 2 Collective bargaining coverage: sectoral and decentralised agreements, 
 2015–2016 (% of employees)
Sectoral coverage Decentralised coverage
Belgium  ≥90%  (No data)
France  ≥90%  61.5%*
Germany  48%  30%**–17%***
Italy  90%  34%
Spain  65–70%  5%
Note: * Percentage share of the workforce in enterprises with at least 10 employees. ** Workers covered by collective 
agreements and a works council. *** This corresponds to 35 per cent of all workers covered by collective agreements.
Source: DECOBA.
In Germany, the erosion of the overall bargaining coverage rate is a key feature of recent 
developments, although it represents a medium- to long-term trend, which started at 
least in the mid-1990s. When we analyse trends in coverage rates in Germany, besides 
looking at the role of industry-wide agreements, it is possible to consider, on one side, 
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single-employer bargaining as an alternative to industry-wide agreements and, on the 
other, the diɣ usion of second-level deals within the framework set by industry-wide 
accords. In practice, the decentralisation of the bargaining structure may take place 
both with a shift to single-employer bargaining and by growing utilisation of opening 
clauses through the conclusion of derogation agreements.
The general trend shows that the coverage of sectoral agreements has progressively 
decreased in the past 20 years. In 1998, coverage was 68 per cent in western Germany 
and 52 per cent in the east. By 2016, it had decreased to 51 per cent and 36 per cent, 
respectively, amounting to overall coverage of 48 per cent. As for company agreements, 
they remained stable over this period. In 1998 and 2016 alike, they covered 8 per cent 
of workers in western Germany and 11 per cent of workers in the east, and 8 per cent 
altogether.
Companies covered by sectoral agreements may also conclude works agreements 
between the works council and the management, which can be considered a form of 
second-level bargaining. However, in the German context these works agreements are 
not seen as collective agreements in the strict sense, as they could only cover issues in 
addition to collective agreements and have to adhere to the favourability principle. All 
in all, around 30 per cent of all workers in Germany are covered by both a collective 
agreement and a works council.
While the German system has always been characterised by sectoral collective 
agreements and (supplementary) works agreements, the debate on decentralisation 
of collective bargaining has focused almost exclusively on so-called ‘derogation 
agreements’. The latter are based on opening clauses in sectoral collective agreements 
that allow (temporary) derogation from collectively agreed industry-wide standards at 
company level. In contrast to regular works agreements, derogation agreements are 
concluded mainly by the responsible trade union rather than by the works council. 
According to survey data, in 2011 some 20 per cent of companies covered by collective 
agreements used opening clauses. These companies employ around 35 per cent of all 
workers covered by collective agreements, which corresponds to about 17 per cent of all 
workers in Germany.
Another source con¿ rms the same proportion of companies using opening clauses in 
2015 (21 per cent) and signals that a further 13 per cent of companies are implementing 
‘informal derogations’ outside the framework of opening clauses. The fact that use 
of opening clauses is not linked to economic and ¿ nancial performance is a further 
indication of its importance. In fact, opening clauses do not seem to be an exceptional 
feature of workplace joint regulation, unlike when ‘hardship clauses’ were originally 
included in sectoral agreements to face temporary diɤ  culties. They appear to be rather 
a structural tool. Today, they are still formally temporary, but tend to be regularly 
renegotiated to accompany ¿ rms’ business strategies.
A further aspect worth considering in the case of Germany are diɣ erentials in the 
sectoral coverage of industry-wide agreements. They can be observed thanks to recent 
data provided by the German Statistical Oɤ  ce, based on the German Structure of 
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Earnings Survey (SES). This survey generally indicates lower coverage rates than the 
traditional source (see the German chapter for a discussion of the two sources), but 
the information about the relative sectoral coverage rates provides important insights. 
While in 2014 coverage was above-average in a number of traditional manufacturing 
sectors, ¿ nancial services, energy and public administration, it was signi¿ cantly lower 
in certain services and in agriculture and somewhat lower in electronic, food industry 
and retail trade.
By combining the data on institutional change and on bargaining coverage, we 
see that some sectors (mainly in manufacturing) seem characterised by organised 
decentralisation, but others (mainly services) show more evidence of de-collectivisation 
and erosion. The lack of a link between derogations and the enterprise’s economic and 
¿ nancial situation, as well as the non-trivial diɣ usion of ‘informal derogations’ suggest 
some limitations in enforcement of the regulatory framework that lays down the 
conditions for derogations. This does not necessarily mean that organisational control 
over the process is weak. In fact, while the procedures involving the various actors and 
stakeholders in the activation and implementation of opening clauses may be followed 
strictly, the capacity to inÀ uence the ¿ nal outcome may still be weakened.
In Italy, the coverage rates of industry-wide agreements have been high and substantially 
stable in recent years. It is estimated that some 80 per cent of the overall workforce are 
covered by sectoral deals (Visser 2016). Recent ISTAT data on the earnings structure 
even indicate that collectively agreed wage rates are applied to almost all employees. In 
fact, more than 90 per cent of enterprises with 10 employees or above apply industry-
wide deals to their whole workforce consistently across sectors (CNEL-ISTAT 2016: 
105–106). Conversely, only a minority of employees are aɣ ected by decentralised 
bargaining. The same ISTAT data show that some 20 per cent of companies with at 
least 10 employees are covered by decentralised collective agreements, including both 
company and territorial accords (CNEL-ISTAT 2016: 109).
In particular, company agreements are signed in 12.9 per cent of enterprises with at 
least 10 employees and the propensity to conclude company deals is strictly related to 
size. Coverage involves 8.8 per cent of enterprises with between 10 and 49 employees, 
31.9 per cent of those with 50–199 employees, 56.6 per cent of those employing between 
200 and 499 employees and 65.5 per cent of the larger ones (Fondazione Di Vittorio 
2016: 2). The type of economic activity inÀ uences the incidence of company agreements. 
In manufacturing and construction, some 25 per cent of companies with 10 employees 
or above are covered by decentralised agreements. Due to the particular features of the 
two sectors, the majority of enterprises in manufacturing are covered by company deals 
(17.9 per cent), whereas in the construction sector the main decentralised level is the 
territory (20.4 per cent). Service companies show a second-level collective bargaining 
coverage below 20 per cent, with a prevalence of company deals (Fondazione Di Vittorio 
2016: 4).
If we move from the percentage of companies covered to coverage in terms of employees, 
it has been estimated that company agreements aɣ ect some 27 per cent of the total private 
sector workforce, including micro-¿ rms below 10 employees and excluding agriculture 
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and household workers. At sectoral level, this goes from 39 per cent in manufacturing 
to 25 per cent in business services, 18 per cent in personal services and 5 per cent in 
construction. In construction, most decentralised deals are concluded at territorial 
level, which add a further estimated coverage of 20 per cent of employees. In the other 
sectors, the extra coverage allowed by territorial deals is 5 per cent in manufacturing 
and business services and 12 per cent in personal services. Overall, it stands at 7 per 
cent, so that the combined coverage of second-level company and territorial agreements 
is 34 per cent (Fondazione Di Vittorio 2016: 8–10).
These data indicate a relatively low diɣ usion of decentralised agreements, with the 
partial exception of manufacturing. Even more importantly for our analysis, the 
extension of second-level agreements does not seem to have grown signi¿ cantly in 
recent decades. A previous ISTAT study on collective bargaining in the mid-1990s 
showed that company agreements were concluded at a slightly lower level of 10 per cent 
of ¿ rms with 10 employees or more, with coverage of some 40 per cent of workers in the 
same subgroups of ¿ rms, which roughly corresponds to the present estimation of 27 per 
cent of the whole workforce.
These two analyses diverge with regard to the distance between the manufacturing and 
service sectors. Whereas there were no substantial diɣ erences in the mid-1990s, now 
manufacturing industry seems more signi¿ cantly involved in decentralised bargaining 
(18 per cent of ¿ rms as opposed to around 10 per cent). It is hard to tell whether this 
is the result of the features of the two surveys or reÀ ects an increase in decentralised 
bargaining in manufacturing. Without further data and analysis, we cannot say whether 
there are clear signs of a general expansion of decentralised collective bargaining. 
Rather, in terms of coverage, sectoral agreements certainly remain the most important 
reference. Moreover, the use of derogations seems rather limited: 2 per cent of ¿ rms 
used them in 2012–2013, according to the CNEL-ISTAT survey (2016: 115). Similarly, 
the latest report of the observatory on decentralised bargaining maintained by the 
union confederation CISL indicates that derogations were included in 4 per cent of 
the agreements signed in 2015–2016 (OCSEL 2017: 10–11). In sum, the bargaining 
hierarchy does not seem to be radically challenged for the time being, also because 
decentralised bargaining has not eɣ ectively expanded its reach.
Among the countries included in this study, Spain’s collective bargaining system has 
probably been most aɣ ected by recent unilateral government initiatives. The substantial 
changes include the following: the prioritisation of decentralised agreements over 
sectoral deals, without reserving any topics to the latter; the shortening of the validity 
of collective agreements after their expiry; the possibility to engage in negotiations with 
non-union entities; and broader scope for employers to introduce unilateral changes in 
working conditions not regulated by mandatory collective bargaining agreements (see 
above). One of the main objectives of the new measures was to promote decentralised 
bargaining at the company level. Data show that particularly the 2012 reform may 
have succeeded in this, as the number of agreements rose in 2013, possibly also driven 
by the new expiration clause and therefore by the necessity to renew deals. Notably, 
the number of agreements concluded in newly established bargaining units went up 
signi¿ cantly in 2013 and this may reÀ ect eɣ orts to take advantage of the new rules on 
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derogations, among other things. Indeed, accords concluded in new company and group 
bargaining units almost doubled from 2012 to 2013 and then remained at a similar high 
level, which slightly decreased by 10 per cent each year until 2016, when they still stood 
40 per cent above the 2012 level. However, in terms of newly covered employees, the 
new agreements involved only some 0.5 per cent of total employees per year from 2012 
to 2016, with a 1 per cent peak in 2013.
Indeed, bargaining coverage rates remained relatively stable during the crisis, at 
around 65 per cent of total employees for agreements above the company level (if we 
take into consideration the share of total employment which is excluded from collective 
bargaining, we would get levels around 7–8 per cent higher; see Visser 2016)1 and about 
6 per cent for company agreements. In fact, the substantial loss of coverage from 2008 
until 2016 – around 1.5 million workers considering the agreements above the company 
level – roughly parallels the fall in the number of employees, which decreased by some 
1.6 million in the same period. Derogations from company agreements remained fairly 
stable between 2012 and 2016, covering around 0.3 per cent of total employees, with 
again a peak of 1 per cent in 2013. In part, the rise in new company-level bargaining 
units illustrated above and the use of derogations can be linked to the activation of 
negotiations in SMEs with non-union worker delegations, which led to derogatory deals 
(agreements ‘in pejus’). This practice remained limited, however, and it has also been 
challenged in court, due to the controversial legitimation of the bargaining party on 
the employee side (see the chapter on Spain for details). According to this evidence, we 
can say that, overall, the Spanish bargaining system, so far, has not been challenged 
substantially: sectoral agreements remain at the heart of the system, whereas the reach 
of company agreements is not expanding and the possibility for derogations is not used 
widely. One issue that remains underexplored is the utilisation of reinforced employer 
prerogatives to unilaterally modify the terms of employment, introduced by the 2012 
reform. If this kind of unilateral modi¿ cation expanded, the central role of collective 
bargaining as a regulatory tool may be threatened, especially in SMEs, where this 
practice could be a more attractive option than collectively agreed derogations.
2.3  Bargaining quality across levels: increasing scope for decentralised 
 agreements
A proper assessment of the quality and eɣ ectiveness of collective bargaining at the 
various levels would require a detailed analysis of the content of the diɣ erent agreements. 
This is certainly an important element of research on current developments in collective 
bargaining, but it goes beyond the objectives of this study. Here, we essentially want 
to consider whether recent changes have involved some degree of ‘hollowing out’ of 
1. The identi¿ cation of the bargaining coverage rate remains a controversial issue in Spain, due to diɣ erent 
methods to calculate it and the alleged limits of oɤ  cial statistics. Current estimates vary from 65 per cent up 
to as much as 90 per cent. Here, we stick to the oɤ  cial statistics provided by the Spanish Ministry of Labour 
(Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social, Estadística de convenios colectivos de trabajo, http://www.empleo.
gob.es/estadisticas/cct/welcome.htm), for the number of covered workers, and to the Eurostat Labour Force 
Survey data (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs/data/database), as far as the number of employees is 
concerned.
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sectoral agreements and we can address this issue essentially by combining the two 
previous dimensions and using summary information on the issues addressed in 
decentralised agreements as opposed to sectoral deals.
In multi-tier bargaining systems the various levels of negotiations are complementary, 
but can also be in competition with one another. Vertical coordination is the 
institutional tool for regulating potential competition and assigning relative importance 
to the diɣ erent levels. Organised bargaining systems are often those where lower-
level negotiations take place in a framework set by higher-level agreements, which 
maintain a hierarchical prevalence. However, vertical coordination may also involve 
a substantial shift of competences from central to decentralised levels. Moreover, 
decentralised collective bargaining does not necessarily imply lower levels of protection 
for the workers involved. Against the background of full-employment, in the 1960s and 
1970s, important waves of decentralisation of collective bargaining were driven by the 
strength of union representation in workplaces, leading to important results in terms of 
pay rises, stronger protections and union prerogatives. As for the legal framework, the 
bargaining power of unions at decentralised level was often reinforced by the presence 
of a favourability principle, which ensured that second-level agreements could only 
enhance protections established at higher levels.
In recent years, the long-term shift of bargaining power in favour of employers driven by 
the internationalisation of markets and production was, on one hand, exacerbated by the 
impact of the economic crisis on growth and employment and, on the other, buttressed 
by a number of measures that eroded the role of sectoral/central collective bargaining. 
Some of these measures may eɣ ectively support a weakening of the regulatory role of 
sectoral agreements, starting from dismantling the favourability principle. The 2012 
reform enacted in Spain, as well as Article 8 of Decree 138 introduced by the Italian 
government in August 2011 provide for the possibility of extensive derogations by 
decentralised agreements under certain, broadly de¿ ned circumstances. Importantly, 
the Spanish regulation includes pay among the terms of employment that can be 
derogated, whereas the Italian rules do not. The recent ordonnances signed by President 
Macron in France on 22 September 2017 go in the same direction, although they provide 
that some fundamental topics remain reserved to sectoral deals, including basic wages. 
However, the very limited impact so far of the former measures in Italy and Spain 
suggests that there is no direct link between reforms and outcomes. The response of the 
social partners is fundamental and it can try to reinstate or con¿ rm the role of industry-
wide agreements. The conclusion of the ¿ rst national metalworking agreement in Spain 
in 2016 goes in this direction. Similarly, the Italian social partners have signed a number 
of intersectoral agreements aimed at establishing a clear framework for organised 
decentralisation, whose objective is to preserve the role of sectoral agreements and of 
the bargaining parties.
In Germany, where the issue of vertical coordination remains fully in the hands of 
the social partners, the system of opening clauses, as well as the practice of ‘informal 
derogations’ seem aɣ ect relations between bargaining levels. Indeed, the utilisation of 
opening clauses appears to be widespread and aɣ ects two major issues, working time 
and wages, often in the form of so-called pacts for employment and competitiveness, 
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whereby more À exibility is exchanged for job security and sometimes investment. In 
the case of the metalworking sector, for instance, the above-mentioned Pforzheim 
Agreement, with its general opening clause, provided solid ground for the diɣ usion of 
derogations, which currently involve around one-third of all companies covered by the 
sectoral agreement (2012–2014, source: IG Metall). In contrast, derogation agreements 
play only a minor role in the German retail trade, since employers largely favour 
disorganised decentralisation and have withdrawn from collective bargaining (see the 
chapter on Germany for more details).
Only Belgium seems to be insulated from this trend towards a possible erosion of the 
role of central agreements through derogations. There, the stability of the favourability 
principle remains a formal impediment to such developments. However, as indicated 
above, the shrinking scope for wage bargaining at central and sectoral level imposed by 
government intervention and con¿ rmed by the new 2017 law on collective bargaining, 
has shifted the attention of the social partners to the company level. This emerging 
trend may encourage the development of company bargaining outside the sectors where 
it was already the main bargaining level (the petro-chemical, chemical, banking, steel 
and paper industries).
Table 3 provides an overview of the current state of play concerning the importance 
of decentralised bargaining in the ¿ ve countries featured in this study. In Belgium, 
the role of company agreements has remained close to the traditional ‘distributive’ 
role. Derogations are possible only in certain very limited and highly regulated cases 
envisaged by sectoral agreements. Therefore, decentralised deals take place mainly 
in larger and better performing enterprises and provide for additional bene¿ ts and 
protections compared with sectoral and central deals. 
In the other countries, the scope and nature of company agreements is much broader. 
In Germany, we can ¿ nd the opening-clause system established and administered by 
the social partners at the sectoral level to speci¿ cally allow derogations. Nowadays, 
opening clauses are broadly used and cover important topics, so that the provisions of 
sectoral agreements can be regarded as de¿ ning a framework, which allows signi¿ cant 
adaptations at company level. Whether this amounts to an overall weakening of the 
regulatory framework or rather enables participation and union revitalisation at 
workplace level is still debated, with rather diɣ erent views in various sectors (see the 
chapter on Germany). In France, Italy and Spain, the most recent shifts to decentralised 
agreements were driven by government intervention, which was implemented either 
unilaterally or without social concertation agreements with the social partners. In some 
cases, reforms had to face the open opposition of at least parts of the union movement 
and some criticism also from the employers’ side. 
These recent changes in legislation have intervened in pre-existing decentralised 
bargaining systems, which show some signi¿ cant diɣ erences. In France, decentralised 
negotiations are well-developed and supported by legislative prerogatives; in Italy, 
they have a limited, but still relevant extension; in Spain, they seem to cover a fairly 
limited share of the workforce. In all cases, though, decentralised bargaining covers a 
wide range of topics and can enable adaptation to local conditions and support mutually 
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bene¿ cial exchanges, as in the case of pacts for employment and competitiveness in 
Germany (Addison et al. 2017).
The fact that, to date, utilisation of derogations is rather limited in all countries 
suggests at least two reÀ ections. First, the balance between sectoral agreements and 
decentralised deals has not changed yet and the former remain the principal reference 
for joint regulation of employment and working conditions. Second, the social partners 
Table 3 Main features of decentralised bargaining, 2016–2017
Favourability principle Diff usion of 
decentralised 
bargaining
Main topics of decentra-
lised bargaining
Current use of 
derogations
Belgium Yes, except very limited 
cases of opening clauses, 
strictly regulated by 
sectoral agreements
No data Additional bonuses and 
beneﬁ ts, working time 
arrangements, job classi-
ﬁ cation
Exceptional, 
almost non-
existent
France Thoroughly redeﬁ ned by 
recent Macron ordon-
nances, with limited topics 
reserved to sectoral agree-
ments (minimum wage 
rates, job classiﬁ cation 
systems, equality between 
women and men, training 
and so on)
High Wage supplements, 
working time, employ-
ment, proﬁ t sharing and 
participation
Very low, almost 
non-existent
Germany Yes, valid for works 
agreements.
Derogations possible 
only within procedural 
framework deﬁ ned at 
sectoral level for opening 
clauses
Medium Implementation of 
sectoral agreements and 
additional social beneﬁ ts 
introduced through works 
agreements. Derogation 
agreements on basis 
of opening clauses and 
informal derogation
Medium, mostly 
on working time 
and compensa-
tion (wages, al-
lowances, annual 
bonuses)
Italy No, broad derogations are 
possible for a wide range 
of reasons according to 
legislation. Basic wage 
rates cannot be aff ected. 
Intersectoral agreements 
deﬁ ned regulatory 
framework for the validity 
of derogatory accords
Medium Wage supplements, 
reorganisation and 
restructuring, welfare 
beneﬁ ts, working time, 
union prerogatives
Low, mostly on 
work organisa-
tion, working 
time, wage 
supplements, job 
classiﬁ cation
Spain Broad derogations are 
possible for a wide range 
of reasons according to 
legislation, which also 
strengthened employer 
prerogatives for unilateral 
changes in terms of 
employment. Decentra-
lised agreements can also 
derogate sectoral wage 
rates
Low Wage supplements, job 
classiﬁ cation, working 
time, employment, equal 
opportunities, training, 
complementary welfare, 
industrial relations
Low, mostly 
on wages and 
working hours
Source: DECOBA
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seems quite cautious about taking up the possibilities oɣ ered by the new legislation. 
Multi-employer bargaining still represents a fundamental reference for unions and 
workers’ protections and employers seem to recognise its merits in terms of providing a 
level playing ¿ eld for competition and a common basis for building positive workplace 
industrial relations. It may only be a question of time, but, if this interpretation is valid, 
the ways in which decentralisation of bargaining structures has been implemented lately 
seem ill-conceived. Instead of supporting the renewal of workplace industrial relations, 
they jeopardise it. Careful monitoring of future developments in this area remains a key 
task for all industrial relations scholars and practitioners.
3.  The driving forces
The mapping of changes in our ¿ ve countries points to both commonalities and substantial 
diɣ erences. What are the factors that can explain the pattern of transformation that we 
have observed? As mentioned above, we are looking at a relatively short window of 
observation between 2012 and 2017, but we want to include a longer time span, with 
a view to understanding whether we are witnessing short-term or long-term eɣ ects. 
Short-term shocks may have an external origin, such as those entailed by the global 
¿ nancial and economic crisis that broke in the second half of the 2000s. However, they 
are always mediated by the internal situation and addressed by domestic actors, so that 
disentangling ‘external’ and ‘internal’ factors can be diɤ  cult, if not impossible. Here, 
we identify some variables that have been used to explain developments in industrial 
relations and, more generally, in the variance of structural reforms implemented in 
the EU in recent years. From a more qualitative perspective, we will try to identify the 
processes and agency that have shaped the patterns we have identi¿ ed.
These are the short-term variables that we have considered:
– economic growth, as an indicator of the economic conditions of enterprises;
– exports, as a measure of the external competitive pressure on enterprises;
– employment and unemployment, as indicators of the balance of power between 
workers and employers;
– public debt and de¿ cit, as a measure of vulnerability and exposure within the EU;
– country-speci¿ c recommendations, in order to consider the inÀ uence of the EU 
governance framework;
– agency of governments and social partners, which represents the mediation of the 
other variables.
Table 4 shows that the ¿ ve countries under examination have been aɣ ected by the 
¿ nancial and economic crisis to quite diɣ erent degrees. 
Spain suɣ ered the largest decline in output, which remained below the pre-crisis period 
in 2016. During the crisis, employment decreased by almost 3.5 million, more than 15 
per cent below the pre-crisis level, and it was still below that level by 11 per cent in 2016. 
The unemployment rate rose to 26 per cent and in 2016 it was still 11 percentage points 
higher than the pre-crisis level. Its ¿ nancial vulnerability increased dramatically: Spain 
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entered the crisis with the lowest debt, but indebtedness increased almost threefold 
during it, while the de¿ cit was higher than in the other four countries and was highest 
of all in 2016. 
At the other end of the spectrum, we have Germany. The recovery was strong; the fall in 
GDP was not insigni¿ cant, but growth resumed rapidly and in 2016 GDP surpassed the 
pre-crisis level by almost 9 per cent. Employment performance has been particularly 
strong. The loss of jobs during the crisis was relatively limited, at 1.4 per cent of the 
pre-crisis level. In 2016, the unemployment rate had almost halved compared with pre-
crisis levels and Germany was the only case among our ¿ ve countries where it was lower 
than before the crisis. Both debt and de¿ cit increased during the crisis, but the debt has 
now almost gone back to the initial level, while in 2016 a surplus was achieved.
The other three countries lie between these two extremes, with Belgium closer to 
Germany in terms of economic and employment performance, but with a higher 
vulnerability in terms of public ¿ nances. Belgium is also the country with the highest 
ratio of exports to GDP, which makes it particularly sensitive to external competition 
issues and therefore very attentive to price dynamics, as the laws on competition clearly 
Table 4 Economic indicators during the crisis, 2007–2016a
GDP volumesb Exportsc Debtc Deﬁ citc
Min 2016 2016 Min Max 2016 Max Mean 2016
EU28 95.6 105.1 44.1 57.6 86.7 83.5 –6.6 –3.6 –1.7
EA19 95.5 103.0 45.9 65.0 92.0 89.2 –6.3 –3.2 –1.5
Belgium 97.7 106.6 84.5 87.0 106.7 105.9 –5.4 –3.0 –2.6
Germany 94.4 108.7 46.1 63.7 81.0 68.3 –4.2 –0.7 0.8
Spain 91.1 98.6 32.9 35.6 100.4 99.4 –11.0 –6.6 –4.5
France 97.1 105.1 29.3 64.3 96.0 96.0 –7.2 –4.5 –3.4
Italy 91.4 93.2 29.8 99.8 132.6 132.6 –5.3 –3.1 –2.4
  
Employment (‘000) Unemployment (%)
Max Reduction Reduc-
tion/
pre-crisisd
2016/
pre-crisise
Max Mean 2016 2016 -
pre-crisisf
EU28 224,173.2 7,453.7 3.3 0.6 11.0 9.3 8.7 1.6
EA19 146,758.6 6,089.0 4.1 –0.5 12.1 10.2 10.2 2.7
Belgium 4,586.7 25.2 0.6 3.2 8.6 7.9 7.9 0.9
Germany 41,267.3 548.1 1.4 7.1 8.8 6.2 4.2 –3.4
Spain 20,579.9 3,440.9 16.7 –10.9 26.2 19.7 19.7 11.4
France 26,583.8 252.0 1.0 2.5 10.4 9.2 10.1 3.0
Italy 23,090.3 899.8 3.9 –1.4 12.9 9.8 11.9 5.7
Notes: a) best performance among the ﬁ ve countries in italics, worst performance among the ﬁ ve countries in bold; 
b) 100=2008, 2007 for Italy; c) % of GDP; d) %; e) % change; f) percentage point change.
Source: Eurostat 2017.
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indicate. Italy is closer to Spain in many respects, with a poor economic and employment 
performance. In particular, Italy lags behind most in terms of recovery. It also presents 
the weakest position in public ¿ nance. France has done relatively well in promoting 
economic recovery, as well as job hoarding and job creation. It has a more vulnerable 
situation in public ¿ nance and relatively high unemployment rates.
It is often asserted that EU economic governance exerts a signi¿ cant pressure on 
national industrial relations systems and especially collective bargaining institutions 
(see Bongelli in this volume). Taking a mainstream economic approach, the link between 
wages and productivity has been emphasised in EU recommendations as a means to 
foster price competitiveness. Institutions promoting the establishment of wage À oors, 
such as legal minimum wages, indexation mechanisms and extension procedures have 
been regarded by mainstream economists with suspicion, as sources of ‘rigidity’ and 
potentially detrimental to employment. The ¿ ve countries under examination have been 
involved in the review cycle of domestic policies embodied in the so-called ‘European 
Semester’ and have received a number of Country-speci¿ c Recommendations (CSRs) on 
wage-setting and labour market institutions. It should be noted, however, that the areas 
covered by such recommendations are broad, whereas we focus on only a subset. In 
addressing recommendations, national governments can, to be sure, select strategically 
and progress in one area may reduce the pressure on others. In the system as a whole, 
‘the Commission is responsible for the analysis and the monitoring it performs, the 
Council is accountable for the recommendations issued … the national governments 
still are to be considered responsible for the policies implemented in their own country’ 
(Bongelli in this volume, p. 264). Although governments retain ¿ nal responsibility 
for their policies, the EU governance framework involves national governments in a 
monitoring and peer review system, which makes policymakers more accountable for 
their initiatives.
Suggestions to introduce ‘structural reforms’ to make the labour market more ‘À exible’, 
better align wages and productivity and make wage-setting more adaptable to local 
conditions have been included in the recommendations addressed to a number of 
countries, including all those under review here. Germany is a partial exception, 
because it imposed comprehensive labour market deregulation well before the crisis 
and its currently good economic and employment performance has reduced monitoring 
pressure, although, among other things, indications for reducing the tax wedge and, most 
notably, to instigate wage growth to support domestic demand have been put forward. 
It should also be noted that many of these recommendations have been reiterated a 
number of times, which may be regarded as an indication of their low eɣ ectiveness, as 
well as of the room to manoeuvre that national governments retain (Marginson and 
Welz 2014). This was the case, for instance, with regard to wage indexation mechanisms 
for Belgium, whose revision was repeatedly suggested in the EU reviews. However, 
reiteration and vulnerability in terms of budgetary imbalances may lead to adoption, 
especially if this can help obtain more À exibility in the assessment of public budget 
developments. The reforms introduced by Italy, France, Spain and Belgium aɣ ecting 
collective bargaining have in fact been acknowledged by EU institutions in their periodic 
review of national policies, although sometimes with concerns about their eɣ ectiveness 
and implementation (as in the case of Spain). 
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It is probably not by chance that the major formal interventions in industrial relations 
and collective bargaining can be found in the countries with the more critical economic 
and budgetary conditions, and we should not forget that Spain also received European 
¿ nancial support to recapitalise its ¿ nancial sector between July 2012 and January 2014. 
However, the changes in institutional frameworks should be seen in terms of the 
interaction between the national and supra-national levels, with governments as key 
actors, especially because of the need to handle the impact of the economic and ¿ nancial 
crisis on domestic economies and labour markets. Spain and France introduced 
important provisions aɣ ecting industrial relations. Italy, which remains in a fragile 
economic and budgetary situation, did not fully follow in the same direction. Important 
and incisive reforms have been imposed on the pension system in late 2011 and the 
labour market since 2012, accommodating EU policy recommendations. However, 
industrial relations were not subjected to far-reaching reforms, with the fundamental 
– if one-oɣ  – exception of Article 8 of Decree Law 138/2011, when the Berlusconi 
government received a letter from the ECB suggesting decentralisation of the bargaining 
system. This relative preservation of social partner autonomy in regulating key elements 
of the collective bargaining system can probably be linked to the voluntarist tradition 
of Italian industrial relations and notably to the eɣ orts of the Italian social partners, 
who have been intensively negotiating on the issues of representation and collective 
bargaining structure since 2011. They achieved important results, as the single text on 
representation of January 2014 shows, but the diɤ  culties faced in implementing their 
agreements may lead to some form of legislative intervention, which could now receive 
broad support, especially if it enacted the results of bilateral negotiations.
Belgium also received substantial recommendations within the EU governance system, 
but it did not change the structure of collective bargaining or, for instance, abandon 
the wage indexation system adopted in collective agreements. Like Italy, the main 
reforms arising from interaction with the EU institutions on social policy concerned 
pensions and the ¿ scal system, including the tax wedge. True, the government took 
central wage-setting under stricter control, imposed a wage freeze in 2013–2014 and 
temporarily abolished the wage indexation mechanism in 2015–2016. However, in 
this it followed a policy orientation established in the late 1980s, with the ¿ rst law on 
competitiveness, which may be linked to the openness of Belgium’s domestic economy.
Germany, despite its positive short-term performance in growth and employment, as 
well as the lack of signi¿ cant pressure on industrial relations from the EU economic 
governance framework, has undergone a signi¿ cant transformation with regard to 
collective bargaining. Indeed, changes in the German bargaining system are no less 
substantial than in the other countries. In fact, the cuts in the coverage of sectoral 
agreements and the increasing role of company-level bargaining in derogating sectoral 
standards may be interpreted as announcing more radical transformations in the future. 
Policy responses have, indeed, gone in the direction of providing more coordination, 
especially at horizontal level, through the introduction of the legal minimum wage in 
January 2015 and the provision of more possibilities to extend collective agreements.
In sum, our case studies clearly show that, besides national governments within the EU 
policy framework, the role of the social partners is of the utmost importance. Not only 
are national policies set domestically, in which the social partners play an important 
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role, but the eɣ ectiveness of legislative interventions is mediated by the strategies 
and initiatives implemented by the social partners, both jointly and individually. 
Germany is probably the example closest to the general picture of long-term changes 
in collective bargaining driven by developments in bilateral industrial relations, 
within a changing economic and institutional framework. The diɣ erences that we can 
discern in the structure of collective bargaining in the chemicals, metalworking and 
service sectors, with the signi¿ cant exception of retail, are indicative of the importance 
of speci¿ c features of the various sectors. Sectors play an important role everywhere 
(Bechter et al. 2011), but in this case the weakening of horizontal coordination and the 
lack of an encompassing formal regulatory framework has probably emphasised the 
role of sectoral social partners. The other countries provide diɣ erent examples of the 
role of social partners: the ‘enrichment’ of decentralised bargaining linked to stricter 
legal wage norms in Belgium; the importance that Spanish employers, especially 
SMEs, still attach to sectoral agreements at provincial level; the results obtained by 
Spanish unions in supporting the role of multi-employer bargaining within the new 
legislative framework; the limited impact so far of the rules enabling derogations in 
France; and the similarly low diɣ usion of derogations and social partner commitment 
to autonomously de¿ ning the rules of collective bargaining in Italy. These examples all 
indicate the substantial autonomy of industrial relations systems, even when external 
government interventionism endangers their independence.
4.  Concluding remarks: the way forward through troubled waters
In this ¿ nal section, we can go back to our initial questions: was the recent crisis a 
turning point for EU industrial relations? What remains after the ‘frontal assault’ on 
multi-employer bargaining? What kind of industrial relations are now being advanced 
by the new EU policy climate, which aims to revitalise social dialogue?
The analysis of our ¿ ve country cases, summarised in Table 5, suggests some tentative 
answers. Multi-employer bargaining has been under pressure in recent years through 
the impact of the ¿ nancial and economic crisis and government interventions in 
areas traditionally within the remit of social partner autonomy. Such pressure on 
collective bargaining systems has impacted both their structure – notably the degree 
of coordination between diɣ erent bargaining levels and across bargaining units – and 
their outcomes, leading especially to wage restraint and internal devaluation, as well as 
to more concession bargaining, namely at company level.
The space for decentralised bargaining increased almost everywhere, including in 
Belgium, where the bargaining system remains strongly organised. In France, Italy and 
Spain, legal reforms have subverted the traditional bargaining hierarchy established 
by previous legislation or collective agreements, thereby favouring decentralised agree-
ments over sectoral ones. In some countries, such weakening of vertical coordination 
may, in the future, involve a substantial erosion of multi-employer bargaining and, 
in certain cases, could lead to disorganised bargaining and even the dismantling of 
collective bargaining institutions.
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Some national collective bargaining systems have been aɣ ected by an increasing variety 
of bargaining units with diɣ erent levels of protection (segmentation) and a tendency 
towards a decline of collective bargaining coverage (de-collectivisation). Germany is a 
case in point, while Italy and – partly – Belgium show emerging signs of segmentation. It 
should be underlined that segmentation often results in lower protection and therefore 
represents a possible alternative to decentralised derogations, especially where the 
prevalence of sectoral agreements in uncontested, as in Belgium.
The increasing government intervention in industrial relations and collective bargaining 
issues is reducing bargaining autonomy in the countries under review. In some cases, 
government intervention aims to directly aɣ ect the bargaining structure or outcomes, 
as in France, Italy and Spain, by supporting the prevalence of decentralised agreements, 
or in Belgium with stricter wage norms and the imposition of temporary wage freezes. 
In Germany, by contrast, the introduction of the legal minimum wage in 2015 and the 
reinforcement of extension mechanisms have gone some way towards counteracting the 
weakening of the general regulatory capacity of industrial relations. 
In sum, the crisis was accompanied by a number of policy-driven changes, especially 
in the countries most aɣ ected by the economic downturn and more exposed in terms 
of public ¿ nance vulnerability, and reinforced the tendency towards segmentation. 
However, our analysis indicates that no systemic changes in collective bargaining 
structure have yet taken place.
Table 5 Breaking through the crisis: current trends in collective bargaining
Bargaining structure Coverage Bargained derogations
Coordination Autonomy Sectoral Decentralised Scope Use
Belgium Organised 
bargaining
Decreasing 
in horizontal 
coordination
High (stable) No data 
(Increasing)
None, very 
limited
Not applicable
France Decentralised 
bargaining
Decreasing 
in vertical 
coordination
High (stable) Increasing Broad, with 
limitations
Low
Germany Organised 
bargaining
Decreasing 
in horizontal 
coordination
Declining 
(partial de-col-
lectivisation)
Medium 
(stable)
Broad, with 
procedural 
rules
Medium 
(increasing)
Italy Organised 
bargaining/
decentra-
lised and 
segmented 
bargaining?
Threatened 
in vertical 
coordination
High (stable) Medium 
(stable)
Broad Low
Spain Decentralised 
bargaining/
disorganised 
bargaining?
Decreasing 
in vertical 
coordination
High (stable) Low (stable) Broad Low
Source: DECOBA.
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Indeed, a number of elements signal the resilience of national employment relations, 
which essentially derives from the autonomous institutions of industrial relations 
and the actions of the social partners. National social partners on both sides seem to 
consider joint regulation, including at central and sectoral levels, as an asset which 
must be preserved.
The scant utilisation of the derogations newly allowed by legislation in France, Italy 
and Spain suggests that, so far, the local bargaining parties do not consider them a 
useful tool, despite the support that employers often gave these reforms in national 
political debates. Possibly this limited implementation may be linked to the disruptive 
potential that derogations could play, especially on existing workplace industrial 
relations, which were established in a regulatory framework that was more conducive 
to mutually bene¿ cial deals. Leaving aside exceptional circumstances, in fact, there is 
no guarantee that recourse to disadvantageous (to workers) derogations would help 
company performance, especially in the medium-to-long term, while they can certainly 
corrode commitment, trust and cooperation in the workplace.
However, it is important to underline that the reforms introduced during the crisis 
have increased the number of options available to employers, thereby reinforcing their 
bargaining position vis-à-vis the unions, and have sometimes directly strengthened the 
employers’ unilateral prerogatives to modify employment terms and conditions. These 
new ‘exit strategies’ from collective bargaining contribute to weakening the regulatory 
capacity of industrial relations and may erode the importance of collective bargaining 
in the future.
Our case studies expose the policy failures that characterise the ways in which the crisis 
was addressed in the European Union. Austerity measures were particularly severe 
where the economic downturn and budgetary fragility were most pronounced. Despite 
the policymakers’ expectations, austerity did not lead to fast and strong recovery. 
Spain and Italy still lagged behind in 2016 in terms of economic and employment 
performance. Decentralisation ‘by decree’ was similarly ineɣ ective. There are no signs 
of lasting growth with regard to decentralised agreements in France, Italy and Spain, 
nor of signi¿ cant use of the opportunities for derogations.
Similarly, autonomous action by the social partners is subject to a number of limitations. 
In Italy, almost 25 years of eɣ orts to support decentralised bargaining as a means 
of promoting productivity and growth, as well as higher wages and better working 
conditions, have achieved meagre results. In Germany, the fully autonomous system 
of opening clauses could not stop either the decline in collective bargaining coverage at 
sectoral level or the emergence of important segments of the economy with very little 
union presence and collective bargaining, if any.
The new policy climate at EU level, therefore, ¿ nds the national systems of industrial 
relations somewhat under strain, or in troubled waters. The double weakness of policy 
initiatives and autonomous action in industrial relations, when taken alone, con¿ rms 
the importance of a combination of supportive legal institutions and autonomous 
industrial relations (Bordogna and Cella 1999). If they proceed along diverging paths, 
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the potential of industrial relations for growth and social cohesion, which is recognised 
and supported by the EU institutions, can be wasted.
In this perspective, horizontal coordination of collective bargaining is becoming a key 
issue, if we want to ¿ ght inequality and promote decent terms of employment and 
working conditions across our economies and in the EU. This may entail more policy 
and legal interventions than in the past to enforce minimum standards and promote the 
integrative role of collective bargaining.
Decentralisation is a long-term trend in collective bargaining, which pre-dates the crisis 
and whose prospects depend on its capacity to meet the expectations of both bargaining 
parties. The policy option of opening up room for derogations does not seem to go in this 
direction. Instead, decentralisation requires substantial institutional support, of which 
horizontal and vertical coordination are essential components, in order to avoid the risks 
of a low-protection/low-productivity trap, with growing disorganisation, segmentation 
and de-collectivisation. In particular, it is important to frame decentralised bargaining 
in a regulatory system that fosters workers’ protections and productivity, by supporting 
wages as a key element of growth rather than a cost. Multi-tier bargaining systems 
may in this way combine the inclusiveness of multi-employer agreements with the 
responsiveness and adaptability of decentralised deals.
Industrial relations institutions at all levels are valuable assets that promote trust and 
cooperation in the workplace. Social partners appear to be clearly aware of this and show 
great caution in handling new legal rules that might endanger established institutions. 
Policies that fully recognise and support the autonomy of the social partners and 
their joint regulatory systems are a necessary element of any initiatives which aim to 
be eɣ ective and fully exploit the potential inherent in industrial relations for growth 
and social cohesion. Balancing a more incisive role for the state with support for social 
partner autonomy is the challenge that lies ahead.
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Chapter 2
The ‘resistible’ rise of decentralised bargaining: 
a cross-country and inter-sectoral comparison
Mimmo Carrieri, Maria Concetta Ambra and Andrea Ciarini
1. Introduction
The common thesis that emerges from the national studies in the present volume is 
that collective bargaining systems and industrial relations have been ‘under stress’ and 
in transition over the course of the past decade. Although all the studies testify that 
there has been a – more or less pronounced – move away from traditional structures 
revolving around national sectoral agreements, along with a redesign of bargaining 
structures, this has not led to anything clear and de¿ nitive. 
On this basis the object of this report – the role and trends of decentralised bargaining 
– becomes a kind of general litmus test for the tendencies and changes in industrial 
relations in European countries. 
It is worth emphasising that the studies in this volume, which analyse in depth the 
quantitative and qualitative developments in two sectors – the metal industry and the 
retail trade – in ¿ ve countries, enable us to substantially improve our understanding 
of the processes involved in decentralised bargaining – but more generally within the 
bargaining framework – on a larger scale than the studies previously available. In 
fact, there is no shortage of comparative research and interesting case studies (see, for 
example, Pulignano and Keune 2014), but by and large they have been limited to a few 
cases in the same sector. In this report we provide a more extensive and systematic 
framework of information and analysis. 
The decentralisation of collective bargaining in all the countries examined in this 
volume emerges as the key issue around which various proposals, debates and attempts 
at implementation revolve. 
Decentralisation is presented here both in the European public debate and in public 
debates in the individual countries under examination not only as desirable, but also as 
necessary, not least in its positive eɣ ects on economic performance, such as an expected 
increase in competitiveness. However, while this linkage is presented as a matter of 
course, there is considerable doubt concerning whether decentralisation of collective 
bargaining really is compatible with the attainment of other public goods. As the French 
researchers remind us in their chapter, authoritative international institutions such as 
the OECD have called into question whether the eɣ ects of decentralisation are self-
evident not only with regard to employment growth – or other social matters – but also in 
relation to the aim of improving economic performance, which is generally presented as 
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inevitable. This means that such outcomes are not automatic, but that decentralisation 
requires accompanying measures, government policies and the support of the social 
partners if it is to yield positive results, whether economic or social. 
This more fragmentary and rather more nuanced way of looking at things, in contrast 
with more con¿ dently straightforward representations, seems to be con¿ rmed by the 
fact that, in all the relevant countries, the gap between the importance attributed to this 
issue and its real substance varies substantially. Essentially, bargaining decentralisation, 
to the extent that it is desired and pursued, does not appear to be a government 
priority within the various collective bargaining systems. This means that its practical 
implementation is taking place more laboriously and ambiguously than institutional 
pronouncements might lead one to believe. For this reason the work carried out in the 
¿ ve countries analysed here turns out to be extremely useful. Indeed, it represents a 
substantial contribution to the available knowledge concerning this phenomenon. And 
it puts particular emphasis, for the ¿ rst time, both in depth and on a comparative basis, 
on the quantitative development of company-level bargaining, but also the speci¿ c 
features it assumes within the national context.
2.  Some aspects of interpretation
The focus of academic discussions of decentralisation is usually the extent to which it is 
controlled and organised (based on the interpretative categories worked out by Traxler 
1995). This variable appears to be indispensable in helping us to classify the case study 
¿ ndings and their rami¿ cations for individual national systems. We shall therefore 
examine it in due course. 
But the Decoba project country reports con¿ rm a high degree of diɣ erentiation with 
regard to the behaviour of the parties concerned, and the substance and outcomes of 
collective bargaining. Indeed, it is reasonable to declare that the bottom line with regard 
to decentralisation, quite apart from whether it is negotiated or monitored, consists 
precisely in the following: it is connected to increasing diɣ erences between companies, 
sectors and national systems. It would therefore make sense to avail oneself of other 
monitoring and classi¿ catory instruments to examine the internal workings of the 
changes under way, rather than top-down or only in the aggregate. 
For this reason one might envisage at least three varieties of decentralisation or 
corporatisation of collective bargaining: 
(i)  wholesale decentralisation, in other words, a broader and more ambitious 
decentralisation that asserts itself at the expense of other levels of negotiation and 
tends to crowd out the competition, overturning collective bargaining structures 
by means of the priority assigned to the company level as opposed to the national 
one;
(ii)  incremental decentralisation, when it develops into an enhancement – more 
or less signi¿ cant – of the framework of regulations and protections already in 
operation by means of sectoral collective bargaining;
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(iii)  equivalent decentralisation, which takes shape in cases in which corporatisation 
does not result in substantial modi¿ cations in the framework of collective 
bargaining overall or in the balance between the bargaining levels. 
But how does the propensity towards decentralisation come into being and develop, 
along with its – whether real or assumed – increasing importance in industrial relations 
systems?
As highlighted in the national case studies, ¿ rst and foremost we can identify:
– pressures and arguments, and a certain commitment on the part of the European 
institutions, as well as unelected technocratic bodies (such as the ECB) leading 
towards an aɤ  rmation of this issue’s key importance;
– declarations, pledges and elaborative or normative processes instigated by national 
governments, often retranslating and rede¿ ning commitments of European origin;
– a focus on this issue as the outcome of cultural innovation, attesting to collective 
bargaining systems’ capacity to reform and modernise, instigated by the industrial 
relations actors themselves through the systems’ internal dynamics. 
The picture that emerges from the country reports testi¿ es to how these elements 
are often found mixed together, but except in the case of Germany, where the role of 
the employers’ side and of the agreements between the negotiating parties is crucial, 
the main initiative in this context largely derives from national and European public 
institutions. 
This trend enables us to underline something of a more general character. In fact, a 
standpoint that we might categorise as of neoliberal origin seems to be particularly 
inÀ uential, one that links the prescriptiveness of decentralisation to the consideration 
that it can establish itself naturally or spontaneously as an epiphenomenon of the self-
regulating market. However, the national case studies provide us with a quite diɣ erent 
picture. Decentralisation is applied to a greater or lesser extent but it takes shape and 
assumes a certain quantitative consistency only in the presence of a clear political or 
institutional impetus, through the use of a variety of instruments. 
To summarise the framework that underpins the promotion of decentralisation we 
might list the following: 
– The commitments of European instigation operating in the various countries to 
varying degrees and resonance. This variable seems more important in countries 
such as Spain and Italy, which were hit particularly hard by the great recession, 
while it is much less amenable to circumstances in Germany.
– National study commissions that amplify and orient the European impetus (as in 
the case of France). 
– Legislative interventions designed to reorganise the collective bargaining system in 
the direction of more marked decentralisation (France, Spain and Belgium). 
– Incentives within the framework of company bargaining aimed at boosting 
productivity increases (Italy). 
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– The prevalence of unilateral government actions, planned or implemented in 
almost all the relevant countries, concerning resort to concertation, except for the 
attempts – generally unsuccessful – on the part of the Hollande administration in 
France to reach a tripartite agreement; in some cases, such government decisions 
have been accompanied by partial accords between the parties, approved by some 
of the interested organisations. 
– A willingness, in some cases, among the social partners (Italy), an active role for 
employers’ associations (to a greater extent in Germany, to a smaller extent in 
France) and generally a certain puzzlement and a wait-and-see attitude on the part 
of the trade unions. 
Thus it is not actors’ particular attitudes – at least not alone or taken in isolation – that 
aɣ ect the development of decentralised bargaining. When this phenomenon manages 
to attain a foothold in the industrial relations domain it is because it is backed by 
the organisations of collective representation, as is particularly evident in the case of 
Germany. In other cases the social partners’ apparent agreement or willingness appear 
to be more for show. Take the example of Italy, with regard to which it is also worth 
mentioning the interconfederal agreement between Con¿ dustria and the trade unions 
(2016), signed in order to extend company bargaining to small businesses with regard 
to productivity and related bene¿ ts. 
The cultural and institutional background from which the bargaining experiences 
of the diɣ erent countries under examination derive should also be considered. Path 
dependence, to be sure, explains the diɤ  culties and resistance that can be observed as 
frequently among the trade unions as among the employers: and among the latter, they 
manifest themselves as much in individual attitudes as in collective choices. However, 
this applies in particular to union organisations. Generally speaking they regard 
company bargaining as problematic, given its peculiar features, and the possibility that 
it is just an tool of management interests. 
The only country that really stands out from this viewpoint is Italy. Indeed, in the Italian 
system, which traditionally is strongly voluntarist, it was originally trade union pressure 
in the 1960s – supported by the organisations of state-owned companies – that fostered 
the emergence of experiments with company-level bargaining (at the time, presented as 
‘articulated’ bargaining – in other words, supplementary to national bargaining). This 
historical background enables us to understand the reasons for the greater willingness 
generally displayed in this regard by Italian trade union confederations. 
Nevertheless, overall the diɣ usion of company-level bargaining remains unsatisfactory, 
especially if we relate the data presented in this volume to the – extremely strong – 
commitment of the public institutions and to the willingness exhibited by the social 
partners, including to a certain extent the trade union organisations. The reasons 
underlying this slow – or at any rate below expectations – growth are well explained in 
the chapter on Spain. It correctly underlines the transaction costs in setting up company 
bargaining, which are perceived as very high by most of the actors. Adopting this 
mechanism, whose bene¿ ts are hardly a foregone conclusion, requires from companies a 
substantial organisational, cultural and ¿ nancial commitment and increases their costs. 
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This particularly concerns smaller companies, which do not have the means necessary 
to cope with these requirements. To the organisational and economic diɤ  culties can 
be added a certain cultural resistance. On the employers’ side, many companies prefer 
to stick with tried and tested national agreements, which do not require any additional 
commitments or added costs. Furthermore, the bene¿ ts of multi-employer agreements, 
appreciated or preferred by a substantial proportion of the same employers, include that 
fact that they keep sectoral cost competition under control, thereby avoiding – more or 
less opportunistic – dumping. Thus it is not just the trade unions that have a problem 
or are reluctant to get on board with decentralisation, even though, generally speaking, 
they seem to take the view that decentralisation mainly favours company strategies and 
shifts the balance of power in favour of the management side. 
The paradox arising from the picture we have painted thus far is that the decentralisation 
of collective bargaining currently in the making in various countries – excluding opt-
outs exercised by a number of companies – should be regarded mainly as a kind of 
‘centralised’ decentralisation; in other words, desired and promoted by central, national 
or European bodies, laws and institutions and thus a higher-level centralisation than 
that of sectoral agreements. This approach, which is strongly evident in key regulations 
on decentralisation, seems rather oriented towards creating a ‘climate’ favourable for 
what has been described as ‘neoliberal decentralisation’ (Baccaro and Howell 2012). 
Its application does not consist so much in the concrete reinforcement of decentralised 
industrial relations as in making the erosion of national-level rules and constraints 
more plausible. 
3. Bargaining structure and coordination
The Decoba project’s choice to focus on two important sectors appears to be fully borne 
out. 
In fact, the metal industry ¿ gures prominently in the history of sectoral agreements, in 
which it has had a pivotal role. Partly, this remains the case, as may be seen from the case 
studies of Germany and Italy, and to a considerable extent in those of France, Belgium 
and Spain. In particular because of its size and well-established role in negotiations the 
metal sector continues to play a prominent role in Germany. Company-level bargaining 
does not seem to have called this into question – notwithstanding the reduction in 
collective agreement coverage – and instead rather complements it. 
The retail sector, which is highly fragmented and dominated by small businesses, has 
generally not featured prominently in traditional industrial relations. But the domain of 
private services is vast and growing, besides being extremely heterogeneous, and trade 
union activities and collective bargaining have found it hard to gain a foothold there. 
This has resulted in a renewed eɣ ort to reorganise industrial relations. 
In other words, as the data presented in the country reports con¿ rm, the metal sector 
generally functions well above average, with signi¿ cant sectoral bargaining, widespread 
company agreements (thanks to the presence of large leading ¿ rms) and consolidated 
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and well structured relations between the parties. In the retail sector, by contrast, things 
generally seem to be going in the opposite direction: it is rather below average, certainly 
in terms of collective agreement coverage.
In fact, bargaining experiences in the retail sector provide us with an outline of collective 
bargaining’s general lines of development. As the case studies make evident, in this 
domain decentralised collective bargaining is struggling to become established and 
appears linked above all to reorganisation measures or some group-wide agreements 
(especially in large retailers). This is hindered by various factors, such as the smaller 
size of businesses and their fragmentation, the weak trade union presence and the 
diɤ  culty of ¿ nding any bargaining chips in the face of strong management pressure 
to cut costs and increase À exibility. Developments in this sector make it easier to 
understand the wide range of trade union trajectories. For example, the downward 
trend in the membership of the ver.di union federation in Germany turns out to be 
related to the failure of collective bargaining to gain ground in this sector. By contrast, 
the often unpredictable growth in unionisation in Italy in the same bargaining sector 
forms the basis – even in a non-linear way – of a more entrenched and extensive 
bargaining activity. 
If, therefore, we adopt a quantitative approach, referring to the substance and 
importance of collective bargaining and decentralisation in the two sectors under 
examination it is safe to say that the data – to be sure, incomplete or not exhaustive 
in some instances – indicate a diɣ erence between the two sectors with regard to the 
breadth and robustness of collective bargaining. In a broad sense collective bargaining 
in the metal sector covers a large number of workers and exhibits a greater capacity 
for regulation. This also applies to company-level bargaining which stands out as 
comparatively more extensive and, at the same time, does not merely play second ¿ ddle 
to national agreements. Conversely, we can say that the picture is the opposite for the 
retail sector, albeit with some diɣ erences and nuances: bargaining coverage is smaller 
and generally appears to be less innovative and more defensive in nature. 
In the countries under examination, not surprisingly, a structural obstacle is mentioned 
that makes it diɤ  cult to extend company-level and decentralised bargaining. In a 
nutshell, company-level bargaining is developing in companies in which conditions are 
generally favourable, namely medium-sized and large companies. This functions as a 
kind of access barrier that is diɤ  cult to break down. Its eɣ ects are similar in the various 
countries, although the degree of impact diɣ ers. This gap between small companies, 
on one hand, and medium-sized and large ones on the other is particularly evident in 
the Mediterranean countries – Spain and especially Italy – in which small enterprises 
(sometimes even micro enterprises) predominate, to a greater or lesser extent. Having 
said that, the eɣ ects even in Germany, France and Belgium are not to be underestimated, 
as the national reports con¿ rm, although this is somewhat attenuated by the leading 
role of a fairly broad swath of large companies. 
As we have already shown, this helps explain the diɣ erences and varying robustness of 
bargaining structures between the metal sector and the retail sector. 
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In all the countries under examination here more or less signi¿ cant sectoral and 
company-level agreements have been signed in the metal sector, often renewed from 
previous agreements. The retail sector, on the other hand, is characterised by weakness 
and fragmentation, tending – for example, in the case of Germany – more in the direction 
of erosion of collective bargaining and ‘disorganised’ decentralisation; in other words, 
outside the rules agreed by the relevant actors at aggregate levels. 
While a signi¿ cant part of the metal sector includes companies committed to 
introducing technological and organisational innovations and to boosting quality and 
competitiveness, that hardly applies to the retail sector. There the competition between 
companies largely involves cutting costs and therefore may be best described as ‘taking 
the low road’. With the exception of a few sectors with more collective agreement 
coverage and otherwise protected the overall impression is one of worsening working 
conditions, longer working hours (with a particular emphasis on Sunday opening in 
some countries), À exibility and precarious terms of employment.
4.  Organised versus disorganised decentralisation:  metal industry 
In this section we focus on the recent changes in collective bargaining in the metal 
industry. As in many other economic sectors the ¿ nancial and economic crisis had 
negative eɣ ects on the metal sector, triggering job losses and a general deterioration 
in the labour market. Apart from Germany, severe employment declines aɣ ected 
metalworkers in many European countries, especially Italy and Spain, as we can see 
in Figures 1 and 2. A general negative trend also aɣ ected value added, which declined 
Figure 1  Employment trends in the manufacturing and metal sectors in selected European 
countries, 2008–2014 (%)
Source: Eurostat Business Statistics.
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Figure 2  Number of enterprises in the metal sector in selected European countries, 
2009–2014 
Source: Eurostat Business Statistics.
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Figure 3  Value added in the metal sector, 2005 and 2015 (%)
Source: Eurostat Business Statistics.
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Against this background it is worth examining how and to what extent the social partners 
– both employers and trade unions – reacted to the pressures imposed by the economic 
downturn and the institutional changes promoted by governments in order to boost 
productivity and sustain economic recovery. The metal industry retains a higher union 
density and collective bargaining coverage than other economic sectors, especially 
trade and retail (see next section). However recent changes in the institutional setting 
and the eɣ ects of the crisis have challenged the unions. In view of this, the aim of this 
section is to analyse the manner in which common trends towards decentralisation can 
be traced in the ¿ ve countries under investigation: Belgium, France, Spain, Germany 
and Italy. As widely recognised, in the metal industry, bargaining encompasses a higher 
number of workers and has a stronger regulatory impact. This also concerns company 
bargaining, which is comparatively more widespread and, at the same time, plays a 
relatively prominent role in national agreements. In many countries the sectoral level 
is signi¿ cant in collective bargaining. However in the more recent years, this does not 
mean that this organised system of social dialogue and collective bargaining is ‘dead’. 
It has rather shifted to a diɣ erent setting, depending on countries’ speci¿ c institutional 
arrangements. 
Even those countries – such as Belgium – that traditionally have been characterised 
by a high degree of centralisation have partially shifted their collective bargaining 
systems towards organised decentralisation. Sectoral bargaining is the main pillar 
of the metal industry’s industrial relations system. At the sectoral level, collective 
agreements are concluded in joint committees or joint subcommittees by all the social 
partners. Joint committees make decisions on pay levels, classi¿ cation schemes, 
working time arrangements, training and working conditions. Also, minimum wages 
are still negotiated at the sectoral level. In these circumstances the trend towards 
decentralisation appears to be grounded in coordinated bargaining at sectoral level. It 
is worth noting that derogation or opening clauses are not part of this decentralisation 
tendency. In fact, the social partners have managed to preserve an intermediary role. 
As noted by Van Gyes et al. in the Belgian report, neoliberal reforms have not been 
incorporated into collective bargaining and social dialogue. Conversely, the state has 
opted for more radical reforms aimed at strengthening wage moderation. It has to be 
said that government intervention has not aɣ ected the bargaining structure, but rather 
the autonomy of the bargaining system, especially after the reform of the wage-setting 
system in 2017. In response to the impact of such state-driven wage moderation on 
industrial relations and collective bargaining, the social partners have tried to bargain 
on various type of bene¿ ts at company and sectoral level (occupational pensions, 
variable pay beyond the ‘¿ xed’ basic wage increase and so on). Most of these À exible 
approaches have led to a new form of coordinated decentralisation that has limited the 
wage freeze imposed by central governments. With more limited room for manoeuvre at 
the intersectoral level, social actors have been able to regain autonomy and inÀ uence at 
sectoral and company level. As the authors provided for the Belgian chapter emphasise, 
they were able to mount their response to decentralisation pressures with a high degree 
of coordination. 
Together with Belgium, France is one of the European countries with a higher degree 
of industrial relations institutionalisation, characterised by state intervention even 
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at company level. Extensive regulation by the state is a traditional feature of French 
industrial relations. Since the Auroux laws of 1992 negotiations at company level are 
mandatory. As reported by Rehfeldt and Vincent, in 2015, 4,310 company agreements 
were signed by union delegates in the metal industry, corresponding to 10 per cent of the 
companies in the sector (1.17 million employees, around 70 per cent of all employees). 
Against this background it is worth noting that only the biggest companies used such 
agreements, with a focus on wages and working time. However, as Rehfeldt and Vincent 
report, such accords often represent only general agreements on job guaranties and 
social standards at company level. Other companies, in particular in the automobile 
sector, have signed diɣ erent agreements, focusing on competitiveness, representing 
what Rehfeldt and Vincent call the French version of ‘concession bargaining’. In France, 
bargaining has traditionally been underpinned by legislation at all levels, including 
derogation. However, as the authors highlight, the laws on derogation have not had a 
signi¿ cant eɣ ect in practice. Despite labour market reforms and changes in collective 
bargaining, the number of collective agreements has remained remarkably stable in 
recent years. Rather than legislation, it was the crisis and the impact of international 
competition that encouraged new decentralised agreements at company level in the 
metal industry. It is worth noting that none of these agreements needed any legal 
stimulation with regard to derogation. However, this might change in the future as a 
consequence of the El Khomri law of 2016 and the awaited reforms proclaimed by the 
new French President Emmanuel Macron. 
Rehfeldt and Vincent outline how French legislation has sought to foster company 
bargaining in the past few years – even before the El Khomri labour law – through 
derogation and the assignment of new tasks to unions at sectoral level in the form of 
a permanent joint committee on bargaining and interpretation. This joint committee 
is to have several tasks, from representing the sector with the public authorities to 
monitoring working conditions and interpreting branch agreements for the courts. 
According to the El Khomri law, competitiveness has to be fostered by greater 
decentralisation of collective bargaining at company level, in order to boost productivity 
and labour À exibility. However, it remains to be proven that such decentralisation can 
have a positive inÀ uence on wages and productivity. 
All these changes con¿ rm a trend towards decentralisation, with unions pushed by 
legislation and state intervention to perform new tasks at company level. The relevance 
of horizontal coordination remains, due to the SMIC. However, most of the recent 
changes promoted by President Macron may reinforce single-employer bargaining by 
limiting the areas reserved to sectoral agreements. 
Spain is a paradigmatic case in this regard, since it is the industrial relations system most 
aɣ ected by unilateral state intervention towards decentralisation and wage devaluation. 
Compared with Belgium and France the Spanish metal industry is characterised by an 
inverse relationship. As outlined by Rocha in the Spanish report, collective bargaining 
in the metal industry has been under pressure due to the combined impacts of the crisis 
and the labour market reforms, especially those of 2012. This combined eɣ ect and the 
traditional fragmentation of collective bargaining due to the high number of micro and 
small companies led to huge deterioration in the industrial relations system, without any 
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intermediary role for trade unions. According to data reported by Rocha these changes 
led to a reduction in the coverage rate, with a decline of 173,000 workers covered by 
collective agreements between 2008 and 2015 (around –14 per cent). Employers in the 
metal industry have taken advantage of this reform by adjusting working conditions at 
company level. As a result, such disorganised decentralisation has helped to strengthen 
companies’ unilateral power to impose wage devaluation and greater À exibility with 
regard to working time distribution. According to Rocha, companies’ unilateral power 
reinforces the trend towards internal devaluation through three main mechanisms: the 
establishment of new bargaining units at company level that can bargain in pejus to 
achieve wage cuts; temporary derogations from sectoral agreements; and, last but not 
least, a steady deterioration of working conditions. 
Employers in the metal sector favour decentralisation at company level. However, 
in some cases they have tried to preserve collective bargaining at territorial level. In 
contrast to the government’s position, employers’ confederations have defended this 
level because it represents a traditional pillar of the Spanish industrial relations system. 
Against this background, Spanish trade unions have reacted by defending provincial 
collective agreements and ensuring better coordination among the diɣ erent bargaining 
levels. Secondly, as Rocha highlights, they reacted by promoting defensive agreements 
aimed at mitigating the negative eɣ ects of the crisis at company level. Thirdly, after 20 
years of failed attempts, they were able to negotiate the ¿ rst statutory national-level 
collective agreement pertaining to industry, technology and services in the metal sector. 
The trend towards decentralisation has aɣ ected both Germany and Italy, but in diɣ erent 
settings. In Germany the Pforzheim Agreement marked a turning point in the long-
standing debate on decentralisation. Starting from this agreement the decentralisation 
of collective bargaining via opening clauses became the new normal in the German 
metal industry. According to data provided by the authors provided for the German 
chapter of this book, there was a steady rise in company-level derogations following the 
Pforzheim Agreement, from only 70 cases in 2004 to 730 in 2009, with the key issues 
being wages and working time. For the period 2012–2014, the data reported by the 
authors show an increase in such agreements: one-third of companies deviated from 
the sectoral agreement. In 2014 roughly half of all companies (representing 60 per cent 
of total employment in the metal industry) were covered by a derogation agreement. 
The Pforzheim Agreement introduced opening clauses into the metal industry. 
Against this background it is worth noting that, contrary to earlier opening clauses, 
the Pforzheim Agreement focused on procedural rules rather than derogations. 
As Schulten and Bispinck (in this volume) highlight in the case of deviation from 
sectoral agreements, the company and the works council are obliged to make a joint 
application to the sector-level bargaining parties. As a second step, unions negotiate 
a supplementary agreement with the company, on various issues, including working 
hours and wages. All these procedures allowed unions to regain control over opening 
clauses. With the establishment of such a general framework the social partners were 
able to inÀ uence decentralisation process, even during the ¿ rst years of the crisis, when 
unions and companies came under particular pressure. On the union side, it is important 
to note that the Pforzheim Agreement allowed unions not only to regain control over 
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decentralisation, but also to experiment with new strategies to recruit new members and 
foster their presence at company level. According to the new strategy, opening clauses 
can be accepted only with the active involvement and consent of union members at 
company level. Moreover, the metal union confederation IG Metall used company-level 
bargaining to recruit new members and to launch a new campaign to boost collective 
bargaining coverage. As Schulten and Bispinck highlight, the new strategy aimed at 
fostering collective bargaining coverage against outsourcing, temporary agency work 
and contract work and at preventing wage dumping in those sectors – such as logistics 
– in which sector-wide collective agreements are still lacking.
To some extent, this same trend can be observed with regard to the Italian metal 
industry. Despite pressure towards disintermediation the sector has maintained a 
certain degree of inter-sectoral coordination, with the role of the two traditional levels 
con¿ rmed. In the past few years, the employers’ association Con¿ ndustria has called 
for more decentralisation in wage setting, in the direction of ¿ rm-level bargaining. 
In the metal industry, the biggest company, FIAT, withdrew from Con¿ ndustria in 
2009 in order to evade the exigencies of collective bargaining and to impose its own 
establishment-level agreements. Against this background, negotiations for the new 
national industry-wide agreement took more than one year and the last two renewals 
were signed without FIOM-CGIL. At the end of a diɤ  cult negotiation, an agreement was 
reached in November 2016 with all the most representative trade unions, and signed 
after the workers approved the draft in a ballot. 
The new agreement provides a wide range of novelties:
– duration (from three to four years); 
– wages (a new inÀ ation adjustment mechanism de¿ ned every year ex post, not ex 
ante, as in other sectoral agreements);
– occupational welfare (both at sectoral and company level: health insurance, 
complementary pensions and a wide range of bene¿ ts provided at company level 
through vouchers);
– training;
– working conditions (total overtime limited to 120 hours per year for companies with 
more than 200 employees, and 128 hours for smaller ¿ rms);
– work–life balance (extension of parental leave); and 
– workers’ participation (new sectoral and national commissions on active labour 
market policies and participation in larger companies). 
The trade unions were able to circumvent the huge pressure towards decentralisation 
by using the new contractual architecture to relaunch collective bargaining. As pointed 
out in the Italian report (Leonardi, Ambra and Ciarini, in this volume), trade union 
confederations have reacted to the new contractual architecture with a certain degree of 
openness, considering the challenge as an opportunity to relaunch collective bargaining 
in terms of both coverage and contents. By contrast, employers stress the changes in 
order to improve À exibility and labour productivity. As the new collective agreement does 
not grant signi¿ cant wage increases, the trade unions reacted by extending bargaining 
on occupational welfare and À exible bene¿ ts at company level. Occupational welfare 
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and À exible bene¿ ts are seen as a way of improving both welfare service provision and 
labour productivity. The À exible bene¿ ts included in the metal industry’s agreement 
are additional ones, provided by the second-tier negotiation, conferring on all workers 
100 euros in 2017, 150 euros in 2018 and 200 euros in 2019. As noted by Leonardi, 
Ambra and Ciarini (in this volume) the vast majority of company-level agreements have 
been signed in larger companies – especially multinationals – with more than 1,000 
employees (39.7 per cent of the total). In fact, small and micro-enterprises are rather 
left out in the cold in this respect because it is diɤ  cult to introduce such À exible bene¿ ts 
without the economies of scale that larger companies enjoy. 
To sum up, collective bargaining was under constraint in all the ¿ ve countries analysed, 
subject to pressure from the economic crisis, on one hand, and from employer demands 
for greater À exibility and wage freezes, on the other. As a consequence of these pressures 
a new wave of decentralisation occurred in many countries. However, this does not 
mean that the previous system of collective bargaining is doomed. Rather its contents 
and tools are being relocated to a new decentralised setting in which the social partners 
can promote new strategies and initiatives in order to minimise the social cost and boost 
collective bargaining coverage. In many cases, the trend towards decentralisation and 
wage freezes has been reinforced by the state, through new legislative frameworks and 
direct intervention aimed at mitigating wage increases and promoting company-level 
bargaining. In Spain, pressures towards decentralisation and wage freezes imposed 
by state intervention have endowed companies with more unilateral power, which has 
had enormous consequences for both the labour market and industrial relations. In the 
other countries, state intervention has been counterbalanced to some extent by a new 
activism among the social partners, using new contractual arrangements to relocate 
Table 1  Collective bargaining in the metal industry: structure and trends in a 
cross-country comparison
Industrial relations in the metal 
industry
Trends towards decentralisation 
Germany The main pillar of the collective 
bargaining system in the German 
metal industry is sectoral bargaining. 
The metal industry is historically 
subdivided into 21 regional bargaining 
areas, in which the employers’ 
associations negotiate with the 
regional IG Metall organisations.
The trend towards decentralisation 
of collective bargaining has aff ected 
the German metal industry for more 
than three decades. For a long time, 
IG Metall was very sceptical of using 
opening clauses, which were criticised 
for undermining the principle function 
of sectoral agreements.
France Sectoral agreements guide collective 
agreements in the French metal 
industry. In order to gain more 
ﬂ exibility employers advocate 
company-level agreements.
Two types of collective agreements 
are negotiated at the sectoral level: 
conventions collectives (CC) and 
accords collectifs.
Despite labour market reforms and 
changes in the collective bargaining 
process, it is worth noting a 
remarkable stability in the number of 
collective agreements in recent years.
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collective bargaining and to extend welfare provision at sectoral and/or at company 
level. 
Tables 1 and 2 present the key evidence in the metal industry sector, distinguishing 
between structure and trends towards decentralisation (Table 1) and changes at sectoral 
and company level (Table 2). 
Table 1  Collective bargaining in the metal industry: structure and trends in a cross-
country comparison (cont.)
Industrial relations in the metal 
industry
Trends towards decentralisation 
Belgium Industrial relations in the Belgian 
metalworking sector are structured 
in terms of three interlinked levels: 
national, sectoral and company.
Sectoral bargaining is the main pillar 
of the metal industry industrial 
relations system. At the sectoral 
level collective agreements are 
concluded in joint committees or joint 
subcommittees by all social partners.
Joint committees make decisions on 
pay levels, classiﬁ cation schemes, 
working time arrangements, training 
and working conditions.
Sectoral collective agreements apply 
to all employers and employees 
covered by the joint committees or 
subcommittees concerned.
Spain Collective bargaining in the metal 
industry is traditionally fragmented 
and atomised, with a large number of 
agreements at provincial and company 
level. This is due to the high number 
of micro and small companies. 
In recent years there has been a slight 
increase in the weight of company-
level agreements, although this has 
not caused a substantial alteration 
in the existing structure of collective 
bargaining in the metal industry.
Italy Since 1993 collective bargaining 
has taken place at two levels in Italy. 
The two-tier bargaining system is 
based on industry-wide agreements. 
More recently the trade unions have 
reinforced the role of second-level 
bargaining, with the main aim of 
increasing ﬂ exibility and productivity.
In contrast to the countries examined 
here, in Italy there is neither a 
statutory minimum wage nor a legal 
extension mechanism. However, courts 
tend to honour minimum wage claims 
based on sectoral agreements for 
workers performing similar work.
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Table 2  Collective bargaining at sectoral and company level in the metal industry (cont.)
Collective bargaining at sectoral level Collective bargaining at company 
level
Germany In 2004 the Pforzheim Agreement 
introduced, for the ﬁ rst time, a general 
opening clause for the whole metal 
industry. According to this agreement, 
companies can derogate from sectoral 
agreements.
The Pforzheim Agreement reorganised 
‘wild’ decentralisation. With the 
deﬁ nition of a general procedural 
framework the sectoral bargaining 
parties were able to regain control of 
the decentralisation process
According to data provided by 
Gesamtmetall, there was a steady 
rise in company-level derogations 
following the Pforzheim Agreement. 
In September 2004, only 70 cases 
were reported by Gesamtmetall, 
but by April 2009 the number had 
increased to 730. The key topics 
addressed by derogation agreements 
were pay and working time. Other 
important employer concessions 
have included extension of workers’ 
and unions’ codetermination rights, 
and commitments to undertake new 
investment and retain operations at 
existing sites. 
France Collective agreements (CCs) guide 
wages, working conditions and sectoral 
welfare beneﬁ ts. The accords collectifs 
treat only speciﬁ c topics. In addition 
to conventions collectives, there are 
in the metal sector 76 conventions 
collectives territoriales (CCTs). They 
represent local agreements, mostly at 
départment level. 
CCs generally have unlimited duration. 
However, minimum wages for diff erent 
qualiﬁ cation levels are renegotiated 
annually and have the form of 
amendments to the CCT.
None of the minimum wages in the 
metal industry are below the statutory 
national inter-sectoral wage (SMIC)
Annual negotiations at company level 
are mandatory. As the amendments 
to the CC only ﬁ x the level of 
conventional minimum wages, these 
company agreements have a decisive 
impact on the evolution of real wages.
Bargaining in big companies (Renault, 
PSA and so on.) inﬂ uences the 
evolution of real wages in the whole 
sector.
Most company agreements concern 
wages and working time.
In 2015, 4,310 company agreements 
were signed by union delegates in 
the metal sector. This corresponds 
to 10 per cent of the companies in 
the sector. As these agreements are 
negotiated mainly by the biggest 
companies, they cover 1.17 million 
employees, around 70 per cent of all 
employees.
Belgium The trend towards decentralisation is 
based on coordinated bargaining at 
the sectoral level. 
Sectoral bargaining is organised in 
several joint committees that jointly 
discuss a wide spectrum of topics: 
wage increases, ﬂ exibility, working 
time, time credits and working 
conditions
Minimum wages are still negotiated 
at the sectoral level as well and are 
increased with the established wage 
margin. 
Sectoral agreements are 
complemented by lower-level 
ﬂ exibility in bargaining additional 
income components and working time 
features. 
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5.  Country or sector? A cross-country comparison of industrial 
 relations in the retail sector 
The decentralisation of collective bargaining in Europe is a well-known issue in the 
industrial relations’ literature (Traxler 1995, 1996, 2008; Marginson 2014; Marginson 
et al. 2016; Visser 2016). However, many studies focus on a country-speci¿ c industrial 
relations model, biased by the adoption of an approach centred on manufacturing. By 
contrast, few studies have looked at other sectors (Bechter et al. 2011) or have examined 
the retail sector in depth (Gautié and Schmitt 2010; Eurofound 2012; ILO 2015). 
The very ¿ rst study that found that industrial relations tend to vary more by sector 
than by country was that of Bechter et al. (2011). They showed how sectoral industrial 
relations regimes could vary, depending on the degree to which each sector is 
internationalised. Traxler and Brandl (2012) developed this argument, focusing on 
inter-sectoral productivity diɣ erentials between the tradeable (exposed) and non- 
tradeable (sheltered) sectors. 
Concerning research that has examined retail speci¿ cally, Gautié and Schmitt (2010) 
in their international comparative analysis underlined that the employment models 
Table 2  Collective bargaining at sectoral and company level in the metal industry (cont.)
Collective bargaining at sectoral level Collective bargaining at company 
level
Spain A slight increase in derogations from 
the contents of sectoral collective 
agreements. 
Aft er Article 41 of the Workers’ 
Statute in 2012 employers reinforced 
their unilateral power regarding 
working conditions. This reform was 
basically aimed at reducing the role of 
collective bargaining and reinforcing 
unilateral internal ﬂ exibility to the 
beneﬁ t of companies 
Labour market reforms aimed 
at boosting decentralisation of 
collective bargaining, through the 
establishment of new bargaining 
units at company level, which can be 
labelled agreements in pejus, namely, 
agreements targeted mainly at 
fostering cuts in wage costs. 
Italy Second-level bargaining was used as 
a defensive option in the crisis years, 
with the aim of tackling the negative 
eff ects of the economic downturn at 
company level.
More recently a new wave of 
decentralised agreements reﬂ ects the 
changes introduced by the stability 
laws of 2016 and 2017 with the 
provision of new ﬁ scal incentives for 
ﬂ exible beneﬁ ts at company level and 
occupational welfare schemes.
In general, the extension of company-
level bargaining in the metal industry 
increases with size of company. 
Second-level bargaining is limited in 
small companies. In contrast there is 
a higher incidence of individual and 
territorial bargaining. 
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characteristic of the retail sector diɣ er fundamentally from those in manufacturing. 
Retailing is typically a low-wage and low-skill sector, which generally involves a higher 
share of low-wage workers, part-timers and female employment (Carré et al. 2010). 
Moreover, it has a low union density (Dribbusch 2005) with lower collective bargaining 
coverage compared with other sectors (Visser 2015). According to Carré et al. (2010) 
working conditions and terms of employment have deteriorated in the sector. Working 
conditions are adversely aɣ ected in particular by a trend towards the fragmentation 
of working hours and compensation, experimentation with non-standard contracts 
and a ‘variety of other exit options from the institutions that safeguard job quality’. 
By contrast, Geppert et al. (2014) claim that it is wrong to generalise these working 
conditions to the retail sector, because company size makes a big diɣ erence. Organising 
a union is very diɤ  cult in smaller retail establishments than in larger stores. But does 
size of ¿ rm matter so much? Do unions have more room to manoeuvre in larger ¿ rms to 
bargain for better wages and working conditions? 
The aim of this contribution is to obtain a better understanding of the factors that 
might explain similarities and diɣ erences across the ¿ ve countries examined (German, 
Belgium, France, Spain and Italy) within the retail sector.
Although each country has its own model of work regulations and a distinctive national 
industrial relations system, a general convergence can be observed towards deteriorating 
wage and working conditions in the retail sector in all the countries examined in this 
book as an outcome of collective bargaining at sectoral and company or local level. What 
other factors could contribute to explain this converging trend?
By focusing on the retail sector across ¿ ve diɣ erent countries, our ¿ ndings con¿ rm 
the speci¿ city of working conditions in the retail sector, which have been observed in 
other research. They are characterised by more articulated working time arrangements 
(Eurofound 2012) and growing use of atypical contracts, with less social protection (ILO 
2015). In addition, as Eurofound (2012) outlined, retail has undergone a considerable 
transformation over the past decade, especially regarding its competitive structure 
and the growth of large companies at the expense of the numerous small and micro 
businesses. 
Since ¿ rm size could be a crucial factor in unionising workers and obtaining better 
conditions, we further compared retail companies by size across the countries examined.
We distinguished four diɣ erent ¿ rm sizes: (i) micro: from zero to one employee; 
(ii) small: from two to nine employees; (iii) medium: from 10 to 49 employees; and 
(iv) large: over 50 employees. Table 3 shows that the retail sector is structurally 
characterised by a large number of micro-¿ rms and/or self-employed. 
The percentage of micro-¿ rms in the French retail sector is very high (about 83 per 
cent). Rather than talk about ‘¿ rms’ in such a case, it seems more correct to talk about 
self-employed workers. These percentages are quite high also in Belgium (about 59 per 
cent), Italy (about 55 per cent) and Spain (about 50 per cent).
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In the French, Spanish and Italian retail sectors, micro- and small ¿ rms taken together 
(or ¿ rms with fewer than 10 employees) account for 98 per cent of all ¿ rms operating 
in the sector. The percentage of medium-sized and large ¿ rms (with more than 10 
employees) is relatively higher only in Germany (about 17 per cent), followed by Belgium 
(about 5 per cent of ¿ rms). Besides the structure of the retail industry across countries, 
since it is assumed that trade unions are likely to ¿ nd more conducive conditions for 
organising workers in large ¿ rms, it is important to examine the diɣ erent proportions of 
Table 3 Enterprises and persons employed in the retail sector, 2015 (by ﬁ rm size)
Enterprises Micro-enterprises
(0–1 employee)
Employees Employees in 
medium-sized and 
large enterprises 
(more than 10 
employees)
a.v. % a.v. %
Germany  338,742 22.2 3,705,195 76.1%
France  526,254 83.4  1,966,245 58.9%
Belgium  75,034 58.7  321,993 57.9%
Spain  450,958 50.0  1,646,089 46.4%
Italy  606,355 54.9  1,821,435 39.1%
Notes: Firm size: Micro: from zero to one employee; small: from 2 to 9 employees; medium: from 10 to 49 employees; large: 
over 50 employees. Data for Belgium and France refer to 2014.
Source: Eurostat, Distributive trades by employment size class (NACE Rev. 2, G) [sbs_sc_dt_r2]; Last updated 11.09.17.
Figure 4 Employees in the retail trade, by ﬁ rm size, 2015
Source: Eurostat, Distributive trades by employment size class (NACE Rev. 2, G) [sbs_sc_dt_r2] (last accessed 
11.09.17). Data for Belgium and France refer to 2014.
24%
41% 42%
54%
61%
76%
59% 58%
46%
39%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Germany France Belgium Spain Italy
% of workers in micro and small firms % of workers employed in medium and large firms
The ‘resistible’ rise of decentralised bargaining: a cross-country and inter-sectoral comparison
 Multi-employer bargaining under pressure – Decentralisation trends in ﬁ ve European countries 57
workers employed in medium-sized and large retailers in each country. According to the 
latest Eurostat data (2015), the majority of the retail workforce is employed in medium-
sized and large ¿ rms (with more than 10 employees) in all the examined countries, 
except for Spain and Italy. German medium-sized and large retail companies employ 
about 76 per cent of workers in the sector, as against 59 per cent in France and 58 per 
cent in Belgium. Only in Spain and Italy do we ¿ nd less than half the retail workforce in 
medium-sized and large companies (46 per cent and 39 per cent, respectively). 
We can expect that German unions will have more room to manoeuvre with regard to 
representing and organising retail workers than Italian unions. However, as the German 
country report shows, trade unions (in this case Ver.di) nevertheless seem weak and 
unable to reach collective agreements with very large companies, such as Amazon or 
Zalando. This calls into question the idea that unions can bargain better wages and 
working conditions in bigger ¿ rms, with higher union density. Perhaps company size 
is a necessary condition for a union presence, but insuɤ  cient for improving wages and 
working conditions. It would also be worth analysing the diɣ erences between large 
retailers with diɣ erent business models; big, global players such as Amazon or Zalando 
operate within e-commerce, with characteristic products and diɣ erent strategies from 
those pursued by multinational food distributors, such as Carrefour, Auchan, Metro 
and Lidl.
Other factors that could help us in explaining this convergence towards lower wages 
and worse working conditions in the retail sector are the structure and characteristics 
of employer and union organisations and the way their relationships are changing in 
diɣ erent countries.
We have focused, for each of the examined countries, on the most signi¿ cant 
transformations in employment relations in the retail sector. The aim is to identify the 
main changes in the national industrial relations system that may have an impact on the 
retail sector, collective bargaining at sectoral and company level and, particularly, on 
relations between collective actors aɣ ecting wages and working conditions.
In the German retail sector, as outlined by Schulten and Bispinck (2017), one of the 
most relevant changes aɣ ecting labour relations has been the refusal of the employers’ 
association to adopt the extension of collective agreements. Since 2000, retail agreements 
have not been generally binding. As a result, collective bargaining coverage has declined 
dramatically (Felbermayr and Lehwald 2015). In addition, a signi¿ cant number of large 
retail corporations decided to withdraw from collective bargaining (Glaubitz 2017). The 
withdrawal of companies (especially large companies) from collective agreements is 
considered one of the driving forces towards more disorganised employment relations 
in the German retail sector (Schulten and Bispinck 2017). Consequently, working 
conditions in German retail have worsened, in term of both wages (which are below 
the average wage levels in the economy) and prolonged working time.  For instance in 
2014, about 22 per cent of all retail workers earned less than 8.50 euros per hour. Only 
in 2015 did the introduction of a national statutory minimum wage begin to reverse this 
trend, with the aim of raising low wages. According to Bosch (2016), in conjunction with 
the introduction of a minimum wage in Germany in 2015, measures to make it easier 
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to declare collective agreements generally binding were enacted. However, the author 
also stresses that these measures cannot be implemented without the agreement of the 
employers. In many industries not covered by collective agreements, the only way to 
achieve this is the mobilisation of employees and trade union action. Regarding the 
practice of extension rejected by the employers’ association since 2000, the situation 
has not changed. A signi¿ cant number of companies have declared that they take the 
existing sectoral agreements as ‘orientation’. Therefore the proportion of employees 
covered by collective agreements at sectoral level decreased from 50 per cent in 2010 to 
39 per cent in 2016, while the share of establishments covered by collective agreements 
fell from 33 per cent in 2010 to 27 per cent in 2016.  Since this practice is rooted mainly in 
diɣ erent strategies pursued by diɣ erent groups of employers (oɤ  cially, the employers’ 
association is against extension, although some individual employers are in favour) it is 
crucial to investigate employers’ strategies further. 
In the French retail sector (as in Spain and Italy), there are many collective agreements 
at national/sectoral level (about 89). The company agreements – also in major 
retailers – generally take over the contents of sectoral agreements, with the addition of 
certain provisions, such as complementary health care or training schemes and (very 
rarely) wage bene¿ ts. The main issue for HR management is the organisation of work 
schedules. The main change has been the latest legislative developments, which made 
negotiations at company level prevail over the sectoral level, especially with regard to 
working time. In addition, with the Macron law of 2015, and the El Khomri law of 2016 
opening possibilities on Sundays have widened. As Rehfeldt and Vincent highlight in 
their chapter, Sunday working and the extension of opening hours have become central 
issues in company negotiations. Low wages are prevalent in the French retail sector 
(similar to other countries). The proportion of employees paid close to the statutory 
minimum wage (SMIC) is the highest (between 20 and 32 per cent) in this sector. 
Moreover, the sector is characterised by great À exibility with regard to working time (29 
per cent of retail workers have schedules that vary from week to week, compared with 
22 per cent in the private sector as a whole). Almost nine out of ten people employed 
in this sector (88 per cent) work usually or occasionally on Saturdays or Sundays (as 
against 52 per cent in the private sector as a whole).
New rules on the deregulation (‘liberalisation’) of retail sector working time were 
introduced also in Italy in 2012, thus having a strong impact on industrial relations 
in the sector, in particular by fostering a split within the main employers’ association 
(see Ambra in this volume). This trend toward more fragmentation of collective actors 
has had an impact on collective bargaining at sectoral level, pushing toward further 
segmentation of the retail sector:
(i)  the traditional retail sector (made up of micro-, small and medium-sized ¿ rms 
associated with Confcommercio or Confesercenti);
(ii)  large-scale and modern distribution (made up of large multi-national companies 
associated with Federdistribuzione); 
(iii)  the cooperative distribution sector (made up of cooperatives, with their speci¿ c 
‘cooperative’ business model).
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The three trade union confederations, which started joint negotiations with all the 
employers’ associations, were able to sign (for the ¿ rst time jointly) the renewal of the 
national collective agreement at sectoral level only with two employers’ associations 
(Confcommercio in 2015 and Confesercenti in 2016), representatives of the vast array 
of micro-, small and medium-sized ¿ rms, but not of large ¿ rms. Negotiations with 
Federdistribuzione, on one side, and with the cooperative distributors, on the other, are 
still under way. Therefore, since 2012, after the split between the two main employers’ 
organisations, about 220,000–230,000 workers in many large ¿ rms still lack a sectoral 
agreement at national level. In addition, since 2013, about 80,000 workers are awaiting 
the renewal of the sectoral agreement with the so-called ‘Distribuzione Cooperativa’. 
Moreover, in recent years, the economic crisis has reduced the level and quality of 
decentralised collective bargaining. Even large retail companies and multinationals 
unilaterally cancelled many of the previous collective agreements at company (or 
establishment) level. Sometimes trade unions have been able to negotiate new collective 
agreements, at the cost of lowering wages and worsening working conditions in exchange 
for job retention. In addition, many new employers’ associations and unions – which 
are not really representative – have been signing new collective agreements at national 
and sectoral level, giving rise to what we call ‘pirate bargaining’. Another anomalous 
phenomenon is the option for companies to choose the sectoral agreement they prefer. 
For instance some ¿ rms operating in the logistics and transportation sector decided to 
associate with Confcommercio and to adopt the national collective agreement signed 
for the small and medium-sized retail sector instead of the national agreement in the 
logistics and transportation sector. These practices raise questions about who decides 
where the borders of a sector lie. How can it be established which sectoral collective 
agreement shall apply to which sector? 
To better understand the phenomenon it would be useful to further analyse the employer 
associations’ strategies and company strategies (especially those of multinationals) 
designed to take advantage of institutional loopholes. Regarding working conditions in 
the Italian retail sector, signi¿ cant changes have strongly aɣ ected workers, including 
increases in temporary contracts and involuntary part-time work (which increased from 
43 per cent in 2008 to 71 per cent in 2015). The introduction of new part-time contracts 
(such as the ‘8 hours contract’ on Saturdays and Sundays for students and young people 
below than 25 years of age). More working time À exibility was introduced at sectoral 
level (for instance, the Confcommercio agreement renewed in 2015 prolonged working 
time from 40–44 hours a week to 40–48 hours). 
The growing fragmentation of collective actors at national and sectoral level is not a 
peculiar feature of the Italian retail sector nor of Italian industrial relations. In France, 
there is a similar– or higher – degree of pluralism. However, within the framework of the 
French model of ‘state-regulated’ employment relations, recent new laws (in 2008 and 
2014) introduced further and clear rules on the representativeness of collective actors 
(both unions and employers’ organisations). By contrast, Italian trade unions and, above 
all, employers’ associations have showed strong resistance not only to the possibility of 
legally regulating the social partners’ representativeness, but also to the introduction 
of some form of statutory minimum wage, as proposed by the Renzi government in 
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2014. A widely shared position among the social partners – both unions and employers’ 
organisations – was that a statutory minimum wage was not necessary because of the 
extensive coverage of sectoral agreements (Colombo and Regalia 2016: 315). For this 
reason Italy’s industrial relations system still stands out among the countries under 
examination here due to its lack of a statutory minimum wage. Italy is in fact the only 
country considered in this volume in which minimum basic wages are ¿ xed by the social 
partners through sectoral agreements. 
In Belgium, every two years trade unions, employer representatives and government 
conclude an inter-professional agreement, which includes a wage norm. The most 
important transformation aɣ ecting the Belgian retail sector was the changing of this 
wage norm from indicative to imperative. The Belgian retail sector is regulated through 
diɣ erent committees (large ¿ rms versus small ¿ rms) that settle on diɣ erent standards 
(in order to take into account, for example, the diɣ erent conditions of the self-employed). 
Negotiations in the concertation committees of small companies are friendly, since there 
are no statutory representative bodies in small enterprises and workers’ representation 
is more limited. Agreements at sectoral level provide a generally agreed minimum by 
leaving few possibilities for the company level (for instance, the possibility to choose 
between alternatives such as meal vouchers or group insurance). Derogations and opt-
outs are allowed only in exceptional cases as part of drastic restructuring processes. 
In addition, in Belgium every sectoral agreement includes a legally required extension 
norm, which makes it binding for unaɤ  liated companies. This is crucial in the 
Belgian retail sector in order to limit (wage/cost-based) competition and to secure the 
(income) protection of all employees. Nevertheless, it is diɤ  cult for trade unions to 
monitor companies’ compliance, especially in the case of small retailers because there 
is almost no employee representation. On the other hand, increasing competition and 
restructuring are putting pressure on employers and making it more and more diɤ  cult 
to aggregate interests. Consequently, employers are becoming more and more interested 
in decentrally-bargained variable pay. 
In Spain, the most signi¿ cant change aɣ ecting labour relations in the retail sector was 
the 2012 labour market reform aimed at fostering the decentralisation of collective 
bargaining. As outlined by Rocha (in this volume), after the 2012 changes most of the 
new company-level agreements signed can be de¿ ned as ‘in pejus’, in the sense that these 
agreements focused mainly on cutting wages (‘wage costs’), extending the annualised 
working day and further À exibilising working time. Also in the Spanish retail sector 
there is a high number of sectoral collective agreements (about 387 in 2015, covering 
about 1.44 million workers), while the coverage of company-level agreements decreased 
from 7.3 per cent of all workers covered in 2012, to 4.3 per cent in 2015. Similar to 
other countries, wages in the retail sector are lower (with an average of 19,771 euros 
a year against an average of 22,858 euros a year in all economic sectors). However, 
there is a statutory minimum wage of 9,034 euros a year. Wages increases are linked 
to sales (taking as a reference the volume of sales in 2010). In a context of increasing 
deregulation of shopping hours, the elimination of paid Sundays and holidays has 
worsened working conditions.
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In conclusion, in each of the examined countries (which have diɣ erent institutional 
characteristics), we always found worse wage and working conditions in the retail sector 
than in manufacturing. The retail sector has undergone a great transformation during 
the past decade, especially in terms of its competitive structure and the growth of large 
companies at the expense of small and micro businesses. Nevertheless, the high presence 
of micro-¿ rms and the self-employed – which seems to be a common trait of the vast 
world of ‘traditional retail’ across all the examined countries – may have inÀ uenced the 
characteristics and structures of retail industrial relations and the relations among the 
collective actors, resulting in a general drop in average wages and worsening working 
conditions (more atypical contracts, prolonged working time, involuntary part-time, 
Sunday working and so on). 
Company size is a necessary condition for a trade union presence and worker organisation, 
but even it is insuɤ  cient to allow trade unions to act collectively (through traditional 
collective bargaining) to improve wages and working conditions. Another factor 
related to ¿ rm size is the range of business models adopted. The retail industry may be 
divided into ‘traditional retailing’, made up of micro-¿ rms and self-employed, ‘modern 
and large-scale organised distribution’, made up of large companies, franchising and 
multinationals, and ¿ nally e-commerce, mainly made up of global players. Therefore 
it would be useful to analyse horizontal coordination not only in the sense of inter-
sectoral coordination, but also in a new light, focusing more attention on the dynamics 
between employers’ and union organisations within the sector. 
6. Final considerations 
However much it may be proclaimed company-level bargaining does not emerge 
automatically. This is demonstrated by the case of Spain, where it remains weak despite 
repeated institutional attempts to strengthen it and to make it the centre of gravity of 
the whole bargaining system. 
The data presented in this volume make it clear that it is France and Germany where a 
marked tendency towards rising company-level bargaining is to be found. 
In the case of France this growth, measured over recent years and an indication that 
the constraints arising from the so-called great recession have been overcome, appears 
due mainly to the favourable institutional framework and, in some cases, promotional 
eɣ orts. This framework was imposed in the early 1980s by the Auroux laws, which 
enshrined an obligation to negotiate. It remains to be seen whether another push will 
be provided by the measures currently being contemplated by the Macron government, 
which were also inspired by the general thrust towards decentralisation.
In Germany, by contrast, decentralisation, which has progressively become more 
entrenched in recent years, appears to be the outcome of changes in bargaining strategy 
that have taken place within the framework of industrials relations, and thus brought 
about by the actors themselves through successive agreements, encouraged in particular 
by the employers. 
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As for Italy, it seems to be on the rise, sustained by various public incentive mechanisms 
developed over recent years. However, it would be jumping the gun to try to draw 
conclusions from this, whether quantitative or qualitative. Only future observation 
will show whether the previously limited space for decentralised bargaining is being 
expanded (practiced to date by only 20 per cent of companies) to cover a proportion of 
small enterprises, and also whether bargaining topics are signi¿ cant and in line with 
the pursuit of more innovation or are more ‘utilitarian’ in nature, seeking to exploit 
economic incentives. 
Still on the subject of the contents of bargaining the information supplied by the 
national reports is certainly useful, but will require more systematic investigation in 
the near future. 
Generally speaking, it emerges from the data and the qualitative assessments that the 
main bargaining topics in the metal sector are concentrated on wages and working time, 
although other, currently less important topics are not neglected, such as organisational 
and technological changes and work organisation. The ¿ rst two issues were important 
in the years leading up to the ¿ nancial and economic crisis because they were subject to 
demands for more À exibility or, to put it another way, for adjustment to more diɤ  cult 
circumstances. In most cases, as the data show, À exible adjustments of this kind occurred 
in a negotiating context that diɣ ered from the past (when it was oriented largely towards 
commercial ends). In general, they tended to revolve around job retention guarantees 
or, in some countries, such as France, were oriented towards an agreed reduction, 
underpinned with guarantees, of jobs deemed surplus to requirements. 
Flexibilisation of working hours and of terms of employment tends to be more 
characteristic of the retail sector. But even in this case not everything is necessarily 
stagnant or to be criticised. Here, too, spaces are opening up – although not generally 
and it is unknown whether generalisation is even possible – in pursuit of new ‘terms of 
trade’ and compromise in negotiation in response to other considerations. One might 
mention, in some countries, agreements in which other topics have been introduced 
into the bargaining framework, in the form of non-wage compensation. Such trends 
are evident, for example, in the design of working hours (À exible working hours among 
other things), various welfare services or other bene¿ ts, as well as greater attention to 
conciliation and more besides. 
The national case studies provide a robust cognitive and interpretative framework 
within which we can draw up an initial overall assessment concerning bargaining system 
trends, the substance of decentralised bargaining, the quality of the various processes 
and the outcomes emerging in company-level bargaining. 
Turning to the initial questions the ¿ rst point to make is that bargaining decentralisation 
is less widespread than desired or expected and that overall – at least in the countries 
under examination here – it does not call into question previous bargaining structures 
and the framework of disorganised decentralisation. In the case of Spain there have been 
repeated attempts to dismantle the collective bargaining system in favour of company-
level bargaining (in contrast to multi-employer bargaining), which is considered to be 
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‘closer’ to the problems of both management and workforce. Here, too, however, the 
data show that these repeated attempts have not produced the expected eɣ ects and 
established a lower centre of gravity for collective bargaining, but rather have led to 
more ambiguous outcomes, ¿ rst and foremost an erosion of bargaining, especially in 
the retail sector. 
In the case of France, too, the push to boost decentralised bargaining both quantitatively 
and qualitatively has to date led to uncertain outcomes and although the legislation 
provides the necessary basis for this, it cannot be said that, to date, company agreements 
have taken oɣ  and displaced sectoral agreements. 
Even more ambiguous is the situation in Italy, where, in response to a law (Article 8 
pushed by the Berlusconi government in 2011) favourable to the primacy of so-called 
‘proximity bargaining’ the decisions and actions of interest-representing organisations 
have taken a rather diɣ erent direction, tending rather largely to reaɤ  rm traditional 
bargaining structures. It should be noted that during the last parliament government 
did not tackle bargaining structures and instead worked towards strengthening 
decentralised agreements, although without impinging on the prerogatives of national 
bargaining (without prejudice to provisions otherwise speci¿ ed, but only partially 
implemented). 
On this basis, what we de¿ ned at the beginning as ‘wholesale decentralisation’ has 
become established, for the time being, only in a limited – albeit important – part of 
the economy in the countries under examination. This applies primarily to big players 
in international markets who prefer their bargaining ‘made to measure’ and closely in 
accordance with management preferences. 
But also the company-level bargaining that we have de¿ ned as ‘incremental’ does not 
really seem to have taken oɣ , despite a number of examples cited by the authors of the 
case studies. The most noteworthy instance in this respect seems to be Germany, where 
company-level bargaining could help to expand room for negotiation and also help to 
increase bargaining coverage, which would be extremely valuable. 
The substance of this phenomenon is diɤ  cult to measure in the case of Italy, where there 
have been numerous signi¿ cant instances of bargaining (see, for example, Pero and 
Ponzellini 2015). Certainly a wide range of enterprises have been reaching agreements 
introducing new organisational models, making cost savings and productivity increases, 
with variable, but positive bene¿ ts on job quality. These agreements are widespread in 
the metal sector, but less so in the retail sector. Apart from the fact that they indicate a 
certain dynamism in some companies (especially medium-sized ones), what proportion 
they represent of companies as a whole is not clear; nor is their ability to serve as a 
positive reference for other companies in these sectors. 
It should also be noted that the larger companies in this category, in all the countries 
under consideration, would also – under certain conditions – be the ones most tempted 
to switch (to wholesale decentralisation). It must be said, however, that decentralisation, 
where it really takes place, rather belongs in the third category, namely ‘equivalent 
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decentralisation’, which at least on the surface does not rock the boat with regard to 
existing agreements. It also seems reasonable to suppose – as indicated by the German 
data – that in such cases a shift is occurring in favour of management, while the trade 
union role is primarily to contain disruptive impulses. 
All in all, the bargaining activities described in this report and in the various countries 
largely come in the category of ‘organised decentralisation’. However, as the German 
chapter shows, this broad formula is liable to induce complacency, masking bargaining 
agreements’ underlying features and dynamics, particularly their quality and depth. 
In fact, this assessment covers a wide range of phenomena, which only increases the 
heterogeneity of bargaining solutions and situations, both within and across sectors. 
This also explains the major complications that beset collective representation. 
When decentralisation is managed the system overall continues to function, albeit 
more slowly. All the case studies complain about lower levels of collective bargaining, 
both quantitative and qualitative. Their worries include the resilience and viability 
of national sectoral agreements, even though they are not lacking in innovation and 
potential, not to mention whether they will be able to maintain the broad scope they had 
in the past. The national sectoral agreement signed in Italy in late 2016 can be regarded 
as something of a relaunch of this instrument, even though the new bargaining issues 
– such as training, welfare and grades – put forward in them at present lack adequate 
redistributive mechanisms. 
According to the authors of the German chapter it would be worth exploring in more 
detail the extent to which decentralisation represents an opportunity for trade unions. 
They describe, taking the example of Germany, positive – albeit still in the minority 
– experiences that could conceivably serve to support union organising. This can be 
con¿ rmed by the other national case studies, with the exception of companies with 
a long tradition and well established institutional rules that nurture decentralised 
bargaining and enable its ongoing adaptation (which seems to be happening in some 
quarters among Italian companies). 
To sum up, the extension and quality of decentralisation in the countries examined 
in this book still seem to be variable, ambiguous or inadequate. For this very reason, 
however, it would be a good idea to try to build on this by increasing the actors’ 
participation to expand it and make it more eɣ ective. But such an advance would be 
possible only by means of a veritable cultural evolution, in which those involved might 
emerge as stakeholders in decentralisation, enhancing reciprocity in decision-making 
and mutual bene¿ ts. This would clarify the possible advantages for employees, beyond 
job retention. 
It is clear from the picture presented here that, while important, the (main) institutional 
factors are not up to the job of engineering a real take-oɣ  for decentralisation. The cultural 
‘glue’ that we referred to above would also be a great help. The envisaged scenario thus 
stands a chance only if the collectively organised actors play a more prominent role and 
show more commitment. They would help realise the full potential of the ‘social factors’ 
that could bring about an eɣ ective upgrade in decentralised bargaining processes, as 
the driving force behind their take-oɣ . 
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But as can be seen from the present volume, these social factors are struggling to 
materialise and to get up and running. Resistance remains formidable in some quarters 
of the business community, where collective organisations face problems in their eɣ orts 
to work out an adequate approach that is recognised by all those involved. 
There are also critical issues on the trade union side, despite the fact that substantial 
progress has been made, as evidenced by the document produced in 2016 by the Italian 
trade union confederations, which are clearly pushing in this direction. Having said that, 
adequate structures and practical outcomes have yet to manifest themselves. Overall, 
trade union organisations are making heavy weather of a clear strategic choice in 
favour of decentralised and company-level agreements, both because of their diɤ  culty 
in convincing their members of the bene¿ ts and due to the continuing prevalence of 
largely defensive attitudes.
References
Addison Ambra M.C. and Carrieri M. (2017) La crescente interdipendenza tra contrattazione e 
welfare, in Sviluppo and Organizzazione, 278, 59–71.
Baccaro L. and Howell C. (2011) A Common Neoliberal Trajectory: The Transformation of 
Industrial Relations in Advanced Capitalism, Politics and Society, 39 (4), 521–563.
Baccaro L. and Howell C. (2012) Il cambiamento delle relazioni industriali nel capitalismo 
avanzato: una traiettoria comune, Quaderni di Rassegna Sindacale-Lavori, No. 1/2012, 
13–73.
Bechter B., Brandl B. and Meardi G. (2011) From national to sectoral industrial relations: 
developments in sectoral industrial relations in the EU, Luxembourg, Publications Offi  ce of the 
European Union. https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/wbs/research/irru/publications/
recresrep/ef1110en_gm.pdf
Bosch G. (2017) The making of the German minimum wage: a case study of institutional change, 
paper presented at 29th Sase Annual Meeting, ‘What’s next? Disruptive/collaborative economy 
or business as usual?’, 29 June–1 July 2017, Lyon, France.
Carré F., Tilly C., Van Klaveren M. and Voss-Dahm D. (2010) Retail jobs in comparative perspective, 
in Gautié J. and Schmitt J. (eds) Low wage work in the wealthy world, New York, Russell Sage 
Foundation, 211–68.
Colombo S. and Regalia I. (2016) The reform and impact of joint regulation and labour market 
policy during the current crisis: Italy, in Koukiadaki A., Távora I. and Martínez Lucio M. (eds) 
Joint regulation and labour market policy in Europe during the crisis, Brussels, ETUI, 257–320.
Crouch C. and Traxler F. (1995) Organized industrial relations in Europe: what future? Aldershot, 
Avebury.
Dribbusch H. (2005) Trade union organising in private sector services: ﬁ ndings from the British, 
Dutch and German retail industry, WSI Discussion paper 136, Düsseldorf, Institute of Economic 
and Social Research.
Eurofound (2012) Working conditions in the retail sector, Dublin, European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/ef/sites/
default/ﬁ les/ef_ﬁ les/docs/ewco/tn1109058s/tn1109058s.pdf
Eurostat (2017) Distributive trades by employment size class (NACE Rev. 2, G). http://appsso.
eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=sbs_sc_dt_r2&lang=en
Mimmo Carrieri, Maria Concetta Ambra and Andrea Ciarini
66  Multi-employer bargaining under pressure – Decentralisation trends in ﬁ ve European countries
Felbermayr G. and Lehwald S. (2015) Tarifbindung im Einzelhandel: Trends und Lohneff ekte, Ifo-
Schnelldienst, 68 (11), 33–40.
Gautié J. and Schmitt J. (eds) (2010) Low-wage work in the wealthy world, New York, Russell Sage 
Foundation.
Geppert M., Williams K., Wortmann M., Czarzasty J., Kagnicioglu D., Kohler H. D. , Royle A., Rückert 
Y. and Uckan B. (2014) Industrial relations in European hypermarkets : home and host country 
inﬂ uences, European journal of industrial relations, 20 (3), 255–271.
Glaubitz J. (2017) Verdrängungswettbewerb im Einzelhandel: Zwischen Preiskrieg. Tariffl  ucht und 
Altersarmut, Düsseldorf, Ver.di Fachbereich Handel. 
ILO (2015) Employment relationships in retail commerce and their impact on decent work and 
competitiveness, Issues paper for discussion at the Global Dialogue Forum, 22–23 April 2015, 
Geneva. 
Koukiadaki A., Távora I. and Martínez Lucio M. (2016) Joint regulation and labour market policy in 
Europe during the crisis, Brussels, ETUI. 
Marginson P. (2014) Coordinated bargaining in Europe: From incremental corrosion to frontal 
assault? European Journal of Industrial Relations, 21 (2), 97–114.
Marginson P., Keune M. and Bohle D. (2016) Negoziare gli eff etti dell’incertezza? In discussione la 
capacità di governance della contrattazione collettiva, Quaderni di Rassegna Sindacale Lavori, 
No. 1/2016, pp. 103–121.
Pero L. and Ponzellini A. M. (2015) Il nuovo lavoro industriale tra innovazione organizzativa e 
partecipazione diretta, in Carrieri M., Nerozzi P. and Treu T. (eds) La partecipazione incisiva. 
Idee e proposte per rilanciare la democrazia nelle imprese, Bologna, Il Mulino.
Pulignano V. and Keune M. (2014) Understanding varieties of ﬂ exibility and security in 
multinationals: product markets, institutions variation and local bargaining, European Journal 
of Industrial relations, 21 (1), 5–21.
Schulten T. and Bispinck R. (2017) Varieties of decentralisation in German collective bargaining 
– experiences from metal industry and retail trade in WP C.S.D.L.E. ‘Massimo D’Antona’, INT – 
137/2017, Catania, University of Catania.
Traxler F. (1995) Farewell to labour market associations? Organised versus disorganised 
decentralisation as a map for industrial relations, in Crouch C. and Traxler F. (eds) Organized 
industrial relations in Europe: what future?, Aldershot, Avebury, 3–19.
Traxler F. (1996) Collective Bargaining and Industrial Change: A Case of Disorganisation? A 
Comparative Analysis of Eighteen OECD Countries, in Eur Sociol Rev, 12 (3), 271–287.
Traxler F. (2008) Le sﬁ de delle relazioni industriali: una comparazione transnazionale, in Senatori 
I. (ed.) Teoria e prassi delle Relazioni Industriali. Letture di Diritto delle Relazioni Industriali, 
Milano, Giuff rè editore, 70–87.
Traxler F. and Brandl B. (2012) Collective Bargaining, Inter-Sectoral Heterogeneity and 
Competitiveness: A Cross-National Comparison of Macroeconomic Performance, British Journal 
of Industrial Relations, 50 (1), 73–98.
Visser J. (2015) The Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention 
and Social Pacts. ICTWSS Database, version 5.0, Amsterdam, Amsterdam Institute for 
Advanced Labour Studies.
Visser J. (2016) What happened to collective bargaining during the great recession? IZA Journal of 
Labor Policy, 5 (9), 1–35.
All links were checked on 18.12.2017.
 Multi-employer bargaining under pressure – Decentralisation trends in ﬁ ve European countries 67
Chapter 3
Opposites attract? Decentralisation tendencies in the 
most organised collective bargaining system in Europe
Belgium in the period 2012–2016
Guy Van Gyes, Dries Van Herreweghe, Ine Smits and Sem Vandekerckhove
1. Introduction
In this chapter we present an overview of recent decentralisation tendencies in the 
Belgian collective bargaining system. In Belgium, organised social dialogue is a core 
element of consociationalism as governance system, a form of democracy in which 
harmony in segmented societies is maintained through the distinctive role of elites and 
the autonomy of organised interests (Deschouwer 2012). A dense network of social 
dialogue bodies and concertation structures is created at the national level to maintain 
social peace and cohesion, and to stimulate economic growth. The characteristics of this 
industrial relations system include: full union participation, recognition and integration; 
a legal framework; centralised and strong organisations on both the employers’ and 
the employees’ side; socio-economic policy concertation; a mix of self-governance 
(paritarism), subsidiarity and state action with regard to social security; mechanisms 
of information and consultation (but not codetermination) in the workplace; and 
ideological pluralism among the actors (especially on the trade union side) linked to 
historical ‘pillarisation’ (Van Gyes et al. 2009). Collective bargaining in Belgium, and 
especially wage bargaining, is known for its high levels of coordination, organisation 
and coverage. A traditional three-level structure is framed by two-year intersectoral 
bargaining, automatic wage indexation, a central wage norm and a statutory minimum 
wage (Vandekerckhove and Van Gyes 2012; Dumka 2015). Despite politically polarised 
positions and regular failure to achieve consensus, the institutional apparatus remains 
intact and there is in general social peace holds sway.
The focus of this report is the period 2012–2016. A second economic dip after the 
2009 recession, linked to the Eurozone crisis, resulted in a period of economic 
stagnation, rising unemployment and continued ¿ scal problems. Belgian politics, 
having ¿ nally resolved a four-year ethno-linguistic dispute and spurred by European 
recommendations, embarked on ambitious reforms, targeting ¿ scal austerity and 
international cost competitiveness. Ending a record period of 514 days without a federal 
government, the country was governed from 2011 to 2014 by a broad multi-party 
coalition of socialists, Christian Democrats and liberals, led by prime minister Elio Di 
Rupo. In autumn 2014, a centre-right government of liberals, Christian Democrats 
and right-wing Flemish nationalists was formed under prime minister Charles Michel. 
Although institutional continuity reigns, social dialogue has come under pressure. In 
particular, the presence of the non-traditional party N-VA and the lack of political allies 
in the government challenged the trade unions, which still enjoy large-scale support 
among the workforce and have maintained a union density rate above 50 per cent. The 
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unions started political strikes and protested against the government(s), but struggled 
to have the same impact as before in the changing environment for social concertation. 
The labour movement has come under increasing criticism by politicians and media. 
Social dialogue has been called into question for ‘not delivering’. 
With this changing political climate of social dialogue as context, we will investigate the 
extent to which the Belgian system of collective bargaining exhibits the decentralisation 
tendencies observed elsewhere. To do so, we ¿ rst depict the traditional and even today 
still strongly organised framework and practice of collective bargaining in Belgium in 
the next section. In Section 3 we then examine decentralisation trends in this system 
using a seven-dimensional operationalisation of the general decentralisation concept. 
In the closing Section 4 we illustrate these trends by summarising the ¿ ndings from 
interviews in two sectors: the metal industry (manufacturing) and retail (services). 
The main conclusion is that although in comparative perspective the Belgian collective 
bargaining system is arguably the most organised and centralised in the EU or the 
OECD (OECD 2017), this does not imply that, in absolute terms, employee relations are 
rigidly ¿ xed and settled only by centralised powers of social dialogue. Decentralisation 
tendencies are also part of the system and today even considered to be interesting 
solutions by the social partners.
2.  The traditional collective bargaining system (at the start of the 
 period under examination)
2.1  Institutional and legal framework
The traditional collective bargaining system in Belgium is entirely regulated by the Act 
of 5 December 1968 on collective bargaining agreements and sectoral joint committees 
(1968-12-05/01) in which the right to organise and bargain collectively is recognised 
and protected. Wage bargaining is structured through three interlinked levels: the 
highest, national level, with centralised cross-sectoral agreements covering the entire 
economy; an important intermediate level covering speci¿ c sectors; and company-level 
negotiations as a complement or substitute for the sector-level bargaining. In principle, 
lower-level agreements can only improve (from the employees’ perspective) what has 
been negotiated at a higher level; in other words, there is no derogation.
Every company and employee is assigned to a sectoral joint committee as soon as the 
company applies for a social security number and the employee is registered. In this 
way, both the employee and the employer can retrieve the sectoral settlements for 
collectively agreed wages, generally including a job classi¿ cation system and a wage 
grading scheme. These systems can be further developed and are often supplemented by 
company-level systems. Finally, the eɣ ective wage level may also include an individual 
raise, notably for higher-level jobs or for occupations characterised by employment 
shortages.
At the sectoral level the collective agreements are concluded within joint committees 
or joint subcommittees by all the organisations that are represented by them. There 
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are around 165 joint (sub)committees that make decisions on pay levels, classi¿ cation 
schemes, working time arrangements, training and so on (see Table 1 for the most 
important ones). The sectoral collective bargaining agreements apply to all the 
employers and employees covered by the joint committees or subcommittees concerned. 
As negotiations at this level give legal content following the agreements at the national 
cross-sectoral level, the sector remains the most important bargaining level overall. 
Moreover, for many non-wage items, this is the highest level of negotiation. When all 
parties sign the sectoral agreements, legal extension by royal decree is fairly easy and is 
therefore nearly always applied. 
By virtue of the 1968 Act, all employers who are members of an employers’ organisation 
that has concluded a collective agreement at national or sectoral level, or who have 
themselves concluded a collective agreement, are bound by such agreement (Humblet 
and Rigaux 2016). The essence of Belgian law on collective agreements is that as soon 
as an employer is bound by such an agreement, the entire workforce becomes bound. 
In other words, a collective agreement binds the employees merely by virtue of the 
fact that they work for an employer who is bound by an agreement. Consequently, 
workers who do not belong to a signatory organisation (that is, a trade union party to 
a collective agreement), but who are employed by an employer member of a signatory 
organisation, are bound by the agreement. This corresponds to the notion that a trade 
union negotiates on behalf of all the workers in a particular economic sector. 
Table 1 Largest joint committees by employment size, Belgium, 2015
Number Committee Statute Number of workers
200 Auxiliary committee white-collars † White-collar  422 973
330 Health sector White/blue-collar  253 961
322 Temporary agency work/personnel 
services ‡ 
White/blue-collar  224 010
124 Construction Blue-collar  143 061
111 Metal industry Blue-collar  115 468
302 Horeca White/blue-collar  114 083
201 Retail (non-food) White-collar  88 722
140 Transport Blue-collar  77 261
207 Chemical industry White-collar  76 956
319 Social work White/blue-collar  68 835
209 Metal industry White-collar  65 248
118 Food industry Blue-collar  58 960
310 Banks White-collar  55 193
311 Warehouses White-collar  54 048
Notes: † Includes employees from the business service sector, and white-collar workers from sectors in which they are a 
small minority, such as construction. ‡ Includes a voucher system subsidised by the state, mainly used for household chores. 
Source: Social Security Administration RSZ/ONSS.
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Furthermore, when these agreements are concluded at the national or sectoral level, 
they can be declared binding erga omnes by Royal Decree. This holds only for collective 
agreements that have been concluded in joint bodies. Once a collective agreement has 
been extended, its provisions become binding – without any possibility of deviation 
– on all employers and the employees in their service, provided they fall within the 
territorial and professional scope of the agreement. Two consequences À ow from this 
extension to non-aɤ  liated parties:
(i) collective agreements that have been declared generally binding will bind all 
employers and employees falling within the jurisdiction of the joint body, insofar as 
they fall within the scope stipulated in the agreement;
(ii) it is an oɣ ence for an employer not to comply with the normative provisions of a 
collective agreement.
An employer cannot avoid the application of normative provisions by disaɤ  liating 
from the signatory employers’ organisation. According Article 21 of the 1968 Act: 
‘An employer whose aɤ  liation to an organisation bound by the agreement comes to 
an end shall remain bound by the said agreement unless and until the terms of the 
Box 1  Hierarchy of legal norms in Belgian labour law according to Article 51 of the Act 
of 5 December 1968
The sources of obligations arising out of the employment relationship between 
employers and employees shall be as follows, in descending order of precedence:
1. the law in its peremptory provisions;
2. collective agreements declared to be generally binding, in the following order:
a. agreements concluded in the National Labour Council;
b. agreements concluded in a joint committee
c. agreements concluded in a joint subcommittee;
3. collective agreements that have not been declared generally binding, where the 
employer is a signatory thereof or is aɤ  liated to an organisation signatory to such 
an agreement, in the following order:
a. agreements concluded in the National Labour Council;
b. agreements concluded in a joint committee;
c. agreements concluded in a joint subcommittee;
d. agreements concluded outside a joint body;
4. an individual agreement in writing;
5. collective agreements concluded in a joint body, but not declared generally 
binding, where the employer, although not a signatory thereof or not aɤ  liated to 
an organisation signatory thereto, falls within the jurisdiction of the joint body in 
which the agreement was concluded;
6. work rules; 
7. the supplementary provisions of the law;
8. a verbal individual agreement;
9. custom.
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said agreement are so amended as to bring about a considerable modi¿ cation of the 
obligation arising out of the agreement.’ This provision guarantees some stability in 
labour relations and avoids a situation in which an employer who is dissatis¿ ed with 
a collective agreement negotiated in a joint body attempts to avoid its application by 
disaɤ  liating from the signatory organisation. 
In order to prevent conÀ icts between collective agreements concluded at diɣ erent 
levels, but covering the same industry, the legislator has established a hierarchy of 
collective agreements. Article 51 establishes a hierarchy between collective agreements 
concluded within the National Labour Council, a joint committee, a joint subcommittee 
and outside a joint body, as outlined in Box 1.
By virtue of this article, certain provisions of collective agreements may therefore be 
declared null and void on the basis that they are contrary to provisions contained in a 
hierarchically superior collective agreement. Consequently, the outcome of collective 
bargaining which has taken place in the body with the largest sphere of inÀ uence 
prevails over the others. 
However, in this hierarchy one can also see that collective agreements concluded in 
a joint body, but not extended or declared generally binding by Royal Decree, rank 
below the individual agreement in writing. Article 26 of the law stipulates that the 
normative issues related to the individual employment relationship (that is, wages, 
working time and so on) in such a non-extended sector or national agreement are, in 
principle, binding (supplementarily binding), if not stated otherwise in the individual 
employment contract. As a consequence, it is common practice in the Belgian system 
to ask for the collective agreement to be declared generally legally binding by Royal 
Decree, to avoid this kind of derogation.
The social peace obligation obliges parties to refrain from formulating any additional 
claims concerning matters regulated by the collective agreement during its period of 
validity. Also, the peace clause may go further and prohibit any additional claim during 
the same period. This obligation may be expressed tacitly or explicitly. When the collective 
agreement does not explicitly address social peace, this obligation is restricted, in the 
sense that it relates only to matters regulated by the collective agreement. The social 
peace obligation is the transposition into labour law of the principles of civil law related 
to the execution of contracts, namely the autonomy of will, the obligatory (binding) 
force of contracts and their execution in good faith. Once it has been negotiated and 
concluded, a contract must be executed in accordance with the parties’ agreement. 
In general, social peace clauses form part of the obligatory portion of the collective 
agreement. This means that they do not bind either employers or employees, whether 
unionised or not, but only their representative organisations. However, social peace 
clauses could also be considered as forming part of the normative provisions when their 
wording is such that their scope of application is broader than that of signatory parties. 
The wording of the social peace clause therefore determines which persons are bound 
by it.
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To ensure implementation in good faith, signatory parties to a collective agreement are 
obliged to inform their members of the content of collective agreements and to exert 
inÀ uence on their members to live up to the normative provisions of the agreement. 
This obligation is not absolute, since signatory parties are not ultimately responsible 
for their members’ conduct. Furthermore, when one signatory party violates the social 
peace obligation, the right of the other party to be indemni¿ ed is limited. Article 4 of 
the 1968 Act provides speci¿ cally that in the case of non-performance of contractual 
obligations, damages can be recovered from an organisation when the collective 
agreement speci¿ cally provides for such a possibility. This never happens in practice, 
however.
2.2  Centralised instruments of coordination
Although, as already mentioned, the legal focus of collective bargaining is the sectoral 
level, the wage bargaining system in particular has developed into a more centralised 
and coordinated system. This is reÀ ected in Belgium’s very high score in the ICTWSS 
centralisation index (Visser 2013). The centralised set of coordinating instruments that 
shape the wage bargaining process in this way include: a statutory minimum wage, 
automatic wage indexation, and bi-annual social programming determined by a central 
wage norm.
2.2.1 Minimum wage
In 1975, the guaranteed average monthly minimum wage (GAMMW) was introduced 
through a collective agreement concluded in the National Labour Council.1 A royal 
decree gives the agreement legal force, so that it applies to all private-sector wage 
earners in Belgium. The GAMMW is the minimum wage that private-sector employers 
must guarantee to a full-time worker for an average month. It is indexed through the 
pivot mechanism (see below) and was last raised in real terms in October 2008.
To determine whether the employer has complied with this obligation, the worker’s 
average monthly wage is calculated. The de¿ nition of the wage – what components 
should be brought into the equation – is left to the sectoral joint committees. If the 
joint committees have not concluded an agreement, the average monthly wage consists 
of the compensation for normal hours worked (for example, wages in cash or in kind, 
bonuses and bene¿ ts based on normal hours worked), excluding certain elements such 
as payment for overtime hours, union bonuses and double holiday pay. The elements 
are added up for a calendar year to obtain the annual wage and a monthly average 
is calculated. The average monthly wage thus obtained can be compared with the 
GAMMW which the employer has to meet.
2.2.2 Wage indexation 
Belgium is one of the few remaining countries in western Europe that have nearly 
universal automatic index-linking for setting wages. This means that pay and social 
security bene¿ ts are linked to a consumer price index. The link is intended to prevent 
1. Dutch: Nationale Arbeidsraad (NAR); French: Conseil National du Travail (CNT).
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the erosion of purchasing power by inÀ ation. Often misunderstood by critics, the system 
is not centrally organised, but rather a patchwork of sectoral mechanisms agreed upon 
freely by the members of the joint committees (NBB 2012) They diɣ er in terms of 
timing, indexation system, calculation of the moving average of the index, rounding 
rules, target groups, and other details. The only restriction, imposed by the law (Royal 
Decree 1993-12-24/34; Act 1994-03-30/31) is that sectors that index wages have to use 
the so-called Health Index, which is the normal consumer price index excluding the 
prices of cigarettes, alcohol and fuel for motorised vehicles. In practice, the sectoral 
agreements refer to the Social Index’, which is a four-month moving average of the 
Health Index. Two types of wage indexation exist:
(i) Pivot system: when the Health Index reaches an increase of 2 per cent, wages 
are also increased by 2 per cent (sometimes with a delay of one month or more). 
This system is, for example, applied in the public sector. Not the date, but the pay 
increase is ¿ xed.
(ii) Coeɤ  cient system: this system looks at the reference index at a certain point in 
time and compares it with another point in time. This percentage diɣ erence will be 
applied to wages. This can be done on a monthly basis, quarterly, every half year, 
yearly and so on. Annual indexation is found most often, with January being the 
usual month for indexing wages. In this system the date of adjustment is known, but 
not the increase. 
2.2.3 Bi-annual intersectoral programming and the wage norm
At the national level, informal pay negotiations in the private sector take place every two 
years outside the permanent oɤ  cial bipartite structure – that is, outside the National 
Labour Council. The result is a national cross-sectoral agreement2 that de¿ nes the wage
norm, which is the upper limit for sectoral and ¿ rm-level pay increases for the following 
two years. The bargaining group, called the ‘Group of Ten’, meets in seclusion, away 
from the media and the general public, and consists of the key representatives of the 
national social partners recognised by the Central Economic Council3 and National 
Labour Council. It is led by a representative of the largest employers’ federation, the 
FEB-VBO. These ‘social-programming’ agreements constitute political and moral 
commitments and are considered very inÀ uential, although they are in principle not 
legally binding. In the absence of a ¿ nal agreement, however, the government may 
legally enforce parts of it in law. While wage increases are further speci¿ ed in sectoral 
collective agreements, non-wage elements of the agreements are often implemented by 
national collective agreements settled in the National Labour Council. Hence one could 
argue that these agreements are the functional equivalent of a bipartite social pact, but 
reached in close interaction with the government. 
The state supports the biannual negotiations with a strict law on monitoring and 
intervention in the wage-setting system and through the services of the Central 
Economic Council. The purpose is to manage wage increases and balance the automatic 
indexing of wages and sectoral bargaining. The 1989 Law on the competitiveness of the 
2. Dutch: Interprofessioneel Akkoord (IPA); French: Accord Interprofessionel (AIP).
3. Dutch: Centrale Raad voor het Bedrijfsleven (CRB); French: Conseil Central de l’Economie (CCE).
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economy (1989-01-06/31) authorises government intervention if the average overall 
wage increase results (based on past performance) in an upsurge of relative labour 
costs and in a deteriorating external performance of companies in the private sector. 
The 1989 Law was extended in 1996 (1996-07-26/32) to enable the government to 
monitor the wage bargaining process even more closely. The most important changes 
with respect to the 1989 Law were a shift from an assessment of labour costs based 
on past performance to one that predicted future performance, and the fact that the 
number of countries used as a benchmark was reduced to three. The forecast weighted 
growth of foreign hourly labour costs (a weighted average for France, Germany and 
the Netherlands) now acts as an upper limit for wage negotiations at all levels (macro, 
sector and company). This limit is suggested to the social partners to be adopted as the 
wage norm. The lower limit remains, as before, the automatic price index. 
3.  Decentralisation and centralisation tendencies
Collective bargaining and especially wage bargaining in Belgium is thus known for its 
high degree of coordination and the importance of the sectoral level of negotiations. 
During the crisis, unlike in other European countries, no major institutional changes 
were made in wage-setting mechanisms (Vermandere and Van Gyes 2014; Dumka 
2015). However, more recently tendencies towards (de)centralisation can be detected, 
and although they do not yet represent major institutional reforms of the system in 
question, they do represent change and transformation.
3.1  Conceptual framework
There is no real consensus on the de¿ nition or measure of decentralisation in the 
literature on decentralised collective bargaining. In broad terms, decentralisation means 
that decision-making authority or power is transferred from the higher/central to the 
local/lower level. Applied to industrial relations, this means that the process of setting 
wages and other contract terms moves downwards in the hierarchical levels of labour 
regulation (Soskice 1990). The ‘decentralisation’ discussion of collective bargaining 
institutions centres around the question of whether wages should be set at the company 
or workplace level, the industry level (intermediate) or the national level (centralised).
Table 2 Conceptual arena of potential decentralisation/centralisation by levels, Belgium
Single company Sectoral or
multi-company bargaining
Intersectoral
Local Company/establishment – –
Region/province – – –
National – National sector agreement National pact/agreement
International – – –
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Table 2 shows that more options are available with regard to the shifting of labour-
regulation powers, for instance adding the geographical dimension. From a Belgian 
perspective – which in recent decades has, politically, become a ‘federalised’ country, 
in which the regions have gained importance – considering the regional level within a 
study of ‘decentralisation’ is certainly a sensible possibility. An additional perspective is 
the occupational divide, which could be added to the table, making it three-dimensional, 
indicating whether agreements at any level or geographical circumscription apply to all 
occupations or are occupation-speci¿ c, in which case this fragmentation of collective 
bargaining is another form of decentralisation.
The next element in the decentralisation discussion is how regulatory or bargaining 
power is decentralised or centralised. Borrowing from the broader conceptualisations 
in administrative science, the following might be mentioned:
– Decentralisation strictu sensu: A clear pattern of decentralisation strictly speaking 
(or ‘devolution’) is provided when collective labour regulation is shifted from a 
higher to a lower level, in the most extreme case from a national, intersectoral, 
multi-occupational bargaining agreement to an agreement for one occupational 
group at a local company or establishment. 
– Deconcentration: The creation of new joint negotiation bodies at the same level, 
which take over powers or responsibilities of the former bodies.
– Delegation/empowerment: The shifting of bargaining power or tasks to lower levels; 
they gain the independence to decide issues on their own, even though they are 
still controlled. The higher level is also still involved. This route can be designated 
as empowerment because the local or lower-level players are explicitly granted 
decision-making power, while the central intervention or agreement establishes the 
local consultation/bargaining procedures and facilities.
– Derogation/opting-out: Deviant collective bargaining agreements organising the 
undercutting of collectively agreed standards by lower-level company agreements. 
This process is facilitated by the necessary inclusion of procedural derogation 
clauses in higher-level collective agreements.
Besides these clear and formally detectable trends of decentralisation, implicit or 
indirect forms of decentralisation can be distinguished (Tros 2001), as well as a shift in 
the balance of power through state intervention:
– Centralised retreat: The abolition, non-continuation or slimming down of 
substantive rules at a centralised or higher level, leaving it open who will ¿ ll in the 
regulatory gap. This will always be a lower-level decision-making unit.
– Deliberate (or not) abstention: New issues are not picked up or are deliberately left 
to other levels of bargaining and regulation. 
– Overruling/state intervention: In this case the bipartite bargaining process is 
overruled by a state intervention imposing a new labour regulation.
In what follows we discuss these dimensions with regard to the development of the 
Belgian collective bargaining system in recent years.
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3.2  Decentralisation strictu sensu: maintenance of multi-level bargaining, 
 with tendencies towards regionalisation
Traditionally in Belgian collective bargaining, the most importance is attached to the 
sectoral level. However, Table 3 draws a more nuanced picture for the largest sectors 
and sector joint committees (referred to by their number or name). Notably in the 
capital-intensive sectors, where labour cost is only a minor issue – although with 
high operational importance – sectoral agreements have never been very important. 
Furthermore, pattern bargaining or bargaining coordination between diɣ erent sectors 
is a pervasive practice in not-for-pro¿ t sectors such as health care and social work. The 
table also mentions many intermediate forms, highlighting the multi-level character 
of the bargaining system and the complementarity between the diɣ erent levels. This is 
also the case for other domains of collective bargaining besides wage setting, such as 
working time regulations. It is thus a fallacy to describe the Belgian practice of collective 
bargaining as a homogeneous, centralised sector system.
However, despite the various levels that are in operation at the same time, the coverage 
rate of collective agreements is still a stable 90 per cent or more. Only particular 
Table 3 Typology of sectors by dominant bargaining form, Belgium
Category Key examples
1 Sectors together Social (health, social work, socio-cultural sector)
2 Sector; only additional company 
bargaining in a very few large 
companies
Joint committees 106, 118, 119, 121, 124, 
130, 140, 201, 226, 303, 304, 314, 317, 327
Blue-collars: construction and construction-
related sectors, graphical industry, transport
White-collars: small retail; horeca, transport, 
arts
White-collars/blue-collars: hairdressers and 
parlours, cleaning, private security; sheltered 
employment for people with disability
3 Sector; additional bargaining in largest 
companies
Garages, textiles, electricians
White-collars: food retail
Large retailers
4 Sector acts as a target-setting 
framework for company bargaining
Non-ferro and metal manufacturing
5 Sector acts as a substitute when no 
company agreement is reached or 
settled
Petro-chemical industry and chemical industry
Auxiliary committee for white-collar and blue-
collars workers (100 and 200)
Banking
6 Company agreements Steel and paper industry
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managerial staff (so-called ‘cadres/kaderleden’) are not bound by these agreements, 
but their working conditions follow at least the increases of the lower-level 
employees. 
As far as decentralisation goes, regionalisation is perhaps a deeper trend. In October 
2011, a sixth state reform was agreed at the political level, continuing the transfer of 
powers to the regional governments and split the electoral constituency of Brussels-
Halle-Vilvoorde, which had been a contentious issue for several decades. Under that 
reform, additional labour market powers were transferred to the regions from 1 July 
2014, such as reductions in social security contributions for speci¿ c target groups, paid 
educational leave and employment plans for job-seekers, while social security, labour 
law, organisation of social dialogue and wage setting remain federal competences. 
Before the reforms, the federal state was responsible for the ‘passive’ component of 
employment policies (bene¿ ts), while the ‘active’ component was a shared responsibility 
between regions, communities and the federal government. Now the regions will 
have more competences regarding active labour market policy (ALMP): vocational 
training, a set of employment incentives, direct job creation policies (for example, 
the household service vouchers system) and controlling and sanctioning active job 
search behaviour. 
Because of the creation of autonomous regional government levels in the 1980s, proper 
policy instruments were needed (Ongena 2010). Especially in Flanders – the largest 
region, which called most for state reforms – the creation of a proper social-economic 
dialogue channel for both the social partners and the political elite was a priority. Early 
on, regional social and economic councils were installed. For instance, two important 
bodies are active in the Flemish social dialogue: SERV (Social and Economic Council 
of Flanders) and VESOC (tripartite commission). SERV (Social and Economic Council 
of Flanders) is the consultative and advisory body of the Flemish social partners, in 
which they determine their common viewpoints and formulate recommendations and 
advice. SERV provides advice on all matters with a socio-economic impact for which the 
Flemish government is authorised. In Flanders SERV is viewed as a centre of dialogue 
and expertise. The tripartite dialogue between government, trade unions and employers 
takes place within the Flemish Economic and Social Consultative Committee (VESOC). 
If a consensus is reached within VESOC, the Flemish government commits itself to 
carrying out all resolutions for which there is consensus. The Flemish social partners 
defend this consensus to their members and contribute to its implementation. The 
chairman of the VESOC committee is the Flemish minister president, the head of the 
Flemish government (www.serv.be/en/serv).
Comparable institutions exist also in the other regions (Conseil économique et social 
de Wallonie, CESW; Conseil économique et social de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale, 
CESRBC).
The regional social dialogue and consultation has led to speci¿ c employment pacts or 
agreements. Examples include the Career Agreement in 2012, the Jobs Pact of 2015 
and the Training and Education Pact of November 2016 in Flanders. In Wallonia 
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concertation was concentrated around the Walloon government’s consecutive ‘Marshall 
plans’ to revitalise the economy. 
In Flanders these tripartite agreements led to the negotiation of sectoral covenants 
between the sectoral social partners (often still organised at the federal level) and the 
Flemish government. Although these agreements do not regulate the employment 
relationship and thus are not collective agreements strictu sensu, they form a ‘tripartite’ 
contract. These sectoral covenants provide a framework that commits all social 
partners in a sector to targets with regard to increasing diversity, school–labour market 
transitions and lifelong learning. These targets do not have to be met in each enterprise 
separately: the social partners are expected to apply for support and to implement plans 
on the company level on a voluntary basis. Examples of targets include: the number of 
diversity plans to be concluded within the next year, the share of migrant workers in 
training courses set up by the sector and so on. 
When sectoral covenants are approved by the Flemish government, the sector receives 
funding for the recruitment of sectoral consultants who assist the social partners in 
the implementation of their sectoral plan and the preparation of dossiers. Sectoral 
covenants are agreements for 2–3 years. After each year, the industry should provide 
a progress or ¿ nal evaluation report to the Flemish government. All sectoral covenants 
are monitored and evaluated annually by the Flemish government. The ¿ rst generation 
of sectoral covenants were concluded within the framework of the Flemish Employment 
Agreement 2001–2002. The policy became structural following a speci¿ c Flemish 
decree on sectoral covenants in 2009.
On 22 May 2015, a new policy framework was agreed by VESOC. A performance-
oriented follow-up system was the main innovation. To date, 34 sectoral covenants have 
been concluded. Execution and coordination of the targets included in the covenants is 
done by 120 consultants, employed by joint sectoral organisations but subsidised by the 
Flemish government.
One result of the growing importance of the regional level has been closer collaboration 
on the employers’ side between the diɣ erent organisations. Although unions also 
have diɣ erent coordination and preparation bodies to internally discuss the diɣ erent 
regional activities and negotiations, they are still confederated (mostly) at national level 
(Pasture 2000). However, regional social dialogue is organised on the employers’ side 
by diɣ erent organisations, among which VOKA, Flanders’ Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, stands out. Since 2012 and the state reform, closer concertation has been 
organised between the diɣ erent employers’ umbrella organisations – eight in total - 
to coordinate and prepare cross-sectoral social dialogue talks at diɣ erent levels on a 
monthly basis. This Intersectoral Employers’ Dialogue is coordinated by the main and 
still federal umbrella employers’ organisation FEB-VBO, but includes also regional-
speci¿ c employers’ confederations (BECI, UCM, UNIZO, UWE and VOKA).
However, labour law (including collective agreements and their organisation) remains 
a federal power.
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3.3  Overruled by government intervention
In the period 2011–2012 Belgium came under ¿ re from ¿ nancial markets and under 
the close supervision of the EU semester. Politics and government, temporarily freezing 
the ethno-linguistic conÀ ict, took the lead in a programme of austerity and structural 
reforms, of which budget cuts, welfare reforms, an increase in the retirement age and 
wage moderation are key aspects, touching core features of existing agreements between 
social partners. 
Table 4 National cross-sectoral ‘programming’ by the Group of Ten, 2009–2016
Time line and content Support and implementation
2009–2010 Agreement – ‘exceptional’ in response to crisis
– Wage premiums (above indexation) of EUR 125 in 2009 
and EUR 250 in 2010 without increasing costs for 
employers.
– Eco-cheques: pay check is a voucher, granted with social 
tax exemptions, focusing on buying ecological or ‘green’ 
consumer goods.
– Temporary unemployed higher beneﬁ t; employer’s new 
social tax reductions to recruit long-term unemployed.
– Full support.
– Implementation by collective agreements.
2011–2012 Diffi  cult, joint proposal rejected
– A postponement of discussion on whether to maintain 
automatic wage indexation system.
– A very limited wage rise of 0.3% above inﬂ ation rate.
– A roadmap for harmonising blue-collar and white-collar 
statutes into one uniform statute.
– Two out of three unions rejected the proposal.
– Implemented by government.
2013–2014 High hopes, talks collapse aft er wage freeze 
by government
Not relevant.
2015–2016 In tense climate, agreement reached because 
some wage increase possible, ‘look-alike’ IPA
– Wage norm set at 0.5 for the total wage bill, creating the 
possibility to increase gross wage by 0.37%. 
– Additional envelope of 0.3% made available to accord 
in other, less taxed types of pay, thus less costly for 
employers. 
– In recurrent negotiations about ‘welfare adaptation’ of 
social beneﬁ ts, agreement stipulated that all minima (for 
pensions, unemployment and disability compensation) 
were to be increased by 2%, but with diff erences for 
particular groups. • Additional envelope of 0.3% made 
available to accord in other, less taxed types of pay, thus 
less costly for employers. 
– In recurrent negotiations about ‘welfare adaptation’ of 
social beneﬁ ts, agreement stipulated that all minima (for 
pensions, unemployment and disability compensation) 
were to be increased by 2%, but with diff erences for 
particular groups.
– ABVV-FGTB withdrew from negotiations; only agreement 
by a ‘Group of Eight’ and mainly implemented by 
government
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Tighter monitoring of wage coordination
Centralised wage coordination came under the direct supervision of the government in 
2013 (it had previously happened in the 1980s and 1990s) (Van Gyes et al. 2017). The 
negotiations between employer and employee representatives on the IPA 2009–2010 
were diɤ  cult and only successful thanks to the ¿ nancial mediation of the government. 
Negotiations on the IPA 2011–2012 failed. The proposed agreement was rejected by 
ABVV-FGTB and ACLVB-CGSLB unions. The government decided to impose the 
draft-IPA. As a consequence, the norm is no longer indicative as in previous periods 
but imperative. In the ensuing years, the impact of the government has been growing, 
resulting in less independence of the social partners. The period 2013–2014 is the low 
point of autonomy. There was not even a draft agreement and the government decided 
unilaterally not to allow extra wage increases above the automatically wage indexation. 
For the period 2015–2016 this arrangement was reversed with a plan to skip a 2 per 
cent indexation, imposed by the government and a negligible room of 0.5 per cent for 
sectoral bargaining. 
These interventions happened amidst continued discussion and diɣ erences of opinion 
about automatic wage indexation and possible revision of the 1996 Law, also in 
accordance with  recommendations made within the European Semester from 2012 
onwards. Then in December 2016 the Michel government proposed a new and stricter 
revision of the 1996 Law, which was adopted by the Parliament in March 2017. Box 2 
lists the main elements of the new bill.
Overruling early retirement settlements
During the 1970s and 1980s, the end-of-career debate was part of the larger debate 
on unemployment (Struyven and Pollet 2015). It was felt that older workers were 
blocking opportunities for the young entering the labour market. Generous early 
retirement systems were set up, regulated by a series of sectoral agreements to organise 
early retirement (collective ¿ nancing by sector-speci¿ c Social Assistance Funds, 
sector-speci¿ c age thresholds and so on). By the 1990s, the debate was disconnected 
from the unemployment issue and moved towards the ageing issue and the ¿ nancial 
sustainability of the pension system. Reform initiatives were launched. In 2006 a ¿ rst 
(moderate) reform was implemented by the so-called Generation Pact. Originally this 
was a Pact negotiated between the social partners, but when the unions pulled out of 
the ¿ nal negotiations, the Verhofstadt government pushed through these ¿ rst reforms. 
Learning from the observation that the social partners had not made much progress in 
increasing the employment rate for 55–64 year olds, the Di Rupo government (2011–
2014) took up the issue, leading to a ‘Generation Pact Bis’. This new set of measures 
included the measure that early retirements coming from collective redundancies would 
still be granted from the age of 52, while those coming from collective agreements would 
have to be 60. Individual applications for early retirement would be considered only 
from the age of 62. The Generation Pact Bis was meant to accelerate the pace of raising 
the actual retirement age. In October 2014, the new Michel government, consisting of 
coalition partners of the political centre-right, announced its programme, in which the 
pension reform would be one of the main components, although no party had it in their 
manifesto – rather it followed from pressures from the European Commission. The 
Opposites attract? Decentralisation tendencies in Belgium,  2012–2016
 Multi-employer bargaining under pressure – Decentralisation trends in ﬁ ve European countries 81
Box 2  Summary of the 2017 revision of the Wage Norm bill
– The maximum margin available for an increase may be calculated by using the 
‘available national and international forecasts’ instead of the current OECD 
¿ gures, which are generally regarded as being too optimistic. This new calculation 
base will allow the CEC to make the calculations in accordance with the principle 
of ‘prudence’ to avoid an overestimating forecast.
– The principle of the bi-annual setting of the wage norm between the social 
partners or by the Council of Ministers if no agreement is reached between the 
two sides remains in place. However, the wage norm margin will be laid down in a 
generally binding collective labour agreement, set by the National Labour Council, 
or by a Royal Decree if no agreement is reached between the two sides. In the ¿ rst 
situation it can no longer be framed as an ‘IPA gentlemen’s agreement’ that has to 
be implemented by the sectoral agreements.
– Automatic wage indexation and seniority-based increases (cf. key part of sector 
and company pay scales) remain outside the scope of de¿ ning the wage norm.
– A new element concerns implementation of ex post correction mechanisms 
to correct unjusti¿ ed increases in the previous period. In this connection, the 
following steps are taken: 
-  The remaining margin is to be calculated every two years by the CEC, as is the 
macroeconomic productivity advantage;
-  Most of the cost savings resulting from the tax shift, currently being 
implemented by the Michel government and including a social tax reduction for 
employers, and at least 50 per cent of new tax savings will be used exclusively 
to reduce the so-called historical ‘gap’: the labour cost gap dating from before 
1996 – a much disputed issue between the social partners. However, it remains 
unclear how all these kind of calculations will be taken into account. 
-  If Belgian wages grow more slowly than those of our neighbours and when 
the historical handicap is still negative, at least half of the surplus should be 
dedicated to further reducing the historical backlog.
– A safety margin has to be provided in the calculated wage norm to absorb 
potential errors in the forecasts ex ante (the index development and hypothesised 
wage trends in neighbouring countries). This safety margin will be a quarter of the 
margin, and at least 0.5 per cent. If this safety margin remains unused, it will be 
added on top of the margin for the next period.
– Employers who exceed the maximum wage norm will be penalised by an 
administrative fi ne ranging between EUR 250 and EUR 5,000 (per employee 
working for the employer and whose wage violates the norm).
– Calculation of the margins will be the sole responsibility of the secretariat of the 
CEC – an autonomous civil service agency – and no longer a point to be settled 
by the bargaining social partners. These national bargainers can only discuss how 
and to what extent the calculated margins will be used (with all the corrections 
prescribed by law taken into account).
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retirement age was set at 66 by 2025 and 67 by 2030. Early retirement on an individual 
basis would by 2018 be possible only at the age of 63. Collectively bargained early 
retirement would be raised to the age of 60 by 2017. The measure received positive 
feedback from the employers’ side and met with ¿ erce resistance – including strikes and 
demonstrations – from the trade unions in response to the consecutive decisions by the 
Di Rupo and Michel governments that overruled existing practices and the regulations 
on early retirement laid down in sectoral agreements.
3.4 Deconcentration: ﬁ ne-tuning of joint committees and harmonisation of 
worker statutes
According to Article 38 of the 1968 Act, sectoral joint committees and joint subcommittees 
are competent to: 
– collaborate in drafting collective agreements;
– promote dispute conciliation between employers and employees; 
– advise the government, the National Labour Council and the Central Economic 
Council on matters falling within their competence, at the latter’s request or on 
their own initiative;
– carry out any other task imposed on them by law or by virtue of a collective 
agreement.
Articles 35 and 36 of the 1968 Act regulate the establishment, competence and scope of 
application of joint committees: the Crown may, on its own initiative or at the request 
of one or more organisations, establish joint committees of employers and employees. 
It shall specify the persons, economic sector or undertakings to which these committees 
shall apply and their territorial scope. Whenever the Minister considers recommending 
that the Crown establish a joint committee or alter the scope of an existing committee, 
he or she shall inform the relevant organisations in a notice published in the Moniteur
Belge. In circumstances in which the Crown acts on its own initiative, there must be 
consultation with the representative organisations. Moreover, Article 37 provides 
that: ‘At the request of a joint committee, the Crown may establish one or more joint 
subcommittees. After consulting the aɣ ected joint committee, the Crown shall specify 
the persons and territory falling within the scope of the de¿ ned subcommittees. At the 
request of the joint committee itself the Minister can thus establish a joint subcommittee.’
In recent years eɣ orts have increased to rationalise and modernise the number of joint 
committees, as well as to revise and update the scope and coverage of speci¿ c joint 
committees. A key event in this regard was the ‘decoupling’ of the so-called auxiliary 
joint committee for white-collar workers No. 218 in 2015 and its merger with the 
other auxiliary joint committee No. 200. Workers from certain non-pro¿ t (known 
in Belgium as ‘social pro¿ t’) sectors and B2B services were transferred to new joint 
committees with a particular scope (public lotteries, social housing, support staɣ  in 
the liberal professions, such as accountants or notaries). Another example is making 
existing subcommittees in the transport and logistics sector oɤ  cial, thereby preventing 
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‘regime shopping’ between joint committees in relation to logistical activities. This joint 
committee No. 140 now has oɤ  cial and clearly de¿ ned subcommittees for bus and 
coach transport (No. 140.01), taxi drivers (No. 140.02), road transport and logistics 
for third parties (No. 140.03), ground handling at airports (No. 140.04) and moving 
companies (No. 140.05). Today the Belgian collective bargaining system includes 40 
joint committees and 40 subcommittees for blue-collar workers; 20 joint committees 
and 3 subcommittees for white-collar workers; and 63 mixed (sub)committees.
In July 2013, an agreement was reached between the social partners about the (partial) 
harmonisation of the two main employment statutes, namely the blue- and white-collar 
statutes. With a deadline imposed by the Constitutional Court acting as a ‘sword of 
Damocles’, a compromise was struck, with, as the main reform in the short term, a single 
dismissal procedure for all employees, both white- and blue-collar. The harmonisation 
also covers other matters and has reinvigorated the debate on merging existing blue-
collar and white-collar joint committees. This splitting of sectoral bargaining (and also 
company bargaining) by occupational statute is found mainly in the manufacturing 
sector. However, the merger debate also aɣ ects the current internal structure of the 
(largest) trade unions (ACV-CSC and ABVV-FGTB), which usually separate sectoral 
federations for blue-collar and white-collar workers. 
In this regard, the 2016 policy brief of Federal Minister of Work Peeters, put before 
Parliament in November 2015, stated the following: 
The landscape of joint committees had developed historically in such a way that 
the logic of the ¿ eld of competence had somehow been lost. This has resulted in 
a series of diɤ  culties: (i) the complexity hampers labour market mobility; (ii) the 
structure does not always reÀ ect economic reality; and (iii) wage bargaining does 
not always coincide particularly well with company structures and the diminishing 
statutory diɣ erentiation between blue- and white-collars. To give an extra boost to 
the dialogue on modernising this landscape, additional analyses and guidelines will 
be made available for the social partners. A working method will be prepared to 
arrange the transition of collectively-agreed rules from one sector to another in an 
orderly and legally correct way.
One example of this ‘concentration’ movement in the ¿ eld is the decision by the blue-
collar and white-collar joint committees of the petroleum industry to bargain for both 
committees (Nos. 117 and 211) in one, common meeting.
3.5  Fading away of (minor) derogation clauses
As explained in Section 2.1, derogation of higher-level collective agreements is possible 
only when done explicitly and if the agreements have not been made generally binding 
by a Royal Decree. As the practice of legal extension is pervasive, (wage) standards at 
company level can in principle only be higher than those set at sectoral level. Company-
level standards can undercut sectorally-de¿ ned minimum or absolute standards only 
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when this possibility is explicitly foreseen in the sectoral agreement, for example in an 
opening clause allowing them to do so. However, whatever room the sectoral agreement 
might provide for company deviations, in all cases the interprofessional minimum wage 
must be respected (Keune 2010).
This kind of opening clause refers, for example, to not adopting the sectoral pay scales 
and job classi¿ cations when a particular company agreement already exists on this 
matter. The same goes when a sectoral system governing extra occupational pension 
bene¿ ts is set up, but the company already has its own system. However, such practices 
remain exceptional, bound to the introduction of new bene¿ ts. Hardship clauses, as 
mentioned by Keune in his 2010 study of Belgium, have in any case not been expanded 
in recent years. In any case, the sectors he mentions for the 2009–2010 bargaining 
round (for example, department stores and the manufacturing of food products) did not 
include this kind of opening clause in the recent bargaining round (2015–2016).
3.6  No centralised retreat
The abolition, non-continuation or slimming down of substantive rules at a centralised 
or higher level, leaving it open who will ¿ ll the regulatory gap – in any case a lower 
level of decision-making – does not seem to have characterised the Belgian collective 
bargaining system in recent times. 
At the sectoral level
On the contrary, it seems that, due to the small margins and limited opportunities 
available in wage bargaining, sectoral bargainers have focused on new topics. This 
includes the development of occupational pension schemes in addition to the (rather 
low) legal pension scheme in the private sector, experimentation with ‘innovation 
agreements’, and the establishment of funds for ‘sustainable work’. In the stimulus 
strategy that Di Rupo launched at the end of 2013, a new law states that at the sectoral 
level an agreement must be reached on innovation in the ¿ rst year after signing a 
new IPA. It should include a report on innovation performance and commitments 
to improve innovation and be based on a ‘scoreboard’. The national social partners 
broadened the approach to sectoral ‘structural challenges’. At the end of 2014, about 
22 joint committees had already reached agreement on the necessary ‘dashboard’. 
Some included existing improvements, so this policy innovation got oɣ  to a slow start. 
However, there were interesting new experiments, such as the chemical industry 
agreement of 18 February 2015, outlined in Box 3. In a press statement Koen Laenens, 
social director of the employers’ organisation Essencia, concluded: 
We want the unions to engage in a broad debate on product and process innovations, 
and on innovations in work organisation. This agreement provides an opportunity 
for all social partners to optimally connect the competitiveness of the Belgian 
chemical and life sciences industry to employment. This collective agreement 
provides us with the opportunity to engage in an innovative social dialogue.
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In the new sectoral agreement that implemented the IPA wage deal for 2015–2016 the 
sector also introduced a so-called ‘Demographic Fund’. As indicated by the legal wage 
norm, the maximum room for wage increases could be complemented for 2016 with 
an additional increase in average labour costs of 0.3 per cent. The social partners in 
the chemical industry decided to reserve this 0.3 per cent for the sector’s occupational 
pension scheme (0.15 per cent) and for the ¿ nancing of a Demographic Fund (0.15 
per cent). Inspired by German examples the Fund is supposed to develop projects and 
distribute budgets to keep workers in work longer in a motivated and feasible way.
At the National Labour Council
The story of the National Labour Council is somewhat diɣ erent. In recent years, it has 
provided more advice than usual (Cox 2013), but it also concluded 15 new national 
agreements in the period 2012–2015. This increase is related to the government’s 
heightened social and labour policy reform activity since 2011. But the Council’s 
role as driver or instigator of new regulation is very constrained, partly because the 
political side wants to take the lead, partly due to rising tensions between employers 
and employees on the core issues of macroeconomic governance (for example, the 
focus on competitiveness and ‘austerity’). As a result, the Council’s activities and 
especially national collective agreements have become more technical than before, in 
a complex, multi-level set of regulations on particular issues, and can be de¿ ned more 
as ‘implementation agreements’ of government decisions (linked to the reforms of leave 
systems and early retirement). However, some more substantial agreements were also 
reached, for instance on temporary agency work (Box 4).
Box 3  Sectoral bargaining innovations in the chemical industry agreement of 18 
February 2015
The agreement stated that it wanted to organise a sectoral social dialogue on the 
following topics:
1. The sector’s innovation capacity.
2. The importance of government support measures for innovation and structural 
transformation.
3. R&D investment in the sector and its impact on production and employment.
4. The status of present and future employees’ innovation competences.
5. Boosting the importance of innovation in social dialogue.
6. Promoting chemical innovation to the broader public and the optimisation of the 
‘go-to-market’ process.
7. Work organisation as a tool for sustainable work and competitiveness.
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3.7  Deliberate abstention or organised delegation: company bonus 
 agreements and local bargaining
These new initiatives, but also wage freezes, have also contributed to a proliferation 
of company agreements, not instead of, but rather in addition to sectoral or national 
initiatives. In the early crisis period the extraordinary measures on temporary 
unemployment (for white-collar employees) already necessitated more company 
agreements. The continued wage moderation also strengthened an ongoing trend 
of agreeing additional wage bene¿ ts at company level in stronger sectors and larger 
companies. 
A key instrument in this regard has been the framework developed by national 
collective agreement No. 90, agreed in 2008. Belgian employers may confer bene¿ ts on 
their employees in the form of a non-recurrent performance-related bonus. The bonus 
may be granted only when a predetermined objective is achieved. A plan needs to 
be agreed on this objective in advance. This plan is in fact confirmed by a company 
collective agreement or by an act of accession, which should be approved by the 
sectoral joint committee. In the collective agreement the target has to be clearly 
de¿ ned, the objective concretely formulated, the monitoring methodology stipulated, 
the target period determined and the payment date agreed. The objective should be 
concrete, measurable, veri¿ able and, obviously, uncertain of achievement. There 
may also be multiple objectives in a single plan. Examples of objectives: to achieve 
speci¿ c sales or revenue growth; the realisation of a particular project; obtaining an 
oɤ  cial quality standard certi¿ cate; or reducing absenteeism. Up to a certain amount, 
such bonuses are exempt from income tax and, apart from a 13.07 per cent employee 
solidarity contribution, only a special social security contribution of 33 per cent is 
payable by the employer. The maximum bonus that can be paid under such a scheme 
is indexed each year. The number of employees receiving a bonus increased from 
Box 4  Summary of the new national agreement on temporary agency work
On 16 July 2013, at the National Labour Council, the social partners concluded 
Collective Agreement No. 108 on temporary work and temporary agency work. The 
following changes were introduced:
– Daily work contracts permitted for the ‘À exibility needs’ of the ‘customer-user’. 
There has to be proof that the À exibility is needed. ‘Customer-user’ employers 
must consult their works’ council or a trade union delegation, explaining why such 
contracts are necessary.
– A new condition allows the hiring of temporary agency workers on the grounds of 
‘insertion’. Temporary agency workers can now ¿ ll vacant posts for a maximum of 
six months. After this ‘trial period’, a permanent contract can be oɣ ered but it is 
not compulsory. 
– New procedures oblige ‘customer-users’ and temporary work agencies to notify 
trade unions when temporary agency workers are employed.
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150,000 in 2008 to 600,000 in 2014 (Figure 1). It represented almost 2,000 company 
agreements and more than 5,500 accession acts in 2015. The bonus system represented 
a wage bill of more than EUR 526 million. Between 2009 and 2015 the percentage of the 
total wage mass coming from this bonus system rose to almost 1 per cent.
In Belgian companies, employee representation exists in the form of information 
and consultation rights through the works council and the Committee for Prevention 
and Protection at Work (CPP). A third form of formalised workplace representation 
consists of the union delegation, which is the main responsible actor for bargaining 
on company agreements (together with a required signatory trade union oɤ  cial). This 
workplace social dialogue has been granted more responsibilities in recent years. As in 
the early 1980s and mid-1990s, the diɤ  culty of selling or implementing ‘À exibilisation’ 
and ‘moderation’ or ‘savings’ policies led to new rights or consultation opportunities 
for employee representatives. In the rising discussion of ‘sustainable work’ – linked 
to the reforms implemented in the retirement system – the focus is increasingly on 
issues such as stress and mental health. Already in the 1990s the Belgian social partners 
agreed on a common approach on the matter of psychosocial risks, ¿ rst by collective 
agreement, later by law. This law was again thoroughly revised in 2014. The new laws 
reinforced and enlarged on previous de¿ nitions of ‘psychosocial risks’ in the workplace. 
The Committee for Prevention and Protection at Work is given important consultation 
and control rights at diɣ erent stages.
Figure 1 Company agreements and accords on collective bonus pay system, Belgium, 
 2008–2015
Source: Eurostat.
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Another innovation was the obligation for companies to establish employment plans 
for older workers. The works council – or in its absence, other employee representation 
bodies – has been granted consultation rights on this new initiative. The Di Rupo 
government, aspiring to complement its cuts in early retirement policies by positive 
incentives to keep more employees aged 55–65 at work, asked the social partners in the 
National Labour Council (NAR/CNT) to develop a framework agreement for company-
level employment plans. National Collective Agreement No. 104 (agreed in June 2012) 
suggested a non-limiting list of initiatives that employers could use in drawing up 
an annual ‘company employment plan for recruiting and/or retaining 45+ year-old 
employees’. Initiatives include: recruitment of new staɣ  aged 45 or over, training and 
developing competences, career guidance, internal changes, adapting working hours 
and conditions to meet the needs of older employees, preventing or remedying physical 
barriers and recognising acquired competences (experience). One condition is that 
employers must negotiate this plan with their employee representatives (union) or, in 
small or medium-sized enterprises, inform the workers. Companies with fewer than 20 
employees are exempt from this obligation. First monitoring data, based on a survey 
of ACV-CSC employee representatives in 2014, show that in four out of ¿ ve cases the 
works council receives information on the plan. Consultation is organised in about two-
thirds of works councils (Pollet and Lamberts 2016).
4.  Sectoral case studies
We shall now illustrate the functioning and nature of the Belgian wage bargaining 
system laid out in Section 2 and the decentralisation tendencies discussed in Section 3 
by looking in detail at the development of collective bargaining in two key sectors: the 
metal industry and the retail sector. This is based on interviews with the trade union 
representatives responsible for bargaining (see Annex).
4.1  Case study I: metal industry
The metal sector (NACE 24-30) consists of several subsectors. Our focus in this 
study are the metalworking industry and steel and non-ferrous metals. Each of these 
subsectors has its own autonomous joint committee which is responsible for collective 
bargaining within its subsector. This is the largest industrial sector in the country, but it 
has experienced downsizing and job losses in the crisis (for example, between 2010 and 
2015 metalworking lost almost 15,000 jobs, employment falling from 167,000 workers 
to 153,000).
Belgium is one of the biggest steel exporters in Europe. Over recent decades, however, 
the Belgian steel sector has undergone restructuring and downsizing, which has 
particularly aɣ ected companies not specialising in high-tech materials and with little 
access to (sea) transport. ArcelorMittal is the biggest steel producer in Belgium, where 
it accounts for approximately 40 per cent of steel production. The economic crisis also 
impacted the non-ferrous metals sector (in which Umicore is the largest company). 
Since 2008–2009 the sector has seen a slow and varying recovery. 
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The industrial relations landscape
Sectoral bargaining is organised in several joint committees. For the metalworking 
sector blue-collar workers are mainly situated in joint committee No. 111, white-collars 
in No. 209. The sector has a historical tradition of some subsectoral bargaining and 
bargaining by province. As the most important bargaining venue (in industry), the 
sector has always been a frontrunner in procedural innovation in the Belgian wage 
bargaining system: a ‘tight’ peace clause is complemented by speci¿ c trade union 
bene¿ ts; there is a regulated procedure for opting-out; and an agreed earnings increase 
can be implemented in companies in a À exible way by choosing one of the possible 
options (increase the basic wage or implement a set of premiums or wage bene¿ ts).
In the metal sector a wide spectrum of topics is discussed within the joint committees, 
including: wage increases, À exibility, working time, time credits and working conditions. 
Since the joint committee for metal working (No. 111) is the biggest, it plays a major role 
in setting an example for the other joint committees. The smaller joint committees base 
the topics they discuss on those determined by joint committee No. 111. In addition, 
the blue-collar unions in the metal sector traditionally play a leading (and if necessary 
mobilising) role in Belgian social dialogue.
The joint committees responsible for the steel sector are No. 104 for blue-collar 
workers and No. 210 for white-collar workers. The collective bargaining tradition in 
the sector diɣ ers from that in the metalworking sector. The main level of collective 
bargaining in the steel sector has always been the company. GSV (Groupement de la 
Sidérurgie – Staalindustrie Verbond) is the employers’ federation active in the sector, 
although because the sector has traditionally been dominated by a few very large 
companies (ArcelorMittal, Aperam, NLMK), it has signi¿ cantly less bargaining power 
and capabilities than its counterpart Agoria in the metal sector. In addition, collective 
bargaining for non-ferrous production is organised at sectoral level by separate joint 
committees, namely No. 105.1 (blue-collar) and No. 224 (white-collar); this sector 
consists mainly of Umicore and several of its divisions. Because of the small number 
of companies in the sector, no separate employers’ federation is active. Therefore, 
bargaining is situated mainly at the company level. The Umicore management plays a 
key role in representing the employers within the sector.
Table 5 Sectoral collective bargaining structure, Belgium
Blue-collar joint committees White-collar joint committees
Number Number of workers Number Number of workers
Metal (construction) 
sector
111 115 873 209 66 204
Steel sector 104 7 213 210 4 092
Non-ferrous sector 105.1 4 313 224 2 755
Note: * As of 03/2016.
Source: RSZ-ONSS.
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On the trade union side, ACV-CSC (represented by ACV-Metea for blue-collar workers 
and the Flemish LBC-NVK and French CNE-GNC for white-collar workers) is now the 
largest trade union (due mainly to its stronger representation in the Flanders region and 
also among white-collar workers). The ABVV-FGTB metal federation has traditionally 
been more militant (also within the socialist trade union itself). In the early 2000s the 
Flemish and Walloon federations separated. White-collar workers are represented by 
BBTK-SETCA in the socialist confederation. The third Belgian confederation ACLVB-
CSLB is less important in the sector (but growing).
Before 1996 wage increases were based less on formal rules and more on ‘gut feeling’. 
However, in 1996 the wage norm was introduced, initially it had a more indicative role 
which became more imposing over the years. In practice the sectoral wage norm has 
always been implemented. Because of the use of the wage norm and the continued use 
of the automatic wage indexation mechanism at the sectoral level there is little room for 
wage setting based on productivity indicators.
The wage indexation system diɣ ers across the sectors as well. Both the metal sector and 
the non-ferrous sector make use of a coeɤ  cient, mainly on an annual basis. The steel 
sector, on the other hand, makes use of a pivot index of 2 per cent.
With regard to job grading and wage classi¿ cation a distinction is drawn between the 
biggest joint committee (No. 111) and the others within the sector. Within joint committee 
No. 111 (metalworking) there is no wage classi¿ cation. Because of the companies’ 
heterogeneity it is not possible to distinguish a number of pro¿ les. Exceptions are the 
provinces of East and West Flanders, which do have a form of provincial classi¿ cation, 
which means that a certain degree of wage classi¿ cation is possible here.
A peace clause has been implemented in every collective agreement that states that 
all matters settled within the agreement cannot be subject to future negotiations or 
actions to force such negotiations. In exchange for social peace the employers pay into 
a sectoral fund to cover part – 70 per cent – of the employees’ trade union membership 
fees. If the peace clause is violated employers have the right to reduce their union 
contribution. 
Decentralisation
The sector is characterised by the following forms of decentralisation and centralisation.
Overruling/state intervention: Despite the importance of the sectoral level, the national 
level still plays a signi¿ cant role in collective bargaining. Trade union interviewees from 
the metal sector said that they wait until the intersectoral (also called ‘interprofessional’), 
national agreements have been concluded (whether successfully or not) to provide 
guidance on structuring the topics of discussion and formulating the bargaining agenda 
and demands at the sectoral level. Within the past six years or so, however, only one 
such agreement has been concluded and signed by all partners at the national level, 
because the state intervened in the wage bargaining process at the national level by 
imposing a wage freeze.
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The sectoral levels have developed their own negotiation traditions and are not severely 
aɣ ected if an interprofessional agreement is not concluded. If negotiations on the 
national level do succeed, the sectoral level has to respect its conclusions. For example, 
if a wage norm is established, it has to be followed by the lower levels. In that case the 
sectoral level negotiators use the nationally agreed wage norm as a starting point and 
framework for further negotiations. 
As already mentioned, in the steel sector the company level has always been the most 
prominent. The sectoral level handles only matters that legally have to be discussed 
on that level (for example, early retirement). Even though the sectoral level is less 
dominant, all successful interprofessional agreements have to be followed as well.
Decentralisation strictu sensu: As a result of the limited À exibility brought about by 
the increase of interprofessional agreements (for example, the wage norm), trade union 
representatives have noticed a rise in individual remuneration. Especially in the case 
of white-collar workers and executives, companies are increasingly providing wage 
optimisation services for individual employees. Representatives have been unable to 
reverse the trend but instead have attempted to frame the individualised measures 
within collective agreements at the company level.
In the metal construction sector a provincial level is also active. These so-called joint 
sections do not have the same autonomy as joint committees; they can negotiate on 
certain topics but always have to report back to the federal level for validation. For 
example, the end-of-year bonuses for the metal construction sector are negotiated at 
this level. This intermediate level has always existed.
Implementation of CBA 90 as organised decentralisation: Because of the limiting 
framework created by the wage norm at national level, many companies see a need to 
increase their À exibility with regard to remuneration. Especially in the metal, steel and 
non-ferrous sector the competition between companies to acquire quali¿ ed technical 
personnel is high. Therefore, companies feel obliged to make their remuneration 
systems more attractive. One way of this doing is to resort to Collective Agreement No. 
90. This collective agreement, dating back to 2007, arranges non-recurring bene¿ ts 
that are related to the collective results of either the company, a group of companies 
or a speci¿ c group of employees prede¿ ned based on objective criteria. On the other 
hand, the results must be de¿ nable, clearly measurable and uncertain when the bene¿ t 
is introduced. 
Delegation/empowerment: Particularly in the metal sector sectoral-level trade union 
oɤ  cials use a form of delegation. Two systems are used to delegate certain decisions to 
the company level.  In the ¿ rst, which is more often utilised in bigger companies, the 
company level has considerable freedom to choose the manner in which they apply the 
wage margin (for example, basic wage increase, hospitalisation insurance and so on). In 
other (often smaller) companies, negotiators at the company level are allowed to choose 
from a list of four options. If in any case the negotiators reach an agreement before 
the deadline stipulated in the sectoral framework agreement, the agreement is deemed 
valid. If no agreement has been concluded the (base) wage will increase automatically 
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according to the wage margin de¿ ned in the sectoral agreement. This system is called 
the ‘company envelope’. According to the people we interviewed, it is a ‘balanced’ 
approach, satisfying both sides of the sectoral bargaining table. From the company 
management standpoint, there is room for negotiation À exibility at the company level 
and an opportunity for made-to-measure company wage negotiations. However, from 
the trade union side a signi¿ cant amount of sectoral inÀ uence and coordination is 
still secured in the process and the sectoral level maintains control over the general 
direction and trend of wage developments. Minimum wages are still negotiated at the 
sectoral level as well and are increased with the established wage margin. 
Derogation/opting out: This form of decentralisation has occurred in rare cases, as in 
the case of supplementary occupational pensions. In 1999 companies within the sector 
were allowed to consider whether or not they would participate in the sectoral collective 
agreement on this matter or to maintain their own supplementary pension system. 
Ultimately, 53 out of approximately 7,500 companies opted to use their own system. 
However, they are still obliged to apply the same extra raise in (occupational) pensions 
(in one form or another) as the other companies.
Centralised retreat: Given the authority enjoyed by Agoria at the sectoral level in the 
metal sector, trade union interviewees deemed it unlikely that the federation would 
agree not to reach a sectoral agreement. This appeared to be on the cards only in 1989, 
when no wage rise seemed possible. This deadlock eventually led to negotiations at the 
provincial level and the creation of provincial wage scales. Even today there are two 
minimum wage scales in the metal sector, the national and the – more generally used 
– provincial wage scale.
Conclusion
The metal sector has always been a vanguard sector in the Belgian system of collective 
bargaining and industrial relations. It experienced major growth in parallel with 
development of the institutional system of Belgian social dialogue (from the 1930s 
to the 1970s). It is probably the key example of Belgian ‘Konfl iktpartnerschaft’. On 
one hand, relations between the social partners have always been diɤ  cult, but on the 
other hand the drive or need to strike deals has always been high (due to the sector’s 
competitiveness and export-orientation). In metal manufacturing this has led to 
coordinated and centralised bargaining at the sectoral level, while in the basic metal 
industry, where labour costs are only a small part of total production costs, company 
size is large and (skilled) workers play a key role in production operations, the main 
focus of collective bargaining has always been the decentralised company level.
In metalworking, sectoral dominance in bargaining has meanwhile evolved in a multi-
layered bargaining setting. Nevertheless, sectoral actors continue to play an organising 
and intermediating role. Traditionally, sectoral bargaining was complemented by 
lower-level À exibility in bargaining additional income components and working time 
features. The loosely structured wage grading system in the sector also facilitated 
labour cost À exibility. In recent times, these À exible opportunities have been expanded 
by transforming the sectoral accords into framework agreements that can be adapted 
to company particularities and preferences. Alongside the higher-level imposition 
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of a wage norm and more opportunities for variable pay, sectoral organisations try 
to maintain their role by translating the wage norm into an ‘envelope’ or ‘menu’ for 
wage bargaining. Additional or innovative forms of reward are framed in procedural 
or substantive sectoral wage agreements (cf. occupational pension system, variable pay 
under CBA-90).
4.2  Case study II: retail
Commerce is a very important sector in the Belgian economy. In total, more than 
400,000 people are employed in the commercial sector, including wholesalers and 
retailers. They account for 11 per cent of Belgian GNP. In this section, however, we focus 
only on the retail sector, thus all ‘shops’ (large and small), every seller to an end-user. 
In the retail sector, over 24,000 employers and over 200,000 employees are active, the 
large majority of them white-collar workers.
Industrial relations landscape
In the most recent social elections in 2016 ABVV-FGTB obtained over 47 per cent 
of the mandates in works councils and committees for prevention and protection at 
work. It thus continues to represent the most employees in the sector. ACV-CSC and 
ACLVB-CGSLB are the second and third largest employee representative organisations, 
respectively. Even though the unions’ ideological foundations diɣ er, collaboration 
at the national, sectoral and company levels on employee representation has been 
described as very productive. Nevertheless, declining inÀ uence has been noted, along 
with a tendency to be more pragmatic because of increasing competition and loss of jobs 
in the retail sector. 
On the employers’ side, the key organisations are Comeos, Unizo and UCM. Comeos 
represents employers in the retail and in wholesale sectors. In the retail sector, store 
chains as well as franchises can join Comeos. Participating in social dialogue at all levels 
in the commerce sector (wholesalers, small and large retailers), Comeos has a very 
powerful position. Unizo and UCM unite and represent independent entrepreneurs 
and the self-employed, respectively, in Flanders and in Wallonia – in other words, 
very small, independent shop owners and retailers. The diɤ  culty for these employer 
representatives is to achieve consensus between the various companies they represent, 
whose objectives and interests diɣ er. Interest aggregation is a major challenge, 
according to the trade union bargainers we interviewed.
The retail sector is organised into seven statutorily recognised sectoral joint committees. 
The sectoral level is thus dominant but fragmented:
(i)  JC 201: independent retailers, covering 95,000 employees. This committee 
covers food retailers employing fewer than 20 employees, and non-food retailers 
employing fewer than 50 employees. 
(ii)  JC 202.01: medium-size food businesses, covering 7,000 employees. This 
autonomous subcommittee includes companies with only one shop, but employing 
more than 20 employees. These are mainly franchises of larger stores. 
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(iii)  JC 202: retail of food products, covering 52,000 employees. These are large food 
retailers with at least two stores and more than 25 employees. 
(iv)  JC 311: large retailers, covering 50,000 employees, including white- and blue-
collar workers. These are large retailers employing more than 50 employees and 
sell only one or two kinds of goods (for example, clothes and shoes). Because of 
the very small number of blue-collar workers, the negotiations are carried out by 
white-collar workers’ representatives.
(v)  JC 312: warehouses, covering 12,000 employees, including white- and blue-collar 
workers. These companies also employ more than 50 employees, but sell three 
or more kinds of goods. Here, too, negotiations are conducted by white-collar 
representatives.
(vi)  (JC 119): blue-collar workers in the food retail sector, covering 37,000 workers. 
This joint committee is not discussed here because it is very diɣ erent from the 
core retail sector.
(vii)  (JC 313): pharmacists, covering 14,000 workers. This joint committee is not 
discussed here again because it is very diɣ erent from the core retail sector.
Enterprises are allocated to a joint committee according to size (number of employees; 
FTE), based on the idea that the self-employed and small enterprises do not have the 
same resources and thus should not be compelled to meet the same standards.  When 
larger enterprises found their way to Belgium in the 1950s, JC 312 was created to 
protect small enterprises from the power and inÀ uence of large store chains. Gradually, 
more forms of diɣ erentiation were addressed by establishing new joint committees. 
Currently, JC 312 provides the best (or, according to interviewees, ‘least bad’) working 
conditions, but only contains three large shops: Hema, Cora and Carrefour. Currently, 
the trade unions oppose the allocation of companies to joint committees on the basis of 
employment size and prefer business turnover as a threshold.
Even though collective agreements are concluded and applied by joint committees, 
negotiations for the ¿ ve core joint committees in the sector take place mainly in two 
concertation committees. This division was developed at the request of the trade unions 
in the mid twentieth century to increase their inÀ uence and representational power. 
JC 201 and 202.01 are taken together as representing small enterprises, while JC 202, 
311 and 312 form a concertation committee for the large retailers. In general, working 
conditions are better in the large retailers than in the small ones. For example: the 
working week is 35 hours as opposed to 38 hours and on average there is a wage basket 
diɣ erence of 20–25 per cent.
Currently, the trade unions would prefer to abandon this negotiating structure because 
of the increased use of franchising by the larger retailers, which entails a shift of the 
personnel of these large retailers to the joint committees of small retailers (and the 
accompanying less favourable labour conditions). According to some trade unionists, 
collective bargaining by joint committees would be more eɣ ective and bene¿ cial. 
Nevertheless, the current negotiation process in both concertation committees is 
described in the following paragraphs.
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Collective bargaining in the retail sector is organised by means of two concertation 
committees, based on size of company. These committees are not legal entities, implying 
that agreements are always oɤ  cially signed, in a second step, at an oɤ  cial meeting of 
the separate joint committees. This arrangement could be referred to as segmentation 
or deconcentration.
Historically, the standards in the committees of large enterprises are higher because 
trade unions agreed that the self-employed, with fewer resources, cannot meet the same 
standards. The interviewees indicate that negotiations are friendly in the concertation 
committee of small companies, but in the end only small steps can be achieved. This is 
mainly because they strongly insist on never matching or surpassing the standards of 
the large retailers. For example, two years ago they negotiated a wage margin of 0.8 per 
cent, which was transposed into a gross bonus of EUR 250 (0.8 per cent, not including 
social security charges/taxes) at the large retailers, but only EUR 188 (0.8 per cent 
including social charges/taxes in the calculation) for employees of the small retailers. 
Nevertheless, sectoral agreements are important for providing a generally agreed 
minimum. Because there are no statutory representative bodies in small enterprises, 
workers’ representation is more limited and sectoral trade union bargainers, although 
they have more leeway with regard to bargaining position, have less mobilisation power. 
Guaranteeing a sectoral minimum framework is thus very important especially in the 
group of small retailers.
In the committee for large companies, interviewees stated that negotiations progress 
more slowly because employer representatives need to inform and consult their 
organisations before making decisions. The main diɤ  culty, however, as indicated by the 
interviewees, is the increasingly rigid attitude of Comeos. Formally, Comeos declares 
that this is because of the heightened competition between ¿ rms (partly because of 
franchises) and the fact that retailers are ¿ rst of all employers, implying that wage costs 
are an important factor and have to be kept low. Customer À ows are another key factor 
often brought up by employers. These tendencies have caused a sectoral standstill in 
the past 12 years, and even a power shift: employer representatives now also formulate 
their demands and state from the outset that they will not exceed the standards set 
by small retailers. According to trade unionists, the introduction of franchises in the 
concertation committee of small retailers has indeed increased competition, but was 
merely a strategy on the part of large retailers to lower their standards. This has given 
rise to a tendency towards low general minimum standards. In recent years this trend 
has been reinforced by falling pro¿ t margins in the sector (due, among other things, to 
À uctuating and moderate sales ¿ gures).
A basic wage rate is laid down by the state in the form of a guaranteed minimum monthly 
income. Sectors are bound to these minima and their options for raising standards are 
limited. Given the frequent use of contracts with limited working hours, this guaranteed 
minimum is very important in the retail sector. 
Biannually, the social partners (trade unions, employer representatives and government) 
conclude an interprofessional agreement, including a wage norm. A key element of 
this agreement is a declaration of intent to increase wages at an agreed pace. The wage 
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norm, however, has evolved from indicative to imperative, implying that the sectoral 
negotiations are limited. Speci¿ c agreements are made by each concertation committee 
and formally concluded by each joint committee.
All joint committees in the retail sector use a pivot indexation system, but the index 
varies between 1 and 2 per cent. 
Sectoral job classi¿ cation is linked to pay brackets and is used by a majority of companies. 
However, it has been described as ‘desperately outdated’. Only some large retailers 
de¿ ne their company-speci¿ c classi¿ cation. Trade unions have called for a renewal 
of the sectoral classi¿ cation to harmonise wage conditions within and between joint 
committees. However, no action has been taken because this demands time, money and 
eɣ ort. This could cause grading diɤ  culties, but currently trade unions are exhibiting 
common sense in their use of this ‘outdated’ instrument.
Every sectoral agreement includes a legally required and accorded extension which 
makes it binding for unaɤ  liated companies. Trade unionists consider this to be very 
important because of the breadth and variance in the retail sector, to limit (wage/
cost-based) competition within the sector and to secure the (income) protection 
of all employees. Nevertheless, it is diɤ  cult for trade unions to monitor companies’ 
compliance, especially in the case of small retailers because there is almost no employee 
representation.
A peace clause is also always added to sectoral agreements, de¿ ning a two-year period 
during which the agreement may not be violated. However, for most agreements 
either trade unions or employers ask to breach the clause to discuss certain aspects 
once again. This is not linked to the trade union premium (see above). Under the trade 
union premium, as we have seen, trade union members get part of their membership 
fee refunded by a sectoral fund. 
Decentralisation tendencies
In general, the sectoral level is still the most important bargaining level, but it is losing 
impact. Underpinning this evolution are certain decentralisation tendencies.
Decentralisation strictu sensu: Interviewees stress that this rarely happens and that it 
should be avoided because full protection cannot be guaranteed. The only circumstances 
in which this happens is when companies ask to apply personal bonuses, based on 
collective agreement No. 90 (collective agreement on non-recurring results-linked 
remuneration). Even though trade unions refuse to organise this at the sectoral level, it 
is often asked for by small companies to boost employees’ commitment.
Deconcentration: Historically, deconcentration has been included in the sectoral 
bargaining structure. Diɣ erent (sub-)sectoral joint committees covered diɣ erent sectors 
(food and non-food) and various company sizes. However, as, on one hand, employers 
seemed to use this diɣ erentiation to indulge in ‘regime shopping’ and trade unions 
strove as much as possible for ‘equal’ workers’ rights, bargaining developed or became 
‘concentrated’ in practice into a ‘centralised’ two-committee system. Even though 
Opposites attract? Decentralisation tendencies in Belgium,  2012–2016
 Multi-employer bargaining under pressure – Decentralisation trends in ﬁ ve European countries 97
negotiations take place mainly in two concertation committees, trade unionists de¿ ne 
these in terms of a rationalisation of eɣ ort, rather than as a newly inserted negotiation 
level. Therefore, they state that there is no tendency towards deconcentration.
Delegation, empowerment: Given the substantial variety in the retail sector, trade 
unionists ¿ nd it important to leave some freedom of implementation. Therefore, they 
have noticed a tendency towards more delegation and empowerment. A minimum 
level or a framework is decided in the sectoral bargaining, oɣ ering some possibilities 
for made-to-measure implementation at the company level. For example, in the last 
sectoral agreements on purchasing power, the total value of the bonus was de¿ ned, but 
companies could choose between alternatives such as meal vouchers, gross bonuses or 
group insurance.
Derogation, opting out: This is allowed only in exceptional cases as part of drastic 
restructuring processes and can only impact agreements on purchasing power. Also, 
these cases are always announced and discussed during the relevant negotiations.
Centralised retreat: The interviewees indicate that this does not happen. However, 
the interviewed trade unionists mentioned multiple new topics of discussion in the 
sector: work on Sundays, reintegration of the long-term unemployed, student work 
and e-commerce. It is not always easy to make binding sectoral agreements on these 
matters. The discussion on e-commerce is particularly important. According to all 
interviewees, employer representative organisations discuss e-commerce only in 
relation to night work. While they state that trade unionists block all discussion of the 
issue, the latter argue that, according to existing regulations, retailers can operate only 
between 5 am and midnight, which they estimate to be suɤ  cient for small retailers to 
organise e-commerce. Moreover, trade unionists acknowledge that they make speci¿ c 
arrangements at company level and that employers are satis¿ ed with the current 
situation. Nevertheless, talks on revising the rules on night work are still ongoing, among 
others pressed by the federal government and the minister of labour. However, partly 
due to legal revision, night work related to e-commerce is now allowed in Belgium, but 
it still has to be arranged by company agreement and with the involvement of the works 
council and/or union representation at the workplace.
Deliberate (or not) abstention: The interviewees admit that this is sometimes the case 
in the retail sector, and that it is occurring more often than in the past. When issues are 
very complex and involve many partners, and the discussions are likely to be diɤ  cult, 
this is sometimes assigned to a work group, which is composed of all partners involved 
and can be expanded with the use of experts. Nevertheless, experience shows that such 
groups do not work particularly well. For example, they are used in relation to the wage 
classi¿ cation system.
Overruling, state intervention: On one hand, the Belgian system implies a form of 
supersession by using interprofessional agreements and the wage norm that are laid 
down by the government and implemented by the social partners and companies. On 
the other hand, interviewees notice that state intervention has increased in recent 
years. They feel that the current government prefers to arrange things directly at the 
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company level, thus ignoring the sectoral level. For example, by making the wage norm 
imperative instead of indicative, the possibilities for sectoral negotiations are limited. 
The increased strictness of the wage norm for basic wage negotiations is, however, 
combined with rules that de¿ ne exceptions (labour cost or income increases that are 
not bound or covered by the wage norm). The key example in this regard is the collective 
bonus system (organised by national collective agreement No. 90), for which there are 
also tax incentives.
The trade unions oppose this tendency because it hampers the protection of employees 
by lowering the degree of harmonisation of labour conditions and by limiting the 
possibilities for representatives to compare their company with similar ones. The 
interviewees fear that this encourages social dumping within the sector.
Conclusion
In conclusion, collective bargaining and especially wage bargaining in the retail sector 
has traditionally been organised according to Belgian ‘norms’ by focusing on the sectoral 
level, acknowledging the role of the statutory minimum wage and applying automatic 
wage indexation. However, a diɣ erentiated or ‘implicit’ decentralising factor was built 
into the system by organising this wage bargaining in a series of joint committees 
(diɣ erentiated by occupation, type of trade and company size). In recent decades this 
diɣ erentiation was nevertheless counter-acted by ‘centralising’ tendencies. First, by 
coordinating joint committee bargaining in two informal committees and in a second 
step by an ever more supervening intersectoral wage norm. The latter decreases the 
room for sectoral bargaining, especially in recent years, when this wage norm was in 
addition superseded by state-imposed wage freezes. In addition to this general factor, the 
interviewed trade union bargainers observe stronger diɤ  culties on the employers’ side 
to keep interests aggregated and to come to the bargaining table with a strong mandate, 
as competition and restructuring are increasing in the sector. Partly to counteract this 
trend, particular employers – looking for stronger commitment and loyalty from their 
employees – are getting more and more interested in the decentrally-bargained variable 
pay system organised by an intersectoral, national framework collective agreement.
5.  Conclusion
Looking at the Belgian collective bargaining system in recent years in the perspective 
of decentralisation/centralisation we can conclude, ¿ rst, that although Belgium is 
categorised in European comparison as very centralised, this global view should be 
corrected. Traditionally, the sectoral level has been very important, but for a series 
of important sectors, this level only provides a framework of basic regulations (for 
example, for the chemical industry, banking and so on). Multi-employer bargaining 
has, on one hand, always been very organised and pervasive, but on the other hand 
it also has also additional layers with sub-sectoral joint bargaining committees and a 
regional level. Nevertheless, the hierarchy between diɣ erent levels and high coverage at 
central levels have always been respected and stimulated by legal instruments, avoiding 
opening clauses and promoting extension erga omnes.
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Strong trade unions – in terms of membership, militancy and representation in 
the workplace – have always been an important factor in this system. It is perhaps 
no coincidence that in this context a political actor that wants to intervene in this 
organised system does not opt for decentralisation (which would only pit the social 
partners against each other as opponents in many more localities), but resorts to state 
intervention. The centralisation tendencies often mentioned in relation to the recent 
history of Belgian social dialogue are in this regard better understood as an attack on 
the traditionally highly-valued autonomy of the social partners to organise and set 
wages and working conditions. Stricter control, overruling or ignoring of collective 
bargaining and social dialogue have been on the increase since Belgian governments – 
perhaps under European surveillance – opted for a programme of austerity. In stronger 
terms, as decentralisation would not guarantee the proposed neoliberal reforms of 
À exibilisation and wage moderation in the strongly organised Belgian system, or would 
even be counterproductive, governments have opted for a more radical form of state 
intervention.
However, this does not mean that this organised system of social dialogue and collective 
bargaining is ‘dead’. It has rather reverted (temporarily?) to a ‘minimal’ approach. 
Instead of bipartite social dialogue that rules, as it were, alongside politics, it is in a 
constant tripartite battle situation, correcting or complementing the stream of new 
government labour and social regulations in the implementation phase. Although thus 
less maximal, that does not mean that the institutional structures themselves have been 
reformed. In addition, it leads to (new) forms of decentralisation in the system which 
may be indirect, unintended (by politicians) and perhaps less on the (international) 
radar. 
– The continued wage moderation and recent wage freezes have been partly, but 
certainly willingly circumvented by bargaining on all types of (new) bene¿ ts 
(ecocheque, company cars, occupational extra-pension) and especially collective 
variable pay beyond the ‘blocked’ basic pay increase. It is an organised form of 
decentralisation as all parties agree at the central level which kind of premiums/
bene¿ ts are bound by the wage norm or not.
– Labour reforms are accompanied with extra powers at the workplace level, not to 
substantially alter the new regulations, but to guide, help, control and monitor them 
in a procedural way. However, these new rights are not always granted in the form 
of collective bargaining authority, but in terms of information and consultation 
rights for union representation at the workplace (for example, works councils). 
– Most of the time these decentralisation tendencies are ‘organised’ and ‘framed’ 
in higher-level agreements (see the envelope system in the metalworking sector). 
Sometimes, however, they are also a result of ‘retreat’ or ‘abstention’ by the higher 
level (one might mention the e-commerce night work regulations). However, 
derogation or opening clauses are not part of this decentralisation tendency and, as 
already stated, sectoral bargainers and actors have managed to maintain at least an 
intermediary role.
To summarise this Belgian story concisely, instead of decentralisation, collective 
bargaining in Belgian is being overruled and superseded by state intervention and 
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political reforms. This state centralisation, however, has increased the attractiveness of 
‘organised’ decentralisation and deconcentration. Hence at the local level the imposed 
wage moderation is ‘moderated’, the agenda for workplace social dialogue is undergoing 
innovation and reform implementation is subject to guidance. As a result, Belgium’s 
multi-layered industrial relations governance system has become more complex than 
it used to be.
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Annex
Table 6 lists the collective bargaining characteristics of 23 EU member states.
Table 6  Level of collective bargaining, degree of centralisation, coordination, trade union 
 density, coverage, employer organisation density and quality of labour relations
Predominant 
level 
Degree of 
centralisation/
decentralisation
Coordination Trade union 
density in the 
private sector
Employer 
organisation 
density
Collective 
bargaining 
coverage rate
Austria Sectoral Organised 
decentralised
High 20–30% ≥ 90% ≥ 90%
Belgium Sectoral/
national
Centralised High 50–60% 80–90% ≥ 90%
Czech 
Republic
Company Decentralised No 10–20% 60–70% 40–50%
Denmark Sectoral Organised 
decentralised
High 60–70% 60–70% 80–90%
Estonia Company Decentralised No < 5% 20–30% 10–20%
Finland Sectoral/
national
Centralised High 50–60% 70–80% 80–90%
France Sectoral Centralised Low 5–10% 70–80% ≥ 90%
Germany Sectoral Organised 
decentralised
High 10–20% 50–60% 50–60%
Greece Company/
sectoral
Decentralised No 10–20% 40–50% 40–50%
Hungary Company Decentralised No 5–10% 40–50% 20–30%
Ireland Company Decentralised No 20–30% 50–60% 40–50%
Italy Sectoral Centralised Low 20–30% 50–60% 80–90%
Latvia Company Decentralised No 5–10% 40–50% 10–20%
Lithuania Company Decentralised No 5–10% 10–20% 5–10%
Luxembourg Company/
sectoral
Decentralised No 20–30% 80–90% 50–60%
Netherlands Sectoral Organised 
decentralised
High 10–20% 80–90% 80–90%
Poland Company Decentralised No 5–10% 20–30% 10–20%
Portugal Sectoral Centralised Low 10–20% 30–40% 60–70%
Slovak 
Republic
Company/
sectoral
Decentralised No 10–20% 30–40% 20–30%
Slovenia Sectoral Centralised No 10–20% 60–70% 60–70%
Spain Sectoral Organised 
decentralised
Low 10–20% 70–80% 70–80%
Sweden Sectoral Organised 
decentralised
High 60–70% 80–90% ≥ 90%
United 
Kingdom
Company Decentralised No 10–20% 30–40% 20–30%
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Annex 2: Interviews conducted for the sectoral case studies
Retail
Chris Van Droogenbroeck – ACV 
Delphine Latawiec – ACV
Myriam Delmée – ABVV
Jan De Weghe – ABVV
Tom Van Droogenbroeck – ACLVB 
Metal
Frans Biebaut – ABVV Metaal
Swat Clerinx – ACV LBC
Marc De Wilde – ACV Metea
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Chapter 4 
Varieties of decentralisation in German collective 
bargaining
Thorsten Schulten and Reinhard Bispinck
1. Introduction
Germany is well to the fore in terms of collective bargaining decentralisation in Europe 
(Keune 2011). In the international literature it is often regarded as a standard case 
of ‘organised’ or ‘controlled decentralisation’, within the framework of which the 
bargaining parties at sectoral level de¿ ne the scope for derogations at company level 
via so-called opening clauses (Visser 2016; OECD 2017). In many European countries 
German experiences have served as an important reference point for reform of national 
collective bargaining systems.
The international perception of the German variant of decentralisation, however, 
is often rather one-sided and does not reÀ ect German collective bargaining in all its 
diversity. There are at least two fundamental problems. First, its development is very 
much viewed through the lenses of major manufacturing industries, such as chemicals 
or metalworking, which industrial relations regimes diɣ er very much from those in 
other sectors, such as  private services (Dribbusch et al. 2017). In addition to a general 
overview of German collective bargaining and its decentralising tendencies, in this 
chapter we provide two in-depth case studies – one on the metal industry and one on 
retail trade – which provides a comprehensive picture of the diɣ erentiated world of 
collective bargaining in Germany.
Secondly, the concept of ‘organised decentralisation’ often takes too rosy a view and 
underestimates the level of conÀ ict. As German experiences show clearly, collective 
bargaining decentralisation is not about a more or less ‘intelligent’ mode of regulation, 
but about diɣ erent interests and power relations. It deals with the fundamental conÀ ict 
between setting up a level playing-¿ eld for all companies and recognising the speci¿ c 
interests and circumstances of individual ¿ rms.
The trend towards decentralisation has fundamentally changed the German collective 
bargaining system. Organised and non-organised forms of decentralisation exist side by 
side, together with an overall trend toward the erosion of collective bargaining in some 
parts of the economy. While decentralisation often goes together with a shift in power 
from labour to capital, it sometimes creates new opportunities for revitalising union 
power.
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2.  Decentralisation of German collective bargaining – an overview
2.1  Basic features of German collective bargaining
The legal basis of collective bargaining in Germany is provided by the Collective 
Agreements Act of 1949 (Tarifvertragsgesetz) (Däubler 2016). Collective agreements 
can be concluded between employers’ associations (or individual employers), on one 
hand, and trade unions, on the other. In contrast, works councils – the statutory employee 
representation bodies elected at workplace and company level – may conclude only 
works agreements (Betriebsvereinbarung), but not collective agreements. According 
to the Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) works agreements ‘may not 
deal with remuneration and other conditions of employment that have been ¿ xed, or 
are normally ¿ xed, by collective agreement’ (Article 77, para 3). Germany has a so-called 
dual system of interest representation in terms of which unions conclude collective 
agreements, while works councils, as non-union bodies, have to regulate and monitor 
their implementation at company level.
Collective agreements are directly binding for all members of the bargaining parties 
concerned; that is, for employees who are members of the signatory unions and all 
member companies of the signatory employers’ associations, or a single company in the 
case of a company agreement. In practice, employers bound by a collective agreement 
usually apply the agreed provisions to all employees, whether they are trade union 
members or not. Collective agreements can also be extended by the Minister of Labour 
to include those employers and employees in the relevant sector who are not directly 
bound by the agreement. In practice, however, the extension of collective agreements 
is very rare and takes place only in a limited number of sectors (Schulten et al. 2015).
According to the ‘favourability principle’ (Günstigkeitsprinzip), departures from 
collectively-agreed provisions are usually possible only when these favour employees. 
For example, a works agreement can provide better employment conditions than a 
collective agreement, but may not worsen them. However, the bargaining parties may 
agree on so-called ‘opening clauses’ (Öɣ nungsklauseln) in collective agreements that 
allow, under certain conditions, a derogation from collectively agreed standards, even if 
this changes employment conditions for the worse.
There are two basic types of collective agreements in Germany: association-level or 
sectoral agreements (Verbands- or Branchentarifverträge) and company agreements 
(Firmentarifverträge) for individual companies or establishments. By the end of 
2016, the German Ministry of Labour had oɤ  cially registered 73,436 valid collective 
agreements, of which 30,463 were concluded at sectoral and 42,973 at company level 
(WSI 2017). 
2.2  German collective bargaining: structure and trends
Traditionally, the German model of collective bargaining was associated with a 
comprehensive system of sectoral agreements and a high bargaining coverage. Since 
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the mid-1990s, however, it has undergone a series of profound changes that have 
led to an increasing fragmentation and partial erosion of the system (Schulten and 
Bispinck 2015; Addison et al. 2017; Ober¿ chtner and Schnabel 2017). Based on the data 
provided by the annual IAB Establishment Panel, which is carried out by the Institute 
of Employment Research (IAB) of the German Federal Employment Agency, between 
1998 and 2016 the proportion of workers covered by collective agreements in western 
Germany decreased from 76 to 59 per cent, while in eastern Germany the proportion 
fell from 63 to 47 per cent (Figure 1). The partial erosion of collective bargaining is 
even more pronounced with regard to sectoral agreements, the traditional core of the 
German bargaining model. According to IAB data the percentage of workers covered by 
sectoral agreements decreased from 68 to 51 per cent in western Germany and from 52 
to 36 per cent in the east of the country.
Among the 56 per cent of German workers who still had a collective agreement in 
2016, 48 per cent were covered by a sectoral and 8 per cent by a company agreement 
(Figure 2). For about half of the 44 per cent of workers who are not covered by collective 
agreements, the companies claim that they take prevailing sectoral agreements as 
‘orientation’ for their own in-house determination of wages and working conditions. 
The impact of the collective agreements is thus beyond the scope of formal bargaining 
coverage. As some recent studies have found, however, many companies that take their 
bearings from prevailing sectoral agreements, often provide for wages and conditions 
well below collectively agreed standards (Addison et al. 2016; Berwing 2016). 
In general, larger companies are much more likely to be covered by collective 
agreements, while the majority of smaller companies have no agreement at all. Thus, 
the bargaining coverage of companies is rather low (Figure 2). In 2016, only 27 per 
Figure 1 Collective bargaining coverage in Germany, 1998–2016 (workers covered by 
 collective agreements as a percentage of all workers)
Source: IAB Establishment Panel (Ellguth and Kohaut 2017).
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cent of companies were covered by a sectoral agreement, 2 per cent had a company 
agreement, while the majority – 70 per cent – of all companies were not covered by 
collective agreements (among them 42 per cent that claim to take prevailing sectoral 
agreements as orientation). 
The IAB establishment panel has been the standard source for calculating collective 
bargaining coverage in Germany for years. More recently, the German Statistical Oɤ  ce 
has published an alternative calculation, based on the German Structure of Earnings 
Survey (SES). According to the latter, overall bargaining coverage is not 56 per cent of 
employees (as calculated by the IAB), but only 45 per cent (Statistisches Bundesamt 
2016a).1
The advantage of the SES data is that they provide more detailed information on 
collective bargaining coverage in diɣ erent sectors (Figure 3). In some branches, such 
as public administration, ¿ nancial services or energy, the vast majority of workers – 80 
per cent or more – are still covered by collective agreements. The same holds true for 
some core manufacturing industries, such as the automobile or chemical industries, in 
which around two-thirds of workers are still covered by collective agreements. Sectors 
such as construction, postal services and health and social services show a bargaining 
1. There is no satisfying explanation for the diɣ erence so far. Both the IAB and the SES data are representative 
for all groups and sizes of companies. From conversations with the data providers it emerges that, due to 
diɣ erences in the methodology of the surveys, IAB data might slightly overestimate and the SES data slightly 
underestimate bargaining coverage, so that the real ¿ gure might be somewhere in the middle.
Figure 2 Collective bargaining coverage in Germany as a percentage of establishments 
 and employees, 2016
  
Source: IAB Establishment Panel.
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coverage of around 40 per cent. Finally, in a large number of private service sectors, 
such as retail trade, hotels and restaurants, automobiles or IT services, only a minority 
– less than 30 per cent – of workers are covered by collective agreements. 
Finally, there is a close relationship between collective bargaining coverage and wage 
levels. Compared with other European countries, Germany exhibits a rather unusual 
pattern, whereby bargaining coverage increases with wage level. According to SES data, 
workers in the two lowest wage quintiles have a bargaining coverage of only 27 per 
cent. In contrast, 66 per cent of workers in the highest wage quintile are covered by a 
collective agreement (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales 2017: 74). This shows 
that the decline of German collective bargaining has been particularly marked in the 
low-wage sector, in which only a minority of workers are still protected by collective 
agreements. Studies have also identi¿ ed the decline in bargaining coverage as the single 
most important reason for the growing wage inequality in Germany (Felbermayr et al. 
2015).
2.3  Decentralisation of collective bargaining
The German system of collective bargaining has always been characterised by a 
highly diɣ erentiated interplay between sector- and company-level regulations. Trade 
unions and employers’ associations agree on certain minimum conditions at sectoral 
level in order to limit competition on labour costs and to demarcate a level-playing 
Figure 3 Collective bargaining coverage in selected sectors, 2014 (workers covered by 
 collective agreements as a percentage of all workers)
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2016) using data of the German Structure of Earnings Survey (SES).
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¿ eld. Management and works councils implement agreements at company level and 
typically negotiate additional social bene¿ ts. Apart from a relatively clear division 
of labour between the two bargaining areas, there were always some overlaps as the 
sectoral agreements include some opening clauses which allow room for regulation at 
company level. This started as early as the 1960s and 1970s with opening clauses on 
work organisation and additional payments and continued in the 1980s with opening 
clauses on working time, which were agreed in exchange for working time reductions. 
The major push for the decentralisation of German collective bargaining came in the 
1990s, against the background of a deep economic crisis in the aftermath of German 
uni¿ cation. A growing number of employers started to criticise the system of sectoral 
collective agreements for being ‘too rigid’ and for not providing suɤ  cient ‘À exibility at 
the company level’. Originally, the demands for derogations from sectoral agreements 
came particularly from companies in severe economic diɤ  culties. In a context of 
increasing unemployment in Germany, sectoral agreements from the mid-1990s 
increasingly included ’hardship clauses’ whereby companies obtained the right to 
derogate from sectoral standards in exchange for the safeguarding of jobs. At ¿ rst, such 
deviations were possible only under relatively strict conditions. However, over time 
the criteria for opening clauses were no longer restricted to the danger of bankruptcy 
but were widened to embrace all kinds of situations and motivations, including even 
‘improving competitiveness’ (Bispinck and Schulten 2010).
Demands for the decentralisation of collective bargaining came ¿ rst of all from the 
employers, with considerable support from mainstream economists (for example, 
Ochel 2005). There was also a strong push for decentralisation from political parties, 
which sometimes called for a statutory opening clause or a revision of the favourability 
principle (Bispinck and Schulten 2005). 
Among the German trade unions the issue of decentralisation was much more contested 
(Bispinck 2004a; Bahnmüller 2017). The Chemical Workers Union (IG BCE), for 
example, has taken a more proactive stance since the early 1990s and has agreed on 
some major opening clauses regarding wages, annual bonuses and working time. In 
this way, IG BCE was able to establish a system of controlled decentralisation whereby 
the union and not parties at the company have the ¿ nal say on derogations. In the view 
of IG BCE this approach has helped the union to stabilise the entire bargaining system 
in the chemical sector (Erhard 2007; Förster 2008). In contrast, most other unions 
originally took a much more sceptical view and tried, if not to prevent at least to limit 
the spread of opening clauses, which were widely regarded as a fundamental threat to 
the concept of sectoral bargaining. 
In practice, however, all unions were more or less ready to accept company deals with 
deviations from sectoral agreements, especially when the companies threaten the loss 
of employment. The debates with the unions came to a turning point in 2004 when the 
Metalworkers Union IG Metall concluded the Pforzheim Agreement, which includes 
a general opening clause and some procedural rules for controlled decentralisation.2 
2. On the Pforzheim Agreement see the section on the metal industry.
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After this milestone agreement, similar opening clauses have been concluded in almost 
all major sectors (Bispinck and Schulten 2010). As a result, the use of opening 
clauses for derogations at company level became a new norm in German collective 
bargaining.
2.4  The use of opening clauses in practice
There are only a few studies and data sets with empirical information on the spread 
of opening clauses in German collective bargaining (Bispinck and Schulten 2003, 
2010; Brändle and Heinbach 2013; Ellguth and Kohaut 2010, 2014; Amlinger and 
Bispinck 2016). One dataset with information on the use of opening clauses is the IAB 
Establishment Panel, which provides data for 2005, 2007 and 2011 (Ellguth and Kohaut 
2014: 441). According to the IAB data, in 2011 20 per cent of all establishments covered 
by collective agreements, representing about 35 per cent of all workers, made use of 
some kind of opening clauses; 13 per cent used opening clauses regarding working time; 
and 10 per cent on pay issues (ibid.: 442). Usually, larger establishments use opening 
clauses more frequently than smaller establishments. There is no clear relationship 
between a company’s resort to opening clauses and its economic performance; it is not 
limited to establishments in economic trouble (ibid.: 447).
Another data source with information on the use of opening clauses is the WSI Works 
Council Survey, which is a representative survey of establishments with at least 20 
employees and a works council (Amlinger and Bispinck 2016).3 The results from the 
WSI Survey are similar to those from the IAB data. All in all, in 2015 21 per cent of all 
establishments were covered by collective agreements that made use of opening clauses. 
In larger establishments the frequency is somewhat higher than in smaller ones. There 
is no clear relationship to economic performance, as opening clauses were used by 24 
per cent of establishments with ‘bad’ economic performance and by 20 per cent of those 
whose economic performance was ‘good’ (Figure 4). 
The WSI Survey also contains information on companies that derogate from collective 
agreements without the justi¿ cation of an opening clause (Figure 4). In total, 13 per cent 
of all establishments declared that they practice some form of ‘informal decentralisation’. 
This probably marks the lower extreme due to a number of undetected cases. Again 
such establishments might be characterised by poor or good economic performance. 
The frequency of informal derogations increases with size of establishment, with the 
exception of very large companies (more than 1,000 employees), at which the frequency 
is somewhat lower.
In terms of sectors, the use of opening clauses is most widespread in manufacturing 
(28 per cent), transport and hotels and restaurants (23 per cent), investment goods 
and company-related services (both 21 per cent). Use is very much below average in 
construction and ¿ nancial services (Figure 5). 
3. Because of changes in the questionnaire the data are not fully comparable with earlier versions of the WSI 
Survey. For an evaluation of the earlier version see: Bispinck and Schulten 2003, 2010.
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In terms of topics the opening clauses used most often concern working time, including 
provisions for reduction or extension of working time or for À exible working time 
arrangements. Of equal importance are opening clauses on wages, allowances and 
annual bonuses. Opening clauses are used relatively rarely with regard to apprenticeship 
pay or other issues (Figure 6). 
2.5  Procedural rules on opening clauses
There are some signi¿ cant diɣ erences regarding procedural rules for opening clauses. 
The standard form, which was developed in the ¿ rst half of the 1990s in the chemical 
industry (Erhard 2007), follows the following procedure. First, the union and employer 
association agree to introduce an opening clause, its content and concrete conditions 
and procedure for its adoption. The content can be conclusive or it can de¿ ne scope 
for derogation at company level. Usually, the parties at company level – management 
and work council – have to make a joint application to the sectoral bargaining parties, 
which make the ¿ nal decision on the derogation. The basic idea underlying ‘controlled 
decentralisation’ is that companies cannot opt for derogation as they see ¿ t. However, 
sometimes the sectoral parties also delegate competence for the ¿ nal decision to the 
parties at company level. This is the case in particular when the issue is of minor 
importance.
Figure 4 Derogations from collective agreements at company level, with or without opening 
 clauses, 2015 (as a percentage of all companies covered by a collective agreement)
Source: WSI Works Council Survey 2015 (Amlinger and Bispinck 2016).
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Since the adoption of the Pforzheim Agreement in the German metal industry in 2004 
Figure 5 Use of opening-clauses in various sectors, 2015 (percentage of all companies 
 covered by collective agreements)
Source: WSI Works Council Survey 2015 (Amlinger and Bispinck 2016).
Figure 6 Topics of used opening-clauses, 2015 (percentage of all companies covered by 
 collective agreements)
Source: WSI Works Council Survey 2015 (Amlinger and Bispinck 2016).
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many sectors have agreed on general opening clauses, which mainly de¿ ne procedural 
rules but say nothing about the content of derogation. The latter is usually the result 
of bargaining between the union and the company with the participation of all actors 
at both sectoral and company level. Concrete derogations are often laid down in a 
company agreement. There are some further procedural rules which usually need to be 
recognised when using opening clauses:
– companies have to open their books to justify the need of derogations; 
– derogations have to be terminated after a certain period of time; 
– companies have to oɣ er something in exchange for derogations (usually job security 
or new investment).
Finally, most trade unions also have internal coordination rules to control the use of 
opening clauses. Usually, every derogation has to be approved by a central coordination 
body, which has to check whether it is in line with the trade union’s rules and principles 
and whether it has no negative consequences for other companies (for example, for the 
case of the Uni¿ ed Services Union ver.di: Wiedemuth 2006).
3.  Decentralisation of collective bargaining – the German 
 metal industry
3.1  Employment in the German metal industry – a sectoral proﬁ le
The metal industry is Germany’s key industrial sector with an annual turnover of more 
than one trillion euros. The sector comprises more than 24,000 companies with almost 
3.9 million employees (Gesamtmetall 2016: 2). The largest sub-sectors within the metal 
industry are the machine-building industry, the automobile industry, production of 
metal goods and the electro and electronic industry (Figure 7). 
The German metal industry is heavily dependent on foreign markets as two-thirds 
of products and services are exported. Although there are a few large, well-known 
corporations, such as Volkswagen, Siemens, Bosch, Daimler and BMW, the industry 
is dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises (the famous Mittelstand). More 
than two-thirds of all metalworking companies have fewer than 100 employees, while 
only 2 per cent have a workforce of more than 1,000. 
Regarding employment structure, metalworking is ¿ rst of all a male-dominated sector: 
nearly 80 per cent of all metalworkers are men. In contrast to many other sectors the 
vast majority – 88 per cent – of employees work full-time, while only 12 per cent have a 
part-time or marginal part-time job (Figure 8). 
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Figure 7 Number of workers in the German metal industry, 2016 
Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2017), authors’ calculations.
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Figure 8 Structure of employment in the German metal industry, September 2016 
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Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2017), authors’ calculations.
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3.2  Trade unions and employers’ associations in the German metal industry
The two main collective actors in the metal industry are the German Metalworkers 
Union, IG Metall, and the Federation of German Employers’ Associations in the Metal 
and Electrical Engineering Industries, Gesamtmetall. IG Metall is the largest aɤ  liate of 
the Confederation of German Trade Unions (DGB), with about 2.27 million members 
in 2016. Apart from the metal industry, IG Metall also represents some other sectors, 
such as the metal trade, the steel industry, the wood industry and the textile industry.
After its membership had peaked in 1991 due to German uni¿ cation, IG Metall was 
faced by a severe decline, which was largely the result of strong deindustrialisation in 
eastern Germany and continuous job losses in the west (Bispinck and Dribbusch 2011, 
Figure 9). After 2005, the metalworkers’ union intensi¿ ed its organising policy in order 
to turn the tide. In conjunction with a reviving economy the union had ¿ nally managed 
to slow down the decline before it was hit by the crisis of 2008/2009. After the crisis 
IG Metall was even able to realise a moderate increase in membership, but the absolute 
¿ gures remain below the pre-uni¿ cation level.
About 30 per cent of the union’s members are either unemployed or have retired. Almost 
90 per cent of the active membership works in the metal industry. The union’s main 
stronghold is the automobile industry, in which around 70 per cent of the employees 
are union members. At some car manufacturing plants union density remains at 90 per 
cent or even higher. Along the supply chain of the automobile industry, however, union 
density is weaker, with slightly more than 40 per cent of the employees being organised. 
Less organised are, for example, the electronic and IT industries, in which less than 30 
per cent of employees hold a union membership card.
IG Metall’s institutional strength at workplace level is also closely related to the 
existence of works councils. According to the representative Establishment Survey of 
the Institute for Employment Research (IAB), in Germany works councils exist only in 9 
per cent of all establishments, representing 41 per cent of all employees. Their existence 
depends primarily on company size: in establishments with more than 500 employees 
about 90 per cent have a works council (Ellguth and Kohaut 2017). In 2014 about 71 
per cent of all works council members within the organisational domain of IG Metall 
were members of the union, some 28 per cent were unorganised and a marginal 0.3 per 
cent were members of the small Christian Metal Workers’ Union or CGM (Christliche 
Gewerkschaft Metall). In larger companies with 500 or more employees 80 per cent or 
more of the works councillors are members of IG Metall. 
The employers’ association in the metal industry, Gesamtmetall, is the largest federation 
in the Confederation of German Employers’ Associations (Bundesvereinigung 
der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, BDA), which is the peak organisation on the 
employers’ side. Gesamtmetall is an umbrella organisation of a large number of regional 
employers’ associations in the German metal industry. These regional associations are 
the bargaining partners of regional sections of IG Metall when it comes to negotiations 
on industry-wide collective agreements. Traditionally, all companies that are member 
of the employers’ association were automatically covered by the sectoral collective 
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agreement. Since the 1990s, however, many employers’ associations have introduced a 
special membership status, known as ‘OT status’ (OT = ohne Tarifbindung; ‘not covered 
by the collective agreement’), which provides member companies with the association’s 
full range of services, but relieves them of the duty to comply with the standards set by 
the industry-wide collective agreement. Gesamtmetall was initially against this type of 
membership but ¿ nally accepted it in 2005, acknowledging associations with ‘OT’ status 
as aɤ  liates. Some companies take advantage of this special OT status but negotiate 
company-level agreements, often with the support of their employers’ association. 
Others have withdrawn from collective bargaining, while some still take the sectoral 
collective agreements as orientation.
The number of member companies in Gesamtmetall with OT status has shown a 
continuous increase (Figure 10). About half of all member companies, representing 
about 20 per cent of the aɣ ected workers, now have OT status and thus are not obliged 
to accept the sectoral collective agreement in metalworking. In particular, small and 
medium-sized companies have used this status to withdraw from collective bargaining. 
3.3  Collective bargaining in the German metal industry – structure and 
 trends
The dominant pattern of collective bargaining in German metalworking is sectoral 
bargaining. The metal industry is historically subdivided into 21 regional bargaining 
Figure 9 Membership of IG Metall, 1980–2016 (millions; until 1990: West Germany, 
 from 1991: Germany)
Source: IG Metall.
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areas, in which the relevant employers’ associations negotiate with the regional IG 
Metall organisations (IG Metall 2017: 12). The most prominent bargaining areas are 
in the federal states of Baden-Wuerttemberg and North-Rhine Westphalia, where the 
bulk of metalworking industry is concentrated. Collective bargaining in metalworking 
usually takes the form of pattern bargaining, whereby a pilot agreement is concluded 
in one bargaining area and then transferred – sometimes with some speci¿ c regional 
amendments – to the other bargaining areas. The sectoral collective agreements cover 
the whole range of sub-branches within the metal industry, including the automotive 
industry, machine-building and the electro and electronic industries. Only the iron- and 
steel industry, as well as the various metal trades have separate collective agreements.
The long-term development of collective bargaining coverage in the metal industry 
is diɤ  cult to describe as there are no consistent data series. Studies on bargaining 
coverage in Germany usually rely on data from the IAB Establishment Panel, which is 
a representative employer survey covering all branches and all sizes of company. The 
IAB Establishment Panel, however, does not provide ¿ gures for the metal industry 
but only for the whole manufacturing sector (Ellguth and Kohaut 2017). As a rough 
approximation to the metal industry ¿ gures are available for the sector ‘capital goods 
and durable consumer goods’, which covers most metalworking branches. On this basis, 
the ¿ gures indicate a relatively stable bargaining coverage of about 60 per cent during 
the past 8 years, which is only slightly above the national average (Table 1).
Figure 10 Members of Gesamtmetall with special ‘OT’ status, 2005–2015 (% of all member 
 companies and aff ected workers)
Source: Gesamtmetall.
24.4
31.1
36.4
38.8 40.2
42.3
44.4
46.8 47.5 48.5
49.7
8.3
11.2
14.0 15.7 15.8
16.5 17.6 18.6
19.3 19.8 20.2
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Member companies Affected workers
Varieties of decentralisation in German collective bargaining
 Multi-employer bargaining under pressure – Decentralisation trends in ﬁ ve European countries 119
Another source for measuring bargaining coverage is the German Structure of Earnings 
Survey (SES), which provides more detailed information but only for 2014 (Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2016). According to this, bargaining coverage of employees within the 
diɣ erent sub-sectors of the German metal industry varies between 36 per cent in the 
production of metal goods and 75 per cent in the shipbuilding and aviation industry 
(Figure 11). In the automobile and machine-building industry coverage is 69 and 67 per 
cent, respectively. As far as bargaining coverage of the establishments is concerned, it 
varies between only 5 per cent in metal goods and 18 per cent in the shipbuilding and 
aviation industry. 
A third source for calculating collective bargaining coverage in the metal industry is 
the membership data of the employers’ association Gesamtmetall, which goes back to 
1960. According to these ¿ gures, sectoral agreements in metalworking have undergone 
Table 1 Collective bargaining coverage in industries producing capital and durable 
 consumer goods, 2009–2016 (% of all employees or establishments)
2009 2011 2013 2015 2016
Employees 61 58 62 60 60
Establishments 32 24 22 26 21
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, special evaluation by the IAB for the authors.
Figure 11 Collective bargaining coverage in sub-sectors of the German metal industry, 2014 
 (% of employees or establishments)
Source: German Structure of Earnings Survey (Statistisches Bundesamt 2016a).
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a remarkable decline (Figure 12). While in 1960 about 80 per cent of all metalworkers 
in western Germany were covered by sectoral agreements, that had fallen to just over 
50 per cent by 2015. The decline started in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s. 
It slowed only at the end of 2000s. Since then it has remained relatively stable at a 
low level. In eastern Germany the situation is even more dramatic. After a sharp 
decline in bargaining coverage in the 1990s, only around 17 per cent of eastern German 
metalworkers are still covered by a collective agreement. 
Figure 12 Collective bargaining coverage by sectoral agreements in the German metal 
 industry, 1960–2015 (% of all employees or establishments)
Source: Gesamtmetall, authors’ calculations.
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Turning to establishments, the ¿ gures are even more striking: only 17 per cent of 
western German and 5 per cent of eastern German metalworking companies are still 
covered by sectoral agreements. Although some establishments are covered by company 
agreements, the large majority of (mainly small-sized) companies in metalworking are 
not aɣ ected by collective bargaining. 
3.4  Decentralisation of collective bargaining in the metal industry
The decentralisation of collective bargaining in the metal industry has a long history. 
Under the conditions of full employment in the 1960s, the trade unions demanded 
additional company bargaining (betriebsnahe Tarifpolitik) in order to obtain extra 
payments at company level and to regulate them within company agreements. At that 
time, the employers emphasised the value of sectoral agreements, which were seen as 
an important instrument for moderating wage increases. The picture changed with 
growing mass unemployment in the 1980s, when the employers started to demand more 
À exibility and (downward) derogations from sectoral agreements at company level.
The introduction and speci¿ c design of opening clauses as a form of ‘organised 
decentralisation’ has always been an issue giving rise to harsh conÀ icts and was 
sometimes even accompanied by industrial action. For a long time, IG Metall was 
very sceptical about using opening clauses, which were criticised for undermining the 
principal function of sectoral agreements, namely the determination of agreed standards 
for the whole sector and therewith the limitation of competition on wages and other 
labour costs (Bahnmüller 2017). In practice, however, the union was always open to 
negotiating special conditions for companies that were in real economic diɤ  culties in 
order to safeguard employment. All in all, the process of decentralisation of collective 
bargaining in the metal industry stretches back over a period of more than 30 years 
(Bispinck 2004a; Haipeter and Lehndorɣ  2014). The main stages were as follows.
From 1984: Exchange of working time reductions for working time ﬂ exibility at company 
level
The decentralisation of collective bargaining in the metal industry started in the mid-
1980s with the issue of working time. In exchange for a reduction of weekly working 
time, IG Metall made some signi¿ cant concessions regarding more working time 
À exibility at company level. In the ¿ rst years of working time reduction after 1984 the 
agreed standard of weekly working time of 38.5 hours had to be achieved only as an 
average. The bargaining parties later introduced a provision that up to 18 per cent of 
employees may, on a voluntary basis, have prolonged working time of 40 hours. In 
companies with a share of 50 per cent or more of high wage groups the 40-hour week 
may be applied to up to 50 per cent of employees. The same applies with regard to 
fostering innovation and countering shortages of skilled labour. 
As a consequence, the 35-hour week, which was ¿ nally achieved in the western German 
metal industry in 1995, was never fully implemented for all metalworkers. For parts of 
the workforce it serves only as a reference value. Since 1994 the collective agreements 
provide additional regulations according to which working time can be reduced to 30 
hours per week with corresponding lower pay in order to safeguard jobs. This was in 
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response to the sharp economic recession in 1992/1993, which threatened employment 
especially in the metal industry. 
1993: Hardship clauses in eastern Germany
Opening clauses concerning pay were introduced for the ¿ rst time in 1993 in eastern 
Germany as a consequence of the deep transformation crisis that hit the metal industry 
in particular. After a very conÀ ictual bargaining round with two weeks of strikes, IG 
Metall agreed to the introduction of a so-called hardship clause (Härtefallklausel) 
in the sectoral agreement. According to the clause, companies are allowed – under 
certain conditions – to deviate from collectively agreed pay. These deviations had to be 
negotiated not by the management and the works councils at establishment level but by 
the sectoral collective bargaining parties themselves. In practice, these provisions were 
used fairly often (Hickel and Kurtzke 1997).
From the mid 1990s: Derogations on pay in western Germany
While IG Metall rejected employers’ demands for formal adoption of the eastern 
German hardship clause also in the west, from the mid-1990s it started to accept more 
and more company derogations also in western German collective agreements. The 
derogation provisions were often fairly vague and did not contain procedural rules. 
The metalworking agreement in North Rhine-Westphalia, for example, had a provision 
under which ‘in case of severe diɤ  culties – for example, in order to prevent insolvency 
– the bargaining parties shall make eɣ orts to come up with special regulations.’
In the metalworking industry deviations from regional sectoral agreements became 
increasingly widespread during the 1990s (Haipeter and Lehndorɣ  2009: 33ɣ ). While 
in eastern Germany the existence of the formalised hardship clause oɣ ered a de¿ ned 
procedure for regulating deviations at company level, in western Germany regional 
agreements contained only very general ‘restructuring clauses’ with no procedural 
requirements. As a result, a ‘grey area’ of company deviations emerged and grew 
(Bahnmüller 2017). Some deviations were backed by sectoral agreements; others de 
facto contravened collectively agreed standards, leading to a kind of ‘wildcat cooperation’ 
(Streeck 1984) at company level. Because of lack of transparency, IG Metall had de facto 
lost its power to control decentralisation at company level, which increasingly took on 
a ‘disorganized’ or ‘wild’ form.
2004: Pforzheim Agreement with the introduction of a general opening clause
The situation changed fundamentally with the adoption of the Pforzheim Agreement, 
which was concluded in the metal industry in February 2004. The agreement was not 
only the result of a conÀ ict in German metalworking but also of a more fundamental 
societal conÀ ict about the future development of the German collective bargaining 
system (Bispinck 2004b). In the early 2000s, Germany was widely regarded as ‘the 
sick man of Europe’ as its economic performance was comparatively weak and its 
unemployment one of the highest in Europe. The prevailing opinion at that time was 
that the economic weakness was grounded in ‘overregulation’ of the labour market. 
Thus, in 2013 the Red-Green government announced its notorious ‘Agenda 2010’, 
which contains a comprehensive programme for weakening labour market regulation. 
As part of his famous ‘Agenda speech’ in the German parliament, former chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder also threatened to intervene in free collective bargaining through the 
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introduction of a statutory opening clause if the bargaining parties themselves were not 
able to reach agreement on more possibilities for companies to derogate from sectoral 
agreements. The Pforzheim Agreement was to certain extent the price the unions had to 
pay to avoid those interventions.
The Pforzheim Agreement contains for the ¿ rst time a general opening clause for 
the whole metal industry, according to which companies can derogate from sectoral 
agreements in order to ‘secure existing employment and to create new jobs’ through 
improvement of ‘competitiveness, innovative capability and investment conditions’ 
(see Box 1). In contrast to earlier opening clauses, the Pforzheim Agreement says 
little about the content of possible derogations but contains mainly procedural rules. 
If a company wants to deviate from the sectoral agreement, the management and the 
works council have to make a joint application to the sector-level bargaining parties; 
that is, the regional organisations of IG Metall and Gesamtmetall. If the latter agree 
on the derogations, IG Metall negotiates a supplementary company agreement with 
the company. In principle, such company agreements can deal with all kind of issues, 
such as ‘cuts in special payments, deferral of claims, increasing or reducing of working 
hours with or without full wage compensation’. In practice, however, IG Metall usually 
accepted such company agreements only when the derogations are temporary and when 
the company gives a job guarantee for the period of derogation.
3.5  Decentralisation of metalworking collective bargaining in practice
The main impact of the Pforzheim Agreement has been the reorganisation – to a 
considerable extent – of the earlier process of wild decentralisation. With the de¿ nition 
of a general procedural framework the sectoral bargaining parties were able to regain 
control of the decentralisation process. For IG Metall this meant that it had to give up its 
resistance in principle to widespread use of derogations at company level and to accept 
Box 1  Pforzheim Agreement, 2004
Collective agreement on competitiveness and securing of production sites for the 
metal and electrical industry, Baden-Württemberg, 25.2.2004*
§ 1 ‘The aim of this collective agreement is to secure existing employment and to create 
new jobs in Germany. This requires improvements in competitiveness, innovative 
capability and investment conditions. The collective bargaining parties are committed 
to these goals and to their of shaping the framework for enhanced employment in 
Germany. 
§ 2 The parties at establishment-level examine whether measures under the existing 
provisions are exhausted to secure and promote employment. The collective bargaining 
parties advise – at the request of the parties at establishment level – what possibilities 
exist within the framework of collective agreements. If it is necessary, taking into 
consideration the social and economic consequences, to secure a sustainable 
development of employment by deviating from collectively agreed regulations, the
Thorsten Schulten and Reinhard Bispinck 
124  Multi-employer bargaining under pressure – Decentralisation trends in ﬁ ve European countries
them as an established part of a more fundamentally revised bargaining system in the 
German metal industry (Bahnmüller 2017). This change of viewpoint, however, does 
not mean that the union automatically accepts all applications for derogation. On the 
contrary, decentralisation of collective bargaining often goes hand in hand often with 
tough conÀ icts at local level (see below).
As the Pforzheim Agreement gave both bargaining parties greater control over the 
process of decentralisation, they also have a much better knowledge of the scope of 
derogations. No coherent statistics are available, but from time to time both parties 
have published some information. According to data provided by Gesamtmetall, there 
was a steady rise in company-level derogations following the Pforzheim Agreement 
(Figure 13). In September 2004, only 70 cases were reported by Gesamtmetall, but by 
April 2009 the number had increased to 730. 
The key topics addressed by derogation agreements were pay and working time. 
Between 2004 and 2006, about two-thirds of all agreements provided for company-
level deviations on these two issues (Figure 14). 
In exchange for employee concessions on pay and working time, employers have usually 
had to oɣ er a quid pro quo (Figure 15). By far the most important issue for such ‘counter 
concessions’ is job protection, whereby the employer makes a commitment to refrain from 
compulsory economic terminations during the lifetime of the derogation agreement. In 
2006, four out of ¿ ve agreements contained a provision on job security (Haipeter and 
Lehndorɣ  2009: 39). Other important employer concessions have included extensions 
of workers’ and unions’ codetermination rights, and commitments to undertake new 
investment and retain operations at existing sites. Between 2004 and 2006, a rising 
proportion of derogation agreements entailed such employer commitments in return 
for deviations from agreed terms. 
Box 1  Pforzheim Agreement, 2004 (cont.)
collective bargaining parties, with the parties at establishment level, after joint 
examination, agree on supplementary derogations from collectively agreed minimum 
standards; for example, cuts in special payments, deferral of claims, increasing or 
reducing working hours with or without full wage compensation (if not regulated 
in the collective agreement). A precondition for this is comprehensive information 
with associated documents. (…) In the overall assessment possible consequences on 
competition and employment in the sector or region, as far as establishments with the 
same collective bargaining coverage are concerned, should be included.’
* Since 2008 the Pforzheim Agreement has been part of a ‘collective agreement on 
the safeguarding and increasing of employment’ (Tarifvertrag zur Beschäftigungs-
sicherung und zum Beschäftigungsaufbau).
Source: Translation by the authors.
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Only few years after the conclusion of the Pforzheim Agreement the global ¿ nancial and 
economic crisis hit the German economy; the metal industry was most severely aɣ ected 
as orders and production felt dramatically. The unions and the works councils came 
under pressure to give support when companies got into ¿ nancial diɤ  culties. While the 
employers demanded wage restraint and other concessions, for the unions employment 
security was the top priority. In practice, companies made excessive use of À exible 
working time arrangements (running down of working time accounts) and short-time 
work (Herzog-Stein and Seifert 2010). 
Figure 13 Number of company-level derogations from sectoral agreement in metalworking
Source: Gesamtmetall (2009).
Figure 14 Issues addressed in derogation agreements in German metalworking, 2004–2006
Source: Haipeter and Lehndorff  (2009: 37).
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Despite a sharp cut in production the employment level in the metal industry remained 
relatively stable (Figure 16). A similar development was observed in other sectors. This 
‘German jobs miracle’ was interpreted as proof of the eɤ  ciency of the built-in À exibility 
of the labour market institutions and regulations. 
For more recent years the latest ¿ gures published by IG Metall (2016) cover 2012–2014 
(2). One-third of company agreements regulate deviations from the sectoral agreements. 
In addition there are so-called recognition agreements (Anerkennungstarifverträge) 
that recognise the sectoral agreements, partially also with some derogations. Finally, 
there are regular company agreements without any relation to sectoral agreements. All 
in all, in 2014 nearly half of all companies under the sectoral agreement in metalworking, 
with about 60 per cent of the aɣ ected employees, were covered by a derogation or 
additional company agreement (IG Metall 2015: 126) (Table 2).
The issues regulated in the more recent derogation agreements are again at the top: 
working time followed by wages, bonus regulations and holiday allowance (Figure 17). 
Holidays themselves were part of the derogations only in exceptional cases. 
The dominating concessions on the employers’ side were regulations concerning 
dismissal protection, followed to a much lower degree by provisions for the protection 
of production sites (Figure 18). The duration of derogation agreements ranges from 
one year and less up to 5 years and more. In the ¿ rst half of 2014 about half of the 
agreements had a duration of more than two years. After expiration the derogation 
agreements are in many and prolonged or renegotiated. 
Figure 15 Share of counter-concessions by issue in all derogation agreements in German 
 metalworking, 2004–2006
Source: Haipeter and Lehndorff  (2009: 39).
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Figure 16 Production and employees in M+E industry, 2005–2015
Source: Haipeter and Lehndorff  (2009: 39).
Table 2  Company agreements in German metalworking sector
Type of agreement 2012 2013 2014 (1st half)
With derogations from 
sectoral agreement
 1,396  1,538  1,450
% of all company collective 
agreements 
 32.9  33.9  33.6
Recognition agreements  522  520  516
Recognition agreements 
with deviations
 254  248  238
Regular company collective 
agreements
 2,072  2,204  2,164
Total  4,244  4,510  4,368
Source: IG Metall (2014).
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Figure 17 Metal industry – number and issues of deviations, 2012–2014
Source: IG Metall (2014).
Figure 18 Metal industry – number and issues of counter concessions, 2012–2014
Source: IG Metall (2016).
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Opening clauses within regular pay settlements
Apart from the introduction of a general opening clause through the Pforzheim 
Agreement it has become more and more common to introduce also more speci¿ c 
opening clauses into the regular pay settlements (Table 3). According to these clauses 
companies received under certain circumstances the possibility to postpone regular 
wage increases or to reduce/postpone lump-sum payments. Between 2006 and 2016 
opening clauses on pay were concluded in ¿ ve of the eight bargaining rounds.
The use of these opening clauses at company level has usually to be approved by IG Metal 
or the works council. In most cases, there were only a limited number of companies 
which demanded the use these derogations in practice. 
3.6  Outlook: Strengthening of union representation and revitalising sectoral 
 collective bargaining
The trend towards the decentralisation of collective bargaining has aɣ ected the German 
metal industry for more than three decades. For a long time the unions tried to avoid or 
at least to limit the trend. The conclusion of the Pforzheim Agreement marked a turning 
point in the debate. Since then the decentralisation of collective bargaining via opening 
clauses has become the new norm in the German metal industry (Bahnmüller 2017). To 
a certain extend the Pforzheim Agreement has helped the bargaining parties to regain 
control over the decentralisation process. Regarding overall collective bargaining 
coverage in the German metal industry, however, it has at best helped to slow down 
but not to stop the decline. IG Metall has drawn two conclusions from this. First, it has 
tried to use the decentralisation process to strengthen its membership and bargaining 
power at company level. Secondly, it has started a broad campaign to reinforce sectoral 
bargaining and increase bargaining coverage.
Table 3  Opening clauses for company derogations within pay settlements, 2006–2016
Bargaining round Provisions
2006 One-off  payment of 310 € could be reduced to 0 € or doubled to 620 €
2007 Postponing of 0.7 % additional one-off  payment and the second stage of wage increase of 1.7 % 
by up to 4 months possible
2008/2009 Postponing of the second-stage increase of 2.1 % by up to 7 months possible, as well as reductions 
in the additional one-off  payment of 122 €, depending on the economic situation 
2010 Pay rise of 2.7 % could be postponed or moved forward by up to two months
2012, 2013, 2015 No provisions in this regard
2016 Postpone or eliminate the lump-sum payment of 150 € and postpone the second-stage pay rise 
of 2.0 % by up to 3 months (at the request of the employers’ association and based on IG Metall’s 
decision)
Source: WSI Collective Agreement Archive.
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Concerning the use of opening clauses, IG Metall has developed a new bargaining 
strategy according to which derogations are accepted only if the union members within 
the company were actively involved in the negotiations and explicitly approve the 
results (Haipeter 2009; Haipeter and Lehndorɣ  2014; Wetzel 2014). Hereby, the union 
tries to use the company bargaining process to recruit new members and strengthen 
its organisational base in the company. Sometimes the derogation agreements even 
contain somewhat better conditions for union members. In companies in which IG 
Metall has no or little membership it usually rejects demands for negotiations on 
company derogations.
More recently, IG Metall launched a broad campaign to increase collective bargaining 
coverage. Hereby, the union emphasises what its current president, Jörg Hofmann, calls 
the ‘magic triangle’ of union density (Mitgliederstärke), participation (Beteiligung) and 
collective bargaining coverage (Tarifbindung) (Hofmann 2016). Elements of the new 
strategy include: 
– the strengthening of bargaining coverage in the core of the value chain where in 
recent years intensive processes of outsourcing, temporary agency work and 
contract work have enlarged the ‘white spots’ on the bargaining landscape; 
– speci¿ c eɣ orts in small and medium sized enterprises where bargaining coverage is 
traditionally low; 
– a campaign on contract work in order to prevent wage dumping. The focus here is 
the contract logistics sector, in which IG Metall is interested not only in concluding 
company collective agreements but also in pushing through for a new sector-wide 
collective agreement.
In 2016 IG Metall for the ¿ rst time also involved companies in the bargaining round 
that are not formally covered by collective agreements. In every bargaining region it 
systematically selected companies, at which it organised protest and warning strikes 
for the adoption of the sectoral collective agreement. At the end of the year the union 
was able to force 145 new companies with around 36,000 employees to join the sectoral 
collective agreement in metalworking (Bier and Rio Antas 2017). In contrast to the 
unions in other sectors as, for example, in the retail trade, IG Metall is not demanding 
an extension of the sectoral agreements in metalworking by the state, but wants to 
increase bargaining coverage by strengthening its own organisation at workplace level.
4. Decentralisation of collective bargaining – German retail trade
4.1 Employment in the German retail trade – a sectoral proﬁ le
With more than 3 million employees working in around 340,000 enterprises the retail 
trade is one of the largest branches in Germany (Handelsverband Deutschland 2016a; 
Glaubitz 2017). By far the largest sub-sector is food retailing, which represents more 
than 40 per cent of overall retail turnover (Mütze 2016). The sector is fairly polarised, 
with a few large corporations, especially among supermarkets, pharmacists, fashion 
chains and department stores, and myriad small shops and enterprises. In 2011, 90 
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per cent of all retail enterprises had fewer than 20 employees, while only 1 per cent had 
more than 100 employees (Dummert 2013). 
Large parts of the retail sector are fairly price sensitive, so that economic development is 
shaped by strong price competition. Against the background of an ongoing extension of 
shop opening hours, as well as continuously growing sales À oor size, ¿ erce competition 
has become more and more the dominant economic pattern in the sector (Glaubitz 
2017). In recent years, the competitive pressure has been further intensi¿ ed by the 
rapid growth of e-commerce (Handelsverband 2016b: 12). The ¿ erce price competition 
has also become a major inÀ uence on employment conditions and labour relations in 
the sector, as labour costs are the second most important cost factor, after goods.
Turning to employment structure, the retail trade is ¿ rst of all a female-dominated 
sector; around 70 per cent of all retail trade workers are women (Figure 18). 
Furthermore, there is a very high proportion of part-time (35 per cent) and marginal 
part-time workers (27 per cent). In Germany, the latter are also called ‘mini-jobbers’, 
with a special employment status according to which they are allowed to earn up to 450 
euros a month at reduced tax and social security conditions. Finally, only a minority of 
38 per cent of all retail workers are still hired on a full-time basis (Figure 19). 
During the 2000s retail employment saw a signi¿ cant shift from full-time to part-time 
work (Figure 20). Between 2000 and 2010 the number of full-time workers decreased 
by almost 20 per cent, while the number of part-time employees increased by around 
8 per cent. Since 2010 the number of both full- and part-time workers has showed a 
steady increase, part-time work growing much faster than full-time. All in all, the retail 
trade has one of the highest proportions of (mainly female) part-time work in Germany. 
Figure 19 Structure of employment in the German retail trade, September 2016 (% of all 
 retail trade workers)
Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2017), Authors’ calculations..
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The retail sector has a relatively high incidence of diɣ erent types of precarious 
employment (Bundesregierung 2016, 2017; Glaubitz 2017). First of all, there is an 
extraordinarily high proportion of marginal part-time employment, which in many 
cases has replaced regular full-time or part-time jobs (Hohendanner and Stegmaier 
2012). There are diɣ erent reasons for the widespread use of mini-jobbers: (i) it allows 
companies to save labour costs, as marginal part-time workers are often ready to accept 
lower wages because they do not have to pay tax for such employment. (ii) Marginal 
part-time work gives employers much working time À exibility, which has become 
particularly important due to the extension of shop-opening hours. As a result, many 
mini-jobbers work in the evening or during the weekend or are even hired on an ‘on-
demand’ basis (Fischer et al. 2015: 218). (iii) Marginal part-time workers often do not 
use their rights regarding holidays, sickness pay and so on.
A second type of precarious employment, which is being used more and more in the 
retail trade sector, is ¿ xed-term employment. In recent years, the latter has become 
particularly widespread among newly hired employees (Table 4). In 2015, almost half 
of all newly hired workers in retail received only a ¿ xed-term contract. This holds true 
for both female and male workers, which show no diɣ erences in this respect. In the 
same year, only 45 per cent of workers with a ¿ xed-term contract were transferred to a 
permanent employment relationship (Bundesregierung 2017: 5).  
Figure 20 Structure of employment in the German retail trade, September 2016 (% of all 
 retail trade workers)
Source: German Statistical Offi  ce, GENESIS-Online Database (www-genesis.destatis.de). Authors’ calculations.
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Table 4  Proportion of newly hired workers in the German retail trade with a 
 ﬁ xed-term contract (%)
Year All Women Men
2010 38 39 37
2011 40 42 34
2012 41 44 36
2013 45 45 46
2014 49 51 46
2015 49 50 48
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, quoted from Bundesregierung (2017: 4).
4.2  Trade unions and employers’ associations in the German retail trade
The two main collective actors in the retail trade are the German Retail Federation 
(Handelsverband Deutschland, HDE) and the United Services Union (Vereinte 
Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft, ver.di). The HDE is the peak business organisation in the 
German retail trade sector, with various regional and professional trade associations, 
and represents about 100,000 enterprises.4 The latter correspond to around 30 per cent 
of all retail enterprises. However, as most of the larger retail corporations are members 
of the HDE, the organisation represents a much higher share of the sector. The HDE is 
both a business organisation, which does political lobbying for the economic interests 
of the sector, and an employers’ association which is involved in collective bargaining.
By far the most important trade union in the retail trade sector is Ver.di, which is the 
second largest trade union in Germany and aɤ  liated with the Confederation of German 
Trade Unions (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB).5 Ver.di represents, apart from the 
public sector, about 200 industries in private services and has about 2 million members 
(Dribbusch et al. 2017: 202). The union has a separate division for the whole commerce 
sector and a sub-division for the retail trade. In 2013 ver.di had about 264,000 members 
in the retail trade which corresponds to a union density of less than 10 per cent (Franke 
2013). While union density is often somewhat higher in larger retail corporations, the 
union is almost absent from many of the small and medium-sized companies. The 
same holds true for the existence of a works council, which is often an important body 
for recruiting new union members. In the commerce sector overall only 9 per cent of 
establishments and 28 per cent of employees are covered by a works council (Ellguth 
and Kohaut 2017: 283). The relatively weak position of ver.di in the retail trade is partly 
also a result of the growing number of precarious retail workers, who are much more 
diɤ  cult to organise.
4. Figures from the HDE Homepage: https://www.einzelhandel.de/
5. There is a second small trade union, the DHV- Die Berufsgewerkschaft e.V., which has some inÀ uence in a 
few retail companies, but is only of minor importance in the sector as a whole. The DHV is aɤ  liated to the 
Confederation of Christian Trade Unions (Christlicher Gewerkschaftsbund, CGB).
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4.3  Collective bargaining in the German retail trade – structure and trends
At ¿ rst glance the industrial relations regime in the retail trade seems to follow the 
traditional German model, with multi-employer collective bargaining at sectoral level. 
In comparison with manufacturing, however, industrial relations in the retail trade have 
become much more diversi¿ ed and fragmented due to the speci¿ c economic structure 
and the dominant pattern of economic development and employment in the sector 
(Kalkowski 2008; Beile and Priessner 2011; Glaubitz 2017).
Collective bargaining in the German retail trade takes place at sectoral level; 
sectoral agreements are concluded for diɣ erent regions. Currently, there are 14 
regional bargaining units, which largely corresponds to the 16 German federal states 
(Bundesländer). The only exceptions are the federal states of Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and 
Thuringia, which form a joint regional bargaining unit. Negotiations are held between 
the regional divisions of ver.di and the HDE, which are autonomous in concluding 
collective agreements at regional level. In practice, however, both organisations aim to 
coordinate their demands and negotiations at national level. If one region concludes a 
pilot agreement, the other regions usually follow with the same or similar agreements. 
Traditionally, collective agreements in the retail trade were always declared universally 
binding so that they cover not only the bargaining parties but all enterprises in the 
sector. The practice of extension, which for a long time was supported by both the 
trade unions and the employers’ associations, started in the mid-1950s and was carried 
on until the early 2000s. There was a joint belief among the bargaining parties that 
extension was necessary in order to create fair competition in the retail trade and to 
prevent downward pressure on wages and working conditions. 
During the 1990s there was growing dissatisfaction with the collective bargaining system 
among some retail companies, which left the main employers’ association or became 
members of competing organisations. In order to keep their members, in 1999 the main 
employers’ associations started to introduce a new membership status, according to 
which member companies were no longer automatically bound by the sectoral collective 
agreements signed by the association (Behrens 2011: 174ɣ .). With the so-called ‘OT’ 
membership status (OT = ohne Tarifbindung, which means ‘not bound by a collective 
agreement’) the HDE established an organisational logic which was in fundamental 
contradiction to the principle of sector-wide extension of collective agreements. Thus, 
from the year 2000 onwards, the employers’ associations refused to accept the practice 
of extension so that retail agreements were no longer generally binding.
As a result of the rejection of extensions, since the year 2000 collective bargaining 
coverage in the retail trade has declined dramatically (Felbermayr and Lehwald 
2015). In 2010, only half of the employees and one-third of the establishments were 
still covered by a collective agreement. Between 2010 and 2016 collective bargaining 
coverage declined even further, down to only 39 per cent of workers and 27 per cent of 
enterprises (Figure 21). While before 2000 the extensions had ensured that the entire 
sector was covered by collective agreements, now only a minority are still involved in 
collective bargaining.
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In 2016, the sectoral collective agreement in the retail trade covered only 34 per cent 
of the employees and 24 per cent of the establishments. In addition, 5 per cent of the 
employees and 3 per cent of the establishments had a company agreement, while a large 
majority – 58 per cent of the employees and 73 per cent of the establishments – were 
not covered by any collective agreement (Figure 22).6  
Among the latter a signi¿ cant number of companies declare that they take the existing 
sectoral agreements as ‘orientation’. In practice, however, this does not mean that they 
provide the same conditions as laid down in the collective agreements. According to 
studies by Addison et al. (2016) and Berwing (2016) companies that argue that collective 
agreements are taken as orientation, nevertheless often have much lower wages and 
working conditions than companies directly covered by the agreements. 
In Germany, there is usually a strong correlation between size of company and bargaining 
coverage. Smaller companies are less likely to be covered by collective agreements, while 
it is rather rare that larger corporations are not covered (Ellgut and Kohaut 2017). In the 
retail trade the picture is somewhat more diɣ erentiated. On one hand, it con¿ rms the 
general trend as the majority of small and medium-sized companies have no collective 
agreement. In addition, however, a signi¿ cant number of large retail corporations have 
decided to withdraw from collective bargaining (Glaubitz 2017). Among them are some 
big players in e-commerce, such as Amazon or Zalando, in which ver.di has not been 
able to reach an agreement so far (Boewe and Schulten 2017). Other large companies, 
6. According to data from the German Structure of Earnings Survey overall bargaining coverage in the retail 
trade is only 28 per cent (Statistisches Bundesamt (2016a). For a discussion of the diɣ erent data sources see 
footnote 1.
Figure 21 Collective bargaining coverage in the German retail trade, 2010–2016 
 (% of establishments and employees)
Source: IAB Establishment Panel.
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such as the warehouse chain Karstadt or the fashion store Esprit, also withdrew from 
collective agreements, but came back into the fold after a long struggle with the union. 
In contrast to that, C&A – the largest fashion chain in Germany – continues to reject 
demands for a collective agreement.
Finally, even signi¿ cant parts of food stores and supermarkets have no collective 
bargaining. Although the two largest food chains EDEKA and REWE are formally 
covered by the retail trade agreements, most supermarkets that run under their brand 
names belong to formally independent merchants many of whom refuse to accept 
collective agreements (Verheyen and Schillig 2017).
4.4  Decentralisation of collective bargaining in the German retail trade7 
As in other sectors, the debates and conÀ icts about stronger decentralisation and 
diɣ erentiation of collective bargaining started in the retail trade in the 1990s. Within 
Ver.di, as well as in its predecessor in the retail trade, the Union for Commerce, Banking 
and Insurance (Gewerkschaft Handel Banken Versicherungen, HBV),8 the issue of 
decentralisation has always been very much contested. In general, the union has been 
more reluctant to accept employers’ demands for opening clauses or other forms of 
decentralisation in order to derogate from standards laid down in the sectoral collective 
agreements at company level. The rationale for the union’s scepticism is grounded 
7. This section is based on an evaluation of original collective agreements in the retail trade provided by the WSI 
Collective Agreements Archive.
8. Ver.di was created in 2001 as a result of a merger of ¿ ve trade unions, one of which was the HBV.
Figure 22 Collective bargaining coverage in the German retail trade, 2016 
 (% of establishments and employees)
Source: IAB Establishment Panel.
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chieÀ y in two considerations. First, the union emphasised that working conditions and, 
especially, pay were at a much lower level than in, for example, manufacturing, so that 
further cuts would not be acceptable. Secondly, it was afraid that decentralisation would 
further weaken the position of the workers considering the relatively low union density 
and low level of works council representation in the retail trade.
Despite the union’s scepticism, some ¿ rst attempts towards ‘organised decentralisation’ 
of collective bargaining in retail go back to the 1990s (Bispinck and WSI-Tarifarchiv 
1999). Most were limited to east Germany, where after uni¿ cation the economy got into 
great diɤ  culties, with unemployment rates often twice as high as in west Germany.
From the second half of the 1990s onwards one major instrument for diɣ erentiation 
was the introduction of a special clause for small and medium-sized companies (the so-
called Mittelstandsklausel) which still exists in all eastern German retail agreements. 
According to this clause, retail companies up to a certain size are allowed to provide 
a basic payment which is below the standard level agreed in the sectoral agreements. 
The retail pay agreement from 2015 for the Federal State of Brandenburg, for example, 
allows ¿ rms to reduce basic payments by 4 per cent in companies of up to 25 employees, 
by 6 per cent in companies of up to 15 employees and by 8 per cent in companies of 
up to 5 employees. All other eastern German agreements contain the same or similar 
provisions, but not those in western Germany, where they were never introduced. 
Almost all regional retail agreements in both eastern and western Germany have some 
opening clauses on working time. While the regular collectively agreed working time 
varies between 37 and 39 hours per week (Bundesregierung 2017: 7), most regional 
agreements allow the extension of regular weekly working time up to 40 hours (or even 
42 hours for special professions) at company level. The company has to compensate for 
basic pay, but does not have to pay overtime. Usually, the working time extension needs 
to be concluded in a works agreement between the works council and the management. 
Some regional agreements also allow for working time extension on an individual basis 
when there is no works council in the company.
After the conclusion of the famous Pforzheim Agreement in 2004, which includes a 
broad framework for company-level derogations in the German metal industry, there 
was general pressure on the unions in other sectors to accept similar agreements . In 
2006 most regional bargaining units in the retail trade concluded so-called ‘collective 
agreements to safeguard employment’ (Tarifverträge zur Beschäftigungssicherung), 
which under certain circumstances allow temporary derogations from the sectoral 
collective agreements at company level. In order to avoid a diɤ  cult economic situation 
which might lead to job losses these agreements allow the works council and the 
management at company level to make a joint demand for such derogations. In this 
case, the parties at sectoral level – the union and the employers’ associations – are 
obliged to negotiate about possible derogations, while the companies need to open their 
books in order to prove the state of their economic circumstances. If an agreement 
could be reached the unions and the company ¿ nally sign an additional company-level 
collective agreement which determines temporary derogations. 
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Similar to the Pforzheim Agreement the Agreements to safeguard employment in 
the retail trade only regulate the procedure for derogations, but say nothing about its 
concrete content where the bargaining parties are almost free to negotiate all kind of 
issues regarding pay, working time and annual bonuses. In practice, however, they 
usually follow the pattern of traditional concession bargaining, in which the union 
agrees on a reduction of labour costs in exchange for a certain job security. Before the 
union is allowed to sign such an agreement, however, it also has to follow its internal 
coordination procedures. Within Ver.di there is an internal rule that all collective 
agreements on derogations need to be approved by the unions’ national collective 
bargaining department (Wiedemuth 2006). 
In practice, the use of opening clauses and other forms of organised decentralisation 
is much less common in the retail trade than in other sectors (Amlinger and Bispinck 
2016: 217). In contrast, the dominant form of decentralisation in the sector is still a more 
‘disorganised’ decentralisation, where companies simply withdraw from the collective 
agreement. Attempts to achieve more organised forms of decentralisation were not able 
to stop the general trend toward a decline in collective bargaining. For a majority of 
the enterprises in the retail sector, however, it currently seems to be more attractive to 
abstain from collective bargaining, while the union often lacks the power to force these 
companies to the bargaining table. 
Only in a few cases – in some larger retail companies – could the unions conclude 
‘phase-in agreements’ (Heranführungs- oder Anerkennungstarifverträge) where the 
company agreed to improve its conditions towards the sector-wide standards within 
a transition period and after that be fully covered by the sectoral agreement. Current 
examples are the fashion stores Esprit and Primark. 
In the case of the large warehouse form Karstadt, which withdrew from collective 
bargaining in 2013 after getting into serious economic diɤ  culties, a new company 
agreement was signed in 2017, according to which the company will again be covered 
by the sectoral collective agreements in the retail trade. However, for the next four years 
wage increases will not follow the sectoral agreements but will be related to company 
performance. In exchange, the company has guaranteed all current jobs and warehouses 
during the same period (Ver.di 2017). 
4.5  Impact of the erosion of collective bargaining in the German retail trade 
The erosion of collective bargaining in the German retail trade has had an enormous 
impact on the working conditions and especially the wages of the aɣ ected workers. 
According to a study by Felbermayr and Lehwald (2015) workers covered by collective 
agreements earn, on average, between 20 and 30 per cent more than workers who are 
not covered. The average wage gap is particularly high among cashiers (30 per cent), 
followed by buyers (26 per cent), salespersons (25 per cent) and receiving clerks (21 per 
cent) (Figure 23). It is also much higher in small and medium-sized companies than in 
larger corporations (ibid: 39). Apart from pay, there are often signi¿ cant diɣ erences 
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regarding other working conditions, such as working time and annual bonuses, which 
further deepens the collective bargaining gap. 
The decline of collective bargaining in the retail trade has also contributed to the fact that 
wages in the retail trade have lagged signi¿ cantly behind overall wage developments. 
Between 2001 and 2016 collectively agreed wages in the retail trade grew by about 37 
per cent in comparison with 44.8 per cent in the economy as a whole and 51.9 per cent 
in the metal industry (Figure 24).
All in all, wage levels in the retail trade are signi¿ cantly below wage levels in 
manufacturing, but also below the average wage level in the economy as a whole (Figure 
25). The wage gap is particularly pronounced in companies covered by collective 
agreements, which underlines the weakness of collective bargaining in the retail sector. 
Concerning gross monthly median wages in companies with collective agreements, 
wage levels in the commerce sector as a whole (that is, retail trade plus wholesale trade 
and garages) are on average 23 per cent below the level in manufacturing and 11 per cent 
below the level in the economy as a whole. In companies without collective agreements 
the respective wage gaps are 12 and 5 per cent. 
The retail sector also has a relatively large proportion of low-wage earners 
(Bundesregierung 2016: 16; 2017: 98f.). In 2014, about 22 per cent of all retail 
workers earned less than 8.50 euros per hour, so that they bene¿ ted considerably 
from the introduction of a national statutory minimum wage in January 2015 
(Mindestlohnkommission 2016: 43).
Figure 23 Collective bargaining coverage in the German retail trade, 2016 (% of 
 establishments and employees)
Source: Felbermayr and Lehwald (2015: 39).

30%
26%
25%
21%
10%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%
Cashier
Buyer
Salesperson
Receiving clerk
Warehouser
Thorsten Schulten and Reinhard Bispinck 
140  Multi-employer bargaining under pressure – Decentralisation trends in ﬁ ve European countries
Figure 25 Gross monthly median wages in German commerce,* manufacturing and total 
 economy, 2014 (full-time workers, euros)
Note: * Commerce = Retail trade, wholesale trade and garages.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2016b), German Structure of Earnings Survey 2014. 
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Figure 24 Collectively agreed wages in the German retail trade, metal industry and total 
 economy, 2001–2016 (2000 = 100)
Source: WSI Collective Agreement Archive.
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4.6  Outlook: Collective bargaining in the retail trade at a crossroads: further 
 erosion or stabilisation?
Developments in the retail trade constitute an extreme example of the general decline in 
German collective bargaining. After the retail employers’ associations started to reject 
the long-standing practice of extension of collective agreements in 2000, collective 
bargaining coverage dropped sharply, so that currently only a minority – about 40 per 
cent – of retail trade workers are still covered. The erosion of collective bargaining has 
largely contributed to a signi¿ cant change in economic development in the sector, which 
is now dominated by ¿ erce competition. As collective bargaining is no longer able to 
take wages and working conditions out of competition by setting sector-wide minimum 
standards, there is strong pressure on labour costs, which has led to a deterioration of 
working conditions and an increase in precarious employment. All this gives companies 
a strong incentive to withdraw from collective agreements. 
Therefore, collective bargaining in the retail trade is now at a crossroads. If the erosion 
continues, bargaining coverage may fall below the critical mass needed for sector-wide 
agreements. The result, sooner or later, would be a complete breakdown of sectoral 
bargaining, so that collective bargaining would remain only at company level in (mainly) 
larger retail corporations.
The alternative would be a re-stabilisation of collective bargaining in the sector. One 
approach to this end might be to strengthen the more organised forms of decentralisation 
in order to give companies more À exibility within collective agreements. Since the 
mid-2000s the retail sector has also had its ‘Pforzheim agreements’, with far-reaching 
possibilities for derogations at company level. The establishment of more organised 
decentralisation, however, was not able to stop the general decline in collective 
bargaining. 
Another approach would be the reintroduction of collective agreement extension in 
the retail sector so that agreed minimum standards could become generally binding. 
The trade union ver.di is currently campaigning for this, which is now seen as the 
key to restabilising the collective bargaining system in the retail trade (Nutzenberger 
2017).9 The employers’ association HDE, however, has so far rejected the demand for 
a reintroduction of extension and has claimed that it has ‘no acceptance’ among its 
members. The HDE criticised, in particular, what it characterises as the ‘old-fashioned’ 
wage systems in the sectoral agreements, which the employers’ association regards as a 
major obstacle to increasing bargaining coverage in the sector (HDE 2017).10 
Moreover, the HDE is opposed to the extension of collective agreements in principle as 
this would call into question its OT status. However, some HDE member companies take 
a diɣ erent view. The head of the Schwarz Corporation, for example, which represents, 
9. For more information on the ver.di campaign for the extension of collective agreements in the retail trade: 
https://handel.verdi.de/themen/tarifpolitik/ave-kampagne
10. Negotiations on a ‘modernisation’ of the wage systems in retail trade have taken place since the 2000s 
(Kalkowski 2008).
Thorsten Schulten and Reinhard Bispinck 
142  Multi-employer bargaining under pressure – Decentralisation trends in ﬁ ve European countries
among others, the second largest German discount chain, Lidl, has openly called for the 
retail sectoral agreements to be declared generally binding, so that all companies are 
competing on a level playing ¿ eld (Stockburger 2017).
The coming years will show whether the erosion of collective bargaining in the retail 
trade will continue or whether the bargaining parties will be able to restabilise the 
system. With regard to the latter, it is becoming obvious that a strategy directed 
towards organised decentralisation is not suɤ  cient as it is much easier for companies 
to withdraw from collective bargaining than to follow a regulated derogation process. 
For the moment, the reintroduction of extension might be the only instrument able to 
stop further erosion and to stabilise the bargaining system. The latter, however, needs 
much broader acceptance among retail employers, which it will probably obtain only 
with ‘modernisation’ of collectively agreed wage structures. 
5.  Conclusion
The trend towards decentralisation has fundamentally changed the German system 
of collective bargaining. It comprises various developments in diɣ erent sectors and 
companies, making the overall picture fairly diverse. On one hand, there are sectors in 
which the bargaining parties have established new forms of organised decentralisation. 
Here, sectoral bargaining is still dominant and the derogations are under the control 
of bargaining parties at sectoral level. The metal industry and even more the chemical 
industry are the most prominent examples of this. The chemical industry may come 
closest to the ideal type of organised decentralisation: the use of opening clauses is fairly 
limited and has clearly helped to stabilise collective bargaining in the sector. 
Experiences in the metal industry, however, are much more ambiguous. On one hand, 
the collective bargaining parties were to a certain extent able to regain control over 
the decentralisation process, as the Pforzheim Agreement established new binding 
coordination procedures. On the other hand the decline of bargaining coverage in 
metalworking continued, while derogations at company level became so widespread 
that sectoral agreements often determine only a framework but not actual pay and 
conditions.
Finally, the retail trade sector is an example of the dominance of unorganised 
decentralisation. After the employers had withdrawn from the regulated system of 
extended collective agreements, bargaining coverage declined dramatically. Today, 
only a minority of retail workers are still covered by a collective agreement. Although 
the sector has created all the instruments needed for a more organised form of 
decentralisation, they are rarely used in practice. 
The diɣ erent paths towards decentralisation in Germany reÀ ect the diɣ erent economic 
conditions, the diɣ erent structures of companies and employment and – not at least – 
the diɣ erent power relations in the various sectors. The majority of German workers are 
experiencing decentralisation as a further weakening of their position. As Nienhüser and 
Hoßfeld (2008, 2010) have shown, there are wide diɣ erences in how the trend towards 
Varieties of decentralisation in German collective bargaining
 Multi-employer bargaining under pressure – Decentralisation trends in ﬁ ve European countries 143
collective bargaining decentralisation is perceived by the actors at company level (Table 
5). The large majority of managers take a fairly positive view, as, from their standpoint, 
decentralisation strengthens the position of both management and works councils, 
takes better account of the business situation and weakens the power of the union at 
workplace level. In contrast, the majority of works councillors are much more sceptical. 
For them, the main winners of bargaining decentralisation are management; only a 
minority of works councillors believe that this process strengthens their own position. 
Only 32 per cent of employee representatives consider that decentralisation could help 
to secure jobs, as against 82 per cent of managers. A large majority of 78 per cent of 
works councillors, but also 40 per cent of managers, believe that the decentralisation of 
collective bargaining leads to more conÀ icts at company level. 
The sceptical or even negative view of the employees has also been con¿ rmed by data 
from the WSI Works Council Survey (Figure 26). Since the late 1990s a stable majority 
of works council members have seen bargaining decentralisation as ‘ambiguous’ 
or ‘generally problematic’, while only 12–15 per cent welcome this trend. Again, 
decentralisation is seen by a large majority of employee representatives as a process 
that mainly strengthens the employers’ bargaining. According to the survey, conducted 
in 2015, 33 per cent of works councillors see decentralisation as ‘ambiguous’, while 
44 per cent view it as generally problematic. Quite often works councillors have felt 
’blackmailed’ by their companies to accept concessions, and, as they could no longer 
refer to binding standards at sectoral level, have lost an important instrument of 
resistance. 
Three decades of experience with collectively agreed opening clauses have changed the 
basic structure of collective bargaining in Germany. The widespread introduction of 
these clauses triggered a process of decentralisation that has shifted an increasingly 
Table 5 Decentralisation of collective bargaining as seen by managers and 
 works councillors (%)
Deviations from sectoral agreements Managers Works councillors
… strengthen the inﬂ uence and power of the management 95 91
… strengthen the inﬂ uence and power of the works council 89 43
… take into account better the situation of the establishment 93 51
… can help to secure jobs 82 32
… lead to lower wages 33 79
… take up unnecessary time and resources 33 67
… lead to more conﬂ icts 40 78
… overburden the management 14 39
… overburden the works council 42 64
… strengthen the power of the unions at the establishment 21 13
… weaken the power of the unions at the establishment 69 83
Source: Nienhüser and Hoßfeld (2010).
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large part of bargaining responsibilities to company level. This has led to a signi¿ cant 
loss of regulatory power on the part of both employers’ associations and trade unions. 
Collectively agreed standards, once seen as formally inviolable norms, have now 
become objects of renegotiation at company level, with varying degrees of involvement 
on the part of the signatories of sectoral agreements. As a consequence, unions must 
now engage much more directly with the needs and requirements of companies, and 
works councils have less scope to take refuge in the mandatory character of sectoral 
regulations when confronted by management calls for local concessions. This requires 
more coordinating eɣ orts from the unions in order to avoid the erosion of standards in 
individual sectors. The functional diɣ erentiation between unions and works councils, 
which has been fundamental to the German dual system of interest representation, has 
become increasingly blurred.
Despite the hazards and side-eɣ ects of decentralisation, trade unions have sought to 
use the process as a starting point to build organisational power at workplace level 
through greater involvement of rank-and-¿ le members in the process of renegotiation. 
Research shows that there are positive results in some cases, but little evidence that this 
strategy has been realised across-the-board (Haipeter 2009; Haipeter and Lehndorɣ  
2014; Bahnmüller 2017). 
Moreover, only about 9 per cent of all establishments, with around 41 per cent of all 
employees, currently have a works council (Ellguth and Kohaut 2017: 283). There 
is an important ‘representation gap’, in particular in small and medium-sized ¿ rms, 
depriving unions of a vital prerequisite for a proactive workplace strategy. Without 
adequate employee representation at the workplace and company level, however, 
Figure 26 View of the works councillors on the decentralisation of collective bargaining 
 Decentralisation of collective bargaining is regarded as …
Source: WSI Works Council Survey 2015 (Amlinger and Bispinck 2016).
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there is a clear danger that the decentralisation of collective bargaining will de facto 
strengthen unilateral decision-making by management.
Finally, the decentralisation process has increasingly undermined the eɣ ectiveness 
of sectoral collective agreements and their basic function: namely, to take wages and 
other working conditions out of competition. At the same time, it is questionable 
whether decentralisation has stabilised the German bargaining system. While this 
might be the case in some sectors, overall there is a parallel trend of decentralisation 
and further decline of bargaining coverage. Therefore, the current debate in Germany 
on strengthening collective bargaining is not about decentralisation but about 
strengthening union power, on one hand, and increasing the political support for the 
bargaining system (for example, through more extensions), on the other.
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Chapter 5
The decentralisation of collective bargaining in France: 
an escalating process
Udo Rehfeldt and Catherine Vincent
1. Introduction
In France, social dialogue has hardly existed without either government intervention 
or an acute social crisis. Political interference both reÀ ects and maintains the loose 
links between social partners. As a result, the key role of state intervention and a long-
standing mutual distrust between employers and trade unions mainly explain the 
relative weakness of the French collective bargaining system.
However, in the years of rapid economic growth, a powerful system of sectoral 
bargaining, by general use of extension procedures, spread the agreed bene¿ ts from 
one sector of activity to another and from company to company. Since the mid-1980s, 
annual bargaining on wages and working time has been compulsory in any company 
hosting one or more trade unions. In the meantime, employers have chosen to privilege 
company-level bargaining to weaken the constraints imposed by legislation or even 
by sectoral bargaining. This early process of decentralisation accelerated after the 
2004 law implemented a limited reversal of the hierarchy of norms. This overhaul of 
collective bargaining, introducing more autonomy at company level, was also desired by 
some union confederations.
Within the economic crisis, reforms were passed to reduce labour regulation and 
increase labour market À exibility. In order to implement their employment policies 
and to ensure À exibility, governments have favoured both national multi-sector 
and company-level bargaining. If the sectoral level remains a place for determining 
employment and working conditions, the regulatory capacity of sectoral agreements 
has declined. The last reforms of 2016 and 2017 were intended to hasten this movement 
and to generalise derogation from sectoral agreements.
2.  The overall development of decentralised bargaining
2.1  Main developments up to the crisis: early decentralisation but the 
 traditional pillar – sectoral bargaining – is still alive
Compared with a number of other European countries, collective bargaining was 
established rather late in the day in France (in 1950). In the following decades, the 
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extension mechanism1 imposed the sectoral level as the pillar of the French bargaining 
system and enabled all employees in a sector to enjoy the advantages, mainly on wages, 
that had been negotiated by unions and employers’ organisations. Although collective 
bargaining in France can legally take place at three levels2 – the multi-industry level, 
sectoral level and company level, in descending order of priority – from the 1950s to 
the 1980s, industry-wide bargaining was the most common level at which collective 
agreements were negotiated; company-level bargaining took place only in large 
companies.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the extension mechanism, along with the technical support 
provided by the Ministry of Labour through joint consultative committees, ensured the 
rapid diɣ usion of locally bargained bene¿ ts to the entire workforce within industries. 
The social advantages attained at multi-industry level took precedence over any inferior 
content of the latter two. In other words, the most favourable clause must prevail over 
any other one that is less favourable from the employees’ perspective (derogation in
mejus or ‘favourability’ principle). 
However, the role of the state remains one of the most peculiar features of the French 
collective bargaining system both because of the collective bargaining rules of procedure 
it raises and its economic policy or administrative action. A ¿ rst characteristic to be 
noted is the broader and much more detailed scope of the Labour Code in France than 
in any other European country, mainly regarding working time and health and safety. 
A second is the coordination between bargaining level and state intervention. Wage-
setting mechanisms are an illustrative example.
The legal minimum wage or ‘SMIC’ (‘salaire minimum interprofessionnel de 
croissance’) represented the gravitational pull for wage bargaining at sectoral level 
and set the pace for annual wage increases. In some ways, it has the same eɣ ect as 
centralised national wage agreements in other countries. At industry level, trade unions 
and employers’ organisations have always negotiated the conventional minimum 
wages – which correspond to the wage À oor for a given set of quali¿ cations – not actual 
wages, as is the case in, for example, Germany. Therefore, sectoral level actors are not 
the only stakeholders regarding wage policies because room for manoeuvre is left for 
bargaining at company level. Agreed wages for blue- and white-collar workers – that 
is, those negotiated at industry level – are concentrated around the minimum wage. 
Increases granted to the lowest quali¿ cation levels often achieve compliance with 
the minimum wage only with diɤ  culty.3 Companies juggle with bonuses and other 
parameters to adjust their wages to the legal constraint. This underlines the weight of 
1. This procedure was implemented in 1936. The contents of sectoral agreements extended by the Ministry of 
Labour are binding on all the employers in a similar activity, with or without registered membership in a 
professional association. This extension procedure helps to oɣ set the weakness of employee representation, as 
well as the employers’ lack of incentives to bargain.
2. The Collective Labour Agreement Act of 1971 legalised the triple level where collective bargaining took place.
3. In 2012, the percentage increases granted at sectoral level remained similar to increases in the minimum wage. 
Despite the obligation provided by the 22 March 2012 law to open up sectoral-level wage negotiations within 
three months if the grid of ‘conventional minimum wages’ has at least one lower coeɤ  cient than the SMIC, in 
June 2012, 15 per cent of the 300 bargaining sectors covering more than 5,000 wage-earners still had a grid 
with at least one lower coeɤ  cient (Ministère du Travail 2013).
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the state mechanism of wage settlements to de¿ ne hierarchies and wage developments. 
Such a mechanism of wage settlement reÀ ected at ¿ rst a ‘virtuous circle’, which explains 
the similar patterns of real wages and productivity evolution over time (Husson et al. 
2015). The sectoral collective agreement remains important for the determination of 
wage hierarchies, as it serves as a reference for extending increases throughout the 
wage scale. This regulatory capacity of sectoral agreements diɣ ers according to sector, 
however (Jobert 2003). In some industries, its regulatory function is still central, as it 
creates real wage convergence in all companies (for example, in the construction and 
petrochemical sectors, but also in industries composed of very small businesses, such 
as auto repair shops). In most other areas, particularly in the major one – the metal 
sector – trade union strength in large companies has enabled extension to the smaller 
ones. The driving force of sectoral collective bargaining has been eroded over the course 
of successive reforms in recent decades.
1980–2000: early decentralisation of collective bargaining, coordinated by law and the 
‘favourability’ principle
The French bargaining coverage rate of 92 per cent in the private sector is today 
among the highest in the OECD countries; in the early 1980s, it never exceeded 80 
per cent. Taking advantage of the 1981 Socialist political change, in line with a series 
of laws aimed at developing employees’ rights, strong impetus was given to fostering 
collective bargaining. Since the Auroux Law of 1982, annual bargaining on wages and 
working time has been compulsory at sector level and in any company hosting one or 
more unions. Even so, no settlement is required. The law also strengthened the rights 
of unions and employee representatives at workplaces. Company-level bargaining was 
regarded positively by trade unions – above all, the CFDT – as a way to invigorate 
workers’ participation and to enable union delegates to better defend and represent 
employees’ concerns.
During the following two decades, the role of sectoral bargaining changed as it faced 
competition from the company level as a venue for establishing norms: what Morin calls 
‘a new space for norm production’ (Morin 1996). Derogations from statutory working 
time were introduced and other compulsory topics added at company level from the 
2000s (for example, forward-looking management of jobs and skills in 2005, gender 
equality in 2006, ¿ nancial participation and pro¿ t sharing in 2008 and employment of 
young/old workers in 2013). Nevertheless, coordination among the diɣ erent levels was 
still ensured by the ‘favourability’ principle.
The signi¿ cant increase in company-level bargaining was triggered by a change in the 
outlook of employers’ organisations in the late 1990s, when they discovered the charms 
of company bargaining, at which they can take advantage of the weakening of the trade 
unions (Figure 1). The sectoral-level bargaining remained determinant for labour 
regulation in SMEs, while large companies took the opportunity of greater company-
level autonomy and relaxation of centralised labour market regulation on working 
time. Company-level bargaining became a way of life for employers all the more easily 
because the balance of power now favoured them at the company level. This priority 
given to the company slowly eroded solidarity among workers in the same industry.
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At the end of the period, the Aubry laws on the 35-hour week (1998 and 2000) managed 
to foster company bargaining on working time reduction and enabled quid pro quo 
agreements whereby workers would accept greater À exibility in exchange for working 
time reduction and public ¿ nancial support.
2000–2016: a less and less coordinated collective bargaining system
From 2000, in order to gain À exibility and to circumvent – and eventually get rid of 
– the domination of sectoral agreements, the main employers’ organisation (MEDEF) 
advocated company agreements, with or without trade union mediation. In July 2001, 
four union confederations – CFDT, CFE-CGC, CFTC and FO – and the three employers’ 
organisations agreed on a ‘common position’, setting out their wishes with regard to 
reforming the rules on collective bargaining. The central plank of this proposed reform 
was the introduction of a ‘majority principle’. This text did not contain a clear reversal of 
the hierarchy of norms, which had been demanded by the employers’ organisations. The 
overhaul of collective bargaining, also desired by some trade unions, ¿ nally occurred in 
May 2004, when a Right-led government transposed into law the ‘common position’ of 
2001, but also introduced a reversal of the hierarchy of norms. This is the main reason 
why all trade unions opposed the new legislation. The May 2004 law and an August 
2008 law brought the following changes:
– A majority criterion was introduced: an agreement shall take eɣ ect only if the 
signatory unions gained at least 30 per cent of the votes at the previous workplace 
elections and only if the agreement was not opposed by the majority unions at the 
level concerned.
– Plant-level agreements could derogate from higher-level bargaining agreements, 
even with regard to less favourable provisions for workers, except in four areas: 
agreed minimum wages, classi¿ cations, vocational training and supplementary 
Figure 1 Number of company-level agreements signed annually, 1983–2012, France
Source: Ministry of Labour.
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social protection. At the same time, three provisions made it possible to frame – 
or even limit – resort to such derogations. First, industry-level negotiators could 
‘lock up’ other topics and exclude them from company-level derogations. Second, 
derogations could eventually be cancelled by an industry-level joint committee. 
Third, the law granted the majority unions the right to challenge the validity of opt-
out company agreements.
– Bargaining possibilities were extended to companies without union representatives.
Since 1966, ¿ ve trade union confederations – CGT, CFDT, FO, CFTC and CFE-CGC – 
have been deemed representative at the national level labelled by the government. Any 
union aɤ  liated to one of these nationally representative confederations had the right 
to participate in collective bargaining at the sectoral and company levels. An agreement 
was considered valid as long as it was signed by just one of these representative unions. 
The 2008 law rede¿ ned the criteria for the representativeness of the diɣ erent unions. 
Workplace elections now became the decisive criterion. In order to take part in collective 
bargaining, a union had to obtain a minimum of 10 per cent of the vote at the workplace 
level and 8 per cent at the sectoral and inter-sectoral levels. This law took eɣ ect in 2010 
for workplace bargaining and in 2013 for the other levels.4 
The March 2014 law, amended in 2016, for the ¿ rst time introduced criteria for the 
representativeness of employers’ organisations. It does not base representativeness 
on an electoral criterion, but on membership. In order to be considered representative 
at the sectoral and inter-sectoral levels, these organisations must prove that they 
represent 8 per cent of the contributing companies or 8 per cent of the corresponding 
number of employees.5 As on the union side, a representative employers’ organisation 
that represents more than 50 per cent of the employees can now challenge the validity 
of a collective agreement. 
In practice, the legal options with regard to derogation oɣ ered by the 2004 law were 
not often used by the social partners because most sectoral agreements prohibited 
derogation and maintained the hierarchy between sectoral and company levels. Despite 
this restriction by sector-level actors, the new collective bargaining architecture provided 
room to manoeuvre for company-level bargaining. Returning to the example of agreed 
wages, the importance of the company in determining wages has increased since the 
mid-1990s and has weakened the leading role of sectoral agreements. The erosion of the 
driving force of sector-level negotiations with regard to real wages induced a tightening 
up of bargained wages, by compressing the wage hierarchy downwards (Delahaie et al. 
2013). Henceforth, large companies sought to negotiate minimum wages at sectoral level 
to preserve some leeway on actual wages, either through company-level negotiations or 
individualised compensation (pro¿ t sharing, employee savings). By the early 2000s, 
performance-related pay had progressively replaced general wage increases and 
brought about a form of wage management whose purpose is to adjust labour costs 
4. The election results are aggregated every four years for the sectoral and inter-sectoral levels by the Ministry of 
Labour. The results were published for the ¿ rst time in March 2013, and for the second time in March 2017. All 
¿ ve union confederations mentioned continue to be representative at the national inter-sectoral level.
5. The Ministry of Labour published the results on employers’ representativeness in April 2017.
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Table 1  Legislative reforms and reform proposals, 2000–2017, France
MEDEF demands 
2000
‘Common 
position’ 2001 
(without CGT)
Legislation 2004, 
2008, 2013, 
2015
El Khomri law 
2016
Macron 
ordinances 2017
Derogation From sectoral 
agreement and 
from law
No derogation 
from sectoral 
agreement unless 
signatories decide 
otherwise 
2004: from 
sectoral 
agreement, unless 
forbidden by 
the agreement; 
forbidden also for 
agreed minimum 
wages, job 
classiﬁ cations, 
supplementary 
social protection 
and multi-
employer 
vocational 
training funds 
Priority to 
company 
agreements 
except ‘agreed 
collective order’, 
supplementary 
or subsidiary role 
for law
First step: only 
working time, 
paid holidays and 
weekly rest
second step: 
other topics 
aft er expert 
commission 
2017–2018
Priority to 
company 
agreements 
unless forbidden 
by sectoral 
agreements on 4 
topics, forbidden 
on the same 5 
topics + ﬁ xed-
terms contracts 
Majority principle 
based on 
elections
– At sectoral level: 
right to oppose 
for unions with 
‘numerical 
majority’ 
At company 
level: sectoral 
agreement must 
choose between 
50% majority or 
right to oppose
2004-8: right 
to oppose for 
majority unions; 
supplementary 
condition: 30% 
majority 
2013: 50% 
majority for 
derogation 
agreements 
in company 
with economic 
diffi  culties 
Working time: 
50% majority at 
company level
Signatory unions 
with 30% can ask 
for ratiﬁ cation by 
referendum
50% majority for 
all agreements
Signatory unions 
with 30% can ask 
for ratiﬁ cation by 
referendum
Employers can 
take the initiative 
for ratiﬁ cation 
by referendum (if 
signatories unions 
allow it)
Bargaining if no 
union delegates 
Mandated 
employees 
or elected 
representatives 
Sectoral 
agreement 
chooses between 
mandated 
employees 
and elected 
representatives 
2015: Elected 
representatives, 
otherwise 
mandated 
employees 
– <20 employees: 
ratiﬁ cation by 
referendum of 
the employer’s 
proposal
20< employees> 
50: Elected 
representatives, 
or mandated 
employees
>50 employees: 
Elected 
representatives, 
otherwise 
mandated 
employees
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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and oɣ er incentives for higher performance (Barreau and Brochard 2003; Castel et al. 
2014). These individualising devices may themselves be subject to negotiation in the 
company, but a signi¿ cant diɣ erence may arise between agreements signed in leading 
companies and the content of the corresponding sectoral agreements. This erosion of 
sectoral bargaining as a result of the decentralisation of bargaining towards company 
level and in the current context of wage moderation is not speci¿ c to France, however 
(Delahaie et al. 2012).
2.2  A quantitative look at collective bargaining since the onset of the crisis
Regarding the development of collective bargaining in 2010–2015, it is diɤ  cult to 
distinguish the general eɣ ects of the economic diɤ  culties – which jeopardised the 
signing of agreements as they undermined the opportunity for reciprocal concessions 
– and the speci¿ c consequences of labour market and collective bargaining reform. 
Nevertheless, analysis of the available statistical sources and quantitative reports 
highlights a remarkable stability of the number of collective agreements in recent years. 
Similarly, the actors involved in negotiating and signing agreements have not changed 
much, despite the legal possibilities for negotiations with non-union representatives at 
the workplace level.
2.2.1 Sectoral and company bargaining in the crisis
Bargaining activity at sectoral level has been broadly stable over the past decade. Since 
2000, between 1,100 and 1,400 agreements have been signed each year at national, 
regional or territorial level. Between 2009 and 2012, the number of agreements annually 
signed reached a very high level, with more than 1,300 agreements concluded each year. 
In 2013, the number of agreements fell signi¿ cantly to around 1,000, a ¿ gure repeated 
in 2014 and 2015. This slight decrease is explained mainly by the decline in agreements 
on wages and working time. In 2015, the number of wage agreements decreased by 
9 per cent due to low inÀ ation (0.1 per cent in 2014, 0 per cent in 2015) and a very 
moderate SMIC rise.
In 2015, 671 sectors had valid collective agreements but only 300 of them covered more 
than 5,000 employees. At the national level, at least one agreement was signed in 70 
per cent of these sectors.  
Regarding the workplace level, as stated above, the number of agreements increased 
substantially between the 1980s and the 2010s, from 3.900 in 1984 to 34.000 in 
2011. In France, unlike other countries, the crisis did not have a negative impact on 
Table 2  Evolution of wage agreements at sectoral level, 2005–2015, France
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
% of wage 
agreements
44.8 46.5 47.6 47.1 34.5 36.5 40.5 45.6 41.6 38.2 34.6 
Source: La négociation collective en 2015, Ministry of Labour.
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the dynamism of company negotiations. On the contrary, the number of agreements 
concluded each year continued to increase, despite a slight decline in 2014. This 
growth was due partly to the reactivation of crisis agreements, with or without conÀ ict. 
Although France has not experienced massive use of temporary short-time working, as 
in Germany, 23,000 companies nonetheless used such devices in 2009. The major car 
producers, such as PSA and Renault, in particular negotiated so-called competiveness-
employment or short-time working agreements (see Part 3 on the metal sector). 
In 2015, 36,600 workplace agreements were signed between employer and employee 
representatives,6 in line with 2014. While the agreements on employment and 
complementary health dried up, the signing of agreements on workplace gender equality 
started to increase due to the renewal of numerous triennial agreements on this subject. 
In 2014, negotiations took place in only 15 per cent of workplaces with more than 10 
employees; however, they were employing 61.5 per cent of the workforce. Negotiations 
started in 84 per cent of workplaces with trade union delegates. Agreements were signed 
in 11.7 per cent of all workplaces and in 68.6 per cent of those with union representation. 
6. That includes agreements signed by union delegates, elected representatives and employees mandated by trade 
unions.
Table 3  Number of sectoral agreements binding more than 5000 employees in 2015, 
 France
Total Metal industry Construction
Number of 
agreements
Employees 
covered
Number of 
agreements
Employees 
covered
Number of 
agreements
Employees 
covered
299 14 073 000 68 1 629 700 57 1 196 500
Source: Ministry of Labour DGT (BDCC).
Table 4  Evolution of the number and the topics of workplaces agreements, 2012–2015, 
 France
2012 2013 2014 2015
Number of agreements  38 799  39 363  36 528  36 624
Number of agreements signed by union 
delegates (DS) or mandated employees 
% of DS/mandated agreements on:
 31 310  31 514  30 965  31 449
Wages  36  33  33  38
Working time  23  21  21  24
Employment   9  17  13  11
Proﬁ t-sharing, participation  18  19  16  19
Source: La négociation collective en 2015, Ministry of Labour.
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2.2.2 Who are the negotiators? Union unity at workplace level
Since early 2000s, successive legislation has extended the possibilities for non-union 
representatives to negotiate at workplace level if there is no union delegate. However, the 
vast majority of agreements were still signed by union delegates. In 2015, almost 85 per 
cent of all workplace agreements were signed by union delegates, 14 per cent by elected 
employee representatives and a few by mandated employees. The slight but constant 
decrease in the number of agreements signed by elected employee representatives (–7 
per cent in 2015) is numerically compensated by the increase in those signed by union 
delegates (+1 per cent in 2015).
Agreements are generally signed by all the trade unions present at the workplace. To 
neutralise the eɣ ect of each union’s presence on the number of agreements they sign, 
the Ministry of Labour calculates their ‘propensity to sign’. This is the signature rate of 
an organisation calculated in the companies where it has a union delegate and where, 
therefore, it has or has not signed the existing agreements. The CFDT appears to be 
the organisation whose union delegates sign agreements most frequently, but the other 
organisations are very close behind (see Table 5). The CGT is characterised by a slightly 
lower propensity but it is not comparable to that at the sectoral level. Indeed, the 
propensity to sign at multi-sectors at sectoral levels of the three main confederations 
is very diɣ erent. In 2015, the CFDT signed 86 per cent of them, FO 68 per cent and the 
CGT only 35 per cent.
2.3  Collective bargaining reforms under pressure from the crisis
Many developments in industrial relations since 2008 have been indirectly linked to the 
economic crisis. Reforms of bargaining systems have continued under pressure from 
the employers’ organisations against a trade union movement which has been more and 
more weakened by economic stagnation and the employment situation. The Socialist 
government that came to power under the Hollande presidency in 2012 proclaimed its 
willingness to strengthen participation rights, but these were implemented in a very 
ambiguous way. The government ended by imposing a reform of collective bargaining 
procedures against the majority of the trade unions and of public opinion. 
Table 5  Unions’ ‘propensity to sign’ company agreements (%)
2012 2013 2014 2015
CFDT 94 94 94 94
CFE-CGC 92 92 91 92
CFTC 90 89 89 89
CGT 85 85 84 84
FO 90 90 89 90
Other unions 16 15 16 18
Source: La négociation collective en 2015, Ministry of Labour.
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2.3.1 A brief revival of tripartite concertation
The onset of the 2008 crisis had the eɣ ect of reactivating a policy of tripartite 
concertation abandoned since the failure of the tripartite summit in 1998 under the 
socialist Prime Minister Jospin. This policy ¿ rst started with the right-wing governments 
under the Sarkozy presidency and was continued by the Socialist president elected in 
2012, François Hollande, when he announced that he would lead a policy of systematic 
concertation with the social partners and organised annual tripartite summits called 
‘Social Conferences’. But even with all this, the negotiations between the employers’ and 
trade union confederations were placed under threat of legislative action and framed 
by government ‘roadmaps’ whose features were often very close to the employers’ 
demands. Last but not least, these negotiations frequently revealed deep disagreements 
among the trade unions.
The ¿ rst Social Conference was convened on 9–10 July 2012. The government presented 
a roadmap for a negotiation that was supposed to end before the close of 2012. Its main 
goal was to secure employment. This negotiation resulted in a ‘national inter-sectoral 
agreement’ (ANI) on competitiveness and job security, signed on 11 January 2013 
by the employers’ organisations and three trade union confederations (CFDT, CFTC 
and CFE-CGC). The CGT and FO refused to sign the ANI but could not challenge its 
validity, as they represented only 49.6 per cent of employees in workplace elections. The 
content of the agreement was very complex and comprised a large number of subjects 
on which the negotiators had agreed reciprocal concessions. The main element was the 
possibility of bargaining workplace agreements in order to secure employment which 
may temporarily (for a maximum of two years) derogate from sectoral agreements on 
wages and working time. To be valid, these workplace agreements must be signed by 
trade unions representing more than 50 per cent of the employees in the workplace 
elections. As promised, the government transposed the ANI into a ‘Law on securing 
employment’, adopted by the Parliament in June 2013. Again, very few companies 
took advantage of this opportunity for derogation; only ten new-type agreements were 
signed by the end of 2016.
In 2014, Hollande wanted to renew the experience and asked the social partners to 
negotiate a ‘pact of responsibility and trust’ in support of his policy of labour cost 
reduction in order to enhance competitiveness and facilitate job creation. In March 
2014, three trade unions – CFDT, CFTC and CFE-CGC – signed such an agreement 
with employers’ organisations. However, the CFE-CGC afterwards withdrew its 
signature because, like the CGT and FO, it considered that the agreement did not 
contain quantitative commitments by the employers on job creation. The agreement 
remained only a ‘joint opinion’ for which there is no majority criterion of validity and 
was obviously a political failure. 
The failure of concertation recurred in 2015, when negotiations on the ‘modernisation of 
social dialogue’ were declared unsuccessful. These negotiations took place on the basis 
of a catalogue of employers’ demands to ‘simplify’ workplace employee representation, 
partly supported by the government. This time, even the CFDT, the CFTC and the CFE-
CGC refused to sign the proposed agreement, because the employers’ organisation CPME 
refused to grant, in return, the possibility of appointing regional union representatives 
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authorised to negotiate collective agreements for small companies without union 
delegates. The government was thus obliged to draw up its own bill, which was adopted 
in July 2015 as the Law on social dialogue and employment. This legislation largely 
takes up the employers’ demands. Among other things, it authorises companies to 
derogate, by a majority agreement, from the legal obligations of consultation and 
negotiation, modifying terms and periodicities. It also introduces regional joint inter-
sector committees for very small companies, but with no ability to negotiate agreements.
2.3.2 An overhaul of collective bargaining without concertation
We have seen that decentralisation of the collective bargaining system has been 
reinforced since 2004 by successive legislative reforms, with both right-wing and left-
wing majorities. These reforms were preceded by concertation with the social partners 
that generally satis¿ ed the demands of the employers’ organisations, with the consent of 
part of the trade unions. The CGT was opposed to most of these reforms, except the one 
concerning representativeness. Since 2013, FO has joined the CGT in this opposition. 
We have also seen that, up to now, very few of the provisions authorising derogatory 
agreements has been put into practice; a very small number of companies have made 
use of them despite a diɤ  cult economic context and an employment crisis.
Unsatis¿ ed with this state of aɣ airs, Prime Minister Manuel Valls commissioned a 
commission of experts in April 2015, to make ‘bold’ proposals to ‘go further’ than the 
previous reforms. The commission was supposed to draw on the experience of other 
countries and also take into account recent reports by think tanks on the same subject, 
most of them in favour of the prioritisation of company agreements by introducing a 
general derogation principle. The experts commission’s report (Combrexelle 2015), 
presented in September 2015, advocates reversal of the hierarchy of norms, giving 
priority to company agreements in order to ensure ‘proximity regulation’. During a four-
year experimental period, four areas should be opened up to derogation: wages, working 
time, employment and working conditions, including derogation from legislation on the 
35-hour week and overtime payments. Sectoral agreements should de¿ ne an ‘agreed 
collective order’ for matters not open to derogation by company agreements. All other 
standards of a sectoral agreement would apply only in the absence of a workplace or 
company agreement. As a safety net, all company agreements should need to be signed 
by the majority unions.
Prime Minister Valls welcomed the report as a whole. He departed from the 
recommendations only on a single point, stating that 35 hours and overtime should not 
be open to derogations, thus giving a pledge to the left-wing of the Socialist Party and 
the trade unions. Without fair concertation,7 the minister of labour, Myriam El Khomri, 
prepared a bill reforming collective bargaining. The ¿ rst draft bill, presented in February 
2016, incorporated almost all of the experts Commission’s proposals. It also introduced 
some measures that were not part of the recommendations, such as the reduction of 
severance payments for employees who make a complaint about unfair dismissal and 
the possibility for minority unions (representing at least 30 per cent of the workforce) 
7. In early November, the minister of labour invited the social partners to negotiate a ‘method agreement’ before 
the end of 2015 to ‘inspire’ the future law, but they declined this invitation and the topic was not included in 
their annual autonomous bargaining programme.
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to impose an employee referendum in order to validate a workplace agreement signed 
by minority unions, thus preventing the majority unions from challenging its validity. 
This draft provoked rejection by all the trade union organisations, this time including 
the CFDT, as well as by the main leaders of the Socialist Party. The government agreed 
to withdraw the draft and negotiate some changes with the CFDT. In particular, the 
reduction of severance payments was ¿ nally dropped, to the dissatisfaction of the 
MEDEF. The new version of the bill led to numerous strikes and mass demonstrations 
organised by a coalition of CGT, FO, and some autonomous and student unions over a 
period of four months. According to opinion polls, the bill was also rejected by a majority 
of the population but was ¿ nally adopted by the Parliament in August. 
The El Khomri Law, which runs to hundreds of pages, has not reduced the complexity 
of the French Labour Code. The announced reversal of the hierarchy of norms is, in 
a ¿ rst step, limited to working time and overtime pay, paid holidays and weekly rest. 
Regarding these topics, the Labour code is rewriting as follows:
 (i) the ‘fundamental principles of labour law’, which would be imperative and 
guaranteed by the Constitution,
(ii)  areas open to derogation by sectoral or company agreements, with a ‘minimum 
legal framework’, and 
(iii)  legal standards that would apply only in the absence of a collective agreement.
The ‘redesign’ of the rest of the Labour Code according to the same principle was to 
be entrusted to a labour law expert commission is supposed to present its conclusions 
by 2018. Labour minister El Khomri did not have the time to set up this commission, 
however, because of the presidential elections of May 2017. 
2.3.3 President Macron’s ordinances: a turning point for decentralisation?
The rejection of the El Khomri law by public opinion certainly contributed to the 
elimination of the Socialist candidate in the presidential elections of 2017 and to the 
election of Emmanuel Macron. What is astonishing, however, is that Macron managed 
to surf victoriously on the wave of rejection of reforms that he had himself largely 
inspired both as advisor of President Hollande and as Minister of the Economy. During 
the election campaign, Macron announced that, once elected, he would prioritise 
continuing labour law reform, and even accelerate it. 
In order to avoid long debates in the parliament and possible demonstrations, the new 
labour minister Muriel Pénicaud has prepared a framework law (loi d’habilitation) which 
in July was passed in parliament by a majority of the new presidential party and what is 
left of the traditional parties of the right. This law authorises the government to execute 
its reform project through ordinances (government decrees). These were adopted in 
September 2017. The vote was preceded by formal consultations with the unions and 
the employers, one by one. These consultations did not make it possible to get a clear 
picture of what will be in the government decrees, however. A twofold overhaul emerged 
from texts clearly developed by and for companies: an unprecedented transformation 
of industrial relations since the Auroux law on the collective bargaining system and 
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workplace representation; a step forward in labour market deregulation (a ceiling on 
damages in case of complaint, dismissal regulation). The employers’ organisations 
clearly support the project and its acceleration, but this time most of the unions are 
¿ rmly opposed. However, only the CGT has completely rejected the project and even 
called for industrial action against it in September and October. It later received some 
support from FO for mobilisation. 
As far as collective bargaining is concerned, in line with the El Khomri law, the ordinance 
on ‘the strengthening of collective bargaining’ has generalised shared competencies 
between the law and sectoral and company agreements. Moreover, the leading role that 
the government claimed to give to company agreements has resulted in, on one hand, 
reinforcement of its legitimacy, and on the other, facilitation of its implementation in 
SMEs without unions.
Regarding competencies in standard-setting, the division is as follows:
– Formally, the role of sectoral agreements has been reinforced because there are 
now thirteen topics with regard to which derogations are forbidden. However, this 
reinforcement has taken place at the expense of the law and not at the expense 
of company agreements (Canut 2017). In addition, a company agreement may 
implement diɣ erent provisions from those of the sectoral one if it provides ‘at least 
equivalent guarantees’. This formula has replaced the classic formula in the Labour 
Code which required ‘provisions more favourable for employees’ (‘favourability 
principle’). The eɣ ectiveness of this guarantee will be conditional on jurisprudential 
interpretation of the new formulation.
– The sectoral ‘lock up’ facility was unlimited under the 2004 law. From now on, this 
facility is reduced to four areas, mainly concerning occupational safety and disabled 
workers. A weakening of sectoral bargaining is evident here.
– The primacy of company agreements concerns everything that does not fall into the 
two previous blocks, which is considerable. For example, all remuneration rules are 
governed solely by the company agreement, with the exception of agreed minimum 
wages, classi¿ cations and overtime premia.
Regarding the validity of company agreements, the requirement for being signed by a 
majority of unions will be widespread as of 1 May 2018.8 The other change introduced 
is openly regressive: in the event of an agreement approved by unions that obtained 
at least 30 per cent of the votes in workplace elections, the initiative to organise a 
referendum among employees, which in the 2016 law belonged only to the signatory 
unions of the agreement, has now been extended to the employer, on condition that the 
signatory unions do not oppose it.
Last but not least, regarding negotiation in workplaces without unions, diɣ erent regimes 
have been introduced depending on size of workplace. Negotiation is then possible on 
all topics:
8. The El Khomri law provided for this generalisation by 1 September 2019.
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– Up to 20 employees in enterprises without employee representatives: the employer 
can propose an ‘agreement’ drafted unilaterally that must be approved by at least 
two-thirds of the staɣ .
– From 20 to 49 employees: two possibilities are open without priority. The agreement 
can be signed by elected representatives if they represent the majority of votes or it 
be signed by employees mandated by a union.
– Over 50 employees without employee representatives: the agreement can be signed 
by elected representatives, otherwise mandated employees.
These new rules clearly indicate that the purpose of the ordinances is to further 
undermine the role of trade unions in collective bargaining.
3.  Decentralisation of collective bargaining in the metal sector
3.1  The sector and its economic context
In this section we will consider the metal sector exclusively from the point of view of 
collective bargaining, which does not exactly correspond to the sector de¿ ned in the 
national economic statistics. The conventional metal sector (métallurgie) has the 
following subsectors:
– metallurgy and manufacturing of metal products,
– manufacturing of data processing and electronic products,
– manufacturing of electrical equipment,
– manufacturing of machinery and equipment,
– automobile industry,
– manufacturing of other transport equipment,
– shipbuilding,
– railway equipment,
– aeronautical and space construction,
– repair and installation of machinery and equipment.
Collective agreements (including the steel industry) covered 1,663,100 employees 
by the end of 2013; 26 per cent of them belonged to the category of professional and 
managerial staɣ  (cadres), 27 per cent were ‘intermediate professions’ (technicians and 
so on), 8 per cent white-collar workers and 39 per cent manual workers. Furthermore, 
22 per cent of the employees were women, 15 per cent under 30 years old, 3 per cent had 
¿ xed-term contracts and 21 per cent were part-time employees (Ministère du Travail, 
2017: 632). 
The metal industry has suɣ ered from a long-term process of de-industrialisation and 
has come under heavy competitive pressure. In the past twenty years, the sector has 
lost one-third of its employment. This process is a result of a lack of innovation and 
investment in France, on one hand, and delocalisation of production, on the other. 
The business downturn since the economic and ¿ nancial crisis of 2008 has added to 
these diɤ  culties. Two types of strategy were developed by French companies to gain 
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competitiveness: a ‘high road’ strategy aimed at gaining new markets by developing new 
products and upgrading skills, and a ‘low road’ strategy aimed at reducing production 
costs, especially labour costs. Very often both strategies are developed at the same time. 
This puts collective bargaining under constraints, because the employers seek to erode 
past union achievements by introducing more À exibility, especially on working time, 
more mobility and more productivity, and also dampening wage dynamics. The unions, 
on their part, have set new priorities, in order to obtain guarantees on employment 
and skills. This explains the growing number of collective agreements focused on 
employment and training. 
Since 2016, France has been in economic recovery. After a period of wage moderation, 
wage bargaining has bene¿ ted from this situation (Ministère du Travail 2017). In 2015 
and 2016 basic wages in the metal sector increased 1.5 per cent per year, more than the 
average basic wage growth in the private sector (1.2 per cent). Given consumer goods 
inÀ ation of 0.2 per cent in 2015 and 0.6 per cent in 2016, purchasing power grew only 
modestly. Managerial and professional staɣ  did better (+1.9 per cent in 2016) than 
manual workers (1.4 per cent) and white-collar workers (1.3 per cent). 
3.2  The actors
In 2013, trade union representativeness was decreed for the ¿ rst time by the Ministry 
of Labour on the basis of the previous workplace elections. Only four unions – CGT, 
CFDT, FO and CFE-CGC – passed the 8 per cent threshold in the metal sector, but 
not the CFTC. This union continued to participate in the sector bargaining, however, 
because it had passed the threshold at the national inter-sector level and was allowed by 
the 2008 law to do so for a transitional period – 2013–2017 – because it was aɤ  liated 
to a representative confederation at the national inter-sector level. In 2017, the CFTC, 
like the autonomous unions UNSA and Solidaires, again did not reach the threshold of 8 
per cent and now risks being excluded from collective bargaining. Therefore, the CFTC 
metal federation has appealed to the government to lower the 8 per cent threshold by 
decree. Alternatively it will try to merge the metal sector with another bargaining sector 
in order to preserve its representativeness. It has obtained support from the UIMM, 
who successfully asked the government, in order to gain time, to delay publication of the 
decree with the oɤ  cial results of representativeness in the metal sector.
Whereas at the national inter-sector level, the CFDT is now the most representative 
union and has surpassed the CGT, it is still only second in the metal sector, but very 
close to the CGT, which has lost 3 percentage points. The CFDT has also lost some 
votes, however, whereas the CFE-CGC – the union of managerial and professional staɣ  
– has gained nearly 3 percentage points and now occupies third place, with a percentage 
nearly double what it obtained at the inter-sector level.
The picture is somewhat diɣ erent at the local level, where most collective bargaining 
takes place. Here, CGT and CFDT are representative in all 76 bargaining regions. The 
CFTC has kept its representativeness in 20 regions, whereas FO has lost it in four. 
Udo Rehfeldt and Catherine Vincent
166  Multi-employer bargaining under pressure – Decentralisation trends in ﬁ ve European countries
UNSA is representative in two regions and Solidaires in one. The CFTC has kept its 
representativeness at the national sectoral level for managerial and professional staɣ , 
where the CFE-CGC has representativeness of 45.9 per cent.9
On the employers’ side, the situation in the metal sector is a peculiar one, compared with 
other sectors. There is one employers’ organisation that participates in the collective 
bargaining: the UIMM (Union des industries et métiers de la métallurgie), which is 
aɤ  liated to the national confederation MEDEF.10 It represents 42,000 companies 
in the metal sector, but exclusively for collective bargaining and social dialogue. 
These companies are members of 10 industrial federations, according to sub-sector 
(automotive, electrical and so on). These federations represent their economic interests 
and are, in turn, aɤ  liated to the UIMM. The UIMM was founded in 1901 and is the most 
powerful and inÀ uential French employers’ organisation, although it has lost some of its 
inÀ uence within MEDEF to the expanding companies of the service sector.
In the steel sector, there is another employers’ organization, GESIM (Groupement
des Entreprises Sidérurgiques et Métallurgiques), which was created in 1981 by two 
employers’ associations representing 22 steel companies in Lorraine and northern 
France. Like the UIMM, it acts only in the area of social aɣ airs and negotiates a proper 
national convention collective (CC) and its amendments for its members. It cooperates 
with the employers’ association A3M, which represents the economic interests of all 
steel and mineral companies. Both are members of the UIMM.
Under a law introduced in 2014, employer organisations’ representativeness is 
measured by membership. In order to participate in collective bargaining, an employers’ 
organisation must represent at least 8 per cent of all aɤ  liated companies or 8 per cent 
of the employees. In April 2017 the Ministry of Labour presented the results of its 
investigations for the ¿ rst time. The UIMM has a representativeness rate of 100 per cent 
in the whole metal sector, both at national and local levels. The same goes for GESIM.
9. This situation is again very diɣ erent from the rest of the private sector, where the CFDT is the ¿ rst union in this 
category (in 2017: CFDT 27.0 per cent, CFE-CGC 19.4 per cent, CGT 19.3 per cent, FO 13.4 per cent and CFTC 
9.2 per cent).
10. Until 2012, the UIMM had a double aɤ  liation: to MEDEF and the confederation of small and medium 
companies CGPME (now CPME).
Table 6  Union representativeness in 2017 according to the 2013–2016 elections, France
Voting 
population
Partici-
pation
CFDT CGT FO CFE-CGC CFTC UNSA Solidaires
Total 
private 
sector
13,244,736 42.76% 26.37% 24.85% 15.59% 10.67% 9.49% 5.35% 3.46%
Metal 
sector
1,178,053 67.85% 25.35% 26.39% 16.17% 19.09% 7.42% 2.71% 1.59%
Note: As explained above, these are not offi  cial ﬁ gures yet, because the sectoral breakdown of the ﬁ gures on union 
representativeness still awaits publication by the Ministry of Labour. Offi  cially, representativeness is only known with 
regard to the employers.
Source: FGMM-CFDT.
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3.3  Procedures and outcomes at sectoral level
According to French labour law, two types of collective agreement are negotiated at the 
sectoral level: the so-called conventions collectives (CC) and the accords collectifs. The 
CCs lay down the regulatory system governing work (wages, terms and conditions of 
employment, working conditions, social welfare). They are considered to be the ‘law of 
the industry’. The accords collectifs treat only speci¿ c, mostly single topics.
In the metal sector, 76 conventions collectives territoriales (CCT) are negotiated at local 
(mostly département) level, sometimes for several departments, sometimes only for 
part of a département. For professional and managerial staɣ , there is a nationwide CC. 
Conventions collectives generally have unlimited duration. However, the minimum 
wages for the diɣ erent quali¿ cation levels are renegotiated annually and take the form 
of amendments to the CCT. There are still major diɣ erences in the wage structure and 
wage levels of the diɣ erent CCTs. However, today none of the minimum wages in the 
metal industry are below the legal national inter-sector wage (SMIC). All CCs and CCTs, 
including their annual amendments, and most national agreements are extended by the 
Ministry of Labour in order to become applicable erga omnes.
The signatory parties of CCTs and annual amendments diɣ er according to region 
and time of signature. For instance the CCT for Moselle goes back to 1955 and was 
initially signed only by FO and CFTC. However, they were later joined by the other 
representative unions.
The national CC for professional and managerial staɣ  was signed in 1992 by CFDT, CFE-
CGC, FO and CFTC. Its latest amendment was signed in 2010 by all ¿ ve representative 
unions.
As already mentioned, there is also a special national CC for the steel industry, signed 
in 2001 by the employers’ organisation GESIM and by all ¿ ve representative unions. It 
covers 17,715 employees, which represent only part of the sector, the rest being covered 
by the extended CCTs of the metal sector. GESIM has never asked for an extension 
of its CC, which contains higher social standards than the CCTs of the metal sector. 
Until 2013, the annual amendments were signed jointly by all ¿ ve unions; those of 2015 
and 2017 only by FO, CFE-CGC, CFTC and CFDT. For its professional and managerial 
staɣ , the GESIM member companies apply the CC of the metal sector negotiated by the 
UIMM. 
Since 1970, a series of national sectoral agreements on speci¿ c topics have been signed 
with the UIMM and are generally extended by the Ministry of Labour. The most 
important recent agreements are as follows:11 
11. The full list and the texts of all national agreements in force can be found in chronological order on the UIMM 
website: https://uimm.fr/textes-conventionnels/accords-nationaux-metallurgie. The texts of all agreements 
signed can be found on the CFTC website: http://www.cftcmetallurgie.com/fr/accords-nationaux-de-la-
metallurgie,23.html. They are documented by topic on the FGMM-CFDT website: http://www.cfdt-fgmm.fr/
conventionmetal.php
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– National agreement of 26 April 2010 on social dialogue (signed by FO, CFE-CGC, 
CFTC, CFDT and CGT). This agreement settles such matters as procedures for the 
validation of company agreements signed by elected employee representatives, the 
creation of specialised joint committees, including an Observatory on Collective 
Bargaining, as well as guarantees concerning the careers and remuneration of 
employee representatives and union delegates.
– National agreement of 17 May 2010 on forward-looking management of employment 
and skills (signed by FO, CFE-CGC, CFTC and CFDT).
– National agreement of 12 December 2013 on disabled employees (signed by FO, 
CFE-CGC, CFTC and CFDT).
– National agreement of 8 April 2014 on gender equality (signed by FO, CFE-CGC, 
CFTC and CFDT).
– National agreement of 21 October 2014 on apprenticeships (signed by FO, CFE-
CGC, CFDT and CFTC).
– National agreement of 13  November 2014 on lifelong learning (signed by CFE-
CGC, FO, CFDT and CFTC), amended 10 January 2017.
– National agreement of 27 June 2016 on the negotiation procedures for a renewal 
of the system of collective bargaining (signed by FO, CFE-CGC, CFTC, CFDT and 
CGT).
– National agreement of 23 September 2016 on employment (signed by CFE-
CGC, FO, CFDT and CFTC). This agreement replaces the one on forward-looking 
management of employment and skills of May 2010.
Before 2004, it was suɤ  cient for a collective agreement to be signed by just one 
representative union in order to be valid. This explains why in 1996 the UIMM was 
able to sign a national agreement on the reduction of working time, allowing more 
overtime, with only two unions, despite the strong opposition of the two main unions 
CGT and CFDT. In 2004 a supplementary condition for validity was introduced by law: 
such an agreement must not be opposed by an arithmetical majority of the number of 
representative unions, that is, three out of ¿ ve. As a consequence, the UIMM began 
to sign national agreements with a coalition of FO, CFE-CGC and CFTC. In 2003, 
the conditions of validity were changed again. Now agreements had to be signed by 
a union or unions that represent at least 30 per cent of the representative unions (as 
determined by the workplace elections) and must not be opposed by representative 
unions that represent more than 50 per cent. As a consequence, UIMM began to sign 
national agreements with a coalition of CFDT, FO, CFE-CGC and CFTC. Exceptionally, 
the procedural agreements on social dialogue of 2010 and on collective bargaining of 
2016 were signed by all ¿ ve representative unions. It remains to be seen how the CFTC’s 
loss of representativeness will aɣ ect coalition building on the union side in negotiations 
over the next four years.
3.4  Collective bargaining at the company level
Since the Auroux laws of 1982, annual negotiations are mandatory at company level. 
They generally lead to company agreements, in particular in the bigger companies. As 
the amendments to the conventions collectives ¿ x only the level of agreed minimum 
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wages, these company agreements have a decisive impact on the evolution of real wages, 
together with the growing practice of wage individualisation.
In 2015, 4,310 company agreements were signed by union delegates in the metal sector 
which correspond to 10 per cent of the companies in the sector. As these agreements are 
negotiated mainly by the biggest companies, they cover 1.17 million employees, around 
70 per cent of all employees.
Neither the unions nor the employers’ organisation UIMM have a detailed knowledge 
of the contents of the company agreements. There is an obligation to send these 
agreements to the Ministry of Labour, which publishes an analysis in their annual 
reports on collective bargaining (last edition: Ministère du Travail 2017). But these 
reports give only a global breakdown on the themes of the agreements and do not get 
down to the sectoral level. The union federations of course perform their own analysis 
and some have set up databases on company agreements. They can, however, obtain 
information only on companies in which their representatives are present and have to 
take the initiative to inform local federation structures about the negotiations and their 
outcomes. The national federations have direct knowledge of company agreements 
only in relation to large multi-workplace companies that sign national agreements. 
Information is more complete on annual wage negotiations at the company level, on 
which the federations send out regular reminders by e-mail to complete their databases. 
As the number of topics for mandatory bargaining has increased in recent years, it is 
more and more diɤ  cult for the union federations to ensure exhaustive monitoring of 
these negotiations. Many unionists complain that these mandatory negotiations exhaust 
local representatives who lose time needed for bargaining on more urgent topics.
Most company agreements concern wages and working time. In the big companies, 
especially in the automotive and electronics sector, more comprehensive agreements 
are negotiated on qualitative topics, in particular on employment. Only two companies 
in the sector have signed an ‘agreement on the conservation of employment’ within the 
meaning of the law on employment protection of 2013, which allows modi¿ cation of 
individual employment contracts in exchange for a temporary employment guarantee. 
Other companies, in particular in the automotive sector, have signed so-called 
‘competitiveness-employment agreements’, which are a French version of concession 
bargaining. Such agreements have no particular legal foundation, but are just ordinary 
company agreements in which the unions exchange guarantees on employment against 
the lowering of social standards contained in past company agreements.
Renault
The most interesting of these ‘competitiveness agreements’ is the one signed by Renault 
in February 2013, in which the management made the commitment that it would not 
close down any site in France. The plan for 7,500 job cuts (15 per cent of the French 
workforce) by 2016 would be implemented through ‘natural wastage’ (resignations, 
retirements and early retirements) without forced redundancies or a voluntary leave 
programme. Car production would be increased from 500,000 to 700,000 in 2016. In 
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exchange, three of the four representative unions12 in Renault – CFDT, CFE-CGC and 
FO,13 but not the CGT – agreed to increase working time (to 1,603 hours per year) and 
to a temporary freeze on wages in 2013, followed by wage moderation in 2014 and 2015, 
depending on the group’s ¿ nancial situation and economic performance. They also 
agreed to the elimination of time saving and training accounts. Mobility between sites 
was to be reinforced, on a voluntary basis, through mobility incentives. In exchange, 
the management made a commitment to improve pro¿ t-sharing and employee share 
ownership. The agreement also contains provisions for monitoring, in particular 
through the introduction of an Observatory. 
The general economic recovery has helped Renault to ful¿ l its commitments, so that 
the objective of 700,000 cars produced in 2016 was even surpassed and pro¿ tability 
enhanced. According to an outside evaluation (Pellet and Urbejtel 2017), this 
performance, together with an improvement in working conditions, contributed to 
restoring con¿ dence between the signatory unions and the management. They signed 
a new agreement on employment in January 2017, which will cover the three years 
2017–2019. Again the management committed itself not to close any of its French 
production sites and moreover will create 3,600 additional permanent jobs and renew 
6,000 youth employment contracts. It will invest massively in the French plants, with 
the aim of increasing productivity from the current 60 cars produced per employee 
per year to 90. In parallel, working conditions will be improved via a ‘zero accident 
safety policy’.14 In exchange, the unions accepted the possibility of raising working time 
by one hour per day during peak business periods, up to a ceiling of eight days per 
month and 50 days per year. These new À exibility measures are to be negotiated at local 
establishment level.
PSA Peugeot Citroën
After the collapse of the automotive market after the 2008 crisis, the ¿ nancial situation 
of the other big French car producer, PSA Peugeot Citroën, was even worse than the 
one at Renault. In June 2011, PSA announced a vast restructuring plan and its intention 
to eliminate 8,000 jobs and close down two production sites in France, one in Aulnay 
(Paris region) and that of its subsidiary for commercial vehicles Sevelnord in Hordain 
(northern France), after Fiat had ended its partnership with this subsidiary. Finally 
PSA negotiated a new partnership with Toyota and decided to keep the Sevelnord plant 
open. This allowed the management to sign a competitiveness agreement for Sevelnord 
in July 2012 with CFE-CGC, FO and the autonomous company union SIA-GSEA, but 
without the fourth representative union at the plant, CGT. By this agreement, the 
management made a commitment to exclude lay-oɣ s for the plant’s 2,800 employees 
for a period of three years, eventually renewable for two years. In exchange, the unions 
accepted a pay freeze for two years, compensated by a reduction of weekly working time, 
12. Union representativeness on the basis of the 2011 workplace elections in Renault was as follows: CFE-CGC 29.7 
per cent, CGT 25.2 per cent, CFDT 19.2 per cent and FO 15.6 per cent. The other unions did not reach the 10 per 
cent threshold. In the 2015 elections, CFC-CGC gained 2.3 per cent and CFDT 1.3 per cent, whereas FO lost 2.6 
per cent and CGT 0.9 per cent.
13. It is interesting to note that FO, which at the national level was, like CGT, opposed to derogatory agreements on 
principle, agreed to sign the agreement with Renault, and also later with PSA.
14. The agreement contains provisions on forward-looking management of employment and skills, for which 
negotiations are mandatory every three years.
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an increase in pro¿ t-sharing and an additional bonus. They also agreed more working 
time À exibility, in particular possible working on Saturday and the introduction of a 
‘daily production guarantee’ (if the daily production goals are not met, the management 
can impose up to 20 minutes’ additional overtime). The agreement also introduced new 
rules for mobility, including temporary staɣ  loans to other companies, which cannot be 
refused unless for family reasons. A transfer to a less quali¿ ed job, which can only be 
temporary (with a maximum of one year) and cannot entail a reduction in pay, requires 
the employee’s written consent.
The situation of the 1,400 workers of the Aulnay plant could not be solved in the same 
manner. Here the management maintained its intention to close the plant and deigned 
only to negotiate a social plan for voluntary departures, early retirement and ¿ nancial 
support for internal and external mobility, which was accepted by the unions CFE-
CGC, CFTC, FO and GSEA. CGT and CFDT called for a strike, which was to last four 
months, without being able to change the plant closure, although it ended in May 2013 
with an agreement that prolonged production for eight months and enhanced ¿ nancial 
compensation. 
The Sevelnord agreement paved the way for a triennial agreement for the whole PSA 
group, which was signed in October 2013 by FO, CFE-CGC, CFTC and SIA-GSEA.15 This 
time, however, the management gave no formal guarantees on the level of employment, 
which explains the refusal of CGT and CFDT to sign. The agreement, a document of 212 
pages called a ‘new social contract’, replaces 11 previous company agreements, including 
those on forward-looking management of employment and skills, quality of life at work 
and social dialogue. In the agreement, the PSA management committed to producing 
1 million vehicles per year in 2016 and to make a global productive investment of 1.5 
billion Euros in its French factories in the period 2014–2016. At least 75 per cent of its 
R&D activities will be carried out in France, and the level of subcontracting will remain 
below 20 per cent until 2016. In exchange, the unions accepted that there would be no 
general wage increase in 2014 and that possible later increases would depend on the 
group’s performance. Furthermore a bonus, granted after 20 years in the company, will 
be cut. Overtime pay for work on Sundays will be lowered to the legal standard. In return 
for these wage cuts, PSA made commitments on future pro¿ t sharing and the purchase 
of vehicles. The unions also accepted more working time À exibility. An important 
part of the compensatory time regime passed from individual choice to unilateral 
management regulation. The range of weekly working time was to be increased, leading 
to less overtime pay. The possibility of part-time work two or three years before the 
end of a career will be introduced on a voluntary basis. Training priorities were to be 
aimed at supporting internal mobility between trades within a site or between sites. 
However, collective internal mobility was used only as a last resort when no local 
solution has been found. Temporary external mobility to another employer may be 
organised through suspension of the employment contract for two years. Finally, the 
agreement announced some improvement in strategic information and consultation, in 
15. Union representativeness in the PSA group on the basis of the 2012 workplace elections was as follows: CGT 
22.6 per cent, FO 18 per cent, CFE-CGC 17.2 per cent, SIA-GSEA 14.7 per cent, CFDT 13.8 per cent and CFTC 
11.7 per cent. In the 2016 elections, FO gained 2.5 per cent and now achieved ¿ rst place, CFC-CGC gained 2.2 
per cent and CFTC 1.7 per cent, whereas SIA-GSEA lost 4 per cent, CGT 3 per cent and CFDT 0.2 per cent.
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particular through the International Strategic Joint Committee and through employee 
representation on the company board (a legal obligation since 2013). 
In February 2014 the French state and a Chinese company became the major 
shareholders of PSA, alongside the Peugeot family, which de¿ nitely saved the company 
from bankruptcy. PSA recovered ¿ nancially16 and in July 2016, it signed a new triennial 
competiveness agreement with the four signatory unions of the previous agreement, 
which were joined by CFDT. In it, PSA committed to hiring 1,000 permanent employees 
by 2019 and promises to make investments for the production of 1 million cars per 
year in France and for the launch of eight new models. In exchange, the unions made 
concessions for more À exibility of work organisation, including night-time working 
on a voluntary basis. Employees may work eight days more than is stipulated in the 
employment contract without earning overtime pay.17 This time, however, no wage freeze 
was demanded, and the management promised to open annual wage negotiations on the 
basis of 1 per cent over the inÀ ation rate. The agreement also included a commitment 
that studies on working conditions would be carried out in cooperation with the unions.
3.5  Trade union strategies for the future of collective bargaining at the 
 sectoral and company levels
Since the end of the 1990s, UIMM and the unions have tried to harmonise the diɣ erent 
classi¿ cation schemes of the diɣ erent CCTs, for which there is no longer any economic 
justi¿ cation. They were, however, unable to conclude these negotiations. CGT and CFDT 
have also asked for a common national CC, including common classi¿ cation schemes 
for both the professional staɣ  and the rest of the employees. CFE-CGC recently modi¿ ed 
its position on this topic, because it has a growing membership outside the category of 
professional and managerial staɣ , in particular among technicians. UIMM agreed to 
reopen negotiations on this topic, as it has realised that the classi¿ cation schemes in 
most CCTs are obsolete. In June 2016, UIMM and all ¿ ve representative unions signed 
a procedural agreement for renegotiation of the whole collective bargaining system in 
the metal sector. It contains a list of topics on which to negotiate, a negotiation agenda 
and a method of validation. There are 11 negotiation topics:
(i)  the architecture of the future collective bargaining system;
(ii)  the classi¿ cation schemes;
(iii)  working time;
(iv)  health and safety, working conditions;
(v)  individual working contracts;
(vi)  employment and vocational training;
(vii)  social protection;
(viii)  remuneration and employee savings;
16. In February 2017 PSA was even able to buy Opel-Vauxhall from General Motors. In March 2017 PSA got the 
support of the unions FO, CFE-CGC, CFDT, CFTC and SIA-GSEA for this purchase.
17. As in the case of Renault, PSA’s working time standards remain above those of the collective agreement for the 
metal sector.
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(ix)  social dialogue at the company level;
(x)  the scope of the future CCs;
(xi)  the entry into force of the agreement and transitional provisions.
The negotiators meet every two weeks to negotiate topic by topic. However, there will 
be no agreements by topic but only one ¿ nal agreement to be validated at the end of the 
negotiation cycle, which UIMM has ¿ xed for the end of 2017, but will more likely be the 
end of 2018.
The negotiations started on topics (i) and (ii), which are, however, very complicated 
because legally the social partners at the local level are completely autonomous. There 
are three possible methods to pass from local CCTs to a common national CC, and the 
negotiators of each local CCT can choose between one of the three methods. The union 
federations will ultimately give instructions on how to handle this problem.
From the Law on Employment Security of 2013 to the El Khomri Labour Law of 2016, 
French legislation has put forward the aim of giving further impetus to company 
bargaining by allowing derogations from sectoral agreements. To satisfy some of the 
trade union criticisms, the El Khomri law has also assigned new tasks to bargaining at 
the sectoral level. It requires that every bargaining sector must set up a ‘permanent joint 
committee on bargaining and interpretation’ (Commission paritaire permanente de 
négociation et d’interprétation – CPPNI). This committee is to have several missions:
– the monitoring of working and employment conditions;
– the publication of an annual report on company agreements dealing with working 
hours, annual leave and so on; 
– the interpretation of branch agreements for the courts that request it.
UIMM proposed to delegate the task of reporting to the ‘observatory on collective 
bargaining’, which was set up jointly by the national agreement on employment of April 
2010, and to set up similar observatories at the local level. The unions welcomed such 
a decentralised structure because it would have the eɣ ect of ‘professionalising’ local 
union representatives. The unions also welcomed UIMM’s proposal as an opportunity 
to transform this observatory into a tool for qualitative analysis of what is really 
negotiated at company level, an objective previously rejected by UIMM, arguing that it 
has no extensive knowledge of company agreements in the metal sector. 
Concerning company agreements, there is considerable negotiating autonomy among 
local union representatives. This explains why there is such a variety of agreements and 
of signatory parties. Sometimes local representatives ask the federation for a model 
agreement. The federations are, however, reluctant to provide one because companies’ 
economic situations diɣ er so much. This can justify diɣ erent approaches to what should 
be negotiated and what concessions should be made. Therefore they establish only check 
lists of possible topics. Some of the controversial topics between unions, and even inside 
one union, are the introduction of mobility leave in an agreement on forward-looking 
management on employment and skills. It is diɤ  cult to establish a common union rule 
on that, because local activists must judge whether such a concession is compensated 
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in a complex agreement by advances for employees in other areas. Some unions take 
a more rigorous stance, refusing to accept concessions of any kind. Often, taking such 
a radical position is a relatively painless display of union principles, as the employers 
generally ¿ nd other unions to sign such agreements. On the other hand, only in very 
rare cases do union federations replace union delegates who sign a company agreement 
that are considered a breach of internal union rules.
4.  Decentralisation of collective bargaining in the retail sector
4.1  Introduction
With almost 2.2 million employees in around 500,000 enterprises, the retail trade 
sector (see Box 1) represents 12 per cent of the total labour force and 10 per cent of 
gross added value. It is therefore one of the largest economic sectors. Nevertheless, 
it has never played a leading role in French industrial relations, in contrast to, for 
example, the metal sector. There are various reasons for this: the preponderant weight 
of very small establishments, a low-skilled and low-wage labour force and, above all, the 
historic weakness of unionisation in the sector. However, because of the dynamism of 
job creation in this sector, but mainly because it constitutes a ¿ eld of experimentation 
for new forms of atypical job Since the Auroux laws of 1992, annual negotiations are 
mandatory at the company level. They generally lead to company agreements, in 
particular in the bigger companies. As the amendments to the conventions collectives 
¿ x only the level of conventional minimum wages, these company agreements have a 
decisive impact on the evolution of real wages, together with the growing practice of 
wage individualisation, retail trade is a key target for French trade union organisation.
It is also a sector that is experiencing strong organisational changes. Although the ¿ rst 
department stores (grands magasins) date back to the second half of the nineteenth 
century, with the establishment of the Bon Marché and the opening of the Felix Potin 
grocery stores, the concept of mass retailing, in the contemporary sense (retail sales of 
all types by store networks to an end customer), is a much more recent economic activity. 
Major global distribution groups, including several French multinational companies, 
are only about ¿ fty years old. During the recent decades of rapidly rising purchasing 
power, with massive access to consumption, distribution has grown remarkably, 
knowing how to exploit every opportunity to constantly improve pro¿ tability. The retail 
Box 1 Deﬁ nition of the retail sector
The retail trade sector corresponds to Section 47 of the French activity classi¿ cation 
(NAF). It represents 29 per cent of the turnover of all trade (including wholesale trade 
and e-commerce).
Within the retail trade, there are three main sub-sectors: food-based stores (meat, 
fruit, vegetables, and frozen food), household goods stores (furniture, household 
appliances and computers) and stores selling personal goods (clothing, perfume, 
books, glasses, pharmacies).
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sector has experienced a tough transformation of management and logistics techniques, 
the computerisation of cashier tasks, the creation of discount stores and attempts to 
diversify into services. However, retail activity has been slowing down for several years. 
In a context of economic crisis, a number of factors have contributed to this deceleration: 
the growth of e-commerce, especially for non-food goods and changes in consumer 
purchasing behaviour, which tend to favour purchases of electronic equipment (mobile 
phones, multimedia, and computers). To adapt, alongside strong price competition, the 
retail trade has launched new strategies: ongoing extension of shop opening hours, new 
digital technologies and the establishment of smaller-scale convenience stores in city 
centres that better meet consumer needs.
4.2  Employment in the French retail trade sector: demanding working 
 conditions and low wages18 
Employment creation remained positive in the retail trade sector, although less dynamic 
than before the crisis (+ 2.1 per cent from the end of 2009 to the end of 2013), while it 
was declining in the wholesale trade and in many other sectors.
The sector is signi¿ cantly polarised, with a few large enterprises, mainly multinational 
companies in supermarkets, DIY stores, fashion chains or department stores, and a 
large mass of small shops. In 2012, 90.6 per cent of all retail enterprises had fewer than 
10 employees (see Table 7). 
The largest sub-sector is food retailing with 45 per cent of the workforce, followed 
by personal goods stores with 32 per cent. Despite this predominance of very small 
establishments, in 2013, 61 per cent of employees of the retail trade (full-time equivalent) 
worked in retail group outlets. The stores are often part of chains, in particular in 
clothing, footwear or perfumery.
Regarding job structure, the proliferation of atypical contracts is characteristic of the 
retail trade sector (see Figure 2), more because of the number of self-employed than the 
number of ¿ xed-term contracts (9 per cent in the retail sector compared with 7 per cent 
for the private sector). 
18. Unless otherwise speci¿ ed, data in this section are taken from the INSEE Employment survey.
Table 7  Proportion of establishments by number of employees (%)
0 1–5 6–10 >11
Food 45.9 40.1 5.5 7.6
Household goods 48.8 40.9 5.4 4.9
Personal goods 37.8 53.1 6.7 2.4
Other 69.3 26.6 2.8 1.4
Total 47.2 43.4 5.5 3.9
Source: Insee, Clap (Connaissance localisée de l’appareil productif), 2012.
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The number of self-employed rose by 6 per cent during the crisis (2009–2013), three 
times faster than all employment in the sector. However, this growth has been less 
vigorous than in other trade sectors or in the economy as a whole. Again, between 2009 
and 2013, payroll employment grew by 1.4 per cent, mainly in the food trade.
Most employees in the sector are unskilled. In the retail sector as a whole, 67.8 per 
cent are unskilled white-collar employees and only 8.9 per cent are blue-collar workers; 
73.5 per cent and 10.5 per cent, respectively, in food retailing. The largest occupational 
categories consist of nearly 900,000 people composed of store cashiers (180,000), 
clothing and sporting goods sellers (140,000), food sellers (110,000), non-specialised 
sellers (100,000) and self-service and storekeepers (just under 100,000).
Nearly one-third of those working in the retail trade are under 30 years of age and 60 
per cent are women, compared with 22 per cent and 39 per cent in the private sector as a 
whole. Some typical retail jobs are overwhelmingly performed by women: 85 per cent of 
cashiers and self-service employees and 76 per cent of salespeople are women. Women 
are, on the other hand, slightly in the minority among managers.
Due to the activity’s dependence on customer À ow, the common denominator of retailers 
is their subjection to substantial time organisation constraints, implicitly experienced 
at all levels of the company. Thus, companies must constantly adapt their workforces 
to À uctuations in the number of customers, whether on an annual, monthly, weekly or 
daily basis. The use of part-time work is the most frequent way of devoting maximum 
working time to customer service and thus reducing wage costs. Some 28 per cent of 
retail employees work part-time. This is much higher than in the private sector as a 
whole (15 per cent). As in other sectors, part-time work is more important for women 
than for men (39 per cent versus 10 per cent). Part-time employment is closely related to 
Figure 2 Structure of employment in the French retail sector (2012)
Source: Insee, Enquête emploi 2012.
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job: half of cashiers and self-service employees and 32 per cent of salespeople are part-
timers. Involuntary part-time work is also typical of supermarket and large retailers (44 
per cent of all part-timers) and related jobs (41 per cent for cashiers and self-service 
employees). The phenomenon is more pronounced among young people: almost half of 
young part-time retail workers want to work more. However, the rate of part-time work 
varies from one store to another, ranging from 15 per cent to almost the whole workforce. 
This diversity in human resource practices can be explained by a combination of several 
factors. Some brands have developed pro-active policies to reduce the use of part-time 
work with quanti¿ ed thresholds, often embodied in company agreements. 
Working time is also characterised by its great À exibility; 29 per cent of people working 
in retail have schedules that vary from week to week, compared with 22 per cent in 
private sector as a whole. Irregularity of schedules concerns supermarkets and cashiers 
and self-service employees in particular. Because these occupations are predominantly 
¿ lled by women, they are most aɣ ected by irregular schedules.
Almost nine out of ten people employed in this sector (88 per cent) work on Saturdays 
or Sundays, usually or occasionally (52 per cent in the private sector as a whole). As for 
Sunday work, 37 per cent of employees work at least occasionally on Sundays and 19 per 
cent usually (24 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively, in the private sector as a whole).
Finally, low wages are particularly prevalent in the retail sector. Fruit and vegetables, 
grocery and dairy products, hairdressing and retail, clothing and textiles are the sectors 
in which the average wages of workers and employees are lowest and the proportion of 
employees paid around the legal minimum wage (SMIC) is the highest (between 20 and 
32 per cent).
All these unfavourable aspects of working conditions represent strong claims and 
bargaining stakes for the trade unions in the sector. 
4.3  Trade unions and employers’ organisations in the retail trade sector
In such a heterogeneous sector it is not surprising that employers’ representation is 
fragmented. Diɣ erences among employers can be found at all levels, including their 
histories (department stores in the nineteenth century and the electronics trade), 
traditions (small grocery stores and supermarkets) and forms of business (butchers, 
bakers, branches of multinational companies). Consequently, diɣ erent and even 
opposing economic and social interests are defended in the various employers’ 
organisations.
The major food retailers and specialised retailers are found in FCD (Federation of Trade 
and Distribution) which belongs to MEDEF. As a member of MEDEF, department stores 
and popular stores, because of their speci¿ c history, have their own federation, UCV 
(City Centre Department Stores Union). Small shops, whether independent or chain-
owned, prefer federations that specialise in their activity: FEH (federation of clothing 
retailers) and FEC (federation of footwear retailers), for example. These federations 
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are generally members of CPME (confederation of SMEs). It is interesting to note that 
in order to better defend their economic interests some employers’ federations have 
created groupings. The Trade Alliance, for example, groups UCV, FEH and FEC. In the 
social ¿ eld, on the other hand, employers’ organisations are striving to keep negotiations 
divided among the various sub-sectors.
Craftsmen have also set up employers’ organisations speci¿ c to their specialty, but 
which, in order to increase their inÀ uence over the public authorities, have joined forces 
in two major confederations: CGAD (General Confederation of Food Retail), to which 
all food handicraft traders belong, and CNAMS (National Confederation of Crafts and 
Services), to which non-food traders (hairdressers, furnishings, À orists) belong. These 
two confederations are founding members of the employers’ confederation of the craft 
sector, which is now called U2P. In the retail sector, most of the larger retail companies, 
as well as the small craft ones are members of an employer organisation. 
Regarding trade unions, we ¿ nd the same organisations as in the other sectors. CFDT, 
CGT and CFTC have a unique federation for the trade sector. Only FO has two: FEC 
(Federation of Employees and Managers) and FGTA (Federation of Food Workers) who 
share the ¿ eld in the retail trade. The results of the representativeness elections give 
a good picture of the unions’ presence in the diɣ erent trade bargaining sectors. The 
weight of each of these organisations varies greatly by sub-sector and depends on their 
Table 8  Trade union representativeness in the main collective bargaining sectors of the 
 retail trade, France, 2017 (%)
Voting rate CFDT CGT FO CFTC UNSA
Supermarkets  64  22  21  25  16  3
Department stores  72  29  33  12  7  3
Clothing (two 
separate branches) 
 36  29  21  12  17  10
Non-food retail shops  15  32  22  9  19  3
Pharmacies  12  16  18  22  8  18
Furnishing  40  30  23  15  17  5
Hairdressing salons  5  12  23  22  7  27
DIY stores  52  30  21  16  22  –
Groceries, 
delicatessens
 7  19  34  13  7  7
Clothing stores  6  21  28  16  16  9
Household 
appliances
 51  21  19  12  26  2
Stationery, bookshops  26  27  19  7  24  10
Sports goods shops  23  17  19  6  30  25
Butchers  7  7  52  13  8  11
Source: Ministère du Travail, Représentativité par branches professionnelles, 2017.
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individual histories. None of the ¿ ve representative trade unions is signi¿ cantly ahead 
of the others. 
It is worth noting the very low voting rate recorded in the craft sectors and in the small 
shops. On the other hand, participation in elections is high in sectors composed of large 
enterprises and close to that of other sectors.
Due to the extension procedure, collective bargaining coverage is high in the trade 
sector, but the degree of workplace employee representation is generally low compared 
with cross-sectoral national averages (see Table 9). Trade union membership is also 
lower in the trade sector: 6 per cent in 2013 compared with 8 per cent in the private 
sector as a whole. As in other sectors, union density is slightly above average in large 
retail enterprises, while trade unions are almost absent from small and medium-sized 
shops.
4.4 Sectoral collective bargaining: structure and outputs
With the exception of department stores and supermarkets, which have a long tradition 
of sectoral bargaining and where the trade union presence is of long standing, sectoral 
bargaining in the retail trade is more recent than in industry. In order to bene¿ t from 
public support for employment and training, it has developed on a corporatist basis 
at the initiative of employers’ organisations. The collective bargaining landscape is 
fragmented, with 84 collective agreements, of which only 29 cover more than 5,000 
employees (see Table 10).  
Bargaining at sectoral level is not very dynamic. First, it is often supported by the 
Ministry of Labour through mixed joint committees (CMP, see box 2). Of the 88 
Table 9  Presence of at least one employee representative or union in workplaces with 11 or 
 more employees in 2011 (%)
Trade sector Private sector
Workplace representation:
11–49 employees 47 50
> 50 employees 96 94
Total 56 60
Union delegate:
11–49 employees 20 21
> 50 employees 64 67
Total 28 31
Source: Ministère du Travail, Dares, Enquête REPONSE 2010–2011 ; volet ‘représentants de la direction’.
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instances of sectoral bargaining followed by a CMP, 35 belong to the trade sector (in 
red in Table 10), thus most retail sub-sectors, including some chains of stores and large 
companies. In the view of the trade union federations, the large food retailers sector is 
the only one with negotiations that lead to agreements with innovative contents.
Secondly, a major common characteristic of other bargaining sectors is the weakness 
of their agreements’ content: they provide very few bene¿ ts to employees in addition 
to those provided for by the Labour Code. The sectoral agreements are signed on 
legally binding topics: vocational training, senior employment and so on. In an area 
as important as wages, for example, union organisations achieve only modest annual 
increases for employees. The agreements signed merely upgrade the classi¿ cation levels 
below the SMIC. The following levels are generally very low. The result is a narrowing of 
the wage range. One union federation oɤ  cial interviewed described sectoral bargaining 
as a ‘minimum service’ for employers. This strategy allows the employers’ federations 
to keep their members and leave room for manoeuvre to large companies to negotiate 
their own agreements. 
Sectoral collective agreements systematically prohibit derogations by company 
agreements as provided for in the Fillon Act of 2004. All trade union organisations in 
the sector refuse to sign agreements that do not provide for this prohibition clause. For 
Table 10  Sectoral collective agreements covering more than 5,000 employees in the retail 
 trade (2015)
Bargaining sector Employees Bargaining sector Employees 
Supermarkets  669 300 Opticians, glasses stores  34 700
Pharmacies  119 100 Laundries  31 900
Clothing branches  111 600 Perfumeries  23 700
Non-food retail shops  107 200 Shoe branches  21 700
Hairdressing salons  98 700 Florists  21 400
DIY stores  74 100 Hardware stores  19 600
Groceries, delicatessens  70 800 Jewellery, watch shops  18 000
Clothing stores  66 800 Garden centres, pet shops  17 500
Household appliances, 
computers
 63 900 Pastry shops  16 100
Furnishing trade  63 000 Meat shops  15 900
Stationery, bookshops  57 000 Shoe stores  10 400
Sports goods shops  56 700 Confectionery, chocolate 
shops
 10 400
Bakeries  43 600 Fishmongers  10 000
Butchers shops  39 300 Consumer cooperatives  9 500
Department stores  37 200
Note: In italics: sectoral bargaining with CMP.
Source: La négociation collective en 2015. Bilan, Ministère du Travail.
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the moment, this lock has been eɣ ective and derogations remain limited. However, the 
latest legislative developments that make negotiation at company level prevail over that 
of the sector with regard to working time weaken trade unions’ strategy, especially on 
Sunday work.
4.5  Decentralisation of collective bargaining: new issues in a 
 renewed legal context
In France, there is a strong correlation between size of enterprise and the existence of 
collective agreements. Smaller enterprises are less likely to sign their own agreements 
but are covered by sectoral agreements. By contrast, most large enterprises are covered 
by workplace agreements. The retail sector follows this pattern. 
Industry and services are the two sectors with the highest number of company 
agreements signed by union delegates, accounting for 34.4 per cent and 37.7 per cent, 
respectively. Although the volumes of agreements signed in these two sectors are very 
similar, service companies employ more than twice as many employees as industrial 
¿ rms (44.9 per cent versus 17.7 per cent). Trade, accommodation, food and transport 
companies, which employ just under one-third of the labour force in the private sector 
sign only 23.6 per cent of agreements. In the trade sector (wholesale, retail, sales and 
car repair) 3,338 company agreements were signed by union representatives in 2015 
out of a total of 31,200 (10.7 per cent of the agreements signed for 16.8 per cent of the 
labour force). As a result, in bargaining sectors with many SMEs, such as small retail, 
national sectoral agreements mitigate the lack of negotiations at company level.
Compared with major industrial groups, for example, the agreements signed with major 
retailers oɣ er little bene¿ t to their employees. In many cases, they only take over the 
sectoral agreement by adding provisions such as complementary health care or training 
schemes, but only very rarely are there wage bene¿ ts. For company HR departments, 
bargaining issues concern mainly the organisation of work schedules. The latest labour 
laws give them new opportunities in this ¿ eld.
Box 2  What are CMPs?
In the event of diɤ  culties or blockages in the bargaining process, Labour Code 
article L.2261-20 allows requests to a mixed-joint committee (CMP) chaired by a 
state representative. The purpose of the CMP is to assist in the negotiation of legally 
binding texts in a sector, by resolving diɤ  cult situations with the help of a third party’s 
technical and legal competence. The CMP is composed of representative union and 
employers’ organisations in the sector concerned and chaired by a representative of 
the Ministry of Labour. The Ministry may initiate a joint committee in two cases: at 
any time, on its own initiative or when an employer or trade union organisation so 
requests.
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Hitherto, Sunday work and the extension of opening hours have been the main issues in 
company negotiations, for both employers and employees. Opening options on Sundays 
widened with the Macron law of 2015, as did opening ranges with the El Khomri law 
of 2016. In both cases, derogations are conditional on the conclusion of a collective 
agreement which provides compensation for employees or, as regards work on Sunday, 
with a unilateral decision of the employer after a ballot among the employees. In this 
legal context, most department stores and specialised chains or retailers have attempted 
to reach agreements on this subject. The union federations have divergent positions 
on Sunday work. CGT and FO are against it in principle and give strict instructions 
on the issue to their union delegates.19 Conversely, CFTC and, above all, CFDT make 
the signing of agreements conditional on the quality of the counterparties oɣ ered to 
employees.
As a result, the situation varies by company. Some have successfully concluded 
agreements, such as BHV. Others, faced with the unions’ refusal to sign, have attempted 
a ballot but failed to achieve the result they wanted (FNAC). Others preferred to abandon 
negotiations (Galeries Lafayette, for example).
More generally, the link between the sectoral and company levels in the retail trade 
has changed only in very large ¿ rms. However, regarding recent and upcoming legal 
changes, and in particular the introduction of the ballot, the balance of power is 
increasingly unfavourable to trade unions in enterprises. In the rest of the sector, the 
sectoral agreements remain the reference for small employers, all the more so because 
their contents are not particularly advantageous for employees.
5. Conclusion 
Although it has earned a degree of centrality in French industrial relations, sector-
level collective bargaining has never achieved integrative capacity and the normative 
signi¿ cance it can boast in some other European countries. Extensive state regulation 
– mainly through the extension procedure, the favourability principle and statutory 
minimum wages – has ensured vertical and horizontal coordination of collective 
bargaining. Starting with the Auroux law (1982), the French collective bargaining 
system has evolved since then through a state-led decentralisation. The aim of the 
government’s policy was twofold. Company competitiveness was supposed to be 
enhanced by fostering workplace agreements better adapted to the ¿ rm’s needs. In the 
meantime, the ‘proximity’ of these agreements would guarantee better protection for 
employees. In the ¿ rst phase this was done without aɣ ecting the favourability principle. 
The reforms accelerated in the late 1990s and 2000s and led to deeper institutional 
change. Some reforms, such as increasing the number of compulsory negotiated topics 
at company level – initially limited to wages and working time – favoured the trade 
unions. Others gave more strength to the employers, in particular expanded scope 
for derogation mechanism or the extending of bargaining competence to non-union 
19. Checking these instructions is not always easy and may sometimes end with the withdrawal of the delegate’s 
mandate.
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representatives, both existing institutions (works councils and employees’ delegates) 
and entirely new institutions (employees mandated by branch unions). As a result, 
company-level bargaining has developed dynamically over recent decades, without 
hampering the development of collective bargaining at the sectoral and multi-sectoral 
levels. 
Our general study and our case studies on the metal and retail sectors show that, 
encouraged at all levels by legislation, the content and scope of bargaining has been 
diversi¿ ed. However, legal stimulation of company level derogation or bargaining 
without unions has not produced signi¿ cant eɣ ects in practice. Unions are still the 
main (and mostly exclusive) bargaining partner and have succeeded in negotiating 
company agreements signi¿ cantly above the standards of the sector-level agreements. 
Nevertheless, decentralisation has had the eɣ ect of increasing inequalities among and 
within sectors. Some diɣ erentiation can be observed. In the metal sector, only minimum 
wage standards are agreed at sectoral level, leaving room for big companies to bargain 
their own real wage development and additional compensation, whereas in the retail 
sector company agreements play only a limited role. Here negotiations at the company 
level presently concentrate on working time, especially Sunday work. In the metal 
sector, which is strongly exposed to international competition and to the business cycle, 
the crisis stimulated the negotiation of new types of agreement at company level in order 
to secure employment. It is important to stress that none of these negotiations needed 
any legal encouragement on derogation, as the agreed provisions of these employment-
securing agreements were not less advantageous than the sectoral agreements, but only 
compared with previous company agreements.
In a context in which employment has became a major public problem, both right- and 
left-wing governments have tried to obtain the social partners’ support for labour market 
reforms, pushing them to negotiate À exibility at national inter-sectoral level. After 2012, 
the PS-led governments reaɤ  rmed the objective of labour market À exibility as a means 
of regaining competitiveness and reducing unemployment, sticking to a supply-side 
vision of the economy. Pressure for structural reforms also came from the European 
Commission. In order to get additional deadlines to meet the stringent public budget 
criteria, the government partly implemented the ‘country speci¿ c recommendations’ 
for France, which in 2015 suggested the facilitation of derogations in order to reduce 
labour costs and link wages to productivity. This was initiated by the El Khomri law, 
voted in the last phase of the socialist government, and was immediately followed by the 
Macron ordinances. Both have utterly changed the French collective bargaining system. 
They represent a legal turning point towards decentralisation by derogation in order to 
stimulate competitiveness, growth and employment. Regarding employment creation, 
this rationale seems to be contradicted by a series of international comparative studies. 
Studies by the ILO (2012) and the OECD (2012) show that it is impossible to establish 
any clear link between the decentralisation of collective bargaining and a country’s 
economic and employment performance. They do show, however, that decentralisation 
has negative eɣ ects on bargaining coverage, income equality and wage dynamics among 
sectors, which can produce negative indirect eɣ ects on growth and employment. 
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It remains to be seen how industrial relations will evolve at company level. Will 
a substantial number of employers use the new legal tools in order to cut costs and 
extend work schedules under the threat of plant closures or redundancy plans? Or, 
will it, like some of the big companies so far, continue to follow a ‘high road’ model of 
competitiveness by maintaining good relations with trade unions as a precondition for 
cooperative work relations and the enhancement of productivity and quality production?
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Chapter 6
Italian collective bargaining at a turning point
Salvo Leonardi,1 Maria Concetta Ambra2 and Andrea Ciarini3
1. Introduction
In the past eight years the Italian system of industrial relations has been undergoing 
a prolonged transitional phase (Carrieri and Treu 2013; Barbera and Perulli 2014; 
Leonardi and Sanna 2015; Guarriello 2014; Gottardi 2016). The numerous events that 
have occurred have changed some of its traits within a relatively short period. The 
various causes are both exogenous and endogenous, economic as well as institutional. 
The main exogenous factors are globalisation, the ¿ nancial crisis and the economic 
downturn, as well as interventions by international institutions in national policy-
making. This scenario is to some extent shared with other countries and is currently 
exerting pressure on diɣ erent models of industrial relations (Katz and Darbishire 2000) 
towards neoliberal convergence (Streeck 2009; Baccaro and Howell 2011). Under 
growing pressure from so-called ‘New European Economic Governance’ (NEEG), many 
national lawmakers – and especially in the Southern European countries (Rocha 2014; 
Cruces et al. 2015; Leonardi 2016) – have stepped up deep labour law reforms, with the 
purpose of reducing the traditional prioritisation of multi-employer bargaining and the 
favourability principle, allowing company-level agreements to derogate in pejus from 
higher bargaining levels or even labour legislation (Marginson 2014; Van Gyes and 
Schulten 2015; Bordogna and Pedersini 2015; Cella 2016). 
The endogenous factors include the structural weakness of the Italian economy, with its 
macroeconomic imbalances, territorial and social dualisms, stagnating productivity and 
competitiveness, inadequate development of human capital and very segmented labour 
market. However, problems in the ¿ eld of industrial relations are also relevant. In the 
European Commission’s 2016 country report on Italy, the national collective bargaining 
system is described as ‘unclear and unspeci¿ ed’. Based on collective agreements binding 
on only the signatory parties, its eɣ ects are uncertain and of limited impact. Extension 
erga omnes is not automatic, the assessment of trade union representativeness is not 
yet operational, and bargaining at the enterprise level and productivity rates remain 
underdeveloped (European Commission 2016).
Most of the Commission’s remarks are on target. The Italian collective bargaining system 
is in fact a complex and precarious mishmash of obscurely strati¿ ed conventional and 
1. Author of all sections except Section 5. 
2. Author of Section 5.2.  
3. Author of Section 5.1.
Salvo Leonardi, Maria Concetta Ambra and Andrea Ciarini
186  Multi-employer bargaining under pressure – Decentralisation trends in ﬁ ve European countries
statutory interventions. The public sector, large-scale private industry, banks, craft 
industry and SMEs, as well as agriculture all have their own systems, with framework 
agreements that often remain in place even though they have expired, without being 
properly updated or replaced.
Meanwhile, the country has been suɣ ering what the Governor of the Bank of Italy and 
other commentators have described as the worst years in its peacetime history. Between 
2007 and 2013, in particular, GDP fell by 9 percentage points, industrial production by 
25 per cent and investment by 30 per cent, while the unemployment rate has doubled 
and productivity has stagnated. Social distress persists, productivity remains low and 
workers are still not feeling any positive eɣ ects from a very timid economic recovery 
(+ 1.5 per cent is expected for the end of 2017). Between 2009 and 2016, real wage 
dynamics(adjusted for inÀ ation, which is still low) remained lower than in the pre-crisis 
years. Wages decreased by 2.3 per cent in 2011–2012, when inÀ ation was higher than 
expected, but increased by more than 2 per cent in 2013–2015, when the cost of living 
fell markedly (by 0.5 per cent per year, on average), below what had been laid down in 
the collective agreements (Banca d’Italia 2017). The unemployment level is still almost 
double that of the pre-crisis years, while precarious work continues to hinder progress 
with productivity and private consumption growth. 
In this chapter, we describe how all these challenges are aɣ ecting and transforming some 
of the key features of collective bargaining in Italy. The recent state interventionism 
on the labour market and industrial relations has posed a serious challenge to the 
traditional primacy of multi-employer bargaining and has exacerbated an insidious 
process of segmentation with regard to labour standards and protections. 
Currently, the debates between the social partners and policy-makers concern three co-
related issues in particular:
(i) the political role of the unions and social dialogue, in a period in which tripartite 
concertation – a pillar of the economic recovery in the 1990s – has repeatedly 
been given up for dead;
(ii)  the relations between law and collective autonomy in the process of laying down 
new rules on industrial relations as a whole; 
(iii) the new structure of collective bargaining in a time of epochal changes for labour 
and the economy.
Generally speaking, the core issues and achievements seem to be as follows: 
(a) how a new reformed collective bargaining system can enhance productivity and 
national economic performance, which have stagnated for too long; and
(b) whether, in this context, Italian collective bargaining can still be described as 
organised – or rather, disorganised – decentralisation (Traxler 1995). 
As we will try to demonstrate, the collective bargaining system has preserved a certain 
degree of organised coordination, despite some attempts to dismantle it, as has been 
the case in other EU member states during the same period. Social dialogue remains 
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fairly lively and reactive, as clearly shown by the inter-confederal agreements on 
representativeness and collective bargaining (2011–2014). The system’s capacity and 
eɣ orts to reform itself should also be appreciated, as should the willingness of the 
three main union confederations to overcome harsh divisions between 2009 and 2011. 
These developments deserve to be adequately supported by the state through auxiliary 
legislation that – transposing the best outcomes of social dialogue – restores to the 
whole system the certainty, transparency and enforceability that are currently missing. 
The situation is very open and evolving and over the coming months we may well see 
more clearly whether the turmoil of these long, critical years is reaching an end.
2.  The structure of collective bargaining in Italy: actors, norms
 and processes
Similar to other Latin countries, the Italian system is based on the principle of trade 
union pluralism, rooted in the ideological conÀ icts emerging from the ruins of the Second 
World War. Since the late 1940s, there have been three central union confederations: the 
General Italian Confederation of Labour (CGIL), the Italian Confederation of Workers’ 
Unions (CISL) and the Italian Union of Labour (UIL).4 
Italian trade unions can still draw on signi¿ cant power resources (Leonardi 2017). Union 
density has declined in Italy, too, but the downward trend has been slower and much 
more contained than elsewhere. It was 41 per cent in 1980 and is now estimated at 38 
per cent (Cazes et al. 2017).5 This is still one of the highest rates in the world (ICTWSS 
2015), behind only Belgium and the Nordic countries. The data could be overestimated, 
however, because there is an underlying risk that in the internal system for obtaining 
a membership card, workers could be registered twice. As a result, observers and trade 
unionists tend to restrict themselves to more cautious estimates, not exceeding 32 per 
cent (with reference only to the three largest confederations). Italy still has the highest 
number of trade union members in absolute terms (over 11 million) because of the high 
number of pensioners who remain aɤ  liated. 
The employers’ organisational density is estimated at around 50 per cent. Employers’ 
associations are organised according to the size, sectoral type, legal status and political 
orientation of the aɤ  liated companies, which intersect in various ways.6 Umbrella 
confederations are organised – on both the workers’ and the employers’ sides – in a 
number of sector/branch peak federations. There are roughly a dozen on the trade 
4. Unions of minor importance include UGL, originally close to the post-fascists, a plethora of professional 
‘autonomous’ unions, which are particularly strong in the ¿ nancial sector, public services, schools and 
transport, and also radical left-wing unions (USB), signi¿ cant only in individual branches or plants.
5. There are 6 million active members in the three main confederations alone, out of a total of 17 million 
dependent employees.
6. The Italian employer landscape is much more fragmented than in the rest of Europe (Bellardi 2016), where 
the historical and most inÀ uential umbrella confederations are Con¿ ndustria, which aɤ  liates medium-
large manufacturing enterprises, Confapi (SMEs), Confartigianato and CNA (craft sector), Confcooperative 
and Lagacoop (cooperatives), ABI (banks), ANIA (insurance), Confcommercio, Confesercenti (trade) and 
Confagricoltura (agriculture).
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union side, but hundreds on the employers’ side. This is one reason why there are so 
many national sectoral agreements, as we shall see. In a single manufacturing sector, 
there might be at least four national collective bargaining units, according to ¿ rm size 
and type: large, small or medium, craft industry and cooperatives. 
The Italian industrial relations system has a high level of voluntarism, at least in the 
private sector, while in the public sector most aspects are governed by the law. The 
1948 constitutional provisions concerning the registration of trade unions and the 
attribution of bargaining capacity at sectoral level in proportion to the number of 
members, legal regulation of the right to strike and workers’ rights to participate in 
company decision-making have never been transposed into law. After the Fascist era, 
in the new democratic system trade unions remained reluctant to be subjected to state 
control over their internal organisation, while they opted for collective autonomy with 
regard to strikes and collective bargaining, rejecting state statutory interventionism. 
Nevertheless, as a result of the spectacular increase in union power after the ‘hot 
Autumn’ of 1969, legislation was enacted in the form of the Workers’ Statute (Act No. 
300 of 1970) to strengthen union rights in the workplace. 
Apart from that one, and with regard to the public sector,7 there are no Italian laws 
regulating either À oor wage setting or collective agreements eɣ ects. Italy is the only EU 
member state, besides Sweden and Denmark, that has neither a statutory minimum 
wage nor an administrative extension procedure to guarantee universal coverage of 
collective agreements (Leonardi 2017). 
Collective bargaining depends on mutual recognition by the social partners; collective 
agreements are acts of private law, considered as expressions of the signatories’ self-
regulatory capacity and subject only to the general provisions of the Civil Code of 1942. 
Collective agreements are not legally binding, so their contents are formally enforceable 
only by the signatories’ aɤ  liates. The law has primacy over collective agreements, and 
collective agreements over individual agreements. Statutory rights and conventional 
minimum standards cannot be derogated in pejus, but only in mejus, by lower level 
collective or individual agreements.8 If more than one industry-wide agreement is 
signed in the same contractual unit – as is happening more and more often – the Courts 
tend to favour the one signed by ‘comparatively the most representatives’, applying a 
series of measuring criteria. But it is not always easy.
Since the tripartite agreement was signed in July 1993, the Italian bargaining system 
has been two-level and articulated hierarchically, prioritising national industry-level 
collective labour agreements, followed by company-level agreements, or, alternatively, 
7. Since the late 1990s there has been a law concerning the selection of representative unions that are entitled 
to bargain (Legislative Decree No. 296/1997 and 165/2001, Art. 43). Unions need to pass a threshold of 5 per 
cent to take part in national collective bargaining, whereas a ¿ nal agreement is binding if signed by unions 
representing at least 51 per cent of the relevant workforce. These thresholds are calculated as a weighted 
average between votes and members in the branch’s companies.
8. By virtue of Art. 2077 of the Civil Code, clauses and terms of individual contracts, pre-existing or subsequent to 
the collective agreement, are by law replaced by those of the collective agreement, except if it contains special 
terms that are more favourable to employees. However, waivers and transactions concerning employee rights 
covered under mandatory provisions of laws and contracts or collective agreements, are not valid (Art. 2113).
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territorial agreements, where ¿ rms are too small and there are no workers’ 
representatives, as in such sectors as crafts, agriculture, construction, retail and tourism.
National sectoral bargaining is the core of the system. It establishes a À oor of rights 
and standards that secondary-level bargaining – which is facultative – must comply 
with, integrating, adapting and generally improving pay and working conditions, 
in accordance with the favourability principle. Among their main tasks, national 
agreements establish sectoral wage À oors according to diɣ erent job levels, protecting 
wage earners’ purchasing power against inÀ ation. As no formal extension mechanisms 
are provided to widen agreements’ binding eɣ ect, a problem might arise in terms of equal 
treatment among workers employed in the same branch, territory or even company. 
Such problems could be particularly acute in the case of minimum wages. The problem 
has found an indirect solution – a sort of functional equivalent – based on judicial resort 
to Article 36 of the Italian Constitution. It states that employees’ remuneration must be 
‘commensurate with the quantity and quality of their work and in any case suɤ  cient 
Table 1 Hourly sectoral minimum wages, Italy, 2008–2015 (euro/hour and Kaitz index)
Hourly minimum wages Kaitz index (% of median)
2008 7.99 74.62
2009 8.22 74.88
2010 8.46 75.13
2011 8.91 78.35
2012 9.06 76.07
2013 9.22 76.20
2014 9.32 80.53
2015 9.41 79.95
Source: Garnero’s calculation based on ISTAT negotiated wages database LFS, 2017. 
Table 2 Hourly sectoral minimum wage by sector, Italy (euros/hour and Kaitz index, 
 2015)
Hourly minimum wages Kaitz index (% of national median)
Agriculture and mining 7.70 59.44
Manufacturing, electricity 9.47 73.11
Construction 8.55 66.03
Retail trade 8.43 66.11
Transport 8.95 69.08
Hotels and restaurants 8.41 64.92
ICT 9.19 70.94
Finance and insurance 12.95 99.97
Public administration 9.72 75.04
Source: Garnero’s calculation based on ISTAT negotiated wages database LFS, 2017. 
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to ensure them and their families a free and digni¿ ed existence’. As interpreted by the 
labour courts, this concept of commensurate and suɤ  cient pay corresponds to the wage 
À oors, diɣ erentiated by job classi¿ cation, set up by the national sectoral agreement to 
which the individual worker is subject. The collectively agreed base wage is inserted 
automatically into individual employment contracts and represents the minimum, not 
liable to eventual derogations. In this way, the system achieves the double objective of 
having a ‘constitutional’ minimum wage, laid down by law or administrative extension 
procedures, and preserves trade union sovereignty over wage bargaining. 
Collectively agreed minimum wages are, on average, higher both in absolute terms and 
relative to the median wage (Kaitz index), estimated the highest in Europe, at 80 per 
cent (ratio between the minimum and the median wage) (Klempermann et al. 2014). 
The lack of a legal extension mechanism has not impeded a very high collective 
bargaining coverage, never estimated to be below 80 per cent by international sources 
and an impressive 99.4 per cent by national sources (CNEL-ISTAT 2015). Employees 
in all branches and companies are – in theory at least – covered by a multi-employer 
agreement. At the moment, there are 809 signed and archived agreements (CNEL 
2016). However, non-compliance rates are not negligible in a country in which levels 
of evasion – for example, via informal workers or bogus self-employment – are among 
the highest in a sample of EU countries. In particular, ‘wages at the bottom of the 
distribution appear to be largely unaɣ ected by minimum wage increases’ (Garnero 
2017). According to this source, 10 per cent of workers, on average, are paid one-¿ fth 
less than the reference minimum wage, with peaks of 30 per cent in agriculture and 
20 per cent in hotels and restaurants, SMEs, in southern Italy, and among women and 
casual workers. 
The proportion of national sectoral wages covered by collective bargaining stands 
at about 88 per cent in the private sector and over 90 per cent in the public sector. 
The remainder is variously composed of collectively or individually negotiated pay 
(restricted wage gap) and/or other elements, such as overtime pay (Fondazione Di 
Vittorio 2016).
The second level of collective bargaining can be company-based or, alternatively, 
territorial (common in sectors in which very small enterprises or casual work 
are prevalent). Its aim is to respond to and stimulate corporate À exibility and 
competitiveness. It is not compulsory but rather facultative and usually depends on 
the presence of unionised works councils. Since the national industry-wide agreement 
sets minimum pay levels, taking into account only purchasing power, at company level 
pay rises – in the form of variable remuneration – depend on performance-related 
indicators (productivity, pro¿ tability, quality, attendance). Productivity in particular, 
the Achilles heel of the whole economic system, is assumed to be the driver of any 
attempt to promote economic development. Since 2007, a number of laws and decrees 
have been promulgated in an eɣ ort to promote performance-related wage increases, 
with the introduction of some tax concessions to support company-level bargaining (see 
below, Section 7)
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With regard to the actors concerned, national negotiations are conducted by the sectoral 
social partner federations, while the ¿ rm level is the prerogative of the unitary union 
representative body (Rappresentanze sindacali unitarie or RSU). In the recent past, 
the RSU has been complemented by the territorial sectoral unions, signatories of the 
higher-level agreement in force in the company, to confer stronger vertical and infra-
associational coherence on the two-tier system. The RSU, whose members are elected 
by members and non-members, is the single channel of workplace representation and 
may be elected in companies with over 15 workers.
3.  What kind of decentralisation? Challenges and changes from 
 2009 to 2014
Over the years, the Italian collective bargaining system, although theoretically well 
designed in the 1993 framework agreement, has encountered practical limits, as well 
as signi¿ cant criticism. The growth of productivity and wages, which largely depend on 
company-level bargaining, have suɣ ered from the failure of the latter to take oɣ . The 
paucity of statutory norms with regard to social partner representativeness and collective 
bargaining eɣ ects has paved the way for uncertainty and bitter disputes, including before 
the courts. Union representativeness has become a thorny issue as relations between 
the major confederations have worsened over the years, following the enforcement of a 
number of key agreements despite the fact that a majority of would-be signatories did 
not back them.9 Another diɤ  cult issue has been collective bargaining decentralisation. 
Moving on from the archetypical ‘organised decentralisation’ designed in 1993, we have 
entered a phase of rapid changes, aimed – to various degrees and through diɣ erent 
processes – at strengthening the decentralisation of collective bargaining. The major 
changes occurred from 2009, a year after the international ¿ nancial crisis commenced. 
Schematically, the timeline of the major changes (presented below) has been non-linear 
(Leonardi and Sanna 2015): 
1. Weakly organised: the Tripartite Agreement for the Reform of Collective Bargaining 
(2009);
2. Totally disorganised: 
– from the bottom, the Fiat model (2009–2010);
– from the top, Article 8 of Act. 148 (legal reform adopted just after the ECB 
request to the Italian government (2011); 
3. Organised decentralisation: the three inter-confederal agreements on represen-
tativeness and bargaining (2011, 2013, 2014).
9. This occurred with the tripartite agreements on the labour market (2001) and the collective bargaining 
system (2009); in some important industry-wide agreements, such as the tertiary and metalworking sectors 
(2008–2010); and at company level, in some big companies, such as FIAT (2010). In all these cases, CGIL and 
its federations were cut out of the deal.
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3.1  Weakly organised: the Tripartite Agreement for the Reform of Collective 
 Bargaining of 22 January 2009
On 22 January 2009, a Tripartite Agreement for the Reform of Collective Bargaining 
was signed by the government and the social partners. CGIL did not participate, 
however, due to its opposition to a number of clauses related to decentralisation and 
industrial unrest. This was followed by an inter-confederal agreement signed with only 
Con¿ ndustria, in April of the same year (and again without CGIL), which introduced 
a number of changes to the system in force since 1993 (Bellardi 2010). The new rules 
safeguarded the two-level structure of collective bargaining, with the provisions of 
sectoral collective agreements continuing to serve as a minimum nationwide threshold 
within the sector, but with the aim of empowering the second level of collective 
bargaining. The duration of sectoral agreements has been harmonised at three years 
for both normative and economic parts (previously, durations were four and two years, 
respectively).A new Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices (HICP) replaces the old 
‘foreseen inÀ ation rate’, ¿ xed through tripartite concertation, as was previously the 
case. Unlike in the past, the restoration of purchasing power will not be full, since the 
new indicator excludes imported energy costs. The gap between forecasted and real 
inÀ ation will be taken into account only if it is deemed ‘signi¿ cant’ at inter-confederate, 
not sectoral level. With a view to including workers not covered by company-level 
bargaining, the sectoral agreement will set a guaranteed minimum increase, just for 
them. Decentralised agreements are to last three years (previously four), covering topics 
de¿ ned by sectoral agreements or legislation and which did not concern those already 
regulated at other bargaining levels. 
One achievement of the 2009 agreements was an incremental strengthening of 
second-level bargaining, at company level. The agreement adopted changes implying 
the unprecedented possibility to introduce opening clauses, allowing deviations from 
national agreements. This was probably the most controversial aspect of the new system 
and the reason why CGIL refused to sign. Until then, derogations in pejus were allowed 
only exceptionally in territorial pacts in order to cope with economic underdevelopment 
and/or a high level of undeclared work. In any case, they were hardly ever put into 
practice.
Although not signed by the largest trade union confederation, the 2009 agreement did 
not prevent unions from renewing all industry-wide agreements in a unitary way in 
the following years. The glaring exceptions were the national agreements in two very 
important sectors – trade and metalworking, accounting for ¿ ve million workers – from 
which the CGIL federations were left out.
3.2  Totally disorganised: the ‘corporatisation’ of the FIAT/FCA model 
At company level, the most controversial instances, as they concerned the country’s 
most important private employer, were some agreements signed at FIAT plants in 2009 
and 2010. The company left the national employers’ association and its strati¿ ed system 
of agreements to sign a new, unprecedented ¿ rst-level agreement, de-linked from the 
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metalworking industry-wide agreement. The agreements were signed by the CISL and 
UIL sectoral federations (FIM and UILM), and not by CGIL’s (FIOM). This new system 
recognises union representation with regard to the signatory organisations only (no 
matter how many members they have or the number of votes they received). Unions 
that refuse to sign ¿ rm-level agreements – such as the historical FIOM-CGIL – are 
excluded from representation within the workplace. Through a sort of closed shop, the 
condition required for recognition by companies is not unions’ real representativeness 
(by votes and/or members) but their willingness to sign company agreements. In order 
to guarantee full enforceability and eɣ ectiveness of the agreements, and to prevent 
all possible forms of workers/unions dissent, a more binding limitation of the right 
to strike was introduced, with sanctions for unions and for individual workers (even 
dismissal) in case of violation of the peace clause. Last but not least, FIAT management 
convened a workers’ referendum on the new system, which also included several changes 
to working time and shifts, holding over them the threat that they would close plants 
(Pomigliano and Mira¿ ori) if a ‘no’ vote prevailed, transferring production to Poland. 
Under such pressure, the workers voted in favour of the new system by a slight majority. 
The dispute paved the way for a harsh period of conÀ icts and reciprocal accusations 
within the national trade union movement. Since then, FIOM-CGIL has campaigned 
unceasingly against the new model, registering a number of successes at the case law 
level, leading up to a ¿ nal ruling by the Constitutional Court (Sent. no. 231/2013), which 
denounced the FIAT/FCA system as unconstitutional. This implies that a comprehensive 
law, embodying democratic and transparent rules on representation and bargaining 
outcomes, is needed. 
The FIAT/FCA case is still the only meaningful example of a company-level agreement 
was signed that fully substituted, rather than merely complementing the industry-
wide agreement. For that reason, it is considered very controversial and potentially 
destabilising for the whole system by many Italian labour lawyers, who consider this 
case to be a risky template for the total ‘corporatisation’ and even ‘Americanisation’ of 
the system.10 
3.3  Decentralisation under ‘New European Economic Governance’: Article 8, 
 Law No. 148/2011
In the summer of 2011, amidst the turmoil in the ¿ nancial markets Italy’s economic 
situation seemed to worsen. The Berlusconi government was weakened by internal 
cleavages and mistrusted by ¿ nancial markets and European institutions alike. Private 
foreign capital withdrew and the country seemed to be in need of an IMF intervention. 
At that moment the country was perhaps the main concern of European policy-makers. 
Then, on 5 August 2011, a ’secret’ ECB letter asked the Italian government to reform 
(i) the pension system, in particular the eligibility criteria for seniority pensions and 
the retirement age for women; (ii) the labour market, making it easier to dismiss 
individual employees; and (iii) collective bargaining, allowing ¿ rm-level agreements to 
tailor wages and working conditions to individual ¿ rms’ speci¿ c needs. Clearly, despite 
10. Among others, Bavaro (2012) and Romeo (2014).
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the many and deep changes already introduced, the narrative from the EU institutions 
was that these changes had been insuɤ  cient. In their view, collectively agreed wages in 
Italy are over-centralised and insuɤ  ciently responsive to labour market conditions and 
¿ rms’ capacity to pay, with secondary-level bargaining insuɤ  ciently developed. 
In a few months, the Parliament approved an austerity package, including all the 
measures that ‘Europe’ had requested. As a result the role of social dialogue was 
completely marginalised. The social partners were barely consulted and their opinions 
hardly considered. Surprisingly, social mobilisation and unrest remained far below 
what might have been expected; for instance, there was just a three-hour strike over the 
reform of the pension system that postponed the retirement age.
Article 8 of Law Decree No. 138 of 12 August 2011 (converted into Law No. 148/2011 by 
means of a vote of con¿ dence), entitled ‘Support for proximity collective bargaining’, 
was the Italian government’s immediate answer of the ECB’s letter (Garilli 2012; Chieco 
2015). Indiɣ erent to the willingness already expressed by the most representative social 
partners, the inter-confederal agreement having been signed just a few weeks previously 
(28 June), the government introduced the possibility for ‘speci¿ c agreements’ signed at 
company or territorial level to deviate from the law and national industry-wide collective 
agreements. Such derogating agreements must be formally justi¿ ed in terms of the 
following: increasing employment; managing industrial and economic crisis; improving 
the quality of employment contracts; increasing productivity, competitiveness and 
pay; encouraging new investments and starting new activities; enhancing workers’ 
participation; or putting a stop to illegal labour. The range of topics with regard to which 
opting out is now possible is very large and includes working time, the introduction 
of new technologies, changes in work organisation, job classi¿ cation and tasks, ¿ xed-
term and part-time contracts, temporary agency work, transformation and conversion 
of employment contracts, hiring and ¿ ring procedures and the consequences of the 
termination of the employment relationship. Exceptions are related to ‘fundamental 
rights’, in conformity with the Italian Constitution and international norms and 
requirements (union rights, discriminatory dismissal, pensions).
For the ¿ rst time in Italy a national law has established, for the private sector, that 
company or territorial collective agreements shall have a binding eɣ ect ‘on all the 
workers concerned’, if they are signed by the ‘trade union organisations operating 
in the company following existing laws and inter-confederal agreements’. With such 
a clause, Article 8 should at least avoid the promotion by employers of ¿ ctitious or 
‘yellow’ representatives with the sole aim of eluding regular collective agreements. The 
new proximity agreements become valid and binding for all employees concerned if 
approved by a majority of union organisations, based on the abovementioned rules.
Decentralised bargaining, in the intention of the lawmaker, is supposed to become the 
new core of the whole system, with the industry-wide level, in turn, relegated to a more 
or less residual role. Broadly denounced and stigmatised by most trade unionists and 
scholars, as a result of Article 8, derogations, which previously were exceptional, would 
become the norm, reversing the traditional hierarchy in labour law (Perulli and Speziale 
2011; Bavaro 2012; Gottardi 2016).
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3.4  Coordinated decentralisation: the inter-confederal agreements on 
 representativeness and bargaining 2011–2014
Meanwhile, on 28 June 2011, Con¿ ndustria and the three main union confederations 
(CGIL included this time), signed an inter-confederal agreement, with a double purpose: 
(i) de¿ ning measurable criteria for union representativeness and the bindingness of 
company agreements; (ii) enhancing collective bargaining decentralisation, with the 
possibility of opening clauses at company level, but in the framework established by the 
primary, national level. 
In a general climate of uncertainty and national worries about economic turmoil – with 
a request from the EU institutions in the air – the Italian social partners made a ¿ rst 
attempt to self-reform the system, before the government could pre-empt them, aware 
of what had just happened in Spain.11 As we have seen, it was wishful thinking. 
The terms of the 28 June agreement were con¿ rmed repeatedly: ¿ rst, in September 
2011, in reaction to the unwelcome and unilateral intervention of the law, in the form 
of Article 8. Afterwards, on 31 May 2013 and on 10 January 2014, the signatory parties 
returned to the issues of the ¿ rst agreement of 2011, specifying its operationalisation in 
detail (Carinci 2013; Zoppoli 2015; Bavaro 2012; Barbera and Perulli 2014). The text of 
10 January 2014 was supposed to be a new inclusive text on the whole subject of union 
representativeness and collective bargaining.12 Other sectors and associations, after 
Con¿ ndustria, beat the same path, signing similar agreements on trade, cooperatives 
and services with the social partners.13 
In order to be considered suɤ  ciently representative, and so admitted to national 
collective bargaining, trade union associations need to pass a 5 per cent threshold. It is 
calculated as a simple average of the votes obtained at the works council elections and 
branch members, collected and certi¿ ed by the National Institute for Social Protection. 
A sectoral agreement is binding if signed by the unions representing least 50 per cent + 
1 of the workforce and – importantly – after a ‘certi¿ ed consultation’ of the workers, if 
approved by a simple majority of votes. 
At company level, the normal employees’ representative body is the abovementioned 
RSU. Its elections can be contested by electoral lists presented by trade union 
organisations adhering to the associations that have signed the framework or sectoral 
agreement at the company, or even others, on condition they accept the rules and obtain 
a minimum number of signatures among the workers. A company agreement will be 
valid and binding if approved by the majority of RSU members. For companies with 
rappresentanze sindacali aziendali (RSA), designated by the unions and not elected by 
all the employees, a ¿ rm agreement will be binding for all if approved by the majority 
of RSA members. In this case, the draft agreement can be subject to a referendum if 
11. During those weeks, in fact, the Spanish government had interrupted social dialogue, intervening unilaterally in 
bargaining decentralisation.
12. Testo Unico su rappresentanza e contrattazione collettiva. 
13. There were a few diɣ erences and amendments concerning the speci¿ c criteria for de¿ ning representativeness 
and secondary-level bargaining, considering that in branches with many SMEs and casual workers, works 
councils may cover only a small proportion of employees.
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at least one of the organisations signing the inter-confederal agreement, or at least 30 
per cent of workers in the company, request it within ten days of the signing of the 
agreement. 
It is worth underlining that at both levels representative democracy and the majoritarian 
principle are supplemented by direct democracy and referendums. 
Once approved in accordance with such a procedure, again at both levels, the dissenting 
signatory organisations are barred from taking industrial action if they are in a minority. 
Through intra-associational coordination, the signatory parties have to exert inÀ uence 
over their aɤ  liates in order to make the agreement fully enforceable and binding. 
Cool-down procedures, established at sectoral level, should prevent and sanction any 
behaviour that might compromise the enforceability and eɤ  cacy of signed agreements.
As regards coordination between national- and company-level bargaining, the primacy of 
the former is explicitly con¿ rmed, although there is a possibility to negotiate ‘modifying 
agreements’ at company level, albeit subject to coordination and in accordance with 
parameters and procedural limits laid down in the national agreement. Collective 
bargaining at company level takes place with regard to matters delegated and in the 
manner de¿ ned by the national collective agreement in the sector or by law. External 
unions can be involved in managing situations of crisis and restructuring, where some 
deviations from the higher level of bargaining might be required temporarily. Unlike 
in the case of Article 8 – and this is a very important diɣ erence – derogations from 
statutory norms are not permitted. 
4.  Recent trends in collective bargaining
To date, the outcomes of the new system laid down in the inter-confederal agreements of 
2011–2014 have not been satisfying, and the new rounds of negotiations in 2015–2017 
have not bene¿ tted. In an entirely voluntary system, the data-gathering process has 
turned out to be fraught, with major diɤ  culties due mainly to the reluctance of many 
enterprises to provide the required information to the institutes in charge of processing 
membership data. 
The issue of signatory representativeness, not de¿ ned by any law, is the Achilles’ heel of 
the whole system. It not only aɣ ects the trade union side, where in fact it has been a cause 
of severe disputes, but also the employers’ associations, whose acute fragmentation 
continues to be one of the most serious weaknesses of the Italian industrial relations 
system. Individual companies (FIAT was by far the most famous case), groups of 
enterprises or branches (such as in the area of hypermarkets and small and medium-
sized enterprises) have chosen to exit from their respective trade associations, to create 
their own new contractual units (Bellardi 2016; Papa 2017). The fragmentation and 
uncertain representativeness of the employers’ associations raise the need to establish 
transparent and certi¿ ed parameters, even on this side, with regard to the total 
number of members and workers. So-called ‘pirate’ agreements, signed by unknown 
or ambiguous associations, are undermining the whole system of collective bargaining 
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‘from the top’, fostering fraudulent strategies and downward contractual dumping. 
The cost gap between a national agreement signed by the most representative unions 
and one signed by others – in the same contractual unit – can be several thousand 
euros a year and with lower pay rates (by up to 20 per cent), which is dumping by 
any estimation. The downward pressure on contractual terms has led the major social 
partners to moderate wage dynamics in order to limit the adoption of smaller contracts 
by businesses (D’Amuri and Nizzi 2017) 
4.1  Recent renewals of national industry-wide agreements
According to the CNEL archive, in 2008 some 396 industry-wide agreements were 
recorded, of which fewer than 300 were endorsed by the large confederations; at the 
end of 2016 that ¿ gure had risen to a striking 803 (Olini 2016), only 225 of which were 
signed by the sectoral federations aɤ  liated to the three main confederations. A striking 
195 were in the commerce sector, 60 in transport and an average of 30 in the other 
main branches: metal, chemical, food, textile, banking and services. Some of them are 
nothing but ‘copy and paste’ agreements, but most were conceived with the express 
purpose of driving down costs and labour standards. 
In the period 2012–2015, the renewal period for workers whose contract has expired 
was, on average, 24 months (ADAPT 2017); in 2016–2017, this was increased to 26 
months. Strikes were recorded in eight cases. 
Between September 2016 and April 2017, over 50 industry-wide agreements – aɣ ecting 
7 million workers (55 per cent of the total) – were renewed by the most representative 
social partner associations. As of May 2017, 42 national agreements, concerning 5.8 
million workers – 45 per cent of those concerned – were still pending, 15 of them in 
the public sector (2.9 million employees). After a seven-year freeze – censured by 
the Constitutional Court – bargaining is once again under way for the renewal of the 
nationwide agreement covering 3 million public workers. 
Nominal wage increases have been scheduled, in two or three tranches, by all the 
agreements. Amounts diɣ er considerably from sector to sector, but on average they 
are fairly low once more: 0.8 per cent, according to the Bank of Italy (2017a). Some of 
them have frozen immediate increases, prolonging agreement duration to over three 
years. Others (trade and crafts) have abandoned the link to the Harmonised Indices 
of Consumer Prices (HICP), giving the negotiating actors more room to manoeuvre. 
They all refer an ex ante calibration, as in the past, with the important exception of the 
metalworking renewal, where the real wage dynamic will be calculated and restored ex 
post, every year in June, after the oɤ  cial data on current inÀ ation are delivered by the 
National Institute of Statistics. 
A monitoring study by ADAPT (2017) of a representative sample of texts shows that, after 
wages, labour market and industrial relations are dealt with in all sectoral agreements. 
The national agreements reaɤ  rm the two-tier system, national and company (or 
alternatively territorial), according to the principle of delegation and non-repeatability 
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of individual contractual items and with a substantial alignment with the coordination 
and specialisation rules de¿ ned in inter-confederal agreements, which are authoritative 
in this respect.
Among recent trends, we would like to underline the growing weight of ‘bilateralism’: 
the social partners’ management of occupational welfare, through joint bodies and 
funds. Encouraged by the legislation to provide a stop-gap in the context of welfare 
state retrenchment, bilateral funds have been established in all sectors. Funded by 
enterprises, they provide complementary pension schemes, supplementary health 
insurance and unemployment bene¿ ts. For a system traditionally lacking a strong 
participatory model in industrial relations, bilateralism can be considered the most 
structured and eɣ ective form of participation (Leonardi 2017).
4.2  Coverage and contents of secondary-level collective bargaining
Unlike other countries, where all collective agreements are collected and archived 
in public observatories – making fairly precise data available – Italy has nothing of 
the kind, only sample-based surveys or observatories. However, they all agree that 
decentralised bargaining is very limited, given the number of enterprises and workers 
covered. According to the Banca d’Italia, company-level bargaining in the private 
sector covers the 20 per cent of enterprises with more than 20 employees (D’Amuri 
and Giorgiantonio 2014; Cardinaleschi 2016; ISTAT 2016; Banca d’Italia 2017). The 
outcomes presented in ISTAT data and their elaboration by the Fondazione Di Vittorio 
(2016) are similar. Here, secondary-level bargaining coverage, summing the territorial 
and company levels, is estimated to involve approximately 20 per cent (21.2 per cent) 
of ¿ rms with more than 10 employees, 13 per cent by ¿ rm-level agreements and the rest 
(8.2 per cent) by territorial agreements.
Figure 1 Companies covered by secondary-level collective bargaining, company or territorial
Source: Fondazione Di Vittorio’s elaboration on ISTAT data, 2016.
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The cross-sectoral gap is remarkable, with a fork between the 43 per cent of the industrial 
sector and the 25.8 per cent of construction, with a mere 5 per cent at company level. 
However, the data show a strong territorial polarisation, with a higher concentration 
in the most economically developed Northern regions, and a substantial absence which 
aɣ ects the Southern regions and the two big islands, where the coverage ratio falls to 
11–13 per cent of ¿ rms, of which only 5.7–7.7 per cent are covered by a company-level 
agreement.
Predictably, ¿ rm size matters,14 so that there is a strong and clear co-relationship 
between ¿ rm size and bargaining propensity. The spread of ¿ rm-level agreements is 
much higher in large companies, such as those with over 200 employees (60.5 per cent, 
56.6 per cent of which at ¿ rm level) or over 500 employees (69 per cent, with 65.5 
per cent at ¿ rm level). It is lower in the other size classes, namely between 50 and 199 
workers, where 38.5 per cent are covered, and between 10 and 49 employees, covering 
17.5 per cent, split equally between company and territorial agreements. The total 
proportion of employees covered by a secondary-level agreement in the private sector 
is approximatively 35 per cent, or 3.7 million workers (Fondazione Di Vittorio 2016). 
Other studies reach similar conclusions, according to which between 70 and 75 per cent 
of Italian wage-earners are excluded by any form of secondary-level bargaining. Wages 
are ‘condemned’ never to increase but merely to remain aligned, at best, with the real 
value they enjoyed when the system was established, in July 1993 (Tronti 2016). 
14. In Italy, ¿ rms under 49 employees represent 98 per cent of all companies, giving employment to 52 per cent of 
all employees; 93.7 per cent have fewer than 16 employees; 88 per cent fewer than ¿ ve. At the other extreme, 
companies with 500 employees or more represent only 0.1 per cent of enterprises, but account for almost 25 per 
cent of overall employment.
Figure 2 Private sector employees estimated to be covered by secondary-level bargaining, 
 total and by sectors, Italy, 2014
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According to our calculations, the ¿ gures on the coverage of company-level bargaining 
and workplace representation overlap. According to institutional sources (CNEL-
ISTAT 2015), elected works councils (RSU) operate in a mere 12 per cent of enterprises. 
The ¿ gure is slightly higher if one includes the other possible form of workplace 
representation, designated by the unions and not elected by employees (RSA), prevalent 
in the ¿ nancial sector. The presence is as low as 8 per cent in companies employing 
fewer than 50 employees. The majority of companies (60 per cent) with more than 
500 employees have a works council (Pellegrini 2017). This is certainly one of the main 
explanations, perhaps the most important, for the very limited extension of company-
level bargaining and agreements (Leonardi 2016). 
If this is not an encouraging picture in terms of coverage, what about the content of 
the company-level agreements? According to some surveys, in the period 2012–2016 
the matter most commonly addressed was wages, present in 77 per cent of territorial 
and 64 per cent of company agreements (ADAPT 2015; 2017). According to another 
study (OCSEL 2017), restructuring was the most frequent issue in 2013–2014 (62 
per cent of agreements), followed by wages (23 per cent). In 2015–2016, wages were 
addressed in 43 per cent and restructuring in 37 per cent of agreements. Working time 
À exibility is another frequent item, whereas occupational welfare has been gaining 
more and more attention in recent collective bargaining rounds, at all levels. A total of 
20 per cent of new ¿ rm-level agreements include one or more items concerning in ¿ rm 
health insurance and a wide range of bene¿ ts concerning working life balance, smart 
working and company day care. This could be further developed, given the robust ¿ scal 
incentives given by the government for such arrangements in ¿ rm-level agreements. 
Finally, work organisation is tackled in 11 per cent of the sample – especially shift work 
– up from 6 per cent the previous year (OCSEL 2017)
Figure 3 Companies covered by territorial or ﬁ rm-level bargaining and works councils (by size 
 and in %)
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on CNEL-ISTAT data referring to 2012–2015.
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It is important to underline here that disorganised decentralisation, with ¿ rm-level 
agreements used as an open alternative to sectoral ones, has not taken place. Empirical 
surveys all agree that derogating from sectoral agreements concerns probably between 
5 and 10 per cent of company agreements (Tomassetti 2015; OCSEL-CISL 2017; Olini 
2016, ADAPT 2017). Work organisation and working time are the most prevalent topics. 
This is good news, but we cannot completely exclude the possibility that the existence of 
derogating agreements is simply insuɤ  ciently known, as their signatory parties, on the 
union side, are not interested in publicising them (Imberti 2013). 
5.  Survey of the metalworking and trade sectors 
5.1  The Italian metal industry in the aft ermath of the crisis
A total of 1.6 million people work in the metal industry in Italy, one of the highest ¿ gures 
in Europe. Its added value in 2014 amounted to 113 million euros, corresponding to 55.3 
per cent of the Italian manufacturing sector’s gross value added (GVA). The bulk of 
this is concentrated in two sub-sectors: the manufacture of machinery and equipment 
(n.e.c.) and the manufacture of fabricated metal products, excluding machinery 
and equipment. The number of active enterprises registered in 2014 was 196,507, 
representing 5.2 per cent of the total economy (excluding ¿ nance and insurance). As 
in many other European countries, the manufacturing sector in Italy has witnessed a 
constant decline in recent decades, in terms of both companies and employment (see 
Figure 4). The economic crisis that started in 2008 aggravated this trend. Between 2008 
and 2014 the workforce in the metal sector shrank by more than 324,000 (–12.5 per 
cent). Unlike the manufacturing sector, the metal industry is characterised by bigger 
Figure 4 Employment trends in the metal industry and manufacturing sector in Italy, 
 NACE Rev. 2, 2008–2014

0
500,000
1,000,000
1,500,000
2,000,000
2,500,000
3,000,000
3,500,000
4,000,000
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Manufacturing Metal industry
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on CNEL-ISTAT data referring to 2012–2015.
Salvo Leonardi, Maria Concetta Ambra and Andrea Ciarini
202  Multi-employer bargaining under pressure – Decentralisation trends in ﬁ ve European countries
than average enterprises. However, value added decreased steadily in the years of the 
crisis (see Figure 5). This trend had serious repercussions for both employment levels 
and labour productivity, which fell steadily compared with the European average. 
5.1.1 The metal industry in Italian industrial relations. Structure and actors
Union density in the Italian metal sector is 32.8, slightly higher than that of the 
manufacturing sector (31.4 per cent) and a bit below the – estimated – national average 
of 33.4 per cent (Carrieri and Feltrin 2016). The most representative sectoral unions 
are FIOM-CGIL, FIM-CISL and UILM-UIL. Employer density is estimated at around 
50 per cent, with a number of employers’ associations. The largest and most inÀ uential 
of the latter is Federmeccanica (aɤ  liated to Con¿ ndustria), with more than 16,000 
enterprises, employing 800,000 workers. The second is Unionmeccanica (aɤ  liated 
to Confapi), representing 80,000 small and medium-sized enterprises, employing 
800,000 workers, with 400,000 in the metal sector proper). Cooperatives and craft 
industry have their own confederations and sectoral federations, also in metalworking. 
In 2013, a new breakaway employers’ confederation – Con¿ mi Industria – was founded 
by local and sectoral employers’ associations from Confapi and Con¿ ndustria. 
The whole metal industry is covered by ¿ ve main national collective agreements, all 
signed by the same unions with the various employers’ associations, depending on ¿ rm 
size and economic subsector: large industry, small and medium, cooperatives, craft 
and goldsmiths’ wares. To date, all the main national collective agreements have been 
renewed. Only the craft sector has not yet renewed its collective agreement. 
Since 1993 collective bargaining has taken place at two levels in Italy. The two-tier 
bargaining system is based on industry-wide agreements. In recent years trade unions 
have reinforced the role of second-level bargaining with the aim of increasing À exibility 
Figure 5 Gross value added at basic prices, 2005 and 2015 (% share of total gross value 
 added)
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and productivity. In general terms the Italian two-tier bargaining system is made up of 
high minimum wages negotiated in collective agreements and a relatively compressed 
wage scale (Garnero 2017). The estimated sectoral Kaitz index15 in the metal industry 
(78.3 per cent) is slightly lower than in the manufacturing sector as a whole (79.88 per 
cent). A high sectoral Kaitz index corresponds to a substantial number of workers being 
paid at the minimum wage level, with a very narrow distribution. Alternatively, it may 
indicate a large number of low paid workers below the minimum wage. 
As reported by Armaroli et al. (2017), pay negotiations in metalworking have, in most 
cases, been characterised by wage moderation. This trend is con¿ rmed if we look at the 
metal industry wage share (Figure 6). Despite a steady increase after the recession that 
started in 2008 this ratio is still far below the pre-crisis level. 
As far as second-level bargaining is concerned, the metal sector shows similarities and 
diɣ erences to the national trend. As already noticed in previous sections there is a close 
relationship between ¿ rm size and decentralised agreements in Italy. Approximately 
35 per cent of employees in the private sector are covered by a second level agreement 
represent, equivalent to 3.7 million workers (Fondazione Di Vittorio 2016). In smaller 
enterprises, most employees are not covered by any workplace representation with the 
consequence that company level bargaining is limited. Due to the higher number of 
companies in the metal sector with more than 250 employees, second-level bargaining 
has a higher incidence there than in the rest of the economy. In order to improve 
À exibility and productivity decentralised and territorial-level bargaining have been 
strengthened in the past two years, by focusing on company welfare agreements. The 
new national industry-wide agreement is fairly representative of this new trend. 
5.1.2 The most recent national industry-wide agreement
Negotiations on the new national industry-wide agreement were diɤ  cult and protracted, 
taking more than one year. The last two renewals had been signed without FIOM-
CGIL and there was a risk, at the beginning, of a similar outcome. Con¿ ndustria and 
its aɤ  liate (Federmeccanica) demanded more collective bargaining decentralisation 
towards the ¿ rm level in wage setting. In the metal sector, the biggest company, FIAT, 
15. The level of the minimum wage compared with the median wage.
Figure 6 Metal industry wage share, 2008–2015 (%)
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left Federmeccanica and Con¿ ndustria in 2009, so as to overcome what it regards as the 
‘rigidities’ of the collective bargaining system and to implement its own establishment-
level contract.
In 2015, metalworker federations presented two platforms to the employers’ 
federation: one FIM-UILM and another FIOM. In the end, they were brought together. 
Federmeccanica presented its own platform, called the ‘renovation of the metalworkers’ 
national collective agreement’, calling for just one level of negotiation and a national 
guaranteed wage only for those uncovered by any collective or individual enterprise 
CLA (covering just 5 per cent of metalworkers), its amount to be de¿ ned every year. 
Nothing happened in 2016 because wage rises already exceeded real expected inÀ ation. 
In July 2017 wages are set to be increased based on the previous year’s inÀ ation; 260 
euros per year as a production bonus or welfare vouchers; an increase in health coverage 
insurance; permanent training lasting 24 hours every three years; and an increase in 
supplementary pension.
At the end of diɤ  cult negotiations, an agreement was reached in November 2016 with 
all the most representative trade unions, and signed after the workers approved the 
draft in a ballot. 
Compared with the past, the new agreement provides considerable novelty. 
– Duration: unlike what had been foreseen in the collective bargaining reform of 
2009, the parties agreed to extend the contract from three to four years.
– Wages: there was no planned wage increase for 2016, but there was a one-oɣ  sum of 
80 euros (gross) in 2017 wages. As of 2017, a new inÀ ation adjustment mechanism 
has been introduced, which is no longer based on expected inÀ ation (on the basis 
of the foreseen or expected inÀ ation rate) but de¿ ned every year ex post, and not ex 
ante, as in other sectoral agreements.
– Occupational welfare, both at sectoral and company level, plays a key role in the 
new collective agreement. It consists of health insurance, training (24 hours every 
three years), complementary pensions and a wide range of bene¿ ts provided at 
company level through vouchers. Due to the robust ¿ scal incentives instituted by 
the government these changes are expected to introduce substantial innovations in 
relations between the social partners. New parameters and a diɣ erent relationship 
between occupational welfare at company and at sectoral level have been established. 
Since 1 June 2017, companies have been committed to providing À exible bene¿ ts for 
all workers up to a maximum of 100 euros in 2017, 150 euros in 2018 and 200 euros in 
2019. It must be said that the ¿ rst real increase, in June 2017, was a pitiful 1.5 euros for 
a typical blue-collar worker. Likewise, supplementary pensions and supplementary 
health insurance have been extended to all workers. As an alternative to monetary 
bonuses, workers can opt – entirely or partly – for in-kind welfare services collectively 
bargained at company or territorial level. The new agreement gives a further boost 
to supplementary pension provision by increasing the contribution rate paid by 
companies in favour of employees who are members of the National Pension Fund 
(Cometa), from 1.2 to 2 per cent. As of 1 October 2017, the supplementary health 
insurance contribution to the sectoral health fund (Metasalute) will be fully borne 
Italian collective bargaining at a turning point
 Multi-employer bargaining under pressure – Decentralisation trends in ﬁ ve European countries 205
by the employer, totalling 156 euros per year. The right to supplementary health 
care has been extended to part-time and ¿ xed-term workers, as well as to workers’ 
dependent family members. In cases in which the company already provides forms 
of supplementary health care, the collective agreement stipulates that the parties 
will have to complement the bene¿ ts with a contribution to be paid by the company, 
which cannot be less than 156 euros per year.
– Training: the contract focuses heavily on training and the individual right of all 
workers to choose training related to innovation (linguistic, technological and 
organisational, transversal or relational skills). This right is currently limited to 24 
hours (or 16) over three years, after which there is a 150-hour reinforcement and 
university training (security training and RLS are also strengthened).
– Participation: support for the direct participation, in diɣ erent ways, of workers 
(observers and committees in second-tier negotiations and security), the 
establishment of a new participation advisory committee in larger companies 
(1,500 employees or so) and a national committee on active labour policies.
Compared with the past, occupational welfare and bene¿ ts constitute a major novelty, 
seen as a way to stimulate labour productivity with no direct monetary increases. The 
À exible bene¿ ts included are additional, provided by second-tier negotiations, for all 
workers. This represents a novelty not only with regard to previous renewals, but also 
with regard to the FCA agreement. The FCA agreement has only one, corporate level. 
It provides the possibility of transforming or replacing part of variable remuneration 
into À exible bene¿ ts, to which the company adds a 5 per cent stake. The FCA’s welfare 
plan is de¿ ned by agreement between the unions that are signatories to the collective 
agreement: FIM-CISL, UILM-UIL, FISMC, UGLM and ACQF, but not FIOM-CGIL. One 
of the strengths of the FCA’s corporate welfare is the fact that it has built up a well-
de¿ ned basket of services, with the unused welfare services re-absorbed in wages. The 
national collective agreement works on the basis of a diɣ erent logic; it is not based on 
the exchange of services and variable parts of remuneration within the company, but 
on the coexistence of a national level entrusted with maintaining purchasing power and 
a second tier that is required to add additional welfare bene¿ ts. The vast majority of 
company agreements have been signed in larger companies, especially multinationals, 
with more than 1,000 employees, 39.7 per cent of the total (ADAPT 2017). In fact, small 
and micro-enterprises, where À exible bene¿ ts cannot be generated by the economies of 
scale that are typical of larger companies, are somewhat worried. A second concern is 
related to the availability of data on the type of services and À exible bene¿ ts negotiated 
in companies. The data show a strong increase in corporate bargaining on the subject of 
welfare. However, the lack of more detailed information on the sectoral and corporate 
levels preclude comparisons of the diɣ erent baskets.
5.1.3 The trade union viewpoint
The metal workers unions have agreed to wage moderation and new participatory 
approach to collective-agreement and company welfare, rejecting the abandonment of 
the national collective agreement. In this exchange Italian metal unions have achieved 
an attenuation of the strong dualisation initially envisaged in the Federmeccanica 
proposals. Against this background the trade unions reacted to these pressures by using 
the new contractual architecture as a tool for relaunching collective bargaining. 
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Wages and labour costs were the most diɤ  cult topic during the long negotiations. As 
one national oɤ  cial of FIOM-CGIL told us:16
‘At the beginning of the negotiations, employers not only did not accept the wage 
increases. In a situation of deÀ ation (with both an economic downturn and falling 
inÀ ation), [perversely] the [company] was actually asking the workers for money 
back. Enterprises were willing to grant wage increases only to those workers whose 
wage levels were lower than the minimum. This called into question the autonomy 
of the national and company levels. At the same time, Federmeccanica’s proposal 
mentioned an integrative health care service borne by the company and the workers. 
We started from a diɤ  cult situation, within a legislative framework that had already 
created derogations, divisions amongst the workers and a weakening of the national 
collective agreement.’ 
Another oɤ  cial from the same organisation  told us that the employers have certainly 
obtained the low wage increases:17
‘They also obtained a mechanism of total variability with regard to company 
welfare bene¿ ts. Previously when negotiating ¿ nal agreements, you could bargain 
for ¿ xed items for everyone. Now they have become variable. We worked on the 
fact that with occupational welfare we could recover what was lacking with regard 
to wages. We have extended integrative health care to everyone and made sure 
that, above all, this responsibility was borne by the enterprises. Federmeccanica 
wanted everything to be regulated within the company. We managed to get this 
in the collective agreement and give workers the opportunity to choose between 
corporate bene¿ ts and other forms of contractual welfare (health insurance and 
complementary pension).’ 
For the FIM-CISL, the focus must be on corporate and territorial negotiations. As we 
were told in an interview with a leader of the metalworkers federation:18
‘We cannot continue with just the national one. If small enterprises alone cannot 
activate company welfare plans, it is necessary to reinforce territorial bargaining in 
order to build economies of scale, in order to activate services. It is also necessary to 
integrate bilateralism in this design: we have to put together parts of bilateralism in 
order to strengthen company welfare in small enterprises. That said, a step forward 
has been made after too many years of divisions. A step forward has been made with 
respect to Federmeccanica, which was demanding money back. Foundations have 
also been laid so that the workers can access more services and integrative bene¿ ts 
under the collective agreement.’
5.1.4 Final comments
The metalworkers unions agreed on wage moderation and a new participatory approach 
16. Maurizio Landini, General Secretary of the FIOM-CGIL.
17. Roberta Turi, member of the FIOM-CGIL national board.
18. Marco Bentivogli, General Secretary of the FIM-CISL.
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to collective agreement–based and company welfare, rejecting the abandonment of the 
national agreement. In this exchange Italian metal unions have achieved an attenuation 
of the strong dualisation initially envisaged by Federmeccanica. In this context trade 
unions have reacted to these pressures by using the new collective-agreement architecture 
as a means of relaunching collective bargaining. Although the new agreement does not 
grant signi¿ cant wage increases, it continues to maintain purchasing power. Despite 
pressure towards disintermediation, the potential destabilisation induced by the FIAT/
FCA case – with its company agreement as an alternative to the national industry-wide 
agreement – did not take place. From such a viewpoint, the sector has maintained a 
degree of inter-sectoral coordination, with the two traditional levels con¿ rmed. The 
signatory social partners were able to establish some points, exploiting the innovations 
provided by the legislation. One point of criticism might be the diɤ  culty that smaller 
companies are likely to experience in actually realising welfare bene¿ ts at plant level, 
especially the in-kind services that require considerable economies of scale. As matter 
of fact the development of company welfare in these companies depends on the ability 
of the social partners to reinforce territorial-level bargaining.
5.2 The Italian trade sector aft er the economic crisis (2008–2014)
5.2.1 Collective bargaining in the trade and retail sector19 
But what changes occurred in the Italian trade sector from 2008 to 2014? First, we 
describe the main structural characteristics of the trade sector in Italy, focusing on the 
retail subsector. Then we analyse collective bargaining at national level, highlighting the 
main actors and processes in trade and retail. Finally, we take a more detailed look at 
decentralised collective bargaining in the trade sector (at company and territorial level) 
in order to understand its impact on wages, working conditions and social protection.
5.2.2 Main structural characteristics of the trade sector in Italy: workers and ﬁ rms
From 2008 to 2014, the economic crisis led to the closure of 91,908 enterprises in the 
Italian trade sector as a whole (–8 per cent); more than 57 per cent of this reduction 
(52,978 ¿ rms) was in the retail sector. 
19. The trade sector (G) comprises three main subsectors: G45, wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles; G46, wholesale trade, excluding motor vehicles and motorcycles; and G47, retail 
trade, excluding motor vehicles and motorcycles. The so-called GDO: Grande distribuzione organizzata (Large 
Distribution) is included in Retail (G47). We used the Eurostat Annual detailed enterprise statistics for trade 
(Nace Rev. 2 G) available from 2008 to 2014 (last update 18.05.17; extracted on 04.06.17).
Table 3 Enterprises in the trade sector, Italy, by economic activities (2008–2014)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2008/2014
G45 122,951 120,850 119,348 119,070 118,220 116,895 115,256 -7,695 -6%
G46 422,198 412,049 409,684 406,450 402,596 398,362 390,963 -31,235 -7%
G47 669,893 651,024 644,873 646,623 642,597 638,383 616,915 -52,978 -8%
G 1,215,042 1,183,923 1,173,905 1,172,143 1,163,413 1,153,640 1,123,134 -91,908 -8%
Source: Eurostat. Annual detailed enterprise statistics for trade (NACE Rev. 2 G).
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Most of the employment (about 97 per cent) is concentrated in ¿ rms with fewer than 10 
employees (Table 4).  
In 2014, the total number of persons working in the trade sector in Italy was 3,302,311. 
However, if you consider only employees, they numbered 1,941,454, about 58 per 
cent of the whole. This falls further to 1,502,830 if you consider full-time employees 
(Eurostat 2016). 
5.2.3 National collective bargaining in the trade sector: actors and processes
In the trade sector, there are three main trade union organisations: Filcams-CGIL, 
Fisascat-CISL and Uiltucs-UIL. These unions represent workers in the largest part 
of private services, including trade and retail, restaurants, hotels and cleaning. Their 
overall number is growing year after year. In 2014 these three trade unions (as a whole) 
had about 900,000 members.20 
Nevertheless, union density in these sectors remains one of the lowest. Union density 
in the trade sector as a whole was about 17 per cent in 2014 (Feltrin and Carrieri 2016), 
lower than in all other sectors.21 However, it is growing, especially in large distribution 
multinational companies.22 
There are four main employers’ organisations in the trade sector and retail: (i) 
Confcommercio; (ii) Confesercenti; (iii) so-called ‘cooperative distribution’; and (iv) 
Federdistribuzione,23 representing ‘modern distribution companies’. 
20. According to trade union data, from 2008 to 2014 Filcams, Fisascat and Uitucs taken together increased their 
membership from about 674,426 to 900,993 (+33.6 per cent). Fiom, Fim and Uilm together increased from 
654,237 to 655,781 members (+0.2 per cent).
21. According to Visser (2015) union density in Italy was 37.3 per cent in 2013. It is still growing. According to our 
calculations based on Italian union data and Istat data, in 2014 union density in Italy reached 37.7 per cent.
22. According to union data, in 2014 almost 900,000 workers were members of Filcams, Fisascat or Uiltucs. 
According to Istat data, in 2014 about 2,800,000 workers 15–64 years of age were employed in the trade sector 
(G), and in hotels and restaurants (I). For this reason union density in trade, hotel and restaurant sectors 
(g-i) in 2014 cannot be higher than 32.1 per cent. This is an overestimation, since we do not know how many 
workers, who are union members, are working in other sectors (for instance, as cleaners).
23. Federdistribuzione is an umbrella association of ¿ ve further associations: (i) ADA, Associazione Distributori 
associate; (ii) ADIS, Associazione Distribuzione Ingrosso e self-services; (iii) AIRAI, Associazioni Imprese 
Table 4 Number of enterprises in the trade sector, in Italy (G) by employment size, 2008/2014
2008 2014 
Total ﬁ rms in trade 
sector (G)
 1,215,042  100%  1,123,134  100%
0–1 person employed  698,061  57%  658,581  59%
2–9  476,193  39%  428,050  38%
Total 0–9  1,174,254  96%  1,086,631  97%
10–49  37,530  3%  33,508  3%
50 or more  3,258  0%  2,995  0%
Source: Eurostat. Annual detailed enterprise statistics for trade (NACE Rev. 2 G).
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Confcommercio declares that it has more than 700,000 aɤ  liated ¿ rms and almost 2.7 
million employees; Confesercenti claims to represent around 350,000 SMEs with more 
than 1,000,000 employees. According to the last Federdistribuzione data, they represent 
about 200 large companies and multinationals (such as Carrefour, Auchan, Esselunga, 
Ikea and so on), with more than 220,000 employees. The problem is that every employer 
association collects and spread its own data. There does not exist, as in the French case, 
a law that establishes the criteria to follow to measure the representativeness not only 
of trade union but also of employer organisations.
Until 2011, Federdistribuzione was part of Confcommercio; in 2012, they split. An 
inÀ uential trade unionist underlined that 
‘the split of Federdistribuzione from Confcommercio occurred after or is somehow 
linked to Law Decree 201/2011 on liberalisation. Confcommercio has its critics 
… Federdistribuzione instead supported liberalisation. This means not only the 
possibility of keeping shops open 24 hours a day but also the possibility of opening 
new outlets by loosening the criteria established by regions and provinces.’ 
(Gabrielli, Filcams CGIL General Secretary)
Retailers Alimentare; (iv) ANCIDIS, Associazione Nazionale Commercio Imprenditoriale al Dettaglio e Imprese 
Specializzate Non Food; and (v) Federdistribuzione Franchising.
Table 5 Workers in the trade sector, Italy, 2008–2014
2008 2014 2008/2014 
Total working in 
sector 
 3,557,898  3,302,311  -255,587  -7%
Number of employees  1,985,710  1,941,454  -44,256  -2%
Number of full-time 
equivalent employees 
 1,699,626  1,502,830  -196,796  -12%
Source: Eurostat. Annual detailed enterprise statistics for trade (NACE Rev. 2 G).
Table 6 Workers in the retail sector, Italy, 2008–2014
2008 2014 2008/2014 
Total working in 
sector 
 1,911,419  1,819,749  -91,670  -5%
Number of employees  1,019,525  1,035,752  16,227  2%
Number of full-time 
equivalent employees 
 851,303  762,723  -88,580  -10%
Source: Eurostat. Annual detailed enterprise statistics for trade (NACE Rev. 2 G).
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Such employer segmentation aɣ ects the number of national collective agreements in 
the trade sector. The following are the main agreements signed (or under negotiation) 
by Filcams CGIL, Fisascat CISL and Uiltucs:
– The national collective agreement for Tertiary, Distribution and Services (TDS) 
with Confcommercio, last renewed in March 2015 (it will expire on December 2017).
– The national collective agreement signed with Confesercenti, renewed in July 2016.
– The national collective agreement in cooperative distribution (expired in 2013).
– Ongoing negotiation for ¿ rst national agreement with Federdistribuzione.
The national agreement with Confcommercio, last renewed in March 2015, expired in 
December 2017. This was the ¿ rst one signed jointly by all three most representative 
unions CGIL, CISL and UIL, since Filcmas CGIL refused to sign the previous two, in 
2008 and 2011. According to Uiltucs data, it covers about 1.2 million workers. 
The national collective agreement signed with Confesercenti in July 2016 is quite similar 
to the Confcommercio national agreement. One novelty is the possibility to adopt a new 
type of ‘temporary contract’. This agreement allows companies located in tourist places 
derogations on the limits set by national collective bargaining. According to Uiltucs, it 
cover about 50,000 workers.
‘From a normative and economic point of view, national agreements in the 
trade sector (with Confcommercio and Confesercenti) are essentially identical. 
Furthermore, each collective agreement has its own bilateral and autonomous 
system.’ (Gabrielli, Filcams-CGIL General Secretary)
The national collective agreement in cooperative distribution expired in 2013 
and negotiations are still ongoing.24 Unions in the past were able to exchange more 
favourable waging conditions and career development in exchange for labour cost cuts. 
Cooperative work in Italy can take advantage of the statutory public tax credit to foster 
the development of cooperative work.
‘Compared with the agreements with Confcommercio and Confesercenti, the 
national agreement for cooperative distribution has slightly higher wages, as it 
establishes better career paths for workers.’ (M.G. Gabrielli, Filcams CGIL General 
Secretary) 
Nevertheless, negotiations to renew this national agreement are still under way. 
According to the Uiltucs national secretary, this national agreement will cover about 
80,000 workers.
‘In recent years cooperative distribution has pushed for reductions in wages and 
labor costs in order to be more competitive than other private (and non-coop) 
¿ rms.’ (Marroni and Uiltucs National Secretary)
24. The three national associations still negotiating the renewal are: ANCC Coop, the National Association of 
Consumer Coop; Confcooperative; and Agci Agrital.
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Also still open are the negotiations on the national agreement with Federdistribuzione, 
which covers about 220,000 employees. The situation is now fraught, due to a halt in 
negotiations. In the words of an oɤ  cial of Filcams CGIL: 
‘At the beginning, there were diɣ erent approaches. Fisascat CISL was more inclined 
to negotiate with Federdistribuzione, while Uiltucs was more hostile because of its 
historically stronger relationships with Confcommercio. We, CGIL, have opened 
a negotiation in a coordinated way by presenting a unique platform (with equal 
wage increases) for all the employers’ organisations, namely Confcommercio, 
Confesercenti, cooperative distribution and Federdistribuzione.’
5.2.4 Decentralised collective bargaining in the trade sector
In November 2016, Confcommercio signed an inter-confederal agreement with 
CGIL, CISL and UIL in order to establish a new system of industrial relations. This 
agreement refers to a previous text on representativeness, signed on November 2015, 
in which Confcommercio underlined its willingness to measure the representativeness 
of the employers’ organisations. This issue, together with an incomplete process for 
measuring trade union organisation is a major issue for the Italian system of industrial 
relations. 
This agreement is similar to (and followed) those signed by Con¿ ndustria on collective 
bargaining and representativeness (see above). In this text, the social partners reiterate 
the importance of a multi-level system of collective bargaining, at national and 
decentralised level. The national agreement remains the cornerstone of the system, in 
order to guarantee equal wages to all workers in the sector. 
Instead, it is possible to bargain territorial or company agreements by derogating 
from the national one only in speci¿ c conditions, explicitly established in the national 
collective agreement’s guidelines. (For instance, in order to foster employment growth, 
good working conditions and quality of work or to deal with an economic crisis.) The 
agreement aims at enhancing collective bargaining not only at company level but also 
at the territorial one in order to ¿ nd the most appropriate solutions to the needs of 
companies of diɣ erent sizes and to improve productivity. It is important to stress the 
usual size of ¿ rms in the trade sector: more than 1 million ¿ rms (almost 97 per cent of 
all enterprises in the sector) had fewer than 10 employees in 2014 (Eurostat 2016).
Derogating from the national agreement is possible only in four speci¿ ed cases: 
(i)   in the event of a serious economic crisis; 
(ii)   in order to bolster employment; 
(iii)  to support development; and 
(iv)  to attract new investment (with particular regard to southern Italy). 
However, according to the national secretary of Uiltucs-UIL, these clauses have never 
been used. The only exception was in 2008, when derogation clauses were used to 
tackle the emergence of illegal work, especially in the south of Italy.
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Regarding the retail sector, in recent years the economic crisis has reduced the level 
and quality of decentralised collective bargaining. Especially in the retail sector, several 
large distribution ¿ rms have cancelled their company agreements. The situation 
described by a trade union oɤ  cial is not easy. ‘We tried to renew company agreements, 
but [...] on one hand there are very old contracts in the drawer, which nobody wants to 
question. Some have ¿ xed wages, or particularly favourable terms. On the other hand, 
some contracts were signed during the economic crisis. It was very hard to renew them. 
We renewed only a few company agreements and they were all concessional’ (National 
secretary of Uiltucs-UIL).
5.2.5 Changes with regard to wages, working conditions and welfare in the trade sector
Regarding wages and labour costs, the Confcommercio national agreement establishes 
the so-called ‘economic guarantee element’. The ‘economic guarantee element’ 
was introduced in the national collective agreement in 2011 and is an additional 
sum (ranging from 60 to 105 euros) that ¿ rms have to pay to their employees if a 
decentralised agreement cannot be reached. Firms with fewer than 30 employees (the 
majority in this sector) can chose to ¿ x variable pay through a territorial agreement, or 
have to apply the ‘economic guarantee element’. On the other hand, ¿ rms with more 
than 30 employees can establish variable pay through company or territorial collective 
agreements. Otherwise, they have to apply the ‘economic guarantee element’. Workers 
will receive the next ‘economic guarantee element’ at the end of November 2017. 
‘It is important to note that in 2011 this sum was higher (from 85 to 140 euros)’ (Marroni, 
Uiltucs-UIL national secretary). The national agreement also established a guideline in 
order to determine the conditions under which it is possible, at territorial or company 
level, to derogate from national agreements. For instance, it is possible in tourist places 
to employ more ‘¿ xed term contract’ workers rather than the percentage ¿ xed by the 
national agreement. Another possibility is to bargain territorial or company agreements 
to increase À exible working time.
In 2015, the hourly minimum wage in the trade sector was about 8.43 euros/hour. 
This is lower than the average of all sectors (about 9.41 euros/hour) (Garnero 2017). 
Other scholars who have examined minimum wages established in the National Trade 
Agreement con¿ rm these data.25 
Signi¿ cant changes that have spilled over to aɣ ect workers include increases in 
involuntary part-time work and temporary contracts, as well as a substantial increase 
in the use of vouchers (in particular in tourism). The use of involuntary part-time 
employment increased from 43 per cent in 2008 to 71 per cent in 2015.26 
The issue of welfare – at both national and company level – is becoming more important. 
Managed through a multi-level system of bilateral bodies and funds, this kind of 
25. According to Garnero (2017) the hourly minimum wage in the manufacturing sector is about 9.47 euros/hour 
and – in contrast to the trade sector – ranges from 7.66 to 11.03 euros/hour. Birindelli (2017), by contrast, 
underlines the existing range in the trade sector between non-¿ xed term workers (8.3 euros/hour) and ¿ xed 
term workers (10.1 euros/hour).
26. Trade union data. They explain this increase as a way to save jobs by avoiding layoɣ s.
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‘bilateral or collective agreement–based welfare’ includes complementary pension 
schemes, integrative health insurance, income bene¿ ts, vocational training and other 
‘À exible bene¿ ts’ paid for by joint contributions of enterprises and workers (especially 
supplementary pension schemes and health care). 
The most important inter-professional fund for lifelong learning in the sector is ‘For.
Te’. A substantial number of small, medium-sized and large companies (operating in 
trade, tourism, services, logistics, shipping and transport) have chosen it. 
A tax concession was introduced to improve welfare measures, collectively bargained, 
not only at decentralised level but (since the end of 2016) also at national level.
According to the president of Confcommercio, Carlo Sangalli: 
‘Over a long period we were able to build a huge integrative welfare system, which 
covers millions of workers, via national bargaining. It’s an instrument of social 
justice, isn’t it? Supported by adequate incentives these instruments are able 
to guarantee a second welfare pillar … in a more mature way, in other European 
countries.’ (Oɤ  cial speech at annual national meeting of Confcommercio, 8 June 
2017, Rome)
Considering the signi¿ cant and growing volume of ¿ nancial resources and aims, the 
issue of transparent governance is fairly crucial. The aim of the social partners is to 
reduce the number of bilateral funds in order to increase the number of recipients and 
to make the services more eɤ  cient and appropriate to newly emerging needs.
5.2.6 Critical issues and perspectives 
The most critical and sensitive issue in the sector is the uncontrolled spread of national 
agreements (labelled ‘pirate’ agreements), signed by a growing number of new unions 
and employers’ organisations. The poorly institutionalised industrial relations system, 
based on social partner autonomy and voluntarism, is seriously compromised by the 
lack of a clear rule on representativeness. The risk is that wild cost competition and 
contractual dumping will be fostered, not only between workers, but also between ¿ rms.
Employers who are not aɤ  liated to any association are free to choose which national 
collective agreement to apply (comparing their costs and advantages), or otherwise to 
sign a new national agreement with a preferred union.
The Confcommercio or Confesercenti national agreement, but also the CISAL 
agreement, may be more advantageous for employers. This issue is crucial for the most 
representative unions. As underlined by the general secretary of Filcams-CGIL: 
‘There is no system that imposes a minimum wage that can be considered binding 
erga omnes! An employer association can say that it represents 1 million ¿ rms 
but no one can checks it. CNEL (the relevant public authority) does not have a 
strong enough legislative architecture to verify whether the terms of an agreement 
constitute dumping.’ 
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Moreover, the options for further derogations available to an employer opting for a 
‘pirate’ national agreement will be much wider than in the case of the most representative 
national agreements.
There is a strong link between the issue of measuring social partner representativeness 
and the contents and quality of the decentralisation bargaining process. In January 
2016 the three confederal trade union asked for legislative measures:
‘If we want to build an innovative and certain system of rules, it would be a major 
step forward to take what we have already designed in the framework agreements 
and to implement it in a law.’ (Filcams-CGIL general secretary) 
Confcommercio is aware of the risk of wild competition and dumping. President Carlo 
Sangalli, in his oɤ  cial speech at the most recent Confcommercio conference (8 June 
2017) said:
‘We, at Confcommercio, are available to immediately verify our representativeness. 
It is an important factor in real economic democracy. We have underlined this belief 
also in the ‘reformist practice’ of the agreement on the contractual model, which 
we signed last November with CGIL, CISL and UIL. National collective bargaining 
agreements obviously aɣ ect diɣ erent partners diɣ erently. Nevertheless, they are 
‘social capital’ for everyone.’
Finally, tax incentives introduced by the government to enhance productivity and 
increase competitiveness through collective agreements at company or territorial level, 
represent another challenge. In the trade sector, the problem is which criteria to adopt 
in order to measure productivity or quality improvements at territorial level, because 
more than 1 million ¿ rms have fewer than 10 employees.
6.  The strategies of the social partners
What do the social partners think about the new reformed system of collective bargaining 
and wage setting? What are their aims?
As far as the employers’ associations are concerned, there is no money for wage increases, 
as the wage rises they gave were higher than expected real inÀ ation. Early in 2015, a 
bombshell was dropped at the opening of the bargaining session in the chemical sector 
by the employers, who demanded the restitution of 79 euros on the grounds that real 
inÀ ation in the previous three-year period had been lower than forecast. In the end, an 
agreement was reached, but the situation remains uncertain and confused. Employers 
claim that no provisional indicator should be taken into consideration, all forms of 
automatism should be abrogated and only real, not forecast inÀ ation should be taken 
into account. This applies particularly in the metal sector, in which the largest and most 
inÀ uential employers’ association, Federmeccanica, issued a position paper entitled 
‘Contractual Renewal’ in 2015. One of its key assumptions is that, at the present time, 
‘nothing can be taken for granted’. The rules of collective bargaining must be rewritten. 
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‘Our sector is no longer able to bear wage increases, which should be delinked from 
real company results because otherwise such increases would provoke a further 
loss of competitiveness and/or reduction of pro¿ t margins. ... Wage rises are 
possible only where gains are registered, that is, at the company level, and must be 
strictly correlated with objective parameters of the pro¿ tability and productivity of 
individual ¿ rms.’
Beside variable wages, occupational welfare at company or territorial level plays a key 
role. Employers are willing to accept higher payments and vouchers for company health 
insurance, training and supplementary pensions. On this basis, the national sectoral 
agreement would maintain only a residual role of ¿ xing a ‘guaranteed wage’ for workers 
not covered by any other decentralised performance-related wage increase. Its amount 
is de¿ ned every year, ex post – after the ISTAT data on the previous year – and not ex 
ante, as was previously the case, based on the anticipated inÀ ation rate. Some of these 
claims were adopted in the most recent sectoral agreements, signed at the end of 2016 
and approved by workers in a referendum (see the sectoral section of this chapter for an 
insight into the last sectoral collective agreement signed in December 2016). The metal 
workers unions agreed to some of these proposals, such as those concerning a new 
approach to contractual welfare and training, but rejected the substantial abandonment 
of the role of the national collective agreement, in consideration of the fact that wage 
increases would now refer to a mere 5 per cent of the sectoral workforce, which are now 
uncovered by any other proximity increment. 
Trade union confederations, as a whole, are fairly united in rejecting this approach, 
considering wage bargaining a matter of fairness, not to mention a key tool for boosting 
demand and production. The renewal of the numerous expired national agreements is a 
priority, starting with the large public sector, with its three million employees, in which 
wage bargaining has not occurred for the past six years. 
On 14 January 2016, CGIL, CISL and UIL signed an inter-confederation agreement 
entitled A modern system of industrial relations for economic development based 
on innovation and quality of work. The new strategy is focused on three pillars, with 
new rules on collective bargaining, participation and representation.27 As for the latter, 
the three confederations stress the importance of a more inclusive model of collective 
bargaining,28 still two-tier with primacy going to the national level. A wage expansion 
policy is required that could herald sustainable wage-driven growth. Wage increases 
beyond merely conserving purchasing power would act as an indispensable driver of 
consumption and domestic demand. The economic conditions considered relevant for 
27. Among the topics covered by collective bargaining, the agreement stresses the importance of active policies 
to enhance training and lifelong learning for workers, À exibility of employment relations, management of 
company crises, sub-contracting, bilateralism, bargained welfare plans and wage policies.
28. Representing and extending legal and social protections to young, atypical and also migrant workers is today 
considered an absolute priority, in terms of both speci¿ c campaigns and mobilisation, but also – as in the 
case of CGIL’s programme – more inclusive collective bargaining with regard to their needs and conditions. A 
national petition for new Charter of Universal Labour Rights was launched by CGIL in April 2016, gathering 
signatures all over the country, with the side request of a referendum on abrogating the legal provisions of the 
Jobs Act (Renzi’s labour market reform), whose more unfair outcomes include mini-jobs paid with vouchers 
worth 10 euros gross and the fact that instances of job reinstatement in cases of unfair dismissal have become 
few and far between.
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economic policy will no longer be con¿ ned to the recovery of purchasing power, which 
has become marginal due to deÀ ation, but will include macroeconomic variables such 
as industry output or average productivity.
7.  The challenge of the ‘Jobs Act’ and ﬁ scal incentives for 
 ﬁ rm-level bargaining
A layering of heteronymous regulatory interventions intersects with the collective 
autonomy of the negotiating tables open around the reform and the relationship 
between the bargaining system, productivity and innovation, wage dynamic and welfare 
reform. 
The impact of Renzi’s labour market reform (the so-called Jobs Act) on collective 
bargaining has been substantial. In order to deviate from legal and common standards, 
the current government no longer delegates to collective bargaining, as was the case, 
for example, with the controversial Article 8 of Law no. 148/2011. Now it is the law that 
directly governs the most sensitive issues (Nunin 2016; Gottardi 2016), imposing ever 
worsening deregulation. It is as if the lawmaker no longer trusts the willingness of the 
social partners to negotiate the reforms needed to increase competiveness through more 
À exibility. This does not mean that collective bargaining has been side-lined completely; 
on the contrary, the number of referrals and delegations to collective bargaining are 
fairly numerous and aɣ ect sensitive issues, such as atypical contracts. But its role is quite 
strictly pre-conditioned by the purpose of introducing further À exibility in employment 
contracts and working conditions, in response to employer pressures (Nunin 2016). Not 
only that, but in order to clarify the notion of ‘collective agreement’, the law refers to 
the ‘national, territorial and company levels’ (Art. 51, Legislative Decree No. 81/2015) 
indiscriminately, without any hierarchy being determined (Zoppoli 2016). In order to 
prevent contractual dumping, the law prescribes that delegated agreements must be 
agreed by comparatively the most representative trade union association, at national 
level, and by ‘their representatives’ or by the RSU at workplace level.
For some commentators, this type of legal intervention is qualitatively more per¿ dious 
even than the already much criticised Article 8. In the new system, in fact, contractual 
derogations are no longer conditional on any ¿ nal outcome, while their stipulation in 
agreements is not subject to the majority principle (Pizzoferrato 2015; Zoppoli 2015). 
In response to this the unions came to demand safeguarding clauses during the 
negotiations in order to halt or hedge against some of the most corrosive changes 
contained in the new legislation. A bitterly disappointed CGIL oɤ  cer sums up the 
situation in this way: ‘I’ve spent my life negotiating the enforcement of the law and now 
I ¿ nd myself having to negotiate against the law, or act as if it didn’t exist.’ 
Besides this the legislator uses another lever, namely ¿ scal measures and incentives. It 
is not the ¿ rst time that it has done this, because in 2012 – through another tripartite 
framework agreement (again not signed by CGIL) – the government and the social 
partners tried to enhance productivity by reducing the tax burden on wage increases. 
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With the Stability Law 2016 (no. 208/2015) and the following decree of 25 March 
2016, the social partners are encouraged to negotiate decentralised agreements aimed 
at improving performance through decentralised collective agreements. Collectively 
agreed productivity-related wage increases (also in the form of employee share options) 
are subject to lower taxation of just 10 per cent, up to maximum of 2,000 euros (up to 
2,500 for companies adopting forms of employees involvement), for employees who 
do not earn more than 50,000 euro gross per year. For 2017, this double ceiling was 
raised to 3,000 euros for the premium (4,000 euros for companies adopting forms of 
employee involvement), and to 80,000 for maximum income.
In order to bene¿ t from such a productivity premium, there have to be real 
improvements in terms of productivity, pro¿ tability, quality and innovation, resulting 
directly from company or territorial collective agreements. They have to de¿ ne 
objectives and parameters in detail. If enterprises want to bene¿ t from such tax 
concessions, improvements have to be real and measurable (production volumes, 
quality improvement of goods and processes, reorganisation of working time and 
smart working, employee involvement and direct participation in work organisation). 
Evaluating joint committees, formed by signatory social partners at the territorial level, 
will verify that employees will receive communications from their employers concerning 
the premium and its correct application.
As an alternative to monetary bonuses, individual employees can opt – entirely or partly 
– for welfare and service bene¿ ts, listed in speci¿ c plans by collective agreements at 
territorial or company level, including such items as education, training, wellbeing and 
assistance for family members, including children, and elderly and dependent persons. 
The trade union confederations have reacted overall to such measures with a certain 
degree of openness, considering this challenge as a great opportunity to relaunch 
collective bargaining in terms of coverage and contents. An inter-confederate agreement 
was signed by CGIL, CISL, UIL and Con¿ ndustria on 14 July 2016; it aims to extend the 
new tax lowering measures to companies where workplace representations have not 
been set up. These documents de¿ ne a template of territorial agreements, to be used 
in all companies aɤ  liated to employers branch federations, apart from works councils. 
By August 2017, 25,000 had already been signed and registered; more than 80 per cent 
have been signed at company level, and concern productivity, pro¿ tability and quality. 
Approximately 5,000 documents concern welfare bene¿ ts.
At least three kinds of risk have been highlighted by scholars and trade unionists: (1) 
employers might opt for less costly increases in the productivity premium and welfare 
bene¿ ts, which is much more convenient than the fully taxed increases in sectoral 
agreements (2) as the employees are free to choose between wage increases and welfare 
bene¿ ts, with the latter exempted from social security contributions, there could be a 
weakening of both welfare state and collective bargaining, which are increasingly being 
eroded by the individualisation of schemes and options; (3) most of these agreements 
seem to be nothing but ‘copy and paste’ templates, piled up on the desks of the competent 
public oɤ  ces in charge of the diɤ  cult tasks of monitoring and authorisation.
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8.  Final remarks 
It is now time, in conclusion, to attempt some answers to our three opening questions 
about the main challenges that are changing the Italian industrial relations landscape.
First, the decline of neo-corporatist practices, which dominated industrial relations 
for 15 years between 1992 and 2007. Since then, with the excuse oɣ ered by the crisis 
and the diktats imposed by the EU, the new political powers-that-be have interpreted 
government as a combination of technocracy and neo-populism, in which there is 
no place for intermediate bodies and their ‘tired rituals’. Following the eclipse of the 
historical major parties and their partial absorption by the ‘Blairite’ new Democratic 
Party, trade unions ¿ nd themselves lacking a reliable partner and potential support 
in the political arena. This is something that the unions will probably have to cope 
with for the next few years, forcing them to reduce their engagement in macro-policy 
and tripartite concertation, refocusing their role and initiative in the classical areas of 
industrial relations: collective bargaining, involvement and participation, industrial 
conÀ ict and campaigning. 
A second main issue, consequently, concerns the current relationship between legislation 
and collective autonomy. The traditional voluntarism of Italian industrial relations, 
quite peculiar today in comparative terms, seems to us to have reached a dead-end 
(Leonardi and Sanna 2015). The landscape is at best chaotic and without clearly de¿ ned 
rules governing representation, with an increasing risk of wage dumping and downward 
competition. The choice once more for a voluntarist solution, as in the case of the new 
rules on representation and collective bargaining, has prevented the most recent inter-
confederate agreements from acquiring the universal and binding characteristics 
indispensable for their eɣ ectiveness. A new public interventionism in the whole area of 
industrial relations (representation, collective bargaining, participation, conÀ ict) would 
be opportune and many commentators, who in the past were sceptical in this regard, 
are now more or less in favour (Caruso 2014; Treu 2016; Gottardi 2016; Carrieri 2017). 
The problem is the kind of interventionism we can expect today, between the external 
pressures of globalisation and the internal weaknesses of the national economy and 
policy. The government no longer seems to operate as a third super-partes player, or in 
support of labour, as it did at the peak of post-war social policy, but on the contrary it 
enters the game overtly on the side of business, its needs and expectations (Guarriello 
2014; Bellardi 2016).29 Paradoxically, such new and critical legislation is likely to tempt 
the unions to call for derogations from it (Art. 8) rather than the employers.
A debate on the need for a speci¿ c law is on the cards and a number of bills are in the 
pipeline in parliament. The government may intervene in a whole range of industrial 
relations issues, after asking the social partners to express common positions, which 
at the moment are still lacking. One possible way, suggested by several commenters, 
could be to transpose into law what the social partners agree on, within the framework 
29. As has been stated, as a result of the unprecedented subordination of workers’ rights to economic 
considerations labour law is changing its traditional paradigm, shifting the balance of power from the rights of 
the weaker party to the rights of the stronger (Mariucci 2016).
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of auxiliary legislation, but there is resistance in some quarters in political parties and 
trade union confederations. The three main trade unions, with the document signed 
in January 2016, proposed to confer an erga omnes binding eɣ ect on industry-wide 
agreements, as foreseen in Article 39 of the Constitution. The choice is then to opt for 
an extension mechanism, in place of what is considered risky by the unions, namely the 
adoption of a statutory minimum wage.
A third and ¿ nal issue, linked to the former, concerns the new structure of collective 
bargaining. Our conclusion here is that, despite the strong pressure from above (New 
European Economic Governance) and from below (¿ rms’ exit strategies), the Italian 
system has maintained a certain degree of inter-sectoral coordination. The two 
traditional levels remain in place and, although weakened, neither has expressed a 
wish to abolish the role and primacy of the national sectoral agreement. Meanwhile, 
and importantly, relations between the three main trade union confederations, which 
deteriorated during the ¿ rst decade of the new century, have improved substantially. 
Having said that, many serious criticisms have been raised. Some refer speci¿ cally to 
the national and sectoral levels. For example, the number of agreements should have 
been reduced drastically and instead it has doubled in just a few years, from fewer 
than 400 in 2008 to over 800 in 2017, with a proliferation of agreements signed by 
associations of very uncertain and sometimes completely unknown representativeness. 
This means that the whole system is getting out of control. There is an evident problem 
with the legitimacy of the signatory actors, for example, in terms of transparency. In 
the absence of binding rules governing competitive pluralism, there is always a risk that 
the situation may descend into chaos, with the parties seeking judicial redress. This is 
not a problem only on the trade union side, but also – and perhaps even more serious 
– on the employers’ side, with regard to which information is almost entirely lacking. 
Someone have proposed the introduction of legislation along the lines of what is found 
in France in this regard. From this viewpoint – and this is one of the key assumptions 
of our study – the major threat to the system seems to come from the top, in terms 
of contractual dumping (Gottardi 2016), rather than from below, where derogations 
seem to be relatively under control. Firm-level agreements as an alternative to the ¿ rst 
sectoral level, have remained limited to the sole case of FIAT/FCA (ADAPT 2017).
However, the periods requested for renewals are, on average, intolerably protracted. 
Millions of workers must sometimes wait a one year or two for a renewal of their 
collective agreement, after it has expired. The stagnation of Italian wages in recent years 
is also a reÀ ection of such dysfunction. 
Furthermore, the recovery of wages’ purchasing power, a pillar of the system when Italy 
boasted exceptionally high inÀ ation, should not be the sole parameter in a period of 
deÀ ation. Other macroeconomic variables, national and speci¿ cally sectoral, must be 
introduced as benchmarks in negotiations; sectoral average productivity, for instance. 
At the same time, due to various impulses and pressures, company-level bargaining 
has certainly been boosted. This has been possible ‘qualitatively’, by (a) reducing 
some exclusive prerogatives of industry-wide agreements, (b) weakening the role of 
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external unions in coordination and (c) expanding the possibility for opening clauses 
and concession bargaining (Bellardi 2016), but in quantitative terms, it has not taken 
oɣ . The main reason, as we have seen, is the average size of Italian ¿ rms: they tend 
to be too small and unprepared to meet such a challenge, not to mention the ongoing 
crisis. Company bargaining would require speci¿ c expertise among the managerial staɣ  
that is usually missing, while works councils would have to be set up, with the risk of 
introducing unprecedented and confrontational industrial relations where they did not 
exist before. On this basis, we can talk of collective bargaining decentralisation without 
decentralised agreements in Italy. In the absence of ¿ rm-level collective agreements, 
productivity and wages increases are decided by employers on an individual and 
discretionary basis. 
In light of all this we should highlight: (i) the value of industry-wide bargaining as 
a fundamental and indispensable tool against inter-¿ rm cut-throat competition, 
enhancing the ‘high-road’ and socially sustainable competition, based on wage-driven 
growth of domestic demand; (ii) the importance of vertical and horizontal articulation 
or coordination of collective bargaining as a key condition for eɣ ective industrial 
relations. We should be able to ¿ gure out possible new collective-agreement units at an 
intermediate level between national sectors and ¿ rms; for instance, at the territorial level 
– as already fruitfully experienced in sectors and branches with a high concentration of 
small ¿ rms and casual work – or along the new value chains, including inter-sector site 
agreements, as proposed by some unions in the case of construction or big shopping 
malls and trade centres.
In our view, we should not undervalue the importance and utility of broader and stronger 
collective bargaining at decentralised level, with a new focus on substantive innovation. 
In an era of world-class manufacturing, digitalisation and Industry 4.0, alongside a 
shrinking and recasting of the welfare state, the social partners should update their 
negotiating repertoire. For a country such as Italy, this means in particular signi¿ cantly 
to improve employee involvement in work organisation in order to foster a consensual 
approach to process and product innovation. It is therefore necessary to invest more 
and more resources and capacity in vocational training and participatory models. But 
the new needs of employees with regard to work–life reconciliation, individual and 
collective services, well-being at work and eɣ orts to tackle new forms of work-related 
stress are also important. A more inclusive collective bargaining is also needed, capable 
of representing the interests of the atypical and vulnerable workers involved in new 
production processes.
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Chapter 7
Strengthening the decentralisation of collective 
bargaining in Spain 
Between the legal changes and real developments
Fernando Rocha  
1. Introduction
Controversy about the adequacy of the structure of collective bargaining to the changes 
in the economic cycle in Spain is not certainly new. In fact, it can be traced back to 
the early 1990s (Cruz 2015; Fernández et al. 2016). However, this debate has gained 
momentum since the onset of the Great Recession in 2008. The renewed interest in 
this topic can be explained by the larger scale of the impact of the current crisis in 
Spain compared with other European countries, especially in terms of employment. The 
most important consequence of this shock was the sharp rise in the unemployment rate, 
which still remains at dramatic levels: 18.6 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2016, the 
second highest in the European Union (EU), after Greece.1  
According to the mainstream narrative adhered to by various international institutions, 
the current Spanish government, the national employers’ organisations and a number 
of scholars, the crisis hit Spain particularly hard for two main reasons: on one hand, 
the ¿ scal imbalances caused by the high public de¿ cit and high external debt, which led 
to the sovereign debt crisis; and on the other hand, the Spanish economy’s historical 
competitiveness problems, closely linked to domestic structural imbalances, especially 
in the labour market. In short, it has been argued that the legal regulations in Spain are 
highly ‘protective’ compared with international standards, particularly with regard to 
employment protection and collective bargaining. In this sense, it has been emphasised 
that the combination of these characteristics led to excessive rigidity of wage dynamics 
as against the change in the economic cycle, because at a time of heavy reductions 
in employment, wages in already settled contracts were unable to adjust downward, 
possibly leading ¿ rms to lay workers oɣ  (Díaz and Villanueva 2014). 
The main political conclusion according to this line of argument was the need for a 
substantial overhaul of the collective bargaining system, aimed at fostering radical 
decentralisation at company level. The goal would be to increase ¿ rms’ internal 
À exibility, thereby facilitating adjustments in wages and working conditions as a way of 
boosting their competitiveness and productivity.
Alternatively, it has been argued that the larger scale of the crisis in Spain is not rooted 
in labour rigidities, but in the weaknesses of the economic growth model consolidated 
since the mid-1990s. This model was characterised strongly by overheated speculative 
1. Eurostat (population 15-74 years, fourth quarter of 2016).
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development in the real estate and building sector, which made it extremely vulnerable 
to economic cycle changes, aggravating their negative eɣ ects in terms of job losses 
(Banyuls and Recio 2015). 
It should be noted that fostering the decentralisation of collective bargaining has been 
a sort of ‘À agship policy’ of ‘New European Economic Governance’, launched in 2010, 
which has promoted a new supra-interventionism in industrial relations (Schulten and 
Müller 2013).
The labour law reforms adopted by various European governments, following EU 
recommendations, have substantially altered the collective bargaining landscape in 
the EU (particularly in the southern countries subjected to external intervention). 
Comparative analysis shows that the enacted measures have targeted not only bargaining 
outcomes, by putting direct pressure on wages, but also bargaining procedures by 
pushing more ‘À exible’ wage-setting arrangements (Schömann and Clauwaert 2012; 
Rocha 2014a; Van Gyes and Schulten 2015; Visser 2016; Piasna and Myant 2017).
More speci¿ cally, substantial legal changes aimed at reinforcing the decentralisation 
of collective bargaining systems have been imposed in various peripheral countries of 
the European Union, leading to a process that has been de¿ ned as a ‘frontal assault on 
multi-employer bargaining systems prevailing in those countries’ (Marginson 2014).
In Spain, labour law has been subject to continuous and intense modi¿ cation since 
2010. The adopted reforms are diverse in both character and scope, but one common 
goal has been to foster collective bargaining at company level. It is worth highlighting 
the legal reform unilaterally enforced by Spain’s conservative government in 2012, 
which no doubt represents a landmark in labour law regulation.
Against this background, the main goal of this chapter is to analyse the decentralisation 
of collective bargaining in Spain since the onset of the current crisis, with particular 
emphasis on the contents and eɣ ects of the labour law reforms approved during this 
period.
This topic has already been addressed in various reports, which have focused in the 
initial impact of labour law changes on collective bargaining developments (Rocha 
2014b; Cruces et al. 2015; Fernández et al. 2016). The time that has passed since the 
approval of the most important reform – in 2012 – allows us, however, to deepen and 
¿ nesse our analysis (in both quantitative and qualitative terms).
The present chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 addresses the regulation of the 
collective bargaining system in Spain. Section 3 analyses some of the main impacts of 
these legal reforms on collective bargaining developments. This general overview is 
complemented with a more detailed analysis of two sectors: retail, with special focus in 
the large distribution; and the metal industry. The report ends with a summary of the 
main ¿ ndings and some conclusions for the debate.
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2.  Labour law reforms in times of crisis
Collective bargaining in Spain has experienced intense development from the restoration 
of democracy with the approval of the Spanish constitution in 1978 until the onset of the 
Great Recession. This is shown by the progressive extension of collective agreements 
and worker coverage, as well as by the increasing number of topics addressed by the 
social partners.
Nevertheless, in parallel with this, a common assertion in the industrial relations debate 
is that some key features of the national collective bargaining system have remained 
unchanged, such as (i) the prevalence of an intermediate degree of coordination, with 
collective agreements being signed predominantly at the industry level, though with 
some geographical decentralisation (mostly at the provincial level); (ii) the erga omnes 
extension of collective bargaining agreements, meaning that they automatically apply to 
all workers and ¿ rms within their scope; and (iii) the wage indexation rules frequently 
established by collective agreements, both sectoral and company-level (Cruz 2015).
These characteristics of the national collective bargaining system were called into 
question, in a number of instances, with the onset of the crisis in 2008. The main 
criticism, as noted above, was that they created additional rigidities hindering the 
responsiveness of wages to economic and ¿ rm-speci¿ c conditions, therefore aggravating 
the most negative impacts of the crisis (Jaumotte 2011; Bentolila and Dolado 2012).
Against this background, in this section we provide an overview of the labour law 
reforms adopted in Spain during this period, with particular focus on measures related 
to the structure of collective bargaining.
2.1  Legal reforms of collective bargaining during the Great Recession
The Great Recession has had a dramatic social impact in Spain. The labour market 
eɣ ects of the crisis have been much more intense than in other European countries 
experiencing a similar economic downturn. Thus, between 2008 and 2016, 2.3 million 
jobs were lost in Spain, accounting for around 37 per cent of total job losses in the 
EU28, with a rate of change of –11.4 per cent for the whole period (the EU28 average 
was 0.5 per cent).2 
Diɣ erent governments have followed diɣ erent approaches, closely linked to changes in 
the anti-crisis policies at European level. Thus, there was a ¿ rst, brief stage characterised 
by stimulus measures on the demand side. 
This sort of approach – popularly labelled ‘Keynesian’ – ended with the turning point 
of the European Council of May 2010, which led to Spain’s Socialist government fully 
accepting a programme of budget adjustment and structural reforms with a neoliberal 
2. Eurostat (second quarters, population 15–74 years of age). In this period 6.9 million jobs were lost in the EU28 
and 7.4 million were created, with a positive net balance of 1 million.
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bent, in accordance with the speci¿ c recommendations for Spain drawn up by the EU 
institutions within the framework of the New EU Economic Governance. This line of 
action was later strengthened by the new Conservative government after the general 
election held in November 2011, which launched an aggressive and still ongoing 
programme of ‘¿ scal consolidation’ policies and ‘structural reforms’ (Rocha 2014b).
Against this background, since May 2010 labour law in Spain has been undergoing 
continuous and intensive modi¿ cation through reforms unilaterally approved by 
Spanish governments in 2010, 2011 and 2012.3 
If we focus on collective bargaining, one main goal of these reforms Ɋ particularly, those 
of 2011 and 2012 Ɋ has been to strengthen decentralisation to company level, following 
the EU recommendations for Spain in this period.
Thus, in 2011 the European Commission proposed that 
the ongoing labour market reform in Spain needs to be complemented by an 
overhaul of the current unwieldy collective bargaining system. The predominance 
of provincial and industry agreements leaves little room for negotiations at ¿ rm 
level. The automatic extension of collective agreements, the validity of non-renewed 
contracts and the use of ex-post inÀ ation indexation clauses contribute to wage-
inertia, preventing the wage À exibility needed to speed up economic adjustment 
and restore competitiveness. The Government has requested social partners to 
agree on a reform of the collective wage bargaining system during Spring 2011 and 
has undertaken to legislate subsequently. (Council of the European Union 2011: 4)
Taking this diagnosis into account, the European Commission recommended that 
Spain should ‘adopt and implement, following consultation with social partners in 
accordance [with] national practice, a reform of the collective wage bargaining process 
and the wage indexation system to ensure that wage growth better reÀ ects productivity 
developments, as well as local and ¿ rm level conditions’ (Council of the European 
Union 2011: 7). 
In this regard, after failed negotiations between the social partners on this topic, in June 
2011 the Socialist government unilaterally adopted Royal Decree Law 7/2011 on Urgent 
Measures to Reform Collective Bargaining (Real Decreto-ley 7/2011, de 10 de junio, de 
medidas urgentes para la reforma de la negociación colectiva). 
Shortly after the adoption of this reform, former presidents of the European Central 
Bank and the National Bank of Spain Jean-Claude Trichet and Miguel Fernández 
Ordoñez sent a ‘strictly con¿ dential’ letter to former Spanish prime minister José Luis 
Rodríguez Zapatero.
3. Law 35/2010 on Urgent Measures for Labour Market Reform; Royal Decree Law 7/2011 on Urgent Measures 
to Reform Collective Bargaining; Royal Decree Law 3/2012 on Urgent Measures to Reform the Labour Market; 
and Law 3/2012 on Urgent Measures to Reform the Labour Market.
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This letter, sent on 5 August 2011, argued that at the present time it was essential that 
the wage-bargaining reform bill adopted by the Spanish government on 10 June 
2011 should more eɣ ectively strengthen the role of ¿ rm-level agreements, with 
a view to ensuring an eɣ ective decentralisation of wage negotiations. During the 
forthcoming parliamentary process, the law should be amended in order to reduce 
the possibility for industry-level agreements (at national or regional level) to limit 
the applicability of ¿ rm-level agreements.4 
Later, the new Conservative government unilaterally launched a new and ‘extremely 
aggressive’5 reform of labour law through Royal Decree Law 3/2012 on Urgent 
Measures to Reform the Labour Market (Real Decreto-ley 3/2012, de 10 de febrero, 
de medidas urgentes para la reforma del mercado laboral), which was later con¿ rmed 
with no substantial modi¿ cations by the National Parliament as Law 3/2012 on Urgent 
Measures to Reform the Labour Market (Ley 3/2012, de 6 de julio, de medidas urgentes 
para la reforma del mercado laboral).
Finally, the EU recommendations for Spain on this topic between 2012 and 2016 
focused on following up the 2012 labour law reform. Overall, the results of this reform 
have been positive, according to the EU. 
Nevertheless, regarding the decentralisation of collective bargaining the European 
Commission country report published in 2016 noted that ‘moderate wage claims might 
reÀ ect a change in the wage setting environment, but there is no evidence that ¿ rm level 
collective bargaining is picking up’ (European Commission 2016: 36). This diagnosis did 
not led, however to a related proposal in the EC recommendations for Spain published 
in 2016 and 2017.
2.2 Strengthening the decentralisation of collective bargaining
One goal of Royal Decree Law 7/2011 on Urgent Measures to Reform Collective 
Bargaining was to ‘promote better management of collective bargaining, while 
encouraging collective bargaining closer to the company [level] and better matching 
of sectoral collective bargaining to the situation of each particular sector of economic 
activity.’
In sum, two innovations in particular are worth highlighting with regard to 
decentralisation:
(i)  A change in Article 83.2 of the Estatuto de los Trabajadores (hereafter: ‘Workers’ 
Statute’), which addresses the social partners’ competences with regard to regulating 
4. The letter is available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/2011-08-05-letter-from-trichet-and-
fernandez-ordonez-to-zapateroen.pdf (accessed on 5/10/2016).
5. Quoting the signi¿ cant expression used by the Spanish Minister of Economy in an informal dialogue with a 
representative of the European institutions.
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 the structure of collective bargaining. Basically, the new wording suppresses the 
possibility of establishing limitations on the negotiation of certain topics at company 
level.
(ii)  The reform establishes the priority of company-level collective agreements over 
sectoral ones with regard to the following matters: 
– the amount of the basic wage and wage supplements, including those linked to 
the company’s situation and results; 
– payment or compensation for overtime and speci¿ c remuneration of shift work; 
– the schedule and distribution of working time, work regime shifts and annual 
holiday planning;
– adaptation of the job classi¿ cation system to company level; 
– adaptation of contracts listed in this law to company-level agreements; 
– measures to promote reconciliation of working life and family and personal life; 
– any other matters established laid down in collective agreements of the kind 
referred to in Article 83.2.
It should be noted, however, that there is an important limitation on prioritising 
company-level agreements. Speci¿ cally, this priority will be enforced ‘unless an 
agreement or collective agreement at state or regional level negotiated under Article 
83.2 establishes diɣ erent rules on the structure of collective bargaining or competition 
between the diɣ erent agreements’. In other words, the norm provides for a prominent 
role for sectoral collective agreements Ɋ at state or regional level Ɋ in de¿ ning the 
competences of company-level collective agreements.
The next reform was promoted by the new Conservative government in 2012 through 
Royal Decree Law 3/2012 on Urgent Measures to Reform the Labour Market and the 
Law 3/2012 on Urgent Measures to Reform the Labour Market. The goals of these legal 
instruments included the ‘modernisation of collective bargaining to bring it into line 
with the speci¿ c needs of companies and workers and to promote permanent dialogue 
within companies’. 
According to the government this new reform was necessary due to the ‘inadequate 
system of collective bargaining’ prevailing in Spain; more speci¿ cally, because since 
the onset of the crisis ‘the system of collective bargaining had restricted employers’ 
options in their eɣ orts to reorganise their productive resources while maintaining jobs’ 
(Government of Spain 2013: 5).
In this regard, the 2012 legal reform was aimed at strengthening decentralisation of the 
collective bargaining system through three mechanisms:
(i)  The reform promotes a widening of ¿ rms options with regard to the temporary 
suspension of sectoral or company-level collective bargaining agreements. The 
main innovations are: (a) easing the derogation of company collective agreements; 
(b) a signi¿ cant relaxation of conditions and widening the range of issues subject 
to derogation; and (c) imposing binding arbitration when the parties are unable 
to reach an agreement within a particular period of time.
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(ii) There is a limitation on the temporary extension rule concerning expired 
collective agreements (so-called ‘ultra-activity’). Previously, this extension was 
inde¿ nite until a new agreement was reached. Now, it has been established that 
once the collective agreement has expired and its renegotiation has begun, if 
there is no new agreement and no agreement to the contrary, the agreement will 
continue to be applied for a maximum of one year.
(iii) Finally, the most important measure is no doubt the establishment of the absolute
priority of company-level collective agreements over sectoral ones with regard 
to the matters mentioned above, by suppressing the limitation included in the 
previous reform of 2011.
The establishment of this absolute priority means decentralisation without reservation 
of the regulation of basic working conditions, which signi¿ cantly erodes the eɣ ectiveness 
and binding force of sectoral agreements (particularly those signed at provincial level). 
The 2012 labor market reform was fully backed by international institutions such as 
the IMF and the OECD, the European Commission and the European Central Bank. It 
was also welcomed by the Spanish employers’ organisations, which characterised the 
reform as a ‘step forward’ in the modernisation of labour law.
Nevertheless, this legal reform was widely criticised by labour law scholars (Baylos 
2013; Ramos 2013; Pérez et al. 2016). It has also been strongly resisted by Spanish trade 
unions, which called two general strikes against this reform in 2012.
With regard to the speci¿ c issue of decentralisation, it should be noted that, in a country 
such as Spain, with a preponderance of small and micro companies, these measures 
aimed at encouraging unilateral decentralisation open up the risk of creating a landscape 
in which real collective bargaining may take place only in a small number of companies.
Furthermore, taking into account the asymmetry between the collective bargaining 
actors and the possible absence or weakness of trade unions in SMEs and micro-
companies, it has been argued that the absolute priority of company-level agreements 
could strengthen the hand of employers wishing to regulate working conditions 
unilaterally, as well as the development of so-called agreements ‘in pejus’; in other 
words, agreements with provisions that are inferior to those of higher bargaining levels 
(Casas 2016).
3.  Eff ects on collective bargaining 
Evaluation of the eɣ ects of legal reforms on collective bargaining in the current economic 
context are subject to a number of methodological constraints, such as diɤ  culties in 
diɣ erentiating between the speci¿ c eɣ ects of labour market reforms and the general 
eɣ ects of the crisis. The limitations of the data on collective bargaining are also a factor.
Nevertheless, analysis of the available statistical sources, as well as of the outcomes of 
diɣ erent reports and the qualitative information provided by social partners, allows 
Fernando Rocha
232  Multi-employer bargaining under pressure – Decentralisation trends in ﬁ ve European countries
us to highlight some of the main eɣ ects of the enacted measures aimed at fostering 
decentralisation of collective bargaining.
This section is divided into three parts. First, there is a statistical analysis of collective 
bargaining developments between 2011 and 2016. This period was chosen to take 
into account the two major labour law reforms that aɣ ected the basis of the collective 
bargaining system (2011 and 2012).
Second, a more qualitative approach is taken to two particularly interesting issues: the 
prioritisation of company-level collective agreements on wages; and the controversy 
concerning the legitimacy of the actors involved in the new collective agreements at 
company level.
Finally, we brieÀ y examine the role of the most representative social partners.
3.1  Collective bargaining developments
In this section we address the evolution of three speci¿ c items in the period 2011–2016:
(i) collective agreements and workers covered, by year of signature; 
(ii) collective agreements and workers covered, by year of economic eɣ ects; 
(iii)  temporary derogations of collective agreements at company level.
The analysis is based on data from the statistics on collective agreements produced by 
the Ministry of Employment and Social Security. 
3.1.1 Collective agreements and workers covered, by year of signature
The evolution of collective agreements by year of signature since 2011 allows us to 
highlight three diɣ erent moments (Table 1). 
Table 1 Collective agreements and workers covered, Spain, 2011–2016 
 (by year of signature and bargaining level)
Collective agreements Workers (1,000)
Year Total Company- 
level
Above 
company- 
level
Total Company- 
level
Above 
company- 
level
2011 1,365 1,035 330 2,628.9 251.8 2,377.2
2012 1,582 1,241 341 3,195.2 289.4 2,905.8
2013 2,502 1,897 605 5,247.6 376.5 4,871.1
2014 1,859 1,522 337 2,169.2 249.3 1,919.9
2015 1,606 1,277 329 3,549.0 172.9 3,376.1
2016* 1,714 1,352 362 2,705.9 262.8 2,443.1
Note: * 2016: provisional data.
Source: Statistics on collective agreements, Ministry of Employment and Social Security (data recorded up to May 2017).
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First, it is worth noting the signi¿ cant increase in the number of collective agreements 
signed in 2013, up by 58 per cent on the previous year. This increase can be explained 
as a result of the agreement on the limitation of the temporary extension rule of expired 
collective agreements, signed by the social partners at national level in May 2013.
The goal of this agreement was to counter one of the measures included in the 2012 
labour law reform, whose aim was to establish (as noted above) a maximum of one 
year for the renewal of expired collective agreements. In this regard, the trade unions 
launched an intensive campaign to boost bargaining processes, in order to ensure the 
continuity of collective agreements (Moreno 2016).
In 2014 there was a sharp decline in terms of both collective agreements and workers 
covered, for a number of reasons: the impasse pending the Supreme Court’s rulings in 
disputes raised on this matter and the refusal of employers’ associations and companies 
to negotiate wage increases as Spain seemed to be ¿ nding its way out of economic 
recession.
The provisional data on 2015 show a slowdown in this falling trend. It is also worth 
noting the signing of a number of sectoral collective agreements with broad coverage 
of workers.
If we focus speci¿ cally on the evolution of the new bargaining units created in this period, 
statistical data show a clear rise in company-level agreements (Table 2), particularly in 
2013, the year after the last labour law reform (whose main goal, as noted above, was to 
foster collective bargaining at company level). 
In 2015 there was a slowdown in this trend, however. This can be explained at least 
partly by various court decisions that established the nullity of many of these new 
agreements, due to the lack of legitimacy of the unitary representation of workers at 
company level (see Section 3.2.2). 
Table 2 Collective agreements signed in new bargaining units and workers covered, Spain, 
 2011–2016 (by year of signature and bargaining level)
Collective agreements Workers (1,000)
Year Total Company- 
level
Above 
company- 
level
Total Company- 
level
Above 
company- 
level
2011 263 240 23 276.7 30.1 246.6
2012 338 323 15 72.4 46.4 26.0
2013 662 625 37 270.3 55.3 215.0
2014 608 575 33 144.7 48.7 96.0
2015 545 524 21 391.7 32.7 359.1
2016* 462 438 24 113.1 45.6 67.5
Note: * 2016: provisional data.
Source: Statistics on collective agreements, Ministry of Employment and Social Security (data recorded up to May 2017).
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Finally, it is important to note that the increase in company-level collective agreements 
after the 2012 labour law reform was modest in terms of workers aɣ ected: from 9.6 per 
cent in 2011 to 11.5 per cent in 2014,6 but with a new fall in 2015 (Figure 1, based on 
Table 1). 
Moreover, taking into account the evolution of agreements by the year in which their 
economic eɣ ects are discerned, the share of workers covered by the company-level 
agreements decreased over time (see Table 3 and Figure 2).
3.1.2  Collective agreements and workers covered, by year in which economic eff ects 
 became known
The evolution of collective agreements shows a continued decline in the ¿ rst stage of 
the crisis (Table 3).7 This trend began to change in 2013, however, and more acutely in 
2015. In the latter year, the last for which de¿ nitive data are available, around 5,600 
collective agreements covering 10 million workers were registered. This means a decline 
in coverage of 1.6 million workers in comparison with the peak of 2008.
If we focus on the evolution of the structure of collective bargaining, the number of 
company-level agreements has risen since 2012. However, as noted above, the share of 
6. This is the last year for which de¿ nitive data are available.
7. The time period covered by this table is longer, in order to capture the evolution of collective bargaining since 
the onset of the crisis.
Figure 1 Workers covered by collective agreements, Spain, 2011–2015 (by year of signature 
 of the collective agreement and bargaining level; % of total workers)
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on statistics on collective agreements, Ministry of Employment and Social Security 
(deﬁ nitive annual data).
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Table 3 Collective agreements and workers covered in Spain, by year of economic eff ects 
 and bargaining level: 2008-2016
Collective agreements Workers (1,000)
Year Total Company- 
level
Above 
company- 
level
Total Company- 
level
Above 
company- 
level
2008 5,987 4,539 1,448 11,968.1 1,215.3 10,752.9
2009 5,689 4,323 1,366 11,557.8 1,114.6 10,443.2
2010 5,067 3,802 1,265 10,794.3 923.2 9,871.1
2011 4,585 3,422 1,163 10,662.8 929.0 9,733.8
2012 4,376 3,234 1,142 10,099.0 925.7 9,173.3
2013 4,589 3,395 1,194 10,265.4 932.7 9,332.7
2014 5,185 4,004 1,181 10,304.7 867.2 9,437.5
2015 5,642 4,493 1,149 10,227.3 846.9 9,380.3
2016* 4,147 3,242 905 8,963.6 620.3 8,343.4
Note: * 2016: provisional data.
Source: Statistics on collective agreements, Ministry of Employment and Social Security (data recorded up to May 2017).
Figure 2 Workers covered by collective agreements, Spain, 2012–2015 (by year of economic 
 eff ects of the agreement and bargaining level; % of workers)
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on statistics on collective agreements, Ministry of Employment and Social Security 
(deﬁ nitive annual data).
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workers covered by company-level agreements has decreased over time compared with 
pre-crisis levels (see Figure 2, based on Table 3).8 
It can be said, therefore, that, although the 2012 labour law reform fostered the 
development of new agreements at company level, to date this process has not brought 
about a substantial alteration of the existing structure of collective bargaining in 
Spain.9 
The reform’s limited eɣ ects, taking into account the fact that collective bargaining 
decentralisation was one of its major goals, can be explained in terms of a number of 
factors.
First, most of the new company-level agreements in this period were signed at small 
or medium-sized ¿ rms. Furthermore, some important new agreements were signed at 
state or regional level, with substantial worker coverage.
Secondly, it has been argued that the creation of new bargaining units at company level 
may represent a risk for many employers in terms of higher transaction costs, higher 
bargaining costs and potential labour conÀ icts associated with stimulating worker 
participation. These factors are especially relevant for smaller companies, which usually 
prefer to displace such risks to higher bargaining levels (Martín and Alos 2016).
Finally, it is important to take into account the inÀ uence of the strategies developed by 
the social partners Ɋ trade unions and employers Ɋ during this period.10 
Another particularly relevant issue is the evolution of agreed wage increases in this 
period. The data show a signi¿ cant trend of wage moderation, particularly since 2012, 
although always maintaining the purchasing power of wages agreed in the collective 
agreements (see Table 4). It should be kept in mind that the information presented in 
Table 4 concerns average increases; many of the collective agreements signed in this 
period established temporary wage freezes or even, in some few cases, temporary wage 
reductions.
Also, despite these moderate average wage increases, it is important to note that there 
has been a strong decline in real wages in Spain (Figure 3). 
This process of so-called ‘internal devaluation’, widely recognised by national and 
international institutions, can be explained by some of the main eɣ ects of the austerity 
measures and the labour law reforms implemented in this period: 
– A strong increase in precarious employment, which is shown both by the rise in the 
number of precarious jobs Ɋ particularly involuntary part-time employment Ɋ and 
8. The ¿ gure includes information only until 2014, which is the last year for which de¿ nitive data are available.
9. The same conclusion can be also found in other recent studies on this topic. See, for example: Cruz 2015; Pérez, 
Rojo, and Ysás 2016. The continuity of the existing structure of collective bargaining has also been noted by the 
European institutions (European Commission 2016).
10. This issue is addressed in Section 3.3.
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the deterioration of working conditions (Muñoz de Bustillo and Esteve 2017).
– The application at company level of some of the measures included in the labour law 
reforms; for example, derogations at company level from working conditions agreed 
in sectoral agreements; and, more acutely, the reinforced power of employers to 
unilaterally modify working conditions.
– The development of a number of new bargaining units at company level, which can 
be considered collective agreements ‘in pejus’.
Table 4 Final agreed wages increases, Spain, 2011–2016 (by bargaining level)
Year Total Company- level Above company- level
2011 2.29 1.97 2.32
2012 1.16 1.48 1.13
2013 0.53 0.55 0.53
2014 0.50 0.37 0.52
2015 0.71 0.46 0.73
2016* 1.06 0.83 1.08
Note: * 2016: provisional data. Data from 2016: agreed wages, taking into account the eff ects of the ﬁ nal review due to the 
application of the wage indexation clauses.
Source: Statistics on collective agreements, Ministry of Employment and Social Security (data recorded up to May 2017).
Figure 3 Real wages per hour (employees), Spain, 2008–2015 (year on year change, %)
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on statistics on collective agreements, Ministry of Employment and Social Security 
(deﬁ nitive annual data).
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The combined eɣ ects of falling wages and austerity measures11 have exacerbated the 
deterioration of the social situation in Spain, in comparison with other European 
countries (Yancheva et al. 2013). This has led to a general rise in inequality and poverty 
levels in the country: the at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate increased to 27.9 
per cent of the population in 2015; and in-work poverty Ɋ the so-called ‘working poor’ 
Ɋ to 14.1 per cent.12 
3.1.3  Temporary collective agreement derogations at company level
As noted above, the 2012 labour market reform substantially changed the regulation of 
temporary derogations of collective agreements at company level. The main outcome 
has been a signi¿ cant increase in the number of temporary derogations of collective 
agreements, especially in 2013 (Table 5).13 
Certainly, if these ¿ gures on derogation are compared with the total number of workers 
covered by collective agreements, they are not so important. 
Detailed analysis of the data shows that derogations are focused mainly on wages and 
working hours, boosting internal devaluation at company level. 
It is also worth noting that around 90 per cent of these temporary derogations were 
agreed between employers and workers’ representatives, even though trade unions 
have serious doubts about the legality of the procedure, in particular with regard to 
the status of workers’ representatives in many of the agreements signed in the micro 
¿ rms.
3.2  Dynamics of collective bargaining: a qualitative approach
The time that has passed since the last major labour law reform makes it possible for us 
to make a more qualitative analysis of its impact on collective bargaining outcomes. An 
in-depth study of all the issues involved would exceed the scope of this chapter, but it is 
worth addressing two topics that are particularly relevant: (i) the priority of company-
level collective agreements on wages; and (ii) the controversy about the legitimacy of 
the signatory parties of some new company-level collective agreements.
3.2.1  Priority of company-level collective agreements on wages
The ¿ ndings of a study of a sample of sectoral and company-level collective agreements 
signed between 2012 and 2015 allow us to discern a number of general trends concerning 
wage regulation in this period, more speci¿ cally with regard to wage structure and wage 
increases (Cruces 2016).
With regard to wage structure, three general aspects are particularly noteworthy: 
11. For example, signi¿ cant cuts aɣ ecting social expenditures and social services.
12. Living Conditions Survey 2016, National Institute of Statistics (published in 2017, data for 2016).
13. Data available since 2012.
Strengthening the decentralisation of collective bargaining in Spain
 Multi-employer bargaining under pressure – Decentralisation trends in ﬁ ve European countries 239
(i) A low level of precision and clarity in the de¿ nition of elements of the remuneration 
structure, particularly in relation to the de¿ nition of wage supplements
(ii) The small number of clauses regulating wage supplements speci¿ cally linked to 
company results.
(iii) A trend towards incorporating more À exibility and the reduction or creation of 
additional wage supplements, depending on business needs.
With regard to wage increases, there are two main points:
(a) The inclusion of provisions regulating moderate wage increases for this period 
(for the statistical development of ¿ nal agreed wages, see Table 4). Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that some collective agreements include provisions on temporary 
wage freezes or even, in a small number of cases, wage cuts.
(b) Most collective agreements establish wage indexation clauses, linked to the 
development of the Harmonised Prince Consumer Index (HIPC). This is a 
traditional feature of the Spanish collective bargaining system and its continuity 
in this period indicates the lack of inÀ uence of the recommendations emanating 
from the European institutions on the suppression of such clauses.
Against this general background, it is important to focus the analysis on the content of 
the new bargaining units at company level created in the wake of the 2012 labour law 
reform. This reform, as already noted, established the absolute priority of company-
level collective bargaining agreements over sectoral ones in the regulation of the base 
wage and wage supplements. 
A report on this topic found a proliferation of new company-level company agreements 
in pejus, in the form of agreements targeted mainly at cutting wage costs (Vivero 2016).
Cutting wage costs has been pursued mainly through provisions on basic wages, 
although collective agreements also address this goal with provisions on other aspects 
(wage supplements, review of wage indexation clauses, overtime and so on).
Finally, it is important to mention that a number of practices have been controversial 
from a legal standpoint. Particularly noteworthy are various cases of new company-
Table 5 Temporary derogations of collective agreements at company level, Spain, 2012–16
Year Derogations (Nº) Workers (Nº)
2012  748  29,352
2013  2,512  159,550
2014  2,073  66,203
2015  1,437  43,173
2016  1,326  32,064
Note: 2012 = between March and December.
Source: Statistics on collective agreements (data recorded up to May 2017).
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level collective agreements in pejus that not only enshrine wage cuts but also make 
them retroactive. 
A Supreme Court ruling in 2015 declared that such ‘retroactivation’ was illegal, among 
other reasons because the Spanish Constitution clearly guarantees ‘the non-retroactivity 
of punitive provisions that are not favourable to or restrictive of individual rights’ 
(Article 9.3).
3.2.2 Legitimacy of collective bargaining actors
The legal rule on legitimacy with regard to negotiating collective agreements establishes 
that ‘the following shall be deemed legitimate to negotiate company-level agreements or 
agreements of lesser scope on behalf of workers: the works council; workers’ delegates, 
as applicable; or the union representatives, if these exist, that altogether form the 
majority of the committee members’ (Workers’ Statute, Article 87).
The Workers’ Statute also establishes that in cases pertaining to more than one workplace, 
a works council should be formed in order to negotiate a collective agreement for the 
whole. This new body may only be agreed on by collective bargaining (Article 63).
Analysis of bargaining processes at company level since 2012 shows that problems have 
arisen concerning actor legitimacy, in particular with regard to workers’ representatives 
in smaller companies: on one hand, in some instances the workers’ representatives did 
not comply with the legal rules governing who may legitimately negotiate. On the other 
hand because, even though there was formal compliance, in many cases it is not certain 
that the workers’ representatives really acted in the workers’ interests, especially in 
smaller companies (Alfonso and Fabregat 2016). 
One clear example of this controversy can be found in the new collective agreements 
signed by so-called ‘facility management’ or ‘multi-services’ companies, whose business 
is to provide a plurality of services to third parties, usually on a permanent basis, 
supplying the necessary personnel and usually performed on the premises of the client 
company.
The emergence of this in Spain can be traced back to the 1990s. The number of such 
companies has been growing constantly, as has the scope of their activities. 
One key factor in this development is the lack of a legal framework for such companies, 
which are not subject to existing regulations on temporary work agencies. There is a 
consensus among labour law scholars that ¿ rms in Spain are increasingly outsourcing 
part of their activities through multi-services companies as a way of avoiding the higher 
labour standards laid down by law for temporary work agencies (Vicente 2017).
The 2012 labour law reform represented a new step in this process, with the establishment 
of the absolute priority of company-level collective agreements over sectoral ones with 
regard to a number of matters. Many companies have taken advantage of this new 
regulation, and as a result there has been a signi¿ cant increase of new bargaining 
agreements signed by multi-services companies in recent years.
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Analysis of the contents of these agreements shows that most of them drive down 
working conditions in comparison with the reference sectoral agreements (Vicente 
2016; Muñoz 2014). 
Against this background, it is worth noting that many of the new collective agreements 
signed by multi-services companies in this period were denounced by trade unions, and 
later declared invalid by the labour courts
The main reason these agreements were rejected was that they had country-wide scope, 
aɣ ecting all workplaces (current and future). However, the agreements were signed by 
the workers’ representatives only of some workplaces, who were not entitled to do so 
(according to the rules on legitimacy established by the Workers’ Statute).
In other words, the labour courts concluded that these agreements were invalid because 
they implied ‘a breach of the principle of correspondence between the representation of 
the body (unitary representation body involved in negotiating the company agreement) 
and the ¿ eld on which it is projected (scope of resulting collective agreement)’ (Muñoz 
2014: 285).
In spite of these court judgments, collective bargaining in multi-services companies 
still constitute an issue of particular concern to Spanish trade unions. Indeed, in 2015 
the two most representative trade unions at national level signed a joint statement in 
which they called for a halt to the promotion ‘of new collective bargaining agreements 
in multi-services companies until the legal framework has been reformed’ (CCOO and 
UGT 2015).
3.3  Role of the social partners
In this section we provide a brief overview of the views and strategies of the social 
partners with regard to the challenges of industrial relations and collective bargaining 
in this period.
The analysis is based on information from the following sources: 
– The Annual Labour Survey (ALS) of 2014, carried out by the Ministry of 
Employment and Social Security. This survey is based on data provided by nearly 
10,000 companies, and its main goal is to obtain information on: measures taken 
by enterprises to adapt to changes in economic circumstances; internal À exibility 
measures and other measures implemented in companies; industrial relations; 
training measures implemented by companies for their workers; and business 
forecasts.14 
– The ¿ ndings of a ¿ eld survey conducted in 2015, based on eight in-depth interviews 
with the heads of the main national-level sectoral federations of Comisiones Obreras 
14. The methodology and data of this survey are available at http://www.empleo.gob.es/estadisticas/EAL/
welcome.htm (accessed on 11/10/2016).
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(CCOO), the most representative trade union in Spain (Cruces 2016b). Obviously, 
this sample is not statistically representative, but qualitatively the information 
collected provides a rich overview of the union movement’s main concerns and 
challenges with regard to the eɣ ects of labour law reform on collective bargaining.
3.3.1  Employers
We may highlight three key ¿ ndings from the 2014 ALS (Lago 2016).
First, a gap can be discerned between the formal and the real goals of the 2012 labour 
law reform. Thus, while one of the reform’s stated objectives was to promote internal 
À exibility in companies, as an alternative mechanism to the widespread use of external 
À exibility in times of crisis, survey data show that most companies have continued to 
resort mainly to layoɣ s and non-renewal of contracts as their preferred way of adjusting 
to slumps. Companies opting for internal À exibility – for example, related to wages and 
working hours – are in the minority.
Second, around 82 per cent of the companies surveyed had a sectoral collective 
agreement as reference for the regulation of working conditions. When asked whether 
the sectoral collective agreement met the company’s needs, 82 per cent answered ‘to 
a fair extent’ or ‘to a considerable extent’. Furthermore, 76 per cent of the companies 
surveyed stated their preference for keeping the sectoral agreement.
These assessments are in striking contrast with the mainstream narrative sustained by 
both European and national institutions, which since the onset of the crisis have called 
repeatedly for a radical decentralisation of collective bargaining, on the pretext that 
companies were crying out for it.
Finally, it is worth noting that most of the companies surveyed stated that, when faced 
by the next economic downturn, they would opt once more for external rather than 
internal À exibility.
It should be noted here that companies’ preference for external À exibility cannot be 
explained in terms of alleged labour market ‘rigidity’. More to the point is a generalised 
pattern of business management strongly focused on a ‘low road’ in pursuit of 
competitiveness Ɋ mainly cutting prices and labour costs Ɋ to the detriment of a more 
sustainable ‘high road’ (based on, for example, innovation, quality and diɣ erentiation 
of products and services, training and quality of employment).
3.3.2  Trade unions
A number of points of interest emerge from these interviews with union oɤ  cials.15 
First, there is a consensus that the development of collective bargaining has been 
diɤ  cult since the onset of the crisis, due to both the adverse economic situation and the 
eɣ ects of the labour law reforms adopted in this period. 
15. Here only the more general issues are addressed, without taking sectoral diɣ erences into account. For a more 
detailed analysis, see Cruces 2016b.
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It is important to note that the impact of this reform is linked not only to its 
implementation, but also to the ‘threat eɣ ect’ of its potential application by employers.16 
According to the unionists interviewed, deployment of this ‘threat eɣ ect’ has been 
constant in bargaining since 2012; not only that, but it has been ‘internalised’ by many 
workers’ representatives.
Second, the main trade union concern just after adoption of the 2012 labour law reform 
was the limitation of the temporary extension rule for expired collective agreements. 
In this regard, a key trade union priority was to preserve collective agreements nearing 
expiry, even to the detriment of their contents (a deterioration of working conditions).
Third, there was also a concern about the widening of companies’ legal options with 
regard to the temporary suspension of sectoral or company-level collective agreements. 
In this sense, the trade unions have prioritised involvement in negotiations on such 
temporary derogations, the outcome of which is that most of them have been agreed.
Fourth, the unionists remarked that the 2012 labour reform has strengthened 
employers’ power to unilaterally modify working conditions at company level. They also 
complained about the lack of information provided on the development and scope of 
this process.
Finally, for the near future the unions’ strategic option is to maintain the role of sectoral 
collective agreements, which are considered a key tool in ensuring a minimum À oor of 
labour rights and regulation of working conditions (especially for workers in smaller 
companies).
4.  Labour market reforms and collective bargaining developments 
 in the metal industry and the retail sector (large retail)
In this section we examine the eɣ ects of the crisis and labour market reforms on 
collective bargaining developments in two sectors: retail, with a particular focus on 
large retail,  and the metal industry.
The analysis of each sector is structured as follows. First, there is a brief overview of 
industrial relations dynamics. Second, we analyse the impacts of labour market reform 
– particularly, that of 2012 í on the structure and development of collective bargaining. 
Third, we look at the position of the social partners. A brief summary concludes.
The study is based on information from various sources, including the ¿ ndings of in-
depth interviews with social partner representatives.17 
16. For example, the threat of creating new bargaining units at company level in order to enforce the absolute 
priority of regulating working conditions.
17. For the commerce sector, we interviewed two union oɤ  cials from CCOO-Services. For the metal industry, 
we interviewed two union oɤ  cials from CCOO-Industria, and one from the main employers’ association 
CONFEMETAL.
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4.1  Retail sector
4.1.1  Industrial relations 
There are two main employers’ organisations in the retail sector in Spain: the National 
Association of Large Distribution Companies (ANGED in Spanish), which brings 
together the most representative companies in the large retail distribution; and the 
Spanish Confederation of Commerce (CEC in Spanish), which represents small and 
medium-sized regional and provincial retail organisations. 
Two other employers’ organisations represent the supermarket sector, although they 
are not involved in collective bargaining: the Spanish Association of Distributors and 
Supermarkets (ASEDAS) and the Spanish Supermarket Chains Association (ACES ).
As for workers’ organisations, union density in the retail sector in Spain is lower than 
the national average: 9 per cent as against 16 per cent in 2010, according to oɤ  cial 
statistics.
Trade unions in this sector are clearly divided into two types of organisation. On one 
hand, there are two ‘independent’ unions: the Federation of Independent Workers in 
Retail (FETICO in Spanish), which is the most representative trade union in the large 
distribution sector, and the Federation of Trade Union Associations (FASGA), which is 
also present in the large distribution sector (particularly in one company). 
On the other hand, there are the sectoral federations integrated in the two traditional 
trade union confederations: CCOO-Services and FeSMC-UGT (the Federation of 
Services, Mobility and Consumption of the General Union of Workers).
The class-based trade unions are highly critical of the other two organisations, which 
they label ‘yellow unions’ – in other words, backed by the employers. Thus, these 
organisations are described as ‘the union departments of ANGED companies’.18 
Collective bargaining in the retail sector has historically been atomised, with a large 
number of agreements in force. Sectoral collective bargaining is basically at provincial 
level, although there are also national-level, regional, interprovincial and even local 
agreements.
In large retail distribution, collective bargaining is organised at two levels: on one hand, 
there is just one sectoral agreement: the ‘national collective agreement of department 
stores’. This agreement applies to all large distribution companies integrated in ANGED.
On the other hand there are various agreements at company level, which are not exactly 
statutory collective agreements (and therefore not registered in the oɤ  cial statistics). 
The aim of these agreements is to develop and/or adapt the contents of the national 
collective agreement.
18. Interview with a CCOO-Services union oɤ  cial.
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4.1.2  Collective bargaining developments 
The combined impacts of the crisis and the labour market reforms approved since 2010 
– particularly that of 2012 – put industrial relations under pressure. 
First, there has been a decline in collective bargaining. Thus, according to the available 
oɤ  cial statistics the net balance for the retail sector is a fall of 46 collective agreements 
between 2008 and 2015 – a variation of 10.50 per cent – and of 10,562 workers covered 
(–0.56 per cent).19 
Second, focusing on the potential eɣ ects of the legal measures aimed at fostering the 
decentralisation of collective bargaining, it is worth highlighting the following issues:
– There has been no alteration in the existing structure of collective bargaining in the 
retail sector, despite the establishment of new company-level collective agreements 
after 2012 (Figure 4). This can be explained by a number of factors: (i) most of the 
new collective agreements were signed by small ¿ rms, with a very low coverage; 
(ii) the creation of new bargaining units at sectoral level, with higher coverage; and 
(iii) employers have opted to take advantage of other measures in the 2012 labour 
reform, such as reinforcement of the unilateral power to modify working conditions 
at company level. 
– The legal limitation imposed on the temporary extension rule for expired collective 
agreements has not had a real impact, although this possibility ‘was used by some 
employers as a threat to reinforce their bargaining position’.20 
19. Statistics on collective agreements, Ministry of Employment and Social Security, Annual Data.
20. Interview with a union oɤ  cial from CCOO-Services.
Figure 4 Workers covered by collective agreements in the retail sector (NACE G), Spain, 2012 
 and 2015 (year of economic eff ects of the agreement and bargaining level; % of 
 total workers)
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on statistics on collective agreements, Ministry of Employment and Social 
Security, annual data recorded up to October 2014 (data 2012) and March 2017 (data 2015).
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– The main eɣ ect of the labour market reform has no doubt been to boost wage 
devaluation, which was already occurring due to the impact of the economic crisis 
in the sector. 
Thus, on one hand there has been a signi¿ cant wage moderation trend, although with 
a slight recovery since 2014, in the context of the fragile improvement in economic 
activity (Figure 5). 
On the other hand, real wages in the sector have fallen sharply, although there were 
signs of recovery at the end of the period, as shown by the development of hourly wages 
(Figure 6).21 
According to the class-based trade unions, the combined eɣ ects of the crisis and the 
labour market reforms have led to a ‘wild wage devaluation’ in many companies in 
the retail sector. In the wake of the 2012 labour market reform two mechanisms in 
particular have been applied by employers to implement wage devaluation.
First, eɣ ective implementation of the ‘absolute prevalence’ of company-level agreements 
over sectoral ones. The consequence of this is that most of the new company-level 
agreements signed after 2012 can be considered to be in pejus (namely, targeted mainly 
at reducing wage costs). 
21. This indicator allows us to overcome the diɣ erences due to the changing full-time/part-time composition of the 
workforce over the years.
Figure 5 Agreed wage increases in the retail sector (NACE G), Spain, 2008–2015 (%)
Source: Author’s elaboration based on statistics on collective agreements, Ministry of Employment and Social 
Security, annual data.
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Thus, ‘the fundamental diɣ erence is that, before the 2012 reform, company-level 
agreements were signed in order to improve the contents of sectoral agreements. After 
the reform, many employers want to sign new company-level agreements in order to 
worsen working conditions’.22 
The second mechanism involves application of the 2012 amendment of Article 41 of the 
Workers’ Statute, which regulates procedures for substantial modi¿ cation of working 
conditions at company level. This reform was basically aimed at reducing the role 
of collective bargaining in this regard and to reinforce the power of employers, thus 
consolidating unilateral internal À exibility.
In this regard, employers in the retail sector have enthusiastically taken advantage of this 
reform to adjust working conditions. The main consequence has been a reinforcement 
of wage devaluation, by means of wage cuts or freezes, an increase in the annual number 
of working days and greater À exibility with regard to working time distribution.
4.1.3  Positions of the social partners in large retail distribution
The employers’ association in the large retail distribution sector, ANGED, has been 
pretty much in favour of the 2012 labour market reform, in particular with regard to 
measures aimed at reinforcing unilateral internal À exibility at company level.
The main strategy pursued by ANGED in order to exploit this reform was to include some 
of its key provisions in the text of the national-level collective agreement of department 
22. Interview with a CCOO-Services union oɤ  cial.
Figure 6 Hourly wages in the retail sector, Spain, 2008–2014 (% increase over previous year)
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data on wages and hours (employees)m Spanish Annual National Accounts.
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stores, signed in 2013 with two ‘independent’ trade unions, FASGA and FETICO, that 
have traditionally aligned themselves with the employers, as noted above.23 
The content of this agreement led to a severe degradation of working conditions, through 
provisions such as: (i) the linking of wage increases to sales, taking as a reference the 
volume of sales in 2010 (in practical terms, this amounted to a real wage freeze); (ii) 
the extension of the annual number of working days by 28; (iii) the elimination of paid 
Sundays and holidays, in a context of increasing deregulation of shopping hours; and 
(iv) greater À exibility with regard to the distribution of working time.
The key point with regard to this agreement, however, was the insertion of a provision 
on substantial modi¿ cation of working conditions. Accordingly, in order to comply with 
the new regulations on the annual number of working days and greater working time 
À exibility, companies may launch a period of consultation with worker’s representatives, 
following the rules established in Article 41 of the Workers’ Statute (modi¿ ed by the 
legal reform of 2012, as noted above).
The outcome of this provision has been continuous modi¿ cation of working conditions 
since 2013, focused on working time. The aim is to increase the annual number of 
working days, but especially the reinforcement of working time À exibility and worker 
availability. In this regard, ‘Article 41 is familiar even to the last employee entering the 
company, because it has been a continuous process of modi¿ cation after modi¿ cation’.24 
As for the employees’ side, the dynamic of industrial relations in large retail distribution 
is strongly conditioned by the clear divide between the traditional class-based trade 
unions and the two ‘independent’ unions (FASGA and FETICO), who are considered by 
the former to be ‘yellow’ unions.
The 2013 collective agreement was strongly criticised by the class-based trade unions 
(CCOO and UGT), which refused to sign it.25 On their view, there were three main 
matters of controversy. 
First, the anomalies concerning the bargaining process, speci¿ cally its short duration. 
Thus, ‘there were only three bargaining meetings. The process began at the end of 
January, and the agreement was signed one month later.’26 
Second, the contents of the agreement, which according to the class-based unions 
implied a strong deterioration of working conditions, as noted above. 
Finally, there was the reinforcement of unilateral À exibility via the provision mentioned 
above. 
23. National-level collective agreement of large stores (2013–2016).
24. Interview with a CCOO-Services union oɤ  cial.
25. It should be noted that the class-based trade unions did not sign the former agreement (2009–2012)either, 
although they did in 2006 (2006–2009).
26. Interview with a CCOO-Services union oɤ  cial.
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4.1.4  Final remarks
Collective bargaining in the retail sector has been under pressure due to the combined 
eɣ ects of the crisis and the labour market reforms, particularly those of 2012. 
This has led, in the ¿ rst instance, to a decline in collective bargaining, in terms of both 
number of agreements and workers covered. 
Second, analysis of the eɣ ects of the 2012 reform, whose aim was to foster the 
decentralisation of collective bargaining, yield three main ¿ ndings:
(i)  The existing structure of collective bargaining in the retail sector has not changed 
substantially, despite the creation of new company-level collective agreements. 
This can be explained by a number of diɣ erent factors: (a) most of the new 
collective agreements were signed by small ¿ rms, with very low coverage; (b) the 
creation of new bargaining units at sectoral level, with higher coverage; and (c) 
employers have taken advantage of other measures drawn from the 2012 labour 
reform, such as reinforcement of their powers concerning unilateral imposition of 
internal À exibility.
(ii)  The legal limitation imposed on the temporary extension rule for expired collective 
agreements has not had a real impact, although this possibility has been used by 
the employers as a threat to reinforce their position in bargaining.
(iii)  The main eɣ ect of labour market reform has no doubt been to boost wage 
devaluation in the sector, which was already occurring due to the economic crisis. 
Thus, on one hand, there has been signi¿ cant wage moderation; and on the other 
hand, there has been a sharp fall in real wages in the sector.
It is worth noting, in relation to the large retail distribution sector, that industrial 
relations dynamics are strongly conditioned by a clear divide between two types of 
trade union organisation: the class-based trade unions and two ‘yellow unions’, which 
have historically been supported by and aligned with the interests of the employers’ 
association.
One major consequence of this divide was the 2013 agreement in the sector, which 
developed a number of key elements of the 2012 labour market reform and which was 
not signed by the class-based trade unions.
Against this background, the latter’s strategy is twofold: (i) rationalisation of the 
structure of collective bargaining in various ways: maintaining and improving the 
existing national-level collective agreements; concentrating existing provincial-level 
agreements into new ones, in order to reduce their number; and linking the company-
level agreements to sectoral agreements. (ii) Improvement of working conditions, 
especially in terms of wages and working time, taking into account the economic 
recovery ongoing since 2014. 
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4.2  Metal industry
4.2.1  Industrial relations
The employers’ association that is party to sectoral collective bargaining is the 
Confederation of Metal Employers Organisations (CONFEMETAL). 
It is worth noting that the composition and even the role of the employers’ organisations 
integrated in CONFEMETAL are very heterogeneous and unstable at provincial level 
(which is the main level of bargaining in the metal industry). Thus, ‘in Spain it is very 
usual that the bargaining processes at provincial level are carried out by law ¿ rms, 
representing the interests of the employers from diɣ erent economic sectors. [This has 
led to a situation in which] many agreements are awaiting renewal because the lawyer 
involved has retired and there is no contact partner on the business side’.27 
The most representative trade unions at national level that are party to sectoral collective 
bargaining are the sectoral federations integrated in the two traditional class-based 
trade unions confederations: the Federation of Industry of Workers’ Commissions 
(CCOO-Industry); and the Federation of Industry, Construction and Agriculture of the 
General Union of Workers (FICA-UGT) and the sectoral federations of three regional-
level trade unions. Two are in the Basque Country: the Federation of Industry of Patriot 
Workers’ Commissions (LAB) and the Federation of Industry and Construction of 
Basques Worker Solidarity (ELA). The third is in Galicia, namely the Federation of 
Industry of the Galician Inter-Union Confederation (CIGA)
Collective bargaining in the metal industry in Spain has historically been atomised, with 
a large number of agreements at provincial and company level. This situation is due to 
the strong fragmentation and atomisation of the sector itself, characterised by a high 
number of micro and small companies.
4.2.2  Collective bargaining developments
Collective bargaining in the metal industry has been under pressure due to the combined 
impacts of the crisis and the labour market reforms approved since 2010, particularly 
those of 2012. Analysing collective bargaining developments in the sector we found the 
following.
First, there has been a slight decline in collective bargaining since 2008. According 
to the oɤ  cial statistics the net balance for the metal industry is a decline of 173,000 
workers covered by collective agreements between 2008 and 2015 (around –14 per 
cent).28 
Second, turning to the potential eɣ ects of the 2012 labour market reform measures 
aimed at boosting decentralisation of collective bargaining, one might mention the 
following:
27. Interview with a CCOO-Industry union oɤ  cial.
28. Statistics on collective agreements, Ministry of Employment and Social Security, de¿ nitive annual data.
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– There has been a slight increase in the weight of the company-level agreements –in 
terms of workers coveredí although this has not caused a substantial alteration of 
the existing structure of collective bargaining in the metal industry (Figure 7).
– The legal limitation of the temporary extension rule for expired collective agreements 
has not had a real impact, although this reform has been used as a kind of threat in 
negotiations. 
– The main eɣ ect of the labour market reform has no doubt been to boost wage 
devaluation, which was already occurring due to the impact of the economic crisis 
in the metal industry. 
Thus, there has been signi¿ cant wage moderation, although with slight signs of recovery 
since 2014 in the context of the fragile recovery of the economic activity (Figure 8).
At the same time, there has been a sharp fall in real wages in the sector, as shown by the 
evolution of hourly wages (Figure 9).29 
According to the trade unions, the employers have implemented three main mechanisms 
to enforce wage devaluation.
29. This indicator allows us to overcome the diɣ erences due to the changing full-time/part-time composition of the 
workforce over the years.
Figure 7 Workers covered by collective agreements in the metal industry,* Spain, 2012 and 
 2015 (by year of economic eff ects of the agreement and bargaining level: 
 % of total workers)
Note: Total number of workers covered by collective agreements registered in the following subsectors (NACE code): 
24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 33.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on statistics on collective agreements, Ministry of Employment and Social 
Security, deﬁ nitive annual data registered up to October 2014 (data for 2012), and March 2017 (data for 2015).
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First, new company-level collective agreements, which can be labelled agreements in
pejus, namely, agreements targeted mainly at fostering cuts in wage costs. 
Second, temporary derogations from sectoral collective agreements. These derogations 
has not been very numerous, but they have focused on wages to a large extent.
Finally and most important, the application of employers’ reinforced powers – after 
the reform of Article 41 of the Workers’ Statute in 2012 í to bring about substantial 
modi¿ cations in working conditions. This reform was basically aimed at reducing the 
existing role of collective bargaining in this area and to reinforce the power of employers 
accordingly, leading to consolidation of unilateral internal À exibility. 
Employers in the metal industry have taken broad advantage of this reform to adjust 
working conditions at company level. The main consequence has been the reinforcement 
of wage devaluation, by means of wage cuts or freezes, an increase in the number of 
annual working days and greater À exibility with regard to working time distribution.
To sum up, according to the trade unions, ‘employers don’t really need to negotiate 
a new company-level agreement, especially in smaller companies, because they can 
generally resort to the substantial modi¿ cation of working conditions made possible by 
the reformed Article 41 of the Workers’ Statute to boost wage devaluation’.30 
30. Interview with a CCOO-Industry union oɤ  cial.
Figure 8 Wage increases agreed in the metal industry,* Spain, 2008–2015 (%)
Note: * Simple average of wage increases in collective agreements registered in the following subsectors (NACE 
code): 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 33.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on statistics on collective agreements, Ministry of Employment and Social 
Security, deﬁ nitive annual data.
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4.2.3  Positions of the social partners
The employers’ confederation in the metal industry has fully backed the labour market 
reforms implemented since 2010 in Spain, although with some nuances regarding 
decentralisation of collective bargaining. 
In short, employers in the metal sector agree with the measures aimed at reinforcing 
bargaining at company level, but at the same time – and contrary to the government’s 
position – they are in favour of preserving the provincial level of bargaining.
This can be explained by the strong tradition of collective bargaining at provincial level, 
but also by their resistance to the potential weakening of the role of the employers’ 
confederation. This confederation comprises a number of heterogeneous employers’ 
organisations, rooted mainly, as already mentioned, at the provincial level. Therefore, ‘if 
we lose the provincial level of bargaining and focus only on company-level agreements, 
there’s a strong risk of losing our own organisation’.31 
It is worth noting the strong prevalence of small and micro companies in the sector. 
Instead of promoting new company-level agreements most employers have been pretty 
much in favour of exploiting other measures included in the labor market reforms, 
aimed at strengthening companies’ unilateral power to implement wage devaluation.
31. Interview with a CONFEMETAL representative.
Figure 9 Hourly wages in the metal industry, Spain, 2008–2014 (% change over previous year)
Note: * Simple average of wage increases in collective agreements registered in the following subsectors (NACE 
code): 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 33.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on statistics on collective agreements, Ministry of Employment and Social 
Security, deﬁ nitive annual data.
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This strategy is also supported by other legal measures, such as the reform of ‘ultra-
activity’,32 whose potential application has been used as a threat in the bargaining 
process, as noted above. Thus, as recognised by the employers themselves, this ‘is being 
used to obtain other bene¿ ts; it is being used as a bargaining strategy’.33 
The most representative metal industry trade unions at national level have developed 
a threefold strategy to confront the pressures aimed at promoting decentralisation of 
collective bargaining.
First, the negotiation of modi¿ cations in the chapter on collective bargaining structure 
in the existing National Metal Industry Agreement. This was a reaction to the labour 
market legal reforms approved in 2011,34 aimed at, among other things, undermining 
the role of provincial collective agreements in favour of company agreements.
An agreement was ¿ nally concluded in January 2012,35 and in its preamble the social 
partners state that 
the current intention to strengthen the company level as the basic level of bargaining 
cannot ignore or be unaware that our sector is made up of medium-sized and, 
above all, small enterprises whose dimensions and characteristics are not the most 
appropriate for negotiating a collective agreement. For this reason, sectoral or sub-
sectoral collective agreements should continue to set the minimum conditions for 
companies and workers in their territorial scope.
Second, the negotiation of the ¿ rst national-level statutory collective agreement in the 
metal industry, after 20 years of failed attempts.36 One key trade union goal was to avoid 
the eɣ ects of the 2012 labour market reform, which among other things limited the 
continuity of collective agreements to one year after their expiry.37 
The main concern of the trade unions was that, due to the lack of a higher level 
agreement, most of the workers could loss the protection of an sectoral agreement with 
the expiration of the existing provincial agreements.
The outcome of bargaining was the ¿ rst national-level industry, technology and services 
collective agreement in the metal sector (Convenio Colectivo Estatal de la Industria, la 
Tecnología y los Servicios del Metal), signed in March 2016 by CONFEMETAL and the 
most representative trade unions at national level (CCOO and UGT). This agreement 
was renewed in March 2017, with the signing of the second national-level collective 
agreement in the sector.
32. The limitation of the temporary extension rule for expired collective agreements.
33. Interview with a representative of CONFEMETAL, quoted in Fernández et al. (2016).
34. Royal Decree Law 7/2011 of 10 June, of urgent measures for the reform of the collective bargaining.
35. Agreement for the modi¿ cation of the National Metal Industry Agreement (published in the Oɤ  cial State 
Bulletin, 22/2/2012).
36. Mainly due to the opposition of the employer’s association (CONFEMETAL).
37. Before this reform, this continuity was legally inde¿ nite until a new agreement was reached.
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The third strategy has aimed at mitigating the worst social eɣ ects of the crisis at company 
level with the negotiation of ‘defensive agreements’, which have been very common 
particularly in the automotive industry. In short, these agreements allowed temporary 
deterioration of working conditions – in terms of wages and especially working time 
À exibility í in exchange for job preservation and future investment.
4.2.4  Final remarks
Collective bargaining in the metal industry has been under pressure, as in the case of the 
retail sector, due to the combined impacts of the crisis and the labour market reforms 
approved since 2010, particularly those of 2012. 
This has led, in the ¿ rst instance, to a decline in collective bargaining during this period. 
Second, analysis of the potential eɣ ects of the measures established by the 2012 labour 
market reform aimed at favouring the decentralisation of collective bargaining yields 
the following conclusions:
– There has been a slight increase in the weight of company-level agreements, although 
this has not caused a substantial alteration in the existing structure of collective 
bargaining in the metal industry. This is because the new agreements at company 
level have been signed to a large extent by small ¿ rms. Also, most employers have 
opted to take advantage of other measures included in the 2012 labor market 
reform, aimed at boosting unilateral internal À exibility at company level. Finally, 
it is worth noting the defence of the continuity of provincial-level bargaining by the 
employers’ confederation.
– The legal limitation of the temporary extension rule for expired collective agreements 
has not had a real impact, although this reform has been used as a kind of threat in 
negotiations. 
– The main eɣ ect of the labour market reform has no doubt been to strengthen 
wage devaluation, which was already happening in response to the impact of the 
economic crisis in the metal industry. Thus, on one hand there has been signi¿ cant 
wage moderation, although with slight signs of recovery since 2014 in the context 
of the fragile economic revival. On the other hand there has been a sharp fall in real 
wages in the sector.
Against this background, the most representative trade unions at national level have 
pursued a threefold strategy: (i) preserving the role of provincial collective agreements, 
ensuring the sectoral structure of collective bargaining and improving coordination 
among the diɣ erent bargaining levels; (ii) mitigating the worst social eɣ ects of the crisis 
at company level by negotiating ‘defensive agreements’; and (iii) negotiating the ¿ rst 
statutory national-level agreement pertaining to industry, technology and services in 
the metal sector, which was ¿ nally reached in 2016, after 20 years of failed attempts.
It is worth highlighting that trade unions in the metal industry are not against company-
level collective bargaining, but they are de¿ nitely opposed to the model of ‘disorganised
decentralisation’ being pushed in the European South by the labour market reforms 
approved under the umbrella of New European Economic Governance. This process 
has seriously eroded  the dynamics of collective bargaining – it has even brought about 
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their collapse in the extreme case of Greece – as well as a profound deterioration in 
working conditions and living standards.
5.  Summary and conclusions
Collective bargaining in Spain has been under strain since the onset of the Great 
Recession. This can be explained, on one hand, by the stronger impact of the crisis in 
Spain compared with other European countries, especially in terms of job destruction. 
The signi¿ cant worsening of the economic and social situation created a tough context 
for the normal development of industrial relations. For example, there was practically a 
‘blockade’ of collective bargaining in the ¿ rst two years of the crisis.
On the other hand, the New European Economic Governance launched in 2010 
established the decentralisation of collective bargaining as a key goal of country-speci¿ c 
recommendations (particularly for southern European countries).
The labour law reforms adopted in various European countries show some diɣ erences in 
terms of contents and scope. Nevertheless, comparative analysis allows us to highlight 
two common trends: 
(i) A certain democratic defi cit with regard to governance, as the labour law reforms 
have been adopted mainly without consultation and negotiation with the social 
partners.
(ii) The bias of the reforms towards more fl exible regulation of collective bargaining, 
emphasising three key goals: (a) giving a major new ‘push’ to the decentralisation 
of collective bargaining; (b) fostering wage devaluation in order to reinforce the 
competitiveness of the national economies; and (c) deepening the asymmetry 
between capital and labour at company level by strengthening employers’ power 
to regulate working conditions unilaterally.
Labour law has been subjected to continuous reform in Spain during this period, the 
most important being the reforms adopted by the Conservative government in 2012. 
This reform is unanimously considered a landmark in Spanish labour law regulation.
One of the major goals of the 2012 labour law reforms was to push the decentralisation 
of collective bargaining, through three main mechanisms: (i) widening employers’ 
possibilities for temporarily suspending sectoral or company-level collective agreements; 
(ii) limitation of the temporary extension rule for expired collective agreements; and 
(iii) giving absolute priority to company-level collective agreements over sectoral ones 
in a number of respects.
Analysis of the eɣ ects of these measures on collective bargaining developments between 
2012 and 2015 yields four main ¿ ndings:
(i) The labour law reforms enacted during this period of crisis have fostered the 
development of new collective agreements at company level. Nevertheless, to date this 
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process has not caused a substantial alteration of the formal structure of collective 
bargaining (in terms of the weight of sectoral and company level agreements).
In fact, if we focus on the evolution of collective agreements registered by the year in 
which their economic eɣ ects became known, statistical data show that the weight of the 
company-level agreements decreased from 10.2 per cent of workers covered in 2008 to 
8.4 per cent in 2014.38 
There are a number of diɣ erent reasons for this: 
– Most new collective agreements were signed by small or medium-sized ¿ rms, with 
low coverage. 
– The creation of new collective agreements at company level may represent a risk for 
many employers in terms of higher transaction costs, higher bargaining costs and 
potential labour conÀ icts associated with encouraging workers’ participation.
– Employers have taken advantage of other measures drawn from the 2012 labour 
reform, such as: wider possibilities for temporary derogations from collective 
agreements at company level; and, especially, reinforcement of the employer’s 
unilateral power to modify working conditions 
– Union strategies aimed at maintaining the continuity of sectoral collective 
agreements, even at the expense of the devaluation of their contents (especially in 
terms of wage freezes or devaluation, and higher À exibility or working time).
(ii) Two controversial issues arise from the development of the new company-level 
agreements created after the 2012 labour law reform. On one hand, it is worth noting 
the signing of various new collective agreements in pejus, namely, agreements whose 
provisions are inferior to those of higher bargaining levels (particularly with regard to 
wages). In some cases these agreements even tried to operate retroactively, although 
the labour courts later struck this down.
On the other hand, there have been problems with regard to the legitimacy of the 
actors involved in the negotiation of some new company-level agreements, in particular 
workers’ representatives in smaller companies.
(iii) The most important eɣ ect of the labour law reforms adopted since 2010 has no 
doubt been strong wage devaluation, which has exacerbated the social situation in 
Spain, with a general rise in inequality and poverty levels; as a result, the at-risk-of-
poverty or social exclusion rate increased to 28.6 per cent of the population in 2014; and 
the in-work poverty rate Ɋ the so-called ‘working poor’ Ɋ rose to 14.8 per cent.39 
(iv) The 2012 labour law reforms have strongly deepened the power asymmetry between 
capital and labour, strengthening the capacity of employers to regulate working 
conditions at company level unilaterally. This has laid the foundations for a more 
38. Statistics on collective agreements, Ministry of Employment and Social Security. Data related to collective 
agreements registered by year of economic eɣ ects (2014 is the last year available with de¿ nitive data).
39. Living Conditions Survey 2015, National Institute of Statistics (published in 2016, data related to 2014).
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authoritarian pattern of industrial relations, and also for the potential consolidation in 
the medium term of a model of ‘disorganised decentralisation’ of collective bargaining. 
In this regard, we have noted that this disorganised decentralisation poses a number of 
challenges (Martín and Alos 2016):
– The characteristics of the business structure in Spain, marked by the prevalence of 
small and micro companies.40 This environment is a breeding ground for patronising 
or even authoritarian industrial relations, thereby obstructing normal development 
of collective bargaining.
– The lack of a trade union in many SMEs, which can lead to the establishment of 
workers’ representatives strongly inÀ uenced by the employers.
– The risk of unfair competition and social dumping. This largely explains the 
reluctance of many employers to discard the sectoral collective agreements, because 
they provide an umbrella for a minimum common regulation of economic and 
working conditions for all the companies aɣ ected.
Against this background, the general strategy of the most representative trade unions 
for the coming years is structured around two key goals. 
First, promotion of wage growth in order to ensure the recovery of purchasing power 
after years of internal devaluation, and taking into account the signs of economic 
recovery registered since 2014.
In this regard, it is worth noting the Third Inter-confederal Agreement on Employment 
and Collective Bargaining 2015, 2016 and 2017, signed on 8 June 2015 by the most 
representative social partners at national level. In this text, which provides guidelines 
for the development of collective bargaining at all levels, the social partners state 
that ‘a breakthrough in wage growth, if possible in line with economic reality in the 
diɣ erent sectors and/or across the economy, and the absence of inÀ ationary pressure 
in the Spanish economy would help to increase workers’ purchasing power and further 
improve our competitiveness, thereby preserving and creating jobs’. 
Thus, a wage increase of ‘up to 1 per cent’ was agreed in 2015 and one of ‘up to 1.5 per 
cent’ in 2016. Nevertheless the guideline for 2017 is still the subject of controversy at 
the time of writing (June 2017), because the trade unions were demanding a higher 
wage increase, taking into account overall economic performance, which has not been 
accepted by the employer’s confederation.
Second, the defence of a model of ‘organised decentralisation’ of collective bargaining, 
emphasising two key elements: 
On one hand, the role of sectoral collective agreements in order to ensure a minimum 
À oor of working conditions and rights for workers, but also to avoid the risk of unfair 
40. In January 2016 there were 1.4 million companies with employees in Spain, of which 90.4 per cent had fewer 
than 10 workers, and 62 per cent one or two. See Central Business Register, National Institute of Statistics (data 
published on 29/7/2016).
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competition and social dumping for companies. One clear example of this approach is 
the ¿ rst national-level collective agreement signed in the metal industry in 2016.
On the other hand, the importance of coordination among the diɣ erent levels of 
collective bargaining, as a way of guaranteeing À exible and fair adaptation of working 
conditions to companies’ changing circumstances.
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Chapter 8
The impact of the European Semester on collective 
bargaining and wages in recent years
Kristian Bongelli
1. Introduction1
The question of whether the EU has competence over collective bargaining and wages 
is of fundamental importance for the trade union movement. The answer is more 
complex than it may seem and forms the basis on which the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC) has developed strategies to cope with economic governance 
over the past few years. However, in order to fully understand the trade union position, 
we need to look brieÀ y at what the European semester is and how it works. This will 
provide an analytical framework for the ETUC’s approach and a proper understanding 
of its two phases. The strategy that is being implemented to counteract and (re-)balance 
the policies imposed via the European semester and to make the latter more socially-
oriented is addressed in Section 2. In Section 3 we look at the improvements and results 
achieved by trade unions within this framework. Looking ¿ rst at the EU as a whole, 
we then examine the ¿ ve target countries of the DECOBA project – Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain – more closely. Finally, we draw conclusions confronting 
recommended policies with trade unions’ views and demands.
2.  Does the European Union have competence over collective 
 bargaining and wages?2
The 2008 crisis made it self-evident that, from the adoption of the single currency, 
the economies of the European Member States became ever more interwoven. Growth 
would spread from one country to another, but so too would any imbalance. The 
Economic and Monetary Union needs more coordinated policies among the national 
levels, especially within the framework of the euro area. This assumption pushed the 
governments of the Member States to design a new form of coordinated exercise of 
public power in the economic domain. In 2011, the European semester for economic 
policy coordination (referred to below as ‘the Semester’) was formally introduced.3 
1. This chapter is based mainly on positions and working documents of the ETUC, developed over the period 
2014–2017 (that is, semester cycles of 2015, 2016, 2017 and start of 2018) in the frame of the daily work on 
collective bargaining, wage policy and the European semester.
2. The description of how the European Semester works in this paragraph is based mainly on Arrigo et al. (2016).
3. See Section I-A, Council Regulation 1466/97/EU of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of 
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, as amended by the Regulation 
(EU) No 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance 
and coordination of economic policies. The Regulation 1175/2011 is one of the legislative instruments of the so-
called Six Pack’.
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The Semester is an innovative decision-making process – halfway between the 
Community and the intergovernmental method – through which the European Member 
States design their policies for budgetary surveillance, ¿ scal consolation and economic 
coordination. In a nutshell, it aims at achieving the following objectives in a single and 
consistent framework of action: deepening and completing the single market, while 
maintaining stable macroeconomic conditions. 
Within the governance of the single currency, each Member State runs a stability or 
convergence programme.4 This implies a transferral of a certain degree of sovereignty to 
the supranational level with a view to coordinating economic and social policies, as well 
as completing the single market. A particular feature of the Semester process is a certain 
degree of shared decision-making among countries, while holding each government 
accountable with regard to the other Member States. For this to happen, the Semester 
goes through a complicated series of interwoven cycles5 and documentation. The cycle 
starts in September and lasts until July.6 For the sake of simplicity, one can summarise 
them in four main steps: 
First, the European Commission sets the political priorities for the coming year in the 
so-called ‘Autumn Package’,7  which comprises the following documents:
(i)  The Annual Growth Survey lays down the broad economic guidelines. The 
document focuses on investment, structural reforms and ¿ scal consolidation.
(ii)  The Joint Employment Report analyses the employment and social situation 
in Europe and the policy responses of national governments. For a long time 
this was a document of minor importance, but that has changed from the 2018 
cycle onwards thanks to the introduction of the European Pillar of Social Rights 
(EPSR) and the consequent stronger focus on social performance. The latter is 
now monitored via the social scoreboard.8 
(iii)  The Alert Mechanism Report, based on a scoreboard of indicators, identi¿ es 
countries that may be aɣ ected by economic imbalances and for which the 
Commission should undertake further in-depth reviews within the Country 
Reports. It is the ¿ rst step in the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, which 
aims to prevent or address imbalances that hinder the smooth functioning of 
national economies, the eurozone or the EU as a whole.
4. All the countries of the European Union should indeed adopt the euro sooner or later, excluding Denmark and 
the UK – which is currently under negotiations for withdrawing from the European Union. For the time being, 
Greece is excluded from the semester process, being under a speci¿ c ¿ nancial assistance programme.
5. There are indeed more and diɣ erent cycles within economic governance. However, for the sake of simplicity, it 
is more opportune to refer to the European Semester as it was a single cycle. There is indeed no clear distinction 
among them as most documents serve the purposes of several cycles at the same time, such as the Country 
Reports. For a more complete explanation of the European Semester, see the following: https://ec.europa.eu/
info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-¿ scal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-
prevention-correction/european-semester_en
6. Since the beginning of the Juncker Commission, the timing of the semester was modi¿ ed so to allow a better 
involvement of stakeholders, notably national parliaments and social partners.
7. For more info see the following: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-¿ scal-policy-
coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/european-semester/european-
semester-timeline/setting-priorities_en.
8. For more details, see the conclusions of this chapter.
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(iv)  Recommendation for the euro area addresses issues critical to the functioning of 
the single currency area.
(v)  Opinion on draft budget plans for euro-area countries assesses the compliance 
of national budget plans with the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP).
The ‘Autumn Package’ is usually released at the end of November. However, the drafting 
process starts in September, at the end of which DG Employment holds a consultation 
meeting with the European9 and national social partners on the broad economic 
guidelines, mainly the Annual Growth Survey.10  
Second, on the basis of the political priorities set out in the ‘Autumn Package’, the 
European Commission analyses the ¿ nancial and socio-economic situation of each 
Member State and identi¿ es critical areas for reform via the Country Reports. Such 
documents – one for every member state – are published between the end of February 
and the beginning of March. During the drafting period, in order to enhance the 
ownership of the process, as well as to share analysis and objectives, the Commission 
involves the diɣ erent stakeholders at European and national level. Notably, it organises 
informal consultations with the European social partners in Brussels,11 undertakes fact-
¿ nding missions in each member state to discuss issues with governments and national 
social partners and liaises with those actors via its European semester oɤ  cials (so-
called ESOs).12  
Third, on the base of critical areas identi¿ ed by the Commission via the Country reports, 
reforms to be undertaken by each government are laid down in the National Plans.13 It is 
crucial to stress the fact that, of course, every government is completely free to design its 
own policy measures in response to the abovementioned challenges. The National Plans 
are generally due between the middle or the end of April. 
The fourth and ¿ nal step is the Country Speci¿ c Recommendations (CSR). They 
represent the ¿ nal output of the semester and embody the abovementioned shared 
decision-making among national governments. The CSR are proposed by the European 
Commission in mid May, on the basis of the ‘discrepancies’ between the objectives 
commonly set out and the actions proposed by each government in the National Plans. 
Basically, they can be regarded as a request to adapt government policies in order 
to make sure agreed objectives will be met. A couple of years ago the Commission 
committed to streamline the content of CSRs and reduce their number. To this end, the 
Commission has focused the CSRs on the countries’ most urgent challenges. The CSRs 
9. The ETUC for the workers’ side, BusinessEurope, CEEP and UEAPME for the employers’ side.
10. The consultation documents of the European social partners are attached to the AGS and made publicly 
available on the following webpage: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-
¿ scal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/european-semester/
european-semester-timeline/setting-priorities_en.
11. Concerning these consultation meetings with the ETUC and its member organisations, see the following 
paragraph.
12. The list of ESOs for each member state can be found on the following webpage: https://ec.europa.eu/info/
about-european-commission/contact/local-oɤ  ces-eu-member-countries_en.
13. ‘National Plans’ is a new expression used by the Commission and include both National Reform Programmes 
(NRP) and Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCP).
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are then discussed and endorsed by the European Council (in diɣ erent compositions) 
and formally adopted by the Council around the ¿ rst week of July. The Council has the 
power to endorse, drop or amend these draft CSRs. In general, ‘it is expected to, as a 
rule, adopt the recommendations proposed by the Commission or publicly explain its 
position’.14 Once adopted, the CSRs are ‘politically binding’ and 
are to be taken into account by Member States in the process of national decision-
making. A failure to implement the recommendations might result in further 
procedural steps under the relevant EU law and ultimately in sanctions under the 
SGP and the MIP. These sanctions might include ¿ nes15 and/or suspension of up to 
¿ ve European Funds, namely the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), 
the European Social Fund (ESF), the Cohesion Fund (CF), the European Agricultural 
Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and the European Maritime and Fisheries 
Fund (EMFF).  (European Parliament [Hradiský] 2017)
So far, the Commission has not issued any sanctions against Member States, even when 
CSRs were not implemented. Nevertheless, experience has made it crystal clear that, 
when a country ¿ nd itself in a diɤ  cult situation – and, as a consequence, its bargaining 
power is low vis-à-vis the European partners – the CSR become more substantial and 
the country comes under more pressure to implement it. On the other hand, very 
often CSRs are welcomed by the receiving government, which sees them as a means 
of undertaking desired reforms while minimising the ‘political shock’, as responsibility 
can be attributed to the usual suspect, namely the European Union.
From what we have just said two elements indicate the answer to the opening question:
(i) the European Commission has a mandate for analysing, monitoring and proposing 
policies;
(ii) decision-making power rests in the hands of the European Council (in other 
words, the national governments themselves).
The reason for these roles is extremely simple. As mentioned above, the semester is half 
way between the Community and intergovernmental methods, as it presents a number 
of peculiarities: (i) it was created by international treaty, other than the treaties of the 
EU, that have not been signed by all the Member States, such as the Euro Plus Pact and 
the Fiscal Compact; and (ii) it makes use of the European institutions – giving them new 
roles, other than those established by the Treaties – to put in place intergovernmental 
programmes. However, by doing so, the related domains (under which collective 
bargaining and wages also fall) are still a national competence but have been put under 
a common umbrella with a view to reaching commonly agreed objectives. 
14. European Parliament [Hradiský] 2017, At a glance. The legal nature of Country Speci¿ c Recommendations, 
European Parliament, IPOL-EGOV, 2017. The brie¿ ng can be found here: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
RegData/etudes/ATAG/2014/528767/IPOL_ATA(2014)528767_EN.pdf.
15. The Commission threatened Member States (Spain and Portugal) with ¿ nes for the ¿ rst time in 2016, see: 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/euro-¿ nance/news/commission-threatens-spain-and-portugal-with-¿ nes/. 
However, the ¿ nes were subsequently dropped, see: https://www.ft.com/content/dɣ 5e6d2-540c-11e6-9664-
e0bdc13c3bef.
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This brings us to an answer to the question kept in mind from the beginning. Do the 
European institutions have competence over collective bargaining and wages? They do, 
but only to a certain extent. This has been the state of aɣ airs since the Member States 
signed oɣ  on the treaties establishing the new economic governance. In this frame, 
collective bargaining systems and wages are indeed scrutinised as factors contributing 
to the EU’s economic performance. Thus, while the Commission is responsible for 
analysis and monitoring,16 the Council is accountable for the recommendations issued. 
This system has been designed, of course, to avoid any further extension of the core 
competences of the European Union itself. At the end of the day, therefore, national 
governments are still responsible for the policies implemented in their own country,17 
even though those national competences have been – to a certain degree – shared with 
their peers.18 
However, acknowledging this does not mean that the resulting interference in collective 
bargaining and wages is acceptable or justi¿ ed. These are areas traditionally reserved 
for the autonomy of social partners, areas from which, traditionally, governments 
have refrained. Only autonomous negotiations between the social partners can 
guarantee a fair balance of the interests of businesses and workers. Nevertheless, as 
we are currently experiencing, the ‘institutional environment’ conducive to collective 
bargaining may change. The governments or, better, the national parliaments, in their 
capacity as legislators, can surely decide otherwise. It is then up to the trade unions 
to step up, mobilise and take action to defend their fundamental prerogatives on 
collective bargaining and wages from this wave of state interventionism. This is why 
the European trade union movement has decided to get more involved in talks with 
the Commission and governments within the framework of Economic governance. The 
aim is to inÀ uence its content to strengthen the social dimension and, by doing so, to 
better defend workers’ interests. In a nutshell, inÀ uencing decisions rather than simply 
reacting after they are already taken.
3.  From reacting to inﬂ uencing: the trade unions’ response to the 
 European semester for economic policy coordination
The European Semester, and in particular the CSR, addresses many topics within the 
core activities of trade unions. The list indeed does not end with collective bargaining 
and wages. Other ¿ elds of concern for the unions addressed by the Semester over the 
years are those encompassed in the so-called structural reforms. Notably, employment 
and labour market, pensions, unemployment bene¿ ts and the welfare system in general. 
Last but not least, the budgetary and ¿ scal reforms, which have negatively impacted 
public expenditure – especially public services – and investment. 
16. This is, by the way, a political exercise itself as the benchmarks used as well as the evaluation of social and 
economic policies can be driven by a political or ideological thinking.
17. Of course, together with the national parliaments.
18. A concrete example may be helpful for understanding this dichotomy. Over the past few years, the Commission 
has been putting forward a CSR on the need to make the Austrian pension system sustainable in the long term, 
a recommendation always endorsed by the Council. Nevertheless, so far the Austrian government has opposed 
this request, considering it unjusti¿ ed.
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In the ¿ rst years of the crisis, the ¿ ght against austerity measures was conducted mainly 
at national level. The situation remained unchanged when the Semester was introduced. 
The trade unions strongly opposed it, regarding it as a method for imposing austerity 
and cuts on countries weakened by debt. Another peculiarity of the Semester is its 
‘democratic de¿ cit’. As an intergovernmental process, it dispenses with supranational 
democratic accountability with regard to the decisions taken. The involvement of the 
European Parliament was and remains a mere (and late) formality rather than a real 
exercise of control. The same happened with the European social partners who were 
consulted solely in merely formal settings in which they could express their views, but 
with no ability to inÀ uence policymaking. Under these conditions, the trade unions were 
able to do nothing more than react to and reject decisions that, usually, had already 
been taken. 
Between 2013 and 2014 the ETUC started working on the Semester dossier in a more 
structured way. Informal coordination was established in order to reach common 
positions with a view to preparing for the consultations. In the meantime, within the 
framework of the ETUC Collective Bargaining and Wages Coordination Committee, a 
¿ rst ‘Semester toolkit’ was being developed with the aim of monitoring the Semester’s 
impact on collective bargaining and wages in the EU countries and sharing information 
in a two-way À ow: between the national unions and the secretariat, on one hand, and 
among aɤ  liates themselves, on the other. Although the feedback generally came from 
between 15 and 18 countries – that is, approximately half the EU Member States – the 
toolkit proved to be a valuable source of information for a comparative analysis of the 
situation, thereby providing sound arguments for inclusion in the ETUC documents 
for the consultations. The toolkit was based on three pillars: monitoring of trade union 
involvement in the Semester at national level; monitoring of respect for fundamental 
trade union rights; and trade union assessment of the CSR, as well as of actions 
undertaken by governments. The ¿ ndings obtained by means of these tools found their 
way into three annual documents. 
In late 2014 the European trade unions decided to change their approach. The decision 
was not an easy one. Simply reacting to the diɣ erent Semester documents and rejecting 
austerity measures did not deliver results for workers and citizens. It even undermined 
the unions’ position to some extent as, in many countries, criticisms were raised claiming 
that the trade unions had been unable to properly ful¿ l their role of opposing austerity. 
The new strategy was to develop stronger internal coordination and to establish a 
structured dialogue with the Commission, especially with DG Employment. This second 
goal might have exposed the trade unions to the charge of ‘fraternising with the enemy’, 
legitimising the process and – at least partly – ‘healing’ its democratic de¿ cit with no 
guarantee of being able to inÀ uence it. However, after almost six years of crisis and 
three of the New Economic Governance, it was high time to step up union eɣ orts and 
shift from a reactive to an active stance. 
The ETUC launched a project to re¿ ne the tools developed in the previous toolkit and 
extend the areas of work. More stable coordination across such areas of work was 
established and reinforced, including collective bargaining and wages, economics 
and taxation, employment and labour market, social protection, education and skills, 
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migration, youth, gender and equal opportunities. Other ¿ elds may be added in the 
near future. In the meantime, each trade union organisation was asked to appoint 
a responsible person to coordinate inputs from the national unions to the ETUC, 
liaising with the Commission’s European Semester Oɤ  cers based in that country and 
participating in the consultation meetings that would take place with the Commission 
and Council committees in Brussels. By December 2017 (the time of writing), the group 
comprised 51 TUSLO (trade union semester liaison oɤ  cers) from 28 countries and four 
European sectoral federations. Together with the ETUC secretariat, they are part of a 
structured dialogue with DG Employment. Consultations are held regularly in advance 
of the drafting of the Annual Growth Survey (end of September) and Country Reports 
(between end of November and beginning of December). A follow-up assessment 
meeting takes place after the latter are released in order to raise critical priorities not 
taken into consideration by the Commission in its analysis. 
In parallel, three tools have been developed in the new toolkit (the so-called ‘ETUC 
Semester Toolkit 2.0’ 19) to prepare and support the ETUC and its aɤ  liates through 
these meetings. The ¿ rst is the document ‘ETUC for growth and social progress. 
Priorities for the broad economic guidelines’. It concerns the de¿ nition of common 
trade union priorities for the whole EU to be addressed in the following Semester cycle 
and to be submitted at the consultations on the AGS. This paper is developed by the 
secretariat, together with the members of the ETUC permanent committees in charge 
of the relevant dossiers. The draft is then adopted by the ETUC Executive Committee 
and so becomes an oɤ  cial common position of the European trade union movement.20 
The second supports the trade union semester liaison oɤ  cers in compiling the so-
called national trade union inputs for country reports.21 This identi¿ es the most urgent 
challenges that should be addressed by each government and puts forward the trade 
unions’ key demands (policy measures to be applied). The ultimate goal is a written 
exchange with the Commission aimed at inÀ uencing the Country Reports with clear 
and evidence-backed demands. The drafting lasts almost two months (October and 
November) as trade unions generally go through their departments and constituencies 
for each of the dossiers involved. The various national inputs are then fed into the ETUC 
report on trade union inputs for country reports, which is forwarded to the Commission 
in preparation for the early stage consultation meeting, which takes place generally 
between the end of November and the beginning of December. A second consultation 
meeting is usually held after the Country Reports are published in order to raise urgent 
issues which have not been taken into consideration. 
The third tool is an online survey monitoring the involvement of trade unions in the 
Semester at national level at the various milestones of each Semester cycle. Such 
19. The ETUC semester toolkit 2.0 was developed within the framework of of the EU-funded project ‘ETUC 
Semester 2.0 – Enabling a trade union inÀ uential presence in the European semester’. The dedicated webpage 
is accessible to ETUC members only, while the online toolkit itself can be exclusively used by TUSLOs.
20. After its adoption, the ¿ nal document is oɤ  cially sent to the Commission and it is attached to the AGS. For 
instance, the 2018 version is publicly available here: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/
economic-and-¿ scal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/
european-semester/european-semester-timeline/setting-priorities_en.
21. A sort of brief country report drafted by trade unions.
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monitoring is based on the ETUC de¿ nition of quality involvement22 and performs an 
extensive analysis of: (i) the format of the consultations; (ii) relevance and the timely 
disclosure of information; (iii) the appropriateness of the interlocutors – at political and 
technical level; and (iv) the consideration given to trade union analysis and positions. 
Eventually, at the end of each cycle, the ETUC secretariat, supported by the trade union 
semester liaison oɤ  cers, releases an assessment of the CSR and the whole cycle to take 
stock of improvements and results. The abovementioned project came to an end in 
September 2017. A follow-up project to further strengthen this strategy was launched 
in December 2017, as some good results have been achieved – at both European and 
national level – through such dialogue with the Commission.23 
However, all this work was possible also thanks to the political support provided by the 
‘fresh start’ instigated by Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, who committed 
himself to relaunching the social dialogue. This was indeed clearly visible in the attitudes 
of Commission oɤ  cials, who were much keener to listen to and discuss priorities and 
policies with the trade unions throughout the entire cycle than in previous years.
4.  Collective bargaining and wages in the Semester over 
 2014–2017: business as usual24
4.1 A brief overview of the EU as a whole
The importance of the European Semester with regard to wages and collective 
bargaining has remained stable. From 2011 to 2016 – excluding 2013 – the number 
of country-speci¿ c recommendations in these areas varied between 11 and 14. In 
2017, they again numbered 14, which means they cover more than half of the EU 
Member States, considering that Greece was under a ¿ nancial assistance programme 
and the United Kingdom is involved in talks on leaving the EU. Looking only at the 
recommendations focusing on wage-formation mechanisms – generally aimed at 
fostering the decentralisation of collective bargaining – it is worth noting that over the 
past four years (2014–2017) they have numbered 11, 11, 12 and 14.25 Nevertheless, some 
minor improvements have been recorded.
The 2015 Semester cycle
At the end of the 2014–2015 cycle, the situation was in any case improving slightly in 
many respects. The Juncker Commission showed more À exibility on budget de¿ cits and 
22. The extensive de¿ nition can be found in the ETUC resolution on trade union involvement in the EU Semester, 
adopted at the Executive Committee on 14–15 December 2016. The resolution is available here: https://www.
etuc.org/documents/etuc-resolution-trade-union-involvement-eu-semester#.WoWje6jtyUk. The survey results 
can be found here: https://www.etuc.org/documents/new-start-social-dialogue-needs-change-pace-trade-
union-involvement-economic-governance#.WorteqjtyUl.
23. Please see the next paragraphs for an evaluation of the results produced.
24. This paragraph is mainly based on previous ETUC documents. Some of them are publicly accessible on the 
ETUC website, while some others were developed for internal purposes and not available. The analysis of 
the macroeconomic impact of the CSR on wages has been performed by Ronald Janssen, then ETUC Chief 
Economist and currently at the OECD-TUAC.
25. For a deeper comparative analysis of social-related CSR in qualitative and quantitative terms, please see S. 
Clauwaert (2017).
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CSR were generally a bit more positive than in previous years, although this was not the 
case with regard to collective bargaining and wages. In general, the Commission’s advice 
on pay was still based on the mantra that ‘wages are to evolve in line with productivity’ 
but its application of this key idea was unbalanced.
Some Member States, aɣ ected by the problem of real wages systematically lagging 
behind productivity developments, did not receive any wage recommendation at all. 
One of the most striking examples was Poland. As shown in Figure 1, from 2000 to 
2015, real wage growth in Poland had fallen short of productivity developments by a 
stunning 30 percentage points. 
Recommendations to improve wage dynamics were also conspicuously missing for those 
countries experiencing a growing number of working poor or large low-paid segments, 
such as Estonia and the United Kingdom. However, besides the abovementioned Member 
States, the key recommendation on wages and productivity was also disingenuous for 
many others, in particular for western European euro-area countries. Here, too, the 
Commission suggested that wages had outpaced productivity whereas, in reality, it was 
the other way around. Looking at the EU and the euro area as a whole (see Figure 2), 
the general trend is clear, with wages lagging around 10 per cent behind productivity 
developments. Nevertheless, the general policy was then to recommend that Member 
States compete against each other by squeezing wages, thereby – dangerously – de facto 
establishing the economies with the lowest wages as the benchmark for all. Turning a 
Figure 1 Wage and productivity developments in Poland 2000–2015
Source: The calculation was made by ETUC economist Matthieu Méaulle in preparation of the ETUC campaign 
‘Europe needs a pay rise’. Data on wages were taken from AMECO database: Real compensation per employee, 
deﬂ ator private consumption: total economy (RWCDC). Data on labour productivity were taken from: EUROSTAT 
database, Labour productivity per hour worked (ESA 2010). Base 100 was set according to the oldest data available.

90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
2015201420132012201120102009200820072006200520042003200220012000
Real compensation 2000=100 Labour productivity 2000=100
Kristian Bongelli
272  Multi-employer bargaining under pressure – Decentralisation trends in ﬁ ve European countries
blind eye to the risks of a beggar-thy-neighbour policy entailed the danger that this race 
to the bottom would end up in very low inÀ ation or even deÀ ation, for the euro area as 
a whole and/or for individual countries.26 
Furthermore, minimum wages were regarded as hampering economic growth due to 
their (presumed) adverse impact on job creation and competitiveness. Besides some of 
the DECOBA countries – which we will talk about later on – such a view was expressed 
in the cases of Portugal, Slovenia and Bulgaria. This totally ignored a large amount of 
research, not to mention experience showing that minimum wages, when introduced 
or raised, do not destroy jobs, but on the contrary foster positive trends.27 On top of 
26. This did indeed happen and the missing ingredient, as testi¿ ed by ECB forecasts, was – surprise surprise – 
wage growth.
27. See, for instance, Amlinger et al. (2016). The authors remark that ‘the negative eɣ ects on the labour market that 
were predicted by many economists did not materialise. On the contrary, employment in Germany has seen 
a continuous increase. Only so-called ‘mini jobs’ (a special form of marginal part-time employment) show a 
strong decline, but many of these were transformed into regular jobs subject to social insurance.’
Figure 2 Growth trends in average real wages and labour productivity in Europe and the Euro 
Area, 1996–2016
Source: This calculation was made within the framework of the ETUC campaign ‘Europe needs a pay rise’. Wage 
growth is calculated as a weighted average of year-on-year growth in average monthly real wages in 36 economies. 
The base year is set as 1999 for reasons of data availability. Source: ILO Global Wage Database; ILO Global 
Employment Trends (GET).
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that, in absolute terms the minimum wage remains low in these countries, especially in 
Bulgaria, where it is the lowest in the EU.28
In other words, after seven years of economic crisis, austerity and falling or stagnating 
wages, the Commission was still recommending a policy based on either wage cuts or 
wage ‘moderation’ when Europe desperately needed something else. This assumption 
was well underlined by an ETUC press release: 
‘The Commission continues to overlook the fact that wages in 23 Member States 
are lagging behind productivity. The Commission fails to identify, or react to, the 
redistribution from wages to pro¿ ts. Europe needs a wage rise for fairness and to 
increase demand, mainly by strengthening collective bargaining.’29 
At the same time, besides suggesting overall wage squeezes for entire economies, the 
Commission was also using the formula of ‘wages in line with productivity’ to promote the 
fragmentation and decentralisation of collective bargaining and wage formation across 
individual sectors and ¿ rms, regions and skills. Moreover, social partner autonomy in 
setting wages was being challenged also by the newly proposed ‘competitiveness boards’ 
– without any prior consultation with the trade unions. These bodies – built upon 
the example of Belgium’s National Labour Council – were meant to advise the social 
partners and thereby to narrow their margin of manoeuvre for negotiations. Reacting 
to the so-called Five Presidents’ Report,30 former ETUC General Secretary Bernadette 
Ségol expressed strong opposition, reaɤ  rming who should control wage setting:
‘There is no way trade unions would accept a body separate from the social partners 
giving advice on wage negotiations. (…) Wage setting is the role of autonomous 
social partners. What the European Commission (…) fails to mention is that the 
[similar] authority in Belgium is run by employers and trade unions – it is not a 
separate body handing down advice to social partners to follow.’31 
The 2016 Semester cycle
At the beginning of the 2016 cycle, the European Commission promised a more socially-
oriented Semester, respecting the autonomy of the social partners. The 2016 Country 
Reports then provided for an in-depth investigation of the socio-economic situation 
in each Member State. Moreover, as had been announced in the Communication on 
Steps Forward Completing Economic and Monetary Union,32 the 2016 Country Reports 
also measured social performance. The benchmarking was supposed to promote social 
28. For a comparison of minimum wages per hour worked see ETUI Benchmarking Working Europe 2017, p. 41.
29. https://www.etuc.org/press/country-speci¿ c-recommendations-2015-eu-needs-increase-wages#.
WYSapVGrRdg
30. The Five Presidents’ Report is a document setting the way forward for the European Union, drafted by 
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, in close cooperation with Council President Donald Tusk, 
Euro Group President Jeroen Dijsselbloem, European Central Bank President Mario Draghi and European 
Parliament President Martin Schulz. It was published on 22 June 2015 and available at: https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/publications/¿ ve-presidents-report-completing-europes-economic-and-monetary-union_en
31. https://www.etuc.org/press/trade-unions-employers-should-set-wages-not-5-presidents-
%E2%80%98competitiveness-authorities#.WYSazFGrRdg
32. https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2015/EN/1-2015-600-EN-F1-1.PDF
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convergence but the social targets were biased. Moreover, it is worth highlighting that 
‘best practices’ as regards collective bargaining and wage setting were unilaterally 
selected by the Commission. This was part-time the detriment of the overall coherence 
of the analysis, generating paradoxes. For instance, the Estonian collective bargaining 
system, characterised by the highest level of decentralisation in the EU, was considered 
to be the most ‘eɤ  cient’, while Croatia was considered ‘ineɤ  cient’ because national 
collective bargaining proved able to protect workers against less favourable working 
time arrangements provided by law. Once again, this was a sign of a rigid ideological 
conviction that structured forms of collective bargaining hamper reforms, ignoring 
their success as a democratic and balanced way to co-regulate the labour market. 
Unfortunately – and despite some concrete improvements in the social ¿ eld – the 
ensuing country-speci¿ c recommendations kept going in the same direction. That wave 
of CSR dogmatically proposed the same failed economic policies of previous years, while 
prompting further interference in collective bargaining and wages throughout Europe. 
Belgium, France, Portugal and Spain received recommendations questioning their 
wage-setting systems and employment protection legislation. The biased reading of 
the centralised collective bargaining model proved diɤ  cult to throw oɣ . Eventually, in 
countries deviating from the Stability and Growth Pact rules, the Commission advanced 
the outdated macroeconomic solutions which had been causing stagnation and severe 
social consequences for so long. Even though the country reports had recognised that the 
weak recovery countries were experiencing was driven mainly by private consumption, 
the CSR did not provide much support for the missing ingredient to relaunch the 
European economy that the ETUC had been demanding for years, namely a generalised 
upward wage dynamic to boost domestic demand. Commenting on the draft CSR just 
released, the then-Deputy General Secretary Veronica Nilsson made crystal clear the 
severe disappointment of the trade unions:
‘The ETUC is very concerned that the Commission is again interfering in the 
autonomy of the social partners and collective bargaining. It’s wrong to claim 
that the increase in minimum wages in Portugal would harm employment and 
competitiveness as it is wrong to claim that the minimum wage in France hampers 
employment. On the contrary, what Europe needs is an increase in minimum wages, 
wage increases through enhanced collective bargaining to boost growth and tackle 
inequality, and action to end precarious employment. The Commissioners repeated 
as usual the need for structural reforms of the labour market which in the past have 
led to less collective bargaining, lower wages and higher unemployment. Europe 
does not need more of the same tried, tested and failed policies.’33 
The 2017 Semester cycle
The 2017 Semester cycle began with some positive novelties. In October 2016, for 
the ¿ rst time ever, the Council’s Employment Committee (EMCO) undertook a sort 
of multilateral surveillance exercise, monitoring the involvement of social partners 
in the Semester at national level. National governments, Commission oɤ  cials and 
33. https://www.etuc.org/press/economic-package-commission-wrong-collective-bargaining-minimum-wages#.
WcZy_sirRdg
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representatives of trade union organisations and employers’ associations gathered to 
perform a peer review of involvement practises in the Member States. Irrespective of 
the – positive – results,34 the event was concrete evidence of the Juncker Commission’s 
commitment to revamp the social dialogue. 
The AGS35 was issued in November, moving forward along this track. The ETUC 
expressed its appreciation for the Commission’s emphasis on the key role that social 
dialogue can play in designing and implementing economic and social policies. 
Finally, the social partners were recognised as responsible macroeconomic actors once 
again. The Commission indeed acknowledged that social dialogue is crucial for well-
functioning social market economies, as shown by the best performing Member States 
over recent years.36 In particular, recalling the social partners’ capacity to engage in this 
exercise could be a basis for implementing capacity-building for national social partners 
enshrined in the Quadripartite Declaration on a ‘New Start for Social Dialogue’,37 as well 
as a driver for implementing the coming European Pillar of Social Rights.
To a certain extent, the AGS 2017 could be considered a ¿ rst step to partially mitigating 
and reversing the policies implemented since 2008. Despite some positive changes and 
the fact that, generally speaking, the priorities the AGS put forward were more balanced 
than in the past, the narrative was still anchored in a general framework in which an 
alleged need for structural reforms, budgetary consolidation and attention to labour 
cost competitiveness still prevailed with regard to the social dimension.
Collective bargaining and wages are a clear example of this, depicted by the ETUC as 
‘schizophrenic’. In this respect, the improvements were self-evident compared with the 
previous years but, in global terms, there still were some causes for serious concern. 
The Commission indeed, probably for the ¿ rst time since the crisis, aɤ  rmed that ‘too 
modest wage developments’ can be counterproductive, leading to ‘weaker aggregate 
demand and growth’.38 This time the mantra ‘aligning wages with productivity’ was 
interpreted also in a direction that might lead to positive wage dynamics. In particular, 
it was stated that wage-setting systems – beyond being able to better respond to 
productivity changes over time – should ensure ‘real income increases’. Furthermore, 
the Commission highlighted that, when ¿ xing the minimum wage, a new element 
should be taken into consideration by governments and social partners, namely the 
impact on in-work poverty.
These references reÀ ected some of the ETUC’s top priorities, outlined in the document 
‘ETUC for Growth and Social Progress: Priorities for the Annual Growth Survey 2017’,39 
34. That exercise fed into the EMCO conclusions enshrined in the document ‘Key messages on successful 
involvement of Social Partners in national European Semester processes’. The text is available here: http://data.
consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14367-2016-INIT/en/pdf.
35. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/¿ les/2017-european-semester-annual-growth-survey_en_0.pdf
36. European Commission, Annual Growth Survey 2017, p. 11.
37. http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=15738&langId=en.
38. Idem.
39. The document was adopted by the ETUC executive committee on 11 October 2016 and can be found here: 
https://www.etuc.org/system/¿ les/eu_semester/¿ le/161011_etuc_priorities_on_the_ags_2017_en_adopted.
pdf
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which also represented the basis of the upcoming ETUC Campaign ‘Europe needs a 
pay rise’.40 The daily work of the ETUC staɣ  and aɤ  liates in structured talks with the 
Commission was ¿ nally delivering results. Some of the Commission’s policy priorities 
were – slowly – turning in the direction desired by the trade union movement.
Then Deputy General Secretary Veronica Nilsson hailed this new orientation and 
expressed the appreciation of the ETUC and its aɤ  liates for Commissioner Thyssen’s 
call for wage-setting to generate real income increases. She commented: 
Wage rises are crucial in increasing internal demand. Without more money in 
workers’ pockets, Europe will be unable to achieve a sustainable recovery.41 
However, many other ideological assumptions remained to counteract and limit the 
progress made. For instance, although decentralisation of collective bargaining was 
not addressed explicitly, the abovementioned positive aspects were counterbalanced 
by an insistence on the importance of having wage-formation systems able to ensure 
that diɣ erences in skills and economic performance across regions, sectors and 
companies are taken into account. This was another argument exhibiting a preference 
for fragmented collective bargaining systems. All this despite the seriousness of the 
social situation, which rather suggested a need to support or (re-)strengthen sectoral 
collective negotiations at national level; this powerful tool could have helped to quickly 
address the problem of income inequality. At the same time, the Commission was also 
backing state interventionism related to reforms of wage-formation systems.42 
Finally, regarding wages, the reference to wage developments that might lead to 
productivity erosion was strongly criticised by the ETUC and its aɤ  liates. Indeed, as 
has been proved several times, real wages have been lagging well behind productivity 
in all European countries for years and, taking into consideration the sharp fall of the 
wage share in GDP since the 1980s,43 the reasons for trade union disappointment and 
concern are self-evident. Once again, the European trade union movement, although 
recognising the improvements made, was forced to call for the Commission to step up 
eɣ orts and take more concrete actions toward the so-called ‘social triple A Europe’.
The situation did not change much with the 2017 Country Reports. The divergence of 
priorities and opinions between the two bodies drafting these documents – DG ECFIN 
(Economic and Financial Aɣ airs) and DG EMPL (Employment, Social Aɣ airs and 
Inclusion) – became even clearer than in the AGS 2017. More positively, it became self-
evident that DG Employment was gaining more ground in all the documents and, by 
doing so, was slowly rebalancing the European Semester, drawing greater attention to 
the social dimension of the economy. Some of the priorities presented by the ETUC and 
member organisations during the consultation meetings with the European Commission 
were taken into account. However, the necessary U-turn desired by the trade unions did 
40. For more information see the campaign website at: https://payrise.eu/
41. https://www.etuc.org/press/etuc-semester-package#.WbP-acirRdg
42. A fear that would have soon came true, for instance, in Belgium. For more details, see G. van Gyes and S. 
Vanderhercke in this volume.
43. See Figures 4 and 5 in this chapter.
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not materialise. The Country Reports touched upon collective bargaining systems in 
nine countries. This was mainly because the issue had been addressed extensively in 
previous years, and the Commission’s position in favour of decentralisation was still 
considered largely valid (we shall look at a number of examples shortly).44 
In Estonia the collective bargaining system, which in 2016 the Commission considered 
the most eɤ  cient in the EU because it had been completely decentralised, was just one 
year later accused of promoting too rapid wage growth.45 Nevertheless, no mention 
was made of the possibility of developing sectoral negotiations, which can help better 
manage wage dynamics. The same was true of Romania’s Country Report, but for 
diɣ erent reasons. Romania was described as suɣ ering from poverty and inequalities and 
collective bargaining should have been considered a factor in democracy building and 
the enhancement of wages and working conditions. However, the Commission made 
only a timid reference to the weakness of collective bargaining and social dialogue.46 
In Cyprus, despite the clear demands put forward by the unions about restoring and 
respecting collective bargaining and extending collective agreements, the Commission 
interfered again in the wage-setting mechanism, but more worryingly, also in the 
democratic process. It claimed only limited progress had been made with the binding 
mechanism restraining the growth rate of public employees’ wages and expressed 
disappointment because the legislative proposal designed to make this mechanism – 
introduced in collective agreements until 2018 – permanent had been ‘rejected by the 
House of Representatives’.47 
To a certain extent, the only ‘positive’ exception to the general picture was Lithuania. 
There, the Commission recalled that both trade unions and employers had raised 
concerns over the Labour Code reform. On this basis, the Commission then recognised 
that a more proactive involvement in the designing process on the part of the social 
partners would bene¿ t the eɣ ectiveness of such a reform. After the pressure exerted 
by the ETUC with regard to the demands of its Lithuanian aɤ  liates, the Commission 
successfully persuaded the government to reopen talks with the social partners and the 
new reform was approved, containing a number of amendments proposed by the social 
partners themselves.
Regarding wages, the narrative remained more or less the same. Despite the need to 
boost domestic demand, pay rises were neither encouraged nor welcomed, with a few 
exceptions,48 where wage increases were considered acceptable and even desirable by 
the Commission, as in line with macroeconomic fundamentals. More concerning was 
the misreading of the minimum wage rises, notably in the eastern European Countries. 
The European Commission kept insisting on its ideological assumption that higher 
minimum wages may aɣ ect job creation and so encourage informal work or bogus self-
employment. The ETUC, on the other hand, asserted that the utmost attention should 
be paid to the negative social consequences of low incomes. For instance, again with 
44. See below for the cases of Belgium, France, Italy and Spain.
45. See Estonia’s 2016 and 2017 Country Reports.
46. See Romania’s 2017 Country Report.
47. See Cyprus’ 2017 Country Report.
48. Germany (see below) and the Netherlands.
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regard to Estonia – as EAKL had feared – the Commission expressed concern because 
the minimum wage was ‘increasing fast, outpacing overall wage growth over recent 
years’ because these ‘increases can have a signi¿ cant impact on the wage bill in the 
poorest regions’, despite the fact that the minimum wage stood at a mere 38 per cent 
of the average wage, one of the lowest levels in the EU. This is not only unacceptable 
for the trade unions and workers, but is detrimental to EU countries’ commitment to 
implement UN Sustainable Development Goal No. 10, which pledges to ‘progressively 
achieve and sustain income growth of the bottom 40 per cent of the population at a rate 
higher than the national average’ by 2030. The paradox is highly worrying, especially 
from a political point of view. The same failed austerity policies that have hindered 
Europe from making a more rapid, not to mention fairer economic recovery and which 
are one of the main instigations of the anti-EU right-wing populism emerging all over 
the continent are still reaɤ  rmed and recommended in too many Member States. 
The Country-Speci¿ c Recommendations in 2017 made further, if minor steps forward 
in the direction asked for by trade unions, but still were generally unsatisfactory. Once 
again, they were not pro-wage growth and failed to encourage collective bargaining. 
Wage growth was recommended in a few countries with an excessive surplus, such as 
Germany and the Netherlands. That was positive, but showed that governments still see 
wages as a factor in macroeconomic adjustment, while the ETUC sees them as a driver 
of social justice and growth. In some countries, CSRs may ultimately be harmful for 
wage development due to the doubts raised about the eɤ  cacy of wage formation in the 
public sector (Cyprus, Romania and Croatia), the performance of statutory minimum 
wages across the economy (as in Portugal) or labour cost trends (as in Finland and 
Estonia). This applies to countries in which the purchasing power of wage earners has 
diminished and wages have underperformed productivity gains in recent decades. 
The reference to transparency in minimum wage–setting mechanisms in Bulgaria and 
Romania was welcome. Transparency in minimum wage setting appeared in several 
country reports but only two countries received a recommendation. However, some 
progress can be discerned in the fact that recommendations to redesign minimum wage 
settings cited the need to involve social partners. 
On collective bargaining, an improvement on the previous cycle was that this time the 
governments showed considerable self-restraint with regard to intervening in collective 
bargaining arrangements. But in countries such as Spain, Romania and Portugal, CSRs 
(even without directly referring to it) harmed the autonomous deployment of industrial 
relations institutions. 
To sum up, one can say that, while the EU economy is recovering, collectively agreed 
wages do not reÀ ect the positive economic outlook. Reduced employment protections 
are one reason why collectively agreed wages are underperforming and inÀ ation is 
on the rise again. Having said that, it is crystal clear that CSRs in 2017 have failed to 
capitalise on the potential for coordinated and multiemployer collective bargaining 
to boost internal demand, on one hand, and to tackle inequality and reinstate social 
justice, on the other.
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If the EU’s ambitions were to achieve ‘structural reforms … to foster social justice, 
mitigate income inequalities and support convergence towards better outcomes’ and 
that ‘social priorities and consequences [had to] be taken into account when designing 
and implementing the reform agenda’, the results of the 2017 cycle have been very 
modest and often very negative to workers. Changes are urgently needed to bring social 
progress to the forefront and become a driver for policies that can improve the quality 
of work and living conditions all over Europe. Positive wage dynamics enabling upward 
wage convergence are necessary both for stimulating the European economy and for 
rebuilding a fairer society. 
4.2  A closer look at the ‘DECOBA countries’
So far, we have looked at the general picture. In this section the analysis will focus 
closely on the ¿ ve countries that comprise this project: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy 
and Spain. In particular, we will see whether and how the collective bargaining and 
wage dynamics policies recommended by the European Commission evolved over the 
period of study. 
Belgium
Belgium has long been one of the Commission’s favourite targets when it comes to 
collective bargaining and wages. Its centralised system of sectoral negotiations has been 
considered a threat to the country’s productivity. According to the Commission this 
is evident from comparing productivity and labour cost trends with neighbouring and 
partner countries, notably Germany. 
In the preamble of the 2015 CSR, the Commission states ‘there is a need to align wage 
growth more closely with productivity and to make wage setting more À exible so as to 
increase the economy’s potential for adjustment … closing the gap entirely will require 
additional action which hinges on reforms of the wage-setting system’. However, 
the CSR asked that this be delivered ‘in consultation with the social partners and in 
accordance with national practices’. 
In 2016 the Commission expressed its intention to release fewer, shorter and more 
focused Country-Speci¿ c Recommendations.49 In the Belgian case, the result was that 
only a few of the previous year’s measures were mentioned, but this was enough to let 
the recipient understand that wage formation reform was still on the agenda: ‘Ensure 
that wages can evolve in line with productivity.’ 
In 2017 no such recommendation was made. Indeed, in this year’s Country Report for 
Belgium the Commission celebrated the long-awaited – or, better, long-recommended 
– reform of collective bargaining. After years of sustained attacks and despite the 
strong opposition of the Belgian unions, the government imposed such a reform. The 
new wage-setting framework has narrowed the room for negotiations between social 
49. However, as many practitioners have aɤ  rmed, while the number of recommendations has been reduced, they 
have become longer, generally by condensing more policy measures in each recommendation.
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partners and granted the government the possibility to take corrective measures in 
order to ¿ x detrimental cost-competitiveness developments.50 
This happened despite that fact that, according to the ETUC’s own calculations within 
the framework of the campaign ‘Europe needs a pay rise’,51 as well as those provided by 
the three Belgian trade union organisations (for the ETUC report on trade union inputs 
for Country Reports 201652), it is not correct in aɤ  rming that wage growth would have 
outpaced productivity gains, in either in the long run or the short.
France 
France has proceeded along almost the same path as Belgium. Wage dynamics were 
assessed as producing negative eɣ ects on the country’s competitiveness, notably – 
again – compared with Germany, and the wage moderation policy applied in 2015 was 
considered insuɤ  cient to compensate these trends. Also, questions have been raised 
about both its collective bargaining system and the SMIC53 for years. In particular, the 
Commission considered its system of collective bargaining to be ineɤ  cient due to its 
presumed rigidity, which did not allow ¿ rm-level collective bargaining to À ourish. It 
then asked for a reform that would have permitted a wider use of derogations from 
sectoral collective agreements. 
The 2015 CSR contained the following: ‘Reform, in consultation with the social partners 
and in accordance with national practices, the wage-setting system to ensure that wages 
evolve in line with productivity. Ensure that minimum wage developments are consistent 
with the objectives of promoting employment and competitiveness.’ A year later the 
CSR on wage-setting reform disappeared as the French government was undertaking 
a reform meant to ease the derogations from sectoral collective bargaining.54 It was 
due to be approved in the second half of the year. Some time later, the 2017 Country 
Report welcomed the adoption of the labour reform but recognised that its eɣ ects would 
depend on the use the social partners make of it. This is of particular signi¿ cance for 
the trade unions. It clearly proves that the European Commission implicitly recognises 
what the ETUC has said several times: the social partners are best placed to decide for 
themselves the appropriate level of collective bargaining and what to negotiate at the 
diɣ erent levels. Therefore, it is necessary that their autonomy be respected.
In 2016, the recommendation on the SMIC was still in place (‘Ensure that the labour 
cost reductions are sustained and that minimum wage developments are consistent 
with job creation and competitiveness’), but ¿ nally removed in 2017. The reason for 
this change is very likely that the French minimum wage – also recognised in the same 
Country Report – represents a tool that eɣ ectively tackles in-work poverty. It is indeed 
one of the very few that stands at 60 per cent of the national average wage, a benchmark 
often used also by the trade unions as a minimum living wage.55 
50. For more details, see G. van Gyes in this book.
51. See the related website at https://payrise.eu/
52. Available here: https://www.etuc.org/system/¿ les/eu_semester/¿ le/etuc_report_on_trade_unions_inputs_
for_country_reports_2016_en.pdf.
53. Salaire Minimum Interprofessionnel de Croissance; in other words, the French minimum wage.
54. For more details, see Rehfeldt and Vincent in this book.
55. For instance, see the ETUC Resolution on low and minimum wages, available here: https://www.etuc.org/
documents/etuc-resolution-common-strategy-low-and-minimum-wages#.WcghvMirRdg.
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Germany 
The German case is very interesting. Germany is the only country – of those analysed 
in this project – whose wage moderation policy has been repeatedly challenged by the 
Commission on the grounds that wages need to increase faster. This is particularly 
true because Germany’s wage moderation policy has had an adverse eɣ ect on the 
competitiveness – in particular, in terms of labour costs – of neighbouring countries 
In 2016, the Commission limited itself to noting that wages were rising less than 
economic fundamentals might lead one to expect, but no recommendation was issued. 
This policy was consistent with Germany’s export-driven economy. The Country Report 
read as follows: ‘over the whole period (2000–2015), the growth rate of wages (both 
in nominal and real terms) undershot the euro area average’, as shown by Figure 3 
(European Commission). 
However, in the same year, the general analysis also highlighted that Europe’s fragile 
recovery was due mainly to domestic factors, especially consumption and the rise of 
positive wage dynamics. In 2017, therefore, the wage narrative has suddenly changed, 
at least for Germany. The Country Report explicitly said that ‘the social partners do 
not appear to be making full use of the existing scope for sustained wage increases’.56 
Moreover, with this analysis the Commission indirectly57 admitted also that the German 
wage moderation policy has been producing spillover eɣ ects in the euro area in recent 
years. This has aɣ ected particularly Belgium’s and France’s cost competitiveness 
(especially labour costs).
By contrast, the German collective bargaining model was not challenged over the period 
in question. The reasons can be found in the features and trends characterising the 
German collective bargaining system deeply analysed by Schulten and Bispinck in this 
book. 
Italy
The 2015 CSR demanded a reform aimed at fostering company-level bargaining, 
recommending that Germany ‘establish, in consultation with the social partners and in 
accordance with national practices, an eɣ ective framework for second-level contractual 
bargaining’.58 
One year later, Italy’s Country Report kept stressing that the Italian collective bargaining 
system was still ineɤ  cient, not providing enough room for ¿ rm-level bargaining (and 
use of derogations from sectoral collective agreements). Nevertheless, subsequent 
waves of CSR did not address collective bargaining. The reform remains a highly 
sensitive open issue and is mentioned in the preamble but the reference to the role of 
the social partners did not encourage unilateral intervention by the government. This 
happened thanks to the platform for autonomous reform of collective bargaining and 
56. European Commission, Germany’s Country report 2017, p. 5.
57.  Indirectly because this is what can be obtained by reading between the lines of Belgium’s and France’s Country 
Reports.
58. As explained in the chapter on Italy in this book, a law enabling ¿ rm- and local-level collective bargaining has 
already been in place in Italy since 2011 (Law 148/2011, Art. 8) but the social partners agreed not to make use of 
it as it was imposed by the government.
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industrial relations put forward by CGIL, CISL and UIL, the three main Italian trade 
union confederations. Such a proposal had already been signed oɣ  by some employers’ 
organisations and was under discussion with Con¿ ndustria and the government itself. 
In Italy, the outstanding reform of the collective bargaining system is not the object of a 
speci¿ c recommendation, but is mentioned in the preamble. The preamble mentions the 
need to move on with the consensus of the social partners and improves on the National 
Reform Programme in which the government envisaged unilateral intervention.
In the 2017 Country Report, the Commission complained that the inter-confederal 
agreement on trade union representativeness and collective bargaining was not yet 
operational. It also stressed that – despite the ¿ scal incentives granted by central 
government, notably in terms of tax reductions for occupational welfare – ¿ rm-level 
bargaining was still not picking up. This translated into a recommendation requiring 
that Italy ‘strengthen the collective bargaining framework to allow collective agreements 
to better take into account local conditions’, with the involvement of the social partners 
themselves. 
The wording has been changed slightly and the role of the social partners is 
acknowledged. However, the Commission keeps promoting state interventionism and 
interference in a domain that should be reserved to the autonomy of the social partners. 
This interference is intended to promote a reform of the collective bargaining system 
toward decentralisation, without taking into account the position of the social partners, 
and especially of the trade unions. 
Figure 3 Nominal and real wages (annual average growth, %)
Source: European Commission, Germany’s Country Reports 2016.
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Spain
In 2015 the Commission recommended that the Spanish government promote the 
alignment of wages and productivity. Again, in other words, it suggested fostering 
decentralised collective bargaining. 
Despite its acknowledgment of the extremely worrying social situation, the 2016 
Country Report kept insisting on this. The Spanish collective bargaining model was still 
considered ineɤ  cient because it was too ‘rigid’ – as in the case of Belgium, France and 
Italy. While wages were considered to be moving in line with the country’s economic 
performance, they were rising  less than they could have done compared with GDP and 
productivity growth. This time, however, there was no recommendation related to the 
mantra of aligning wages to productivity in the following round of CSR. 
In the 2017 Country Report, the European Commission has again addressed the issue 
and expressed disappointment because ¿ rm-level negotiations have not picked up 
despite the recent reforms. However, this did not take into consideration the leeway 
with regard to unilateral modi¿ cation in terms of pay and working time granted to the 
employers. As the Spanish author complains (in this volume), this was mainly due to 
the fact that these unilateral modi¿ cations are not subject to registration by the labour 
authority.59
5.  Summary and conclusions
Having examined the European Semester cycles from 2014 to 2017, it is now time to 
draw some conclusions. The positive change in the Commission’s narrative and the 
greater attention paid to the social dimension of the economy60 and the involvement 
of social partners in decision-making61 – at least at EU level – cannot be denied.62 This 
is clearly the result of the strong commitment of President Juncker to recovering the 
original values of the European social model. Nevertheless, the road ahead toward a 
‘triple A Social Europe’ is still long. The Spanish case represents a clear example of trade 
union disillusionment. The ETUC and its Spanish member organisations had welcomed 
the Country Report’s analysis of the negative impact of high rates of precariousness 
in the labour market but this did not translate into an appropriate policy response 
when it came to the recommendations. Here, measures to ‘promote hiring on open-
ended contracts’ imply the removal of ‘uncertainty in case of legal dispute following a 
dismissal, along with comparatively high severance payments for workers on permanent 
contracts’.63 
59. For a deeper analysis of this worrying problem, see Rocha in this book.
60. This is the case, for instance, with regard to those recommendations aimed at ¿ ghting undeclared work in 
Portugal and Romania.
61. For instance, Annual Growth Survey 2018, p. 9: ‘Social partners are essential stakeholders in the reform 
process. The timely and meaningful involvement of social partners in the design, sequencing and 
implementation of reforms can improve ownership, impact and delivery.’
62. This is the case, for instance, with regard to those recommendations aimed at ¿ ghting undeclared work in 
Portugal and Romania.
63. Spain’s Country Speci¿ c Recommendations 2017.
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The troubled path to the ‘social triple A’ is even clearer when it comes to collective 
bargaining and wages, particularly with regard to the ¿ ve countries analysed here. One 
can easily see how intensively the European Semester has insisted on reforming wage 
formation systems by fostering the trend toward decentralisation. Germany may be an 
exception in that it did not receive such recommendations over the period in question. 
However, this can be ascribed to the fact that its system was already characterised by 
decentralisation and fragmentation. Italy is the only country in which national sectoral 
bargaining is still under attack, whereas with regard to Belgium, France and Spain, the 
Commission dropped the relevant recommendations once reforms were implemented. 
However, in these four countries the Commission is still complaining because ¿ rm-level 
bargaining is – surprisingly in its view – not taking oɣ . In fact, this is happening for a 
reason, as the unions have tried to explain. Indeed, in economies dominated by small 
and medium-sized enterprises, the demand for decentralisation of collective bargaining 
to make it more responsive to quickly changing business needs is ideological. SMEs 
rarely have the capacity and skills to negotiate collective agreements. For them company 
bargaining represents a cost and impediment. By contrast, sectoral bargaining is a tool 
for setting wage levels and preventing unfair competition. Moreover, the Commission 
has also admitted that social partners make poor use of derogations even when they are 
allowed to. As stated by the ETUC on many occasions, this is not surprising. The social 
partners are indeed best placed to decide what to negotiate about and at what level. 
This is why institutions should stop unwanted interference in free collective bargaining. 
Another paradox in the Commission’s narrative is the predictability of wage dynamics. 
As previously noted, at one point the European Commission considered the Estonian 
bargaining system to be the most eɤ  cient as it was totally decentralised. Some months 
later it complained that negotiated pay rises were not responsive to productivity and 
economic performance. Again, sectoral collective bargaining is an example of how 
unions and businesses can be responsible macroeconomic actors. This testi¿ es once 
again that strong social partners represent added value for the economy and society as a 
whole. Even the Commission itself acknowledged this recently.64 Nevertheless, concrete 
support for strengthening national sectoral collective bargaining, where necessary, has 
not yet been forthcoming. 
In addition, it is worth stressing the inconsistency between the Commission’s analysis 
and the policies it recommends. In countries with outstanding problems of income 
inequality, national sectoral bargaining is the most eɤ  cient instrument for a rapid 
redistribution of wealth, especially after more than 30 years of a constantly falling wage 
share, as shown in Figure 4. 
This situation particularly aɣ ects countries that have been under Troika programmes 
(Ireland, Spain, Portugal) and in many central and eastern European countries, but it 
64. See, for example, European Commission, DG Employment, ‘Industrial Relations in Europe 2014’. The foreword 
by Commissioner Thyssen reads as follows: ‘As in previous years, the verdict (…) is unambiguous: countries 
with strong social dialogue institutions are among the EU’s best performing and most competitive economies, 
with a better and more resilient social situation. Social partners can identify balanced and tailor-made policy 
solutions in response to complex socio-economic developments.’ This assumption is repeated further in the text. 
The report is available here: http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=13500&langId=en.
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also aɣ ects western European members of the euro area (Austria, Belgium, Germany 
and the Netherlands), as can be seen from Figure 5.
At least concerning wages – and social policies in general – such a situation seems to 
be positively evolving, looking at the general narrative of the 2018 Autumn Package.65 
Here, social progress comprises the distributional eɣ ects of reforms and upward 
convergence in working and living conditions. In particular, both the AGS and JER 
came closer to the ETUC position on wage policy. The AGS aɤ  rms that ‘growth in real 
wages, as a result of increased productivity, is crucial to reduce inequalities and ensure 
high standards of living. More dynamic wage developments, when translated into 
greater domestic demand, would support further the ongoing economic expansion.’66 
The JER (¿ nally) acknowledged that ‘wage growth remains subdued in most countries. 
(…) In addition, in the period 2014 to 2016, real wage growth lagged behind productivity 
growth. This is a long-term trend: in the EU, from 2000 to 2016, real productivity per 
person employed grew by 14.3 per cent, while real compensation per employee grew 
by 10.2 per cent.’67 The Commission attributes this to the remaining slack in the labour 
65. This was published on 22 November 2017 and can be found here: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-
euro/economic-and-¿ scal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/
european-semester/european-semester-timeline/setting-priorities_en.
66. Annual Growth Survey 2018, p. 10.
67. Draft Joint Employment Report 2018, p. 8.
Figure 4 Changes in the wage share in Europe, 1960–2016
Source: Ameco. 
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market, weak productivity growth and low inÀ ation expectations. However, what they 
do not mention is that, again, this is often because trade union power has been eroded 
or restrained by recent reforms in many countries, collective bargaining has been 
weakened or dismantled at the multi-employer level or, as in the case of the public 
sector, because wages have been cut or frozen and collective agreements have not been 
renewed for years.
It may be argued that if unions and/or employers’ organisations are weak or not 
representative enough to negotiate wage increases and conclude sectoral agreements, 
this is not the fault of the European Commission or of governments. This is not completely 
true. Collective bargaining, and social dialogue in general, needs a supportive framework 
– either legal or institutional – enabling social partners’ negotiations. This is of course in 
place in those Member States with strong industrial relations traditions, but is missing 
or has been dismantled due to recent reforms in many others. As well explained by 
ETUC General Secretary Luca Visentini – in his speech given at the conference ‘End 
Corporate Greed. Europe – and the world – needs a pay rise’, ‘without such frameworks, 
we will never be able to address the gap in wages and working conditions between 
Western and Eastern Europe, nor social dumping’.68 Thus, the ETUC, via its pay rise 
campaign, is spreading the key message that Europe needs wage increases achieved 
through collective bargaining, notably national sectoral negotiations.
68. The complete speech can be found on the ETUC website.
Figure 5 Declining labour shares in the EU, 1995–2014 (percentage points)
Note: See also R. Janssen, Why pay rises are a plus for the economy, academic paper developed for the ETUC 
campaign ‘Europe needs a pay rise’, available here: https://payrise.eu/get-the-facts/.
Source: OECD ECO Working Paper 2017/5.
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The European trade union movement has expressed appreciation for the eɣ orts so far 
on the part of the Commission69 to put social policies back at the top of the political 
agenda, but it is high time that something was delivered. The trade unions are strongly 
committed and supportive with regard to the social initiatives that will be further 
developed in the coming months by the EU institutions, notably the European Pillar of 
Social Rights70 and related legislative initiatives.71
For too long policymakers have overlooked the vital functions of collective bargaining, 
especially at national sectoral level. In this perspective the European Pillar of Social 
Rights is an unprecedented occasion to ¿ nally reverse this trend and create upward 
social convergence across the EU Member States. The 20 principles put forward by 
the Commission clearly indicate the role the social partners may (and have to) play in 
eɣ ective implementation via social dialogue and collective bargaining. The Commission 
promised that the 2018 cycle will be the ¿ rst round of the new ‘social semester’, which 
is intended to launch implementation of the 20 principles. As recognised by the 
ETUC,72 the Autumn Package represents a ¿ rst step in the right direction. However, the 
expectations of the European trade union movement are high. In the ETUC’s view, the 
EPSR – in order to be eɣ ective – should help to better shape future Semester cycles. The 
way forward to rebalancing economic governance by strengthening its social dimension 
– that is, making it an economic and social governance – is to increase the value attached 
to the JER and the social scoreboard.73 They are in fact the two main tools through 
which the EPSR is expected to be implemented. The hope is that the JER (along with the 
social scoreboard) can be put on the same level as the AMR (and its MIP scoreboard) so 
to drive more socially-oriented policies. Of course, this is clearly a political decision by 
European leaders to show that they are willing to put their ¿ ne words into practice. The 
ETUC’s ambition is to see CSRs demand the implementation of EPSR principles and 
thereby to improve the grave social situation in which the EU ¿ nds itself. 
However, for this to happen, the following conditions must be met. First, governments 
should agree to receive more CSRs, if necessary. Streamlining and reducing the number 
of CSRs can no longer be acceptable if this would limit (or even exclude) the adoption 
69. The fact that the EMCO peer review of social partners’ involvement in the European semester is becoming a 
cyclical practice testi¿ es to such eɣ orts. A second exercise was held on Wednesday 22 November 2017, this 
time targeting 12 countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, France, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Spain and Romania. This multilateral surveillance is supposed to lead to CSRs to enhance the social 
partners’ involvement at national level in the milestones of the European semester for some countries with weak 
practices.
70. The formal proclamation of the Pillar by European governments took place at the Social Summit for Fair Jobs 
and Growth in Gothenburg (Sweden) on 17 November 2017.
71. Four pieces of legislation are currently under discussion at EU level: (i) the work–life balance directive; (ii) the 
written statement directive (now referred to as the ‘transparent and predictable working conditions directive’; 
(iii) revision of the posting of workers directive; and (iv) a Recommendation on universal access to social 
protection. The ¿ rst three initiatives are currently under negotiation in the trilogue (involving the Commission, 
Parliament and Council), while the proposal for a recommendation on social protection will be published on 
13 March 2018, together with the ‘Social Fairness Package’, including a proposal for a recommendation on a 
European social security number and a proposal for a regulation on the European Labour Authority.
72. For a complete evaluation of the Autumn Package see the ETUC position on the Broad Economic Guidelines 
for the European Semester cycle 2018, adopted at the Executive Committee on 13–14 December 2017, available 
here: https://www.etuc.org/documents/etuc-position-broad-economic-guidelines-european-semester-
cycle-2018#.Wo7QJqjtyUk.
73. For more details on the social scoreboard see https://composite-indicators.jrc.ec.europa.eu/social-scoreboard/.
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of social CSR.74 Secondly, putting social priorities at the same level as ¿ nancial and 
economic priorities entails two things: on one hand, to pay more attention to the social 
consequences of the latter, while, on the other hand, investing in social measures. 
Trade unions need to mobilise to make sure that these social reforms receive the 
necessary funding. Restricting the latter to the meagre resources available under the 
European funds would jeopardise the realisation of the ambitious objectives the EU has 
committed itself to.75 Member States have to dedicate a share of their own budgets to 
social measures. This implies that the Commission and Council guarantee enough ¿ scal 
À exibility to Member States so that they can undertake them properly. In a nutshell: 
allocating enough money to such social reforms will turn political commitments into 
concrete actions. 
Over the past decade, social policy has not been on policy-makers’ agenda and the few 
improvements recorded in recent years are still too meagre to alleviate the resentment 
and anti-European feeling that have grown among EU citizens across the continent. 
Reversing such disillusionment requires that all these social initiatives be delivered, 
bringing concrete bene¿ ts to workers and citizens. Europe ¿ nally has a chance to get 
back on track to progress toward the key objective of the European integration project: 
prosperity for all.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and outlook
More challenges and some opportunities for industrial 
relations in the European Union
Roberto Pedersini
1. Decentralisation and industrial relations
This book clearly shows that industrial relations in the European Union are experiencing 
important changes. The economic and ¿ nancial crisis, which hit the countries covered by 
our analysis with quite diɣ erent consequences in terms of growth and employment, had 
a signi¿ cant impact on collective bargaining. Particularly important in this respect was 
the role of governments, which increasingly and more incisively intervened to constrain 
the social partners’ autonomy. According to the classi¿ cation proposed by Bordogna 
and Cella (1999), this corresponds to the growing importance of ‘corrective’ initiatives, 
whereby governments steer industrial relations towards arrangements that they believe 
are more consistent with their policy objectives. Wage moderation and freezes imposed 
at cross-industry level in Belgium and the emphasis on decentralised bargaining in 
Spain, France and Italy are clear examples of this new attitude. The implications of 
the latter governments’ initiatives are that industrial relations and collective bargaining 
should renounce at least some of their concern with solidarity among all workers, 
as well as comprehensive standards of protection, and rather embrace more À exible 
regulatory arrangements, which allow for variation across ¿ rms, according to their 
speci¿ c organisational features, market position, competitiveness issues, and economic 
and ¿ nancial situation.
However, if the contribution of multi-employer collective agreements to de¿ ning the 
terms of employment is scaled down signi¿ cantly, the general legitimation of industrial 
relations may be eroded, since it also – perhaps mainly – derives from the capacity to 
extend inclusive protection and realise tangible improvements in economic and working 
conditions on a broad front. Indeed, following Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick 
(2013), this inclusiveness is the really distinctive feature of trade union action and 
the original hallmark of industrial relations. Trade unions – and usually employers’ 
associations, too – need more solidarity rather than less to develop their role and 
relevance in the regulation of the employment relationship. Otherwise, decentralisation 
and segmentation of protection may be accompanied by decreasing bargaining coverage 
and possibly the emergence of particularistic representation, which would contradict 
the essence of much of the European trade union tradition.
The German experience of opening clauses provides an example of the capacity 
of the social partners to accommodate increasing demands for broader leeway at 
decentralised level to adapt to local conditions, while keeping the overall system under 
close scrutiny and supervision. The À ip side of this is that such a system could not halt 
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the ongoing decline in union density and collective bargaining coverage, even in the 
traditional strongholds of industrial relations. More generally, our country case studies 
provide clear evidence that trade unions and employers alike are seeking new ways to 
express their autonomy in regulating employment, despite the restrictions imposed by 
governments. And they often do it together, thereby con¿ rming the viability and mutual 
bene¿ ts of joint regulation and in particular of collective bargaining.
2.  The role of employers in institutional change
The ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach (Hall and Soskice 2001) assumes that industrial 
relations institutions constitute an asset in coordinated market economies, so that 
employers will try to protect and even strengthen them. In this view, the main bene¿ ts 
that industrial relations bring to employers are wage moderation and coordination at 
national level, which help to avoid inÀ ationary pressures, as well as labour–management 
cooperation and mutual trust at the workplace level. This fosters adaptation and 
internal À exibility, commitment, incremental organisational improvements and 
quality enhancement. Moreover, strong collective representation of employers can 
promote inter-¿ rm cooperation and the production of collective goods, such as higher 
investments in worker skills, and facilitate partnerships and collaboration in developing 
and implementing innovation.
This analysis has been challenged on many grounds, including for the dichotomous 
nature of the typology of capitalism – which excessively constrains the variety of 
institutional arrangements – and the emphasis on complementarity, which privileges 
‘pure’ systems and somehow disregards ‘mixed’ con¿ gurations (Amable 2003; Hancké, 
Rhodes and Thatcher 2007; Burroni 2016). Importantly, mainstream analysis of the 
varieties of capitalism has been criticised for providing a unitary picture of national 
production systems, whereas a broad variety of competitive strategies can be found in any 
country (Berger 2006). Moreover, the focus on the national level fails to detect internal 
diɣ erences and the emergence of signi¿ cant forms of dualisation or segmentation of 
protection levels, including in the ¿ eld of industrial relations (Palier and Thelen 2010; 
Thelen 2014). Additionally, the emphasis on institutions and their stability downplays 
agency and the possibility that economic actors may transform the role of certain 
institutional tools to better serve their interests, for example, by exploiting the changing 
balance of bargaining power (Baccaro and Howell 2017). In this way, institutions that 
were created to represent and protect workers may be turned to the bene¿ t of company 
interests and to re-stablish managerial prerogatives.
Despite the various weaknesses highlighted in the abovementioned literature, a 
substantial merit of the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach is to draw the attention of 
scholars and practitioners to ¿ rms and employers, as well as to the bene¿ ts that joint 
regulation can bring them. These include not only the institutionalisation of conÀ ict 
and the containment of competition based on labour costs within the framework of 
multi-employer bargaining (Sisson 1987) – both fairly important objectives – but also 
the provision of speci¿ c resources that can support their competitive strategies. Indeed, 
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industrial relations institutions can represent an asset and contribute to shaping 
competitiveness. The stability and development of industrial relations practices are, in 
fact, dependent on the commitment of employers, especially when the strength of trade 
unions and the support of the public regulators are declining, as at the present juncture.
In these circumstances, it is true that industrial relations institutions may become 
more prone to ‘capture’ by employers’ interests, as claimed by the ‘neoliberal trajectory’ 
hypothesis (Baccaro and Howell 2011, 2017). The procedural justice embodied in 
collective bargaining processes could provide employers with superior arrangements 
than unilateralism, because it would also legitimise their interests and therefore 
strengthen their strategies. However, it must be underlined that institutional continuity 
also preserves the potential for protecting workers, should the balance of power and 
interests change again. ‘Institutional conversion’ may in fact be better than ‘institutional 
demise’ and could even be regarded as a possible outcome of the bargaining game. 
This may not be so diɣ erent from concession bargaining, which can be reversed, as the 
conditions for the assertion of workers’ interests are re-established. Shifting attention 
from the institutional framework to its performance certainly helps signi¿ cantly to 
properly assess the role of industrial relations in speci¿ c situations. But performance 
can change and awareness of it can help the actors to adjust their strategies and rede¿ ne 
their objectives.
3.  Industrial relations trajectories between ‘loyalty’ and ‘exit’
A remarkable piece of evidence provided by our study is the lack of outright examples of 
employers’ defection. Despite the increased possibilities (and even instances) of exit, this 
strategy has not become a predominant choice. Along the vertical axis of coordination, 
decentralisation has been promoted in many ways in recent years, but there is no 
clear evidence of a signi¿ cant shift in the bargaining structure towards the workplace, 
especially in terms of an increasing incidence of derogatory deals. In France, until 
the latest Macron ordonnances, the social partners have been fairly keen to maintain 
the overall coordinating role of sectoral agreements and very few derogations were 
introduced, even when speci¿ c legislation allowed it. Similarly, in Spain, the coverage of 
decentralised bargaining has remained stable and there are important examples of the 
social partners reasserting and even strengthening bargaining coordination at industry-
wide level, as in the case of the metalworking sector. In Italy, the legislation enacted in 
the summer of 2011, which introduced the possibility of ‘disorganised decentralisation’, 
has been used rarely and with great caution. In particular, the major national social 
partners soon thereafter completed a formal framework for ¿ rmly coordinating second-
level agreements. In Belgium, the possible enhancement of the role of decentralised 
bargaining seems a response to the constraints introduced by the government, with a 
view to regaining the room for manoeuvre that legislative reforms reduced. Therefore, it 
is more a result of the dynamism of industrial relations than a sign of their weakening. 
In Germany, in the core manufacturing sectors, opening clauses now seem to be an 
established norm, embedded in a strong and well-functioning coordinating framework, 
in which sectoral social partners have a key role.
Roberto Pedersini
294  Multi-employer bargaining under pressure – Decentralisation trends in ﬁ ve European countries
Interestingly, our cases show that the attachment to sectoral bargaining is particularly 
widespread among SMEs, probably because of the bene¿ ts of standardisation, such as 
transaction cost savings, combined with reduced distributional conÀ ict at the workplace 
level. In addition, SMEs often need less formal work À exibility and ‘customised rules’ 
than larger enterprises, thanks to more direct and intensive personal relations. 
Therefore, strengthening decentralised bargaining may be less important for SMEs. 
Indeed, this may help to explain why, in countries where the role of SMEs is particularly 
important – such as Italy and Spain – eɣ orts to expand the coverage of second-level 
bargaining often achieve little.
It is true that we are not able to observe the full picture. We do not know whether, 
outside the perimeter covered by the major social partners, collective relations are 
losing ground. We have no indications, for instance, about the use of reinforced 
managerial prerogatives by Spanish employers, or of the impact of the increased scope 
for derogatory deals in France, Italy and Spain on the bargaining power at workplace 
level, and therefore on the content of actual deals. Concession bargaining may be 
increasing or is the ‘gatekeeper’ role assigned to trade unions instead fostering the 
conclusion of mutual-bene¿ t agreements? The erosion of collective bargaining coverage 
that we observe in Germany may suggest that, in fact, the main challenges do not come 
from decentralisation, but rather from de-collectivisation. The shift to second-level 
bargaining, including with broader room for derogations, may not threaten the role 
of multi-employer agreements, but it may not be enough to stop the erosion of the 
relevance of collective bargaining overall.
There are indeed some signs that the real threats to the current European collective 
bargaining systems may come from the weakening of horizontal coordination rather 
than from ‘disorganised’ vertical decentralisation. Taking inspiration from Hirschman’s 
work (Hirschman 1970), if ‘loyalty’ seems the prevalent response on the part of the 
core employers of established sectoral industrial relations, ‘exit’ may emerge as an 
appealing option for more peripheral industry actors. Moreover, in the case of low 
unionised sectors, the real challenge is how to extend collective employment relations 
and collective bargaining to new areas.
4.  The challenge of dualisation: is collective autonomy 
self-suffi  cient?
Dualisation and segmentation are found in many economic and employment 
systems and they represent a current trend that could be reinforced in the near 
future (Emmenegger et al. 2012). Although this was not the focus of our analysis, 
we encountered some signi¿ cant instances of this emergent feature. Even the highly 
regulated and coordinated Belgian system shows some elements of regime shopping 
between diɣ erent joint committees, where the shift between them can represent 
an answer to growing competitive pressures. Similarly, in Italy the increase in the 
number of sectoral agreements registered at the National Council of the Economy and 
Labour (CNEL) is perceived by the social partners as a source of potential ‘contractual 
dumping’, which can endanger worker protections, as well as fair competition. Indeed, 
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the number of registered industry-wide agreements more than doubled between 2008 
and 2017 from around 400 to 868 in September 2017. Germany is often regarded as 
an example of dualisation, including in the ¿ eld of industrial relations, as shown by 
the data on sectoral collective bargaining coverage. The point here is whether and how 
it is possible to address segmentation and extend the reach of industrial relations and 
collective bargaining and strengthen horizontal coordination.
The traditional solutions from within the industrial relations systems essentially rely 
on organisational resources, such as the monopoly of representation and the leadership 
of certain sectors in pattern bargaining. But these are scarcely available nowadays, 
in open and diversi¿ ed economies. Indeed, the autonomous regulatory capacity of 
social partners may not be suɤ  cient to avoid defections and the fragmentation of the 
bargaining system. The social partners seem to be aware of such limitations and are 
open to accepting – or even asking for – legislative interventions on matters with regard 
to which they were previously keen to maintain autonomy.
This is the case, for instance, of Italy, where employers have started to recognise 
the importance of introducing formal representativeness criteria for employers’ 
associations, as a means to stop the proliferation of sectoral agreements and avoid 
‘contractual dumping’ by alternative sectoral deals signed by organisations expressly 
established to undercut collectively agreed economic and working conditions (so-called 
‘pirate agreements’). Given the problem of enforcement in this ¿ eld, the social partners 
are increasingly open to letting the area of representation be regulated by legislation, 
something they have traditionally opposed. Such developments may even lead to 
the implementation of the erga omnes clause included in the Italian Constitution, 
which has remained unimplemented for 70 years, because the social partners did not 
support it. A similar shift in the social partners’ orientation away from the rejection 
of legislative intervention can be found in the introduction of a statutory minimum 
wage in Germany. Clearly, the social partners may be in favour of legal regulation in 
the ¿ eld of representation and collective bargaining if these are supportive of their role 
and autonomy. The Italian social partners may thus welcome legislation embodying 
the representativeness rules they jointly agreed and German employer associations and 
trade unions are happy with a system that recognises their role in de¿ ning the statutory 
minimum wage and takes into consideration developments in collectively agreed pay.
In other words, addressing the challenge of dualisation and dwindling horizontal 
coordination would require a signi¿ cant change in the nature of recent government 
initiatives in industrial relations: more supportive measures in place of corrective 
actions (more a case of ‘admission’ instead of correction, if we follow the analytical 
framework proposed by Bordogna and Cella 1999).
5.  Policymaking and social dialogue in a multi-level system: 
ﬁ nally establishing a link?
Our analysis suggests that, in the countries under investigation, employers and trade 
unions are willing and able to enforce the vertical coordination of collective bargaining, 
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even when legislative reforms weaken formal constraints, for instance and notably by 
abolishing or reverting the favourability principle. While it is not a general conclusion, it 
is reasonable to assume that this situation holds in countries in which industrial relations 
are similarly well established and the role of sectoral agreements is traditionally strong. 
This would apply to most continental western European countries.
Indeed, recent research on Ireland shows that sectoral coordination is viable also in 
the case of decentralised bargaining, if supportive institutions and industrial relations 
traditions are present, with the active backing of employers (Roche and Gormley 2017). 
Employers, in fact, are not keen to dismantle the collective bargaining machinery, which 
allows them to obtain À exibility and wage concessions and to maintain a collaborative 
relationship with trade unions. Although this seems to be an instance of institutional 
conversion and plasticity, collective bargaining institutions have remained in place and 
could be exploited in the workers’ interests ‘when unions regained enough con¿ dence 
and power to push for pay rises’ (Roche and Gormley 2017: 19).
Conversely, horizontal coordination seems more problematic because of the possible 
segmentation of the representational landscape, especially on the employers’ side and 
even within industries, and because of the broadening gap in protection levels across 
the diɣ erent segments of domestic economies. In this case, organisational resources 
and voluntarism may fall short. A statutory framework is probably needed and the main 
supportive tools in this ¿ eld would probably be extension mechanisms and income 
policies. However, they belong mainly to the past and have been weakened by recent 
reforms, except in the form of wage freezes and restraint. Governments have rather 
gone in the other direction, promoting broader diɣ erences within sectors and across 
industries. In fact, the decentralisation of collective bargaining and the reduced scope 
for extensions, which emerged during the crisis, are two means of achieving these goals 
(Marginson and Welz 2014; Marginson 2015).
The prospects of a renewed political initiative in support of inclusive industrial relations 
institutions are not very strong at present. But, as in the case of ‘plastic institutions’, a new 
cycle may emerge. Growing inequalities, compressed wages and fragile recovery suggest 
that some, at least moderate but generalised, income increases can meet the demands 
of a signi¿ cant share of the workforce in low-paid jobs, as well as support economic 
growth, through the expansionary impact on domestic demand. Industrial relations and 
collective bargaining could provide an appropriate framework for implementing such 
wage policies (OECD 2012), as they incorporate a structural link with competitiveness 
requirements by operating through labour–management agreements. Moreover, they 
can ensure broader protection of workers’ rights, which goes beyond their simple 
economic interests. However, pursuing collective goals requires social partners who 
are committed to representing broad interests and implementing inclusive deals. In 
this sense, preserving their constituencies and extending their reach to new areas of 
employment and the economy appear key components of any ‘new start for social 
dialogue’ at national level.
What is the role of the European Union in all this? Our study shows that the EU can 
and does play a fairly important role. The national level probably remains decisive for 
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actual developments and the key strategic interactions still take place in the domestic 
context. However, the constraints imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact, as well as 
the economic policies promoted by the European Union have a substantial impact on 
the content and framing of national-level developments. Of course, this is a two-sided 
relationship, between the supranational and national levels, and it is aɣ ected by EU and 
national developments alike.
In its early years after 2010, the European Semester had a role in the diɣ usion of 
initiatives aimed at increasing decentralisation and reducing the coordination capacity 
of national industrial relations systems, as illustrated by our country cases. This was part 
of the blueprint for structural reforms and was meant to strengthen the scope of market 
mechanisms, on the assumption that it would help speed up and reinforce recovery. 
This strategy achieved limited results and new tensions emerged. They included, on one 
hand, problems in ensuring eɣ ective coordination between the EU and national levels 
of policymaking and, on the other hand, de¿ ning the balance between economic and 
social goals and policies at EU level.
Importantly for our argument, in recent years EU initiatives have been reinforcing the 
emphasis on social partner involvement in policymaking at all levels. The new start 
for social dialogue launched in March 2015, the proclamation of the European Pillar 
of Social Rights in 2017 and the rebalancing of economic and social objectives in the 
European Semester all go in the direction of broadening the scope of social dialogue 
and industrial relations. They recognise the role of the social partners and provide 
topics on which bipartite and tripartite relations can develop at EU and – possibly more 
signi¿ cantly – at national level. Moreover, with a stronger emphasis compared with 
the past, the European Semester now requires the involvement of the social partners 
in policymaking at national level, which may constitute a small but important help in 
re-establishing social partnership in areas in which lately government unilateralism has 
usually prevailed.
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